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

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Contents

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ORIGINAL ARTICLE

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More than self-interest: Why different classes have different attitudes to income inequality

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Abstract

The connection between social class and political preferences is among the most well established in the social sciences. This association is typically taken as prima facie evidence of economic self-interest: Classes hold different attitudes, values, and party preferences because they have different economic interests. However, this assumption has rarely been tested empirically. In this article, we use survey data from 18 West European countries to examine why classes differ on a central aspect of political preferences, namely their views on the desirability of income inequality. We find that only a moderate proportion of differences between employee classes in support for redistribution can be accounted for by contemporary differences in resources and risks; differences in economic interests to some degree account for the anti-redistributive preferences of the professional middle classes compared with the working class. However, the preferences of the self-employed have a different explanation; autonomy is a better explanation of the right-wing preferences of the self-employed compared with the working class.

KEYWORDS

EGP, mechanisms, redistributive preferences, self-interest, social class

1. | INTRODUCTION

Discussions of class differences in political preferences have been extensive since the early days of social science. Class voting has received most attention, although studies of class differences in political attitudes, particularly those concerning inequality and redistribution, have also accumulated an extensive bibliography. This is no accident, as concern with inequality and redistribution typically lies at the heart of class politics, and conflict over inequality and its amelioration via redistribution has historically provided the axis of many Western party systems. Underpinning and perpetuating these party systems have been divisions between social classes supporting parties of the left and right. This pattern of class voting is typically assumed to derive from simple self-interest: as expressed through Lipset's (1960) influential assertion that "in virtually every economically developed country the lower income groups vote mainly for parties of the left." A view echoed recently in an extensive comparative analysis of class voting (Evans & de Graaf, 2013, p. viii), where it is assumed to result from "the rational expression of individual differences in (primarily) interests that cluster as a result of shared characteristics deriving from similar conditions of employment."

In short, working-class people tend to be poorer; left-wing parties espouse redistribution from rich to poor; therefore rational self-interest leads working-class people to vote for left-wing parties, and vice versa for the middle classes. However, despite the frequency with which this implicit chain of causation linking class position with differences in resources, attitudes towards redistribution and party choice is invoked, rigorous attempts to test it are noticeable for their absence. In this paper we examine the mechanisms that link class position to support for redistribution, using one of the recently developed mediation methodologies that allows us to disentangle their relative importance.

2. | WHY DOES CLASS AFFECT REDISTRIBUTIVE PREFERENCES?

The assumption that class voting occurs due to the classes' different economic ideologies or inequality preferences relies on there being a strong link between class and redistributive preferences. Such an association has indeed been extensively documented across Western democracies (e.g., Kalmijn & Kraaykamp, 2007, Knutsen, 2018, ch. 3, Langsæther & Stubager, 2019), such as Denmark (Stubager, 2006), the Netherlands (Van de Werfhorst & de Graaf, 2014), Sweden (Svallfors, 2006), the UK (Evans, 1993; Evans & Tilley, 2017), and the US (Shingles, 1989). However, much less is known about *why* this is the case: What explains the association between class and preferences for inequality?

As with class voting, the association between class and preferences regarding inequality has been assumed to follow neatly from material interests. As Sears and Funk (1991, p. 1) put it, "[s]elf-interest is never far from front stage when we consider the ordinary individual's social and political attitudes." Thus Svallfors (2006, p. 21) claims that the classes "obviously have an interest in increasing their resources and limiting their risks …. Different class interests are then one obvious source of variation in social attitudes." This is particularly likely to be true with respect to income inequality: people in classes who have higher incomes are likely to be less supportive of income redistribution than those on lower incomes. Accordingly, from the earliest research into class differences in attitudes onwards it has been assumed that, as Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee (1954, p. 184) assert, classes are typically opposed to each other on position issues related to economic interests, such as taxation, labor management, and tariffs, and this is motivated by "[s]elf-interest of a relatively direct kind." More recently, scholars such as Kalmijn and Kraaykamp (2007, p. 550) affirm that "the attitudes class members hold are a reflection of those [economic] interests," while Curtis and Andersen (2015, p. 5) claim that it is "widely accepted that self-interest plays an important role in determining preferences for inequality." That material interests and perceptions of risk create class differences in attitudes and behavior is the assumption of "virtually all established theorizing on class economic relations" (Brooks & Svallfors, 2010, p. 200).

Despite the prevalence of this perspective, however, very few studies have examined whether these economic interests actually do account for differences between classes, and the few that do so have been geographically limited to Scandinavia. Moreover, even this evidence is inconclusive. In his analysis of Swedish data, Svallfors (2006, pp. 94–95) finds that working conditions, income, financial problems, and unemployment account for only a small proportion of class differences in welfare spending preferences and that "almost all class differences remain after controlling for the other variables." Brooks and Svallfors's (2010) study of mechanisms connecting class and inequality attitudes in the Nordic countries finds that self-interest factors such as household income, unemployment experience, and household economic situation account for 26%–34% of the class differences. Finally, in their detailed study of class mechanisms in Sweden, Bengtsson, Berglund, and Oskarson (2013) find that class differences in left-right orientations are mediated to some extent by self-interest variables such as income and job security.

The relative scarcity and geographical specificity of studies testing this assumed causal chain is unfortunate, given that a model wherein class position shapes (primarily material) interests which then affect political preferences is implicit in a very large number of studies of the relationship between class and politics (examples beyond those discussed above include Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1960, ch. 13; Chan & Goldthorpe, 2007; Gallagher, Laver, & Mair, 2011, p. 284; Evans & Tilley, 2017, ch. 4). Our first aim in this paper, then, is to redress this omission in the understanding of class politics. We do this by examining the importance of economic self-interest for all Western European countries with respect to the area of political preference that is most likely to be affected by material interests, namely income inequality. We focus on the key area of programmatic and policy implementation addressing this concern: support for redistribution. We examine these attitudes because of their centrality to politics and their link to class differences in material interests and because unlike voting, say, for parties of the left or right, they are not restricted by the choice-set of options presented by the political parties. When parties do not offer significantly different choices to voters with respect to redistribution and inequality we would not expect classes to differ strongly in their vote. When inequality is depoliticized, class voting is less likely to be observed even when class differences in attitudes towards inequality and redistribution are robust (Evans & Tilley, 2012). The recent rise of radical right parties in Europe is also likely to have weakened the link between economic self-interest and party choice in some instances. Radical right parties typically mobilize support with anti-immigration stances rather than explicitly redistributive programs and as such appeal to a different set of class-related attitudes (Rydgren, 2013).

Our measure of class position is the Erikson and Goldthorpe occupational class schema (e.g. Erikson & Goldthorpe, 1992; Goldthorpe, 2000; Goldthorpe & McKnight, 2006). This is not only somewhat ubiquitous in stratification research but also benefits from detailed validation studies in which measures of occupational attributes such as employment conditions, promotion prospects, job uncertainty, and control over work have been shown to cluster into latent classes that correspond closely to the class categories in the schema (Evans & Mills 1998). The schema also has a clearly specified conceptual underpinning that evolved from a focus on work and market situations (Goldthorpe, 1980, p. 39) to the employment contracts that underlie the distribution of these attributes (Erikson & Goldthorpe, 1992; Goldthorpe, 2000). "Classes differ in sources and levels of income, their degree of economic security and chances of economic advancement … their location within systems of authority and control governing the process of production in which they are engaged, and their degree of autonomy in performing their work-tasks and roles" (Goldthorpe, 1980, p. 39) Goldthorpe went on to identify the reason for this differentiation, which lies in the nature of the employment contract. Employers prefer labor contracts for jobs that are easily monitored, and which do not require specialized knowledge or expertise, while in the opposite case they rely on a service contract or a mixed relationship. In other words, this has to do with the way in which commitment is obtained from the work-force.

The key features of employment contracts are their degree of "asset-specificity" and the degree of monitoring difficulty (Goldthorpe, 2000, p. 213). Employees with a "service" contract—typically in professional and managerial jobs—score highly in both these respects and exercise delegated authority with specialized knowledge

and expertise in the interest of their employing organization. Their commitment is bought via higher salaries and better prospects (Goldthorpe & McKnight, 2006). Their asset specificity also endows them with higher levels of autonomy in their work. Those on "labor" contracts—typically in working-class jobs—are more heavily monitored with consequently less autonomy and tend to provide discrete amounts of labor under closer supervision, as well as receive lower incomes and less job security. Class positions are therefore quite directly related to income, autonomy, and security. It is the influence of these mechanisms that we intend to examine in the analysis that follows. Working-class occupations have poorer working conditions, lower incomes and fewer opportunities and the working class are expected to find redistributive policies more appealing than those in more advantaged situations.

3. | UNDERSTANDING WHY THE PREFERENCES OF THE SELF-EMPLOYED DIFFER FROM THE WORKING CLASS

We further propose that the story of class differences in interests is not likely to be as simple as hitherto assumed, as it may vary according to the classes being considered. A key distinction is in how we might account for differences in attitudes between the middle class and the working class and the self-employed, or petite bourgeoisie, and the working class.

While professional and managerial classes have much higher and more stable incomes than the working class, the self-employed do not. In their study of the economic interests of classes, Goldthorpe and McKnight (2006, p. 21) claim that fluctuations in earnings are much higher among self-employed than among employees in general "as a direct consequence of the relations that characterize their class position." They also cite qualitative evidence that this economic uncertainty creates problems in both business planning and family budgeting. Moreover, the incomes of the self-employed are closer to those of the working class than to those of the service classes (Goldthorpe & McKnight, 2006, pp. 127–128), even when correcting for potential under-reporting of their income. Finally, while the self-employed have the lowest risk of unemployment (due to being their own employer), *underemployment* is another source of economic insecurity for this group (Goldthorpe & McKnight, 2006, p. 114). Despite these economic disadvantages the self-employed have consistently been found to be among the most economically right-wing citizens (e.g., Evans, 1993, p. 455; Jansen, 2011, pp. 104–105; Knutsen, 2018, p. 91; Svallfors, 2006, ch. 3–4; Van de Werfhorst & de Graaf, 2014) who tend to vote for right-wing parties (e.g., Bengtsson, Hansen, Hardarson, Narud, & Oscarsson, 2014, p. 159; Jansen, Evans, & De Graaf, 2013; Langsæther, 2019b, ch. 2). While this could be related to their opposition to labor regulations or employee rights, it is hard to find an economic interest basis for their support for income inequality. Previous studies have not considered this issue and have also tended to use composite measures of class differences (i.e., the kappa index—see Brooks & Svallfors, 2010) that do not distinguish how mechanisms might work differently for different classes. This leads then to our first hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1 *Economic interests can account for differences in support for redistribution between the middle and working classes, but are less likely to do so for differences between the self-employed and the workers.*

The similarity in economic situation between the self-employed and the working class suggests that we need to look at class differences outside of the realm of economic interests when trying to account for this axis of class political division. Key amongst these is work autonomy and control. According to Kohn (2001), people learn on the job and extend the lessons learnt to realities outside of work. Kohn focused on authoritarianism, showing that the degree to which someone is monitored does affect their level of authoritarianism (Kohn, 1969), a line of inquiry also considered by Bengtsson et al. (2013, p. 698). However, the argument can be generalized. We argue that people who experience autonomy in the workplace may have a more acute sense of the relationship between

decisions and outcomes than employees with low levels of autonomy. Generalizing from this experience to political attitudes could lead to a belief that people are responsible for their own outcomes, thus justifying a higher level of inequality, a smaller welfare state, and lower taxes. A similar argument has been made by Kitschelt and Rehm (2014, pp. 1674–1675), who argue that people who enjoy discretion and autonomy in their jobs generalize these experiences to other spheres of life, inducing a tendency towards right-wing ideology in the economic domain. Jansen (2019, p. 11) also argues that job autonomy can be associated with opposition to redistribution and other government interventions. However, while professional and managerial classes generally have more autonomy than the working class (e.g., Erikson & Goldthorpe, 1992; Evans, 1992), work autonomy is a particularly important source of difference between the self-employed and the working class. We therefore predict:

Hypothesis 2 *Job autonomy will be substantially more important for differentiating between support for redistribution between the self-employed and the working class than between the middle and working classes.*

4. | DATA AND METHODOLOGY

To test the above hypotheses, we rely on the European Values Study (EVS, 2008–10), which covers all the West European countries and includes a measure of redistribution preferences, suitable class measures for both current class and class origins (see below), and a range of relevant variables capturing aspects of the different mechanisms for explaining class differences in preferences.[1] These include perceived job autonomy, income, unemployment experience, and social security dependence. We utilize data on 9,570 respondents from Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. We limit our analyses to Western Europe as the recency of the post-communist transition suggests there are features of class politics that need consideration in their own right: the class structure is rather different and class differences in income as well as redistributive preferences are smaller.

4.1. | The dependent variable: Income inequality preferences

We rely on an item in the European Values Study asking respondents to place their views on a scale from 1–10, where 1 denotes "incomes should be made more equal," while 10 denotes "there should be greater incentives for individual effort."[2] We have reversed the scale so that higher values indicate that the respondent is more in favor of redistribution.

4.2. | The independent variables

To measure *class*, we utilize the EGP class schema (Erikson & Goldthorpe, 1992; Erikson, Goldthorpe, & Portocarero, 1979), which is "the only systematically validated measure of class position" for use in large-scale comparative projects (Evans & De Graaf, 2013, p. 13). We use a modified version of this schema. We include the higher service class and the lower service class, which correspond to class I (higher controllers) and class II (lower controllers) in the original schema. Furthermore, we include the self-employed (sometimes referred to as the petite bourgeoisie), which consists of class IVa, IVb, and IVc in the original schema, that is, self-employed with and without employees, and self-employed farmers. We also include the routine non-manual employees, which consist of class IIIa (routine non-manual employees) and IIIb (lower sales-service employees). Some scholars include class IIIb among the workers. In Section 5 of the Online Appendix, we re-estimate all analyses with class IIIb categorized as working class, and the results are robust to this change. Finally, we have the working class, consisting of manual supervisors

(class V), skilled and unskilled workers (class VI and VIIa), and farm labor (class VIIb).[3] The EVS contains pre-coded variables for the respondents' EGP class location as well as that of the parents when the respondent was aged 14. We use the former to measure *class*, and the latter to measure *class origins*.

We include class origins to identify background effects. Early life experiences are generally considered to affect political attitudes, values, and identities (Neundorf & Smets, 2017; van Deth, Jan, Abendschön, & Vollmar, 2011). The formative years between childhood and adulthood are considered especially important in these respects (Neundorf & Smets, 2017, p. 4). A recent British Household Panel Study (BHPS) analysis has found intergenerational transmission of both parents' ideologies, as well as persistent effects of growing up in poverty (O'Grady, 2019). As current class is associated with class origins, class differences in socialization and early experiences have a potentially confounding impact on contemporary attitude differences between classes. We thus present analyses with controls for background here, while we present analyses without such controls in Section 9 of the Online Appendix, and results are highly similar.

We also include age, gender, and education as control variables. We distinguish between respondents with low, medium, and higher education. The first group consists of those who have no or only primary education (ISCED one digit 0 and 1), the second group consists of respondents who completed lower or upper secondary education or post-secondary but non-tertiary education (that is, ISCED one digit 2–4) and finally, the third group consists of respondents who have completed first or second stage of tertiary education (ISCED one digit 5 and 6).

To test the hypotheses, we include three variables measuring economic interests. The first is *household income*. In each country, the respondents are asked to place their household income in one of several income categories—these vary from country to country. The EVS team has then converted these categories into euros (1000), corrected for purchasing power parity, and harmonized into a cross-nationally comparable variable.[4] The second is *unemployment experience*. The respondent is asked "[d]uring the last five years, have you experienced a continuous period of unemployment longer than three months?" The variable is coded 1 if the answer is yes, and 0 if the answer is no. Furthermore, we use a measure of *social security dependence*. In this case, the respondent is asked "during the last five years, have you been dependent on social security at any time?" The variable is coded the same way as unemployment experience. These variables index core material interests related to income levels and employment security. Finally, we measure *job autonomy*. Respondents are asked "[h]ow free are you to make decisions in your job?" and may indicate any value from 1 (which reads "none at all") to 10 ("a great deal").

4.3. | Methodology

To test the hypotheses, we employ the KHB method of mediation analysis (Kohler, Karlson, & Holm, 2011). While this methodology was originally developed to deal with mediation analysis in logistic regression analyses, it can also be used in the ordinary least squares (OLS) setting. In this case, it is equivalent to traditional mediation analysis; however, an important advantage is that the KHB package in Stata allows us not only to assess how much of the effect of class that is due to other (preceding or intermediate) variables, but also to disentangle the mediating effect of various variables simultaneously (Breen, Karlson, & Holm, 2013).[5]

In the first model, we regress income inequality preferences on current class, as well as age, gender, and education. In the second model, we also include class origins. These are all potential confounders as they may affect both current class and redistributive preferences. By including education, we control to some extent also for other potential confounders that are associated with educational attainment, such as career ambition or aspirational values. The same is the case for parental class, which effectively controls for early socialization related to the class environment one grows up in, as well as childhood experiences such as growing up in poverty (see the discussion below). However, we acknowledge that there may be confounders we have overlooked (although sensitivity analyses provide some comfort in this regard, see Online Appendix, Section 10) or reverse causality issues that we are unable to handle with cross-sectional data.

Finally, in the third model, we also add the three economic interest variables as well as job autonomy. Applying the KHB method, we then disentangle the mediating effect of these variables. Hypothesis 1 receives support if the economic interest variables reduce the coefficients of the service classes more than that of the self-employed from Model 2 to Model 3, controlling for job autonomy. Conversely, Hypothesis 2 receives support if job autonomy reduces the coefficient of the self-employed more than those of the service classes from Model 2 to Model 3, controlling for economic interests.[6]

5. | RESULTS

Before moving on to the hypothesis testing, we want to illustrate the importance of class. First, classes do indeed differ in terms of income and job autonomy in the way discussed above. Figure 1 plots the marginal effect of class on income (left panel) and job autonomy (right panel) in OLS regression models including country-fixed effects and cluster robust standard errors (see Table A.1.1 in the Online Appendix for the full regression table). As is clear, the workers have the smallest incomes, followed closely by the routine non-manual employees and then the self-employed. The lower service class earns substantially more, while the higher service class by far has the highest incomes. For job autonomy, the picture is different. The workers and routine non-manual employees are clearly least autonomous. The lower service class is a full scale point more autonomous, followed by the higher service class. The self-employed report by far the highest job autonomy, a full scale point above even the higher service class. Clearly, income and job autonomy are unequally distributed in different classes.

Despite arguments about the death of class (see, e.g., Evans, 2017 for a brief overview), political preferences also follow class lines. Figure 2 compares the association between current class and redistributive preferences (left panel) with the association between left-right self-placement and redistributive preferences (right panel), from models that include country fixed effects and controls for age, gender, and education (see Online Appendix, Table A.1.2 for the full regression table). Left-right self-placement should be—and is—strongly correlated with redistributive preferences. To see the importance of class, Figure 2 demonstrates that the difference between



FIGURE 1 Income levels (left panel) and job autonomy (right panel), by class [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]



FIGURE 2 Class and redistributive preferences (left) compared to left-right self-placement and redistributive preferences (right) [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

the higher service class and the self-employed on the one hand, and the working class on the other, is the same as moving almost three units (1.5 standard deviations) on the left-right self-placement scale. The workers and routine non-manual employees are equally in favor of redistribution, while the lower service class is in between. The results are in line with previous findings (see, e.g., Langsæther, 2019b, p. 14).

We now move on to test the hypotheses. The first row in Table 1 shows the effect of current class on income inequality preferences. All estimates are as expected. The higher service class and self-employed are approximately equally right-wing, while the workers and routine non-manual employees are equally in favor of redistribution. The lower service class is in an intermediate position. In line with previous research, women are slightly more in favor of redistribution than men, while age and education do not affect income inequality preferences when controlling for occupational class.

The second row depicts the results from Model 2, adding also class origins to control for class differences in socialization and early experiences. There is a modest effect of having a background from the higher service class rather than from the working class, but otherwise class origins have very little effect when estimated simultaneously with current class. As can be seen in Row 4, controlling for class origins does not change the coefficients of current class position by much. This implies that current class differences in inequality preferences are *not* due to growing up in different class environments.

Finally, Model 3 includes controls for the economic interests variables as well as job autonomy. We notice that income has a substantial effect: Moving one standard deviation on the income scale (1.52) would reduce opposition to income inequality by 0.21 scale units. We note, however, that this means that one would have to move almost four standard deviations across the income scale to achieve an effect similar to the difference between the higher service class and the workers in Model 1. Occupational class is indeed important for these preferences. Having experienced unemployment in the last 5 years does not affect redistributive preferences, controlled for all the other variables, whereas having been dependent on social security does increase support for redistribution by 0.35. Job autonomy, while less important than income, has a substantial impact on redistributive preferences: People who are one standard deviation (2.26) more autonomous in their jobs are 0.16 units less opposed to income inequality.

TABLE 1 Explaining class differences in attitudes to income inequality

Dependent variable: Attitudes toward income inequality (1–10: pro to con)					
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Δcoefficient Model 1–2	Δcoefficient Model 2–3
Current class (Ref: Working class)					
Higher service	−0.88*** (0.11)	−0.82** (0.10)	−0.57** (0.07)	−0.06** (0.02)	−0.25*** (0.05)
Lower service	−0.46*** (0.09)	−0.43** (0.08)	−0.29** (0.08)	−0.03* (0.02)	−0.14*** (0.03)
Rout.nman	−0.08 (0.10)	−0.06 (0.09)	−0.03 (0.09)	−0.02 (0.01)	−0.03 (0.03)
Self-empl.	−0.83*** (0.17)	−0.79** (0.16)	−0.58** (0.15)	−0.04 (0.03)	−0.21*** (0.04)
Class origins (Ref: Working class)					
Higher service		−0.40** (0.11)	−0.37** (0.11)		
Lower service		−0.08 (0.10)	−0.09 (0.10)		
Rout.nman		−0.01 (0.09)	−0.01 (0.10)		
Self-empl.		−0.11 (0.11)	−0.10 (0.10)		
Economic interest					
Income			−0.14** (0.04)		
Unemployment exp.			−0.06 (0.08)		
Social sec. dep.			0.35** (0.09)		
Autonomy					
Job autonomy			−0.07*** (0.01)		
Control variables					
Age	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)		
Female	0.32*** (0.07)	0.31*** (0.07)	0.27*** (0.06)		
Medium edu. (ref: Low edu)	0.04 (0.13)	0.04 (0.13)	0.17 (0.14)		
High edu.	−0.02 (0.14)	0.03 (0.14)	0.22 (0.16)		
Constant	7.56*** (0.17)	7.61*** (0.18)	8.05*** (0.18)		
Observations	9,570	9,570	9,570		
R^2	0.129	0.131	0.142		

Note: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. Country FE applied.

*$p < .05$, **$p < .01$, ***$p < .001$.

The final row shows how the class coefficients from Model 2 change when including the economic interest variables as well as job autonomy. We see that these become substantially smaller. The difference between the higher service class and the workers is reduced by 0.25, that is, 31%. Approximately a third of the difference between the lower service class and the working class also disappears. More than a quarter of the difference between the self-employed and the working class is eliminated. All these changes are statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Routine non-manual employees were not different from the working class prior to introducing the mediators, so this coefficient hardly changes and the change is not statistically significant.

To be able to test hypotheses 1 and 2, however, we need to know to what degree this mediation is accounted for by different variables. The KHB methodology allows us to do this. Table 2 shows mediation by variable for the three classes that were more right-wing than the workers and the routine non-manual employees: The two service classes and the self-employed.

Table 2 shows that of the material interest variables, only income accounts for a substantial proportion—about a fifth—of the right-wing orientation of the higher service class, and the change is about three times as large as the standard error. The same is true for the lower service class: 15.3% of the difference between this class and the workers and routine non-manual employees is due to income. Unemployment experience is neither substantially nor statistically significant for these classes' right-wing orientations, whereas social security dependence accounts for around 2% of the difference between them and the workers.

This is also the case for the self-employed. However, in contrast to the service classes, a much smaller proportion of the difference between the *self-employed* and the workers can be attributed to income differences—only around 6%. Put simply: Material interest does not seem to be an important reason for the right-wing orientation of this class. Hypothesis 1 receives support.

Moving on to job autonomy, we see that this variable mediates 11%–15% of the right-wing orientations of the two service classes. However, it accounts for a fifth of the right-wing orientations of the self-employed. Particularly noticeable is the difference in mediation effects between the higher service class and the working class (11.2%), and the self-employed and the working class (19.9%). The latter is almost twice the level of the former. In other words, while the job autonomy of the service class is associated with being more right-wing, this factor is far more important for the self-employed, in line with Hypothesis 2.

TABLE 2 Assessing mediation by variable

Mediation due to…	Change in coefficient (standard error in parentheses)	% mediation
Higher service class		
…income	−0.150 (0.048)	18.2
…job autonomy	−0.092 (0.171)	11.2
…social security dependence	−0.015 (0.005)	1.8
…unemployment experience	0.005 (0.007)	−0.6
Lower service class		
…income	−0.065 (0.022)	15.3
…job autonomy	−0.063 (0.012)	14.7
…social security dependence	−0.010 (0.004)	2.4
…unemployment experience	0.003 (0.004)	−0.7
Self-employed		
…income	−0.044 (0.016)	5.5
…job autonomy	−0.158 (0.029)	19.9
…social security dependence	−0.014 (0.005)	1.8
…unemployment experience	0.003 (0.004)	−0.4

To ensure that these results are not driven by any country in particular, we have re-estimated all the models 18 times, each time leaving out all the respondents from one country (see the Online Appendix, Section 8). The results are always very similar to those reported in Tables 1 and 2.

6. | CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

This article addresses an understudied yet important question within class studies. We broaden the geographical scope compared to the few previous studies on mechanisms connecting class and redistributive preferences and we disentangle the importance of individual mediators. Our results hold regardless of which mediation technique we utilize; whether we examine redistributive preferences or broader economic left-right ideology; whether we include control variables or not; whether we exclude any individual country; whether we include class IIIb among routine non-manual employees or the workers; and regardless of whether we adjust income for household composition. These robust findings yield three general conclusions. First, in Western Europe, self-interest accounts for less than a fifth of overall class differences in attitudes to income inequality, an attitude chosen as a most likely case for the expression of self-interest. Furthermore, most of the class differences accounted for by self-interest result from current household income rather than unemployment experience or social security dependence.

The low level of mediation via self-interest is thought provoking given how many studies in the field seem to assume that this mechanism should account for (net of measurement error) most or all class differences in redistribution preferences. We are aware that this test of the self-interest perspective is not comprehensive, and more and better measures of material interests might increase the level of mediation. However, our findings are consistent with the limited number of previous studies examining the Nordic countries discussed in the introduction, some of which do include a more extensive range of mediating variables. The implication of our findings is that class analysts may benefit from relaxing the assumption that class differences in redistributive preferences are only (or perhaps even primarily) related to differences in self-interest, and try to theorize and empirically investigate other sources of class differences in preferences. One fruitful area for such research might well lie in examining network effects on class attitudes. The more people interact within a group, the more likely they are to influence each other (Zuckerman, Dasovic, & Fitzgerald, 2007, p. 31), and people tend to interact most with people in the same class, for instance due to clustering in families, schools, workplaces, and neighborhoods (Kalmijn & Kraaykamp, 2007, p. 550). This means that there are likely to be important class differences that we can explain by social interactions, norms, and identity rather than economic self-interest per se.

Second, we find that job autonomy plays a hitherto undetected role in accounting for certain class differences, even when controlling for income. While income is more important for the service classes' right-wing orientation than job autonomy, the latter is much more important for the right-wing orientation of the self-employed. This is in line with the claims of authors such as Kohn (1969, 2001) and Kitschelt and Rehm (2014), who argue that people generalize experiences from their work to other aspects of life, including political attitudes. It also helps to explain the puzzle of why a group of people who are not much better off than the working class are still much more in favor of income inequality. Heterogeneity of mechanisms between classes may therefore be a promising line of inquiry in future efforts to understanding class differences in preferences.

Thirdly, we find that class origins are not important for current class differences in support for redistribution. What people in different classes think about income inequality is more related to their current situation than to their early socialization.[7] This non-finding differs from the literature on social mobility and class *voting*, which tends to find that the preferences of the socially mobile lie between their origin and destination (e.g., De Graaf, Nieuwbeerta, & Heath, 1995). That party allegiance is perhaps more strongly influenced by origins than are redistributive preferences may well relate to the continuing, if weakened (Dalton & Wattenberg, 2000), presence of durable party affiliations in many Western democracies. Such party affiliations are likely to be more stable than are issue preferences (Huddy, 2013) and less likely to change following changes in resources and interests (Svallfors,

2006, p. 21).[8] It suggests that further consideration of the factors that mediate the relationship between class position and redistributive preferences is likely to make progress through further examination of aspects of the current situation rather than background factors. This might well include an expansion from considerations of narrow material/economic self-interests to a broader conception of personal self-interest. This could well include factors such as social norms, identities, and historical legacies.

To conclude, although based on a partial test, our findings imply that we cannot simply assume that class differences are only due to economic self-interest, and that the mechanisms explaining different class differences in political attitudes are general across classes. We need to recognize that different influences are likely to be at play in explaining why some classes differ from others—particularly in the case of job autonomy and the self-employed. We also need to move beyond studying differences in material interests, and to examine interactions, norms and identities that might throw further light on class divisions.

DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

The data that support the findings of this study are openly available in GESIS at http://doi.org/doi:10.4232/1.10188, reference number ZA4800.

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NOTES

1 Alternative data sources such as the ISSP inequality module or the ESS work wave unfortunately lack measures of job autonomy.

2 We have also run all models using instead a multi-indicator scale of economic left-right values developed by Knutsen (2018) and employed in other studies of class voting (e.g., Langsæther, 2019a). These are available in the Online Appendix. Results are similar to those reported here with our inequality preference measure, although origins do mediate a (very small) proportion of current class differences in the alternative models. This is not surprising, as ideology and values may be more influenced by upbringing than attitudes.

3 We have run all models distinguishing between skilled and unskilled workers, but find no differences in their redistributive preferences, which is why they are merged into a single working class.

4 The income variable is at the household level, but households vary in their composition. To ensure that this does not affect our findings, we re-estimate all models using two alternative specifications. In the first, we only include respondents living alone. In the second, we include all respondents but divide the income of two-person households by two. All conclusions remain the same regardless of choice of income variable, see Online Appendix, Section 4.

5 We have also run mediation analyses with the *medeff* package in Stata (Hicks & Tingley, 2011), which is based on the mediation approach in Imai, Keele, and Tingley (2010), Imai, Keele, and Yamamoto (2010). Results are very similar, see Online Appendix, Table A.7.1.

6 All mediation analyses are estimated using the *khb* package in Stata/MP 15.1, with the latest update at the time of writing (st0236_2).

7 As noted earlier, in analyses examining generalized left-right values rather than, specifically, support for income redistribution we do find some effect of background on these more stable and enduring aspects of belief systems (on which, see Evans & Neundorf, 2018).

8 It is also possible self-selection may bias our results: It may be that people who are both opposed to redistribution and enjoy autonomy self-select into self-employment. Long-term panel data studies are needed to examine such selection processes.

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SUPPORTING INFORMATION

Additional Supporting Information may be found online in the Supporting Information section.

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ORIGINAL ARTICLE

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Anti-elite politics and emotional reactions to socio-economic problems: Experimental evidence on "pocketbook anger" from France, Germany, and the United States

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Abstract

Many observers have noticed the importance of anger in contemporary politics, particularly with reference to populism. This article addresses the question under which conditions people become angry about a specific aspect of their lives: their personal financial situation. Specifically, it asks if populist anti-elite rhetoric has a causal influence on anger and if this influence differs across socio-economic groups. The theoretical expectation is that anti-elite rhetoric allows people to externalize responsibility for an unfavorable financial situation and thereby to turn negative self-conscious emotions into anger. The argument is tested with original survey data from France, Germany, and the United States. The empirical analysis yields three main insights. First, negative emotional reactions to respondents' personal finances (and anger in particular) are surprisingly widespread in all three countries. Second, there is a pronounced socio-economic gradient in the distribution of anger and other negative emotions. Third, and most importantly, randomly exposing participants to populist anti-elite rhetoric causes considerably higher expressed anger about one's financial situation in France and Germany, but less so in the United

States. This suggests a causal role of anti-elite rhetoric in stirring "pocketbook anger." This is true in particular in the middle classes. The notion that populist rhetoric reduces negative self-conscious emotions, such as shame, is not supported by the data.

KEYWORDS
anger, middle class, populism, socio-economic problems, survey experiments

1 | INTRODUCTION

Under which conditions do people become angry about their financial situation? Because feeling anger is intertwined with the motivation to identify and attack a culprit, it can fundamentally change how people connect their pocketbook to politics. Specifically, this article asks whether populist anti-elite rhetoric plays a causal role in stirring "pocketbook anger"[1] and, if yes, which socio-economic groups are most susceptible to it.

These questions are important for research into how individual socio-economic problems influence political behavior and thereby might contribute to political inequality. The literature on this topic, which has grown tremendously since the Great Recession, is rather fragmented (Margalit, 2019). There are largely separate discussions about how people respond to socio-economic problems with pragmatic-materialistic responses (Margalit, 2013), withdrawal from politics (Emmenegger, Marx, & Schraff, 2017), political radicalism (Rooduijn & Burgoon, 2018) or out-group hostility (Gidron & Hall, 2017).

Which of these political responses prevails under which conditions is a largely unanswered question. An emerging literature suggests, however, that part of the answer lies in peoples' varying *emotional* responses to socio-economic problems (Aytaç, Rau, & Stokes, in press; Hochschild, 2016; Marx & Nguyen, 2018; Salmela & von Scheve, 2017; Smith, Cronin, & Kessler, 2008; Wagner, 2014). Similar (economic) situations can be appraised by people in different ways, which leads to different emotions and (political) action tendencies (Keltner & Lerner, 2010; Lerner, Li, Valdesolo, & Kassam, 2015; Marcus, Neuman, & MacKuen, 2017). Anger is particularly relevant in this context, because it has the potential to mobilize even disadvantaged or inattentive citizens to participate in politics (Aytaç et al., in press; Lamprianou & Ellinas, 2019; Valentino, Brader, Groenendyk, Gregorowicz, & Hutchings, 2011). Emotions and emotionalized politics can therefore contribute to reducing inequality in political engagement across socio-economic groups (Anduiza, Guinjoan, & Rico, 2019; Marx & Nguyen, 2018), although this might come at the cost of a more distrusting, superficial, and polarized electorate (Banks & Valentino, 2012; Suhay & Erisen, 2018; Webster, 2018).

This raises the question under which conditions people are likely to become angry about their economic situation as opposed to other emotional responses. While one source of variation certainly are personality differences, this article focuses on the political context. Specifically, it looks at how populist anti-elite rhetoric influences the link between socio-economic problems and negative emotions. Besides being an important phenomenon in contemporary politics, populism is interesting for the present research question, because the aggressive attribution of responsibility to political elites is one of its core elements (Busby, Gubler, & Hawkins, 2019). Such externalization of blame is precisely what makes the difference between anger and other negative emotions (Keltner & Lerner, 2010; Weiner, 2006).

In sum, the main hypothesis explored is that populist anti-elite rhetoric – by constructing a general culprit – allows people to externalize responsibility for their financial situation and, hence, to experience anger about it. A

second hypothesis is that the populism–attribution–anger nexus functions as a coping mechanism to reduce the more painful negative emotion of shame that results from internalized blame.

Although the primary goal is to contribute to debates about the political-behavior implications of socio-economic problems, the article also speaks to two controversies in contemporary populism research. First, the research design allows to address the question of which socio-economic groups are receptive to populist mobilization and whether absolute or relative forms of deprivation matter more in this regard (Hameleers, Bos, & Vreese, 2018; Mols & Jetten, 2017; Mudde & Rovira Kalwasser 2018; Spruyt, Keppens, & Droogenbroeck, 2016). Second, it speaks to an emerging (but somewhat implicit) debate about whether populist parties benefit from or create negative emotions (Hochschild, 2016; Magni, 2017; Rico, Guinjoan, & Anduiza, 2017; Salmela & von Scheve, 2017). The results show a causal flow from populist anti-elite rhetoric to emotions so that the populism-emotions link should, at the very least, be seen as recursive (Nguyen, 2019; Rooduijn, van der Brug, & de Lange, 2016; Wirz, 2018).

The empirical evidence is based on a survey experiment conducted in samples (representative of the population between 18 and 65 years) from three countries: France, Germany, and the United States. Randomly exposing participants to anti-elite rhetoric causes considerably higher expressed anger about one's financial situation in France and Germany, but less so in the US where a president with populist tendencies is in office. The distribution of anger across socio-economic and political groups differs somewhat between the countries. A consistent finding is, however, that it is not so much the lower classes but rather the middle classes that respond to anti-elite messages with pocketbook anger.

2 | ANTI-ELITE MOBILIZATION AND POCKETBOOK ANGER

Emotions are embodied mental processes triggered by a stimulus. This process involves cognitive appraisals along several dimensions (valence, goal relevance, novelty, fairness, agency, and intentionality), physiological arousal and action tendencies. Together these components form a subjectively experienced emotion (Scherer & Moors, 2019). Anger is associated with events appraised as undesirable and caused by others. Its intensity should rise with goal relevance (e.g., if self-esteem is involved), perceived unfairness and intentionality (Hegtvedt & Parris, 2014; Smith et al., 2008; Weiner, 2006). The corresponding action tendency is to approach (e.g., restoration of justice, retribution, holding culprit responsible). Other-blame and approach motivation differentiate anger from negative self-conscious emotions, in particular shame, that come with internal attribution and withdrawal tendencies (Keltner & Lerner, 2010). In line with this reasoning, it has been shown to foster political efficacy and participation and the tendency to punish incumbents (Aytaç et al., in press; Jasper, 2018; Lamprianou & Ellinas, 2019; Marcus et al., 2017; Valentino et al., 2011; Wagner, 2014).

Note that I do not claim causal precedence for cognitive appraisals in general, a claim that would not be in line with neuroscientific evidence on the emotion process (Barrett, 2017). But the argument developed below does turn on the idea that political discourses can stir pocketbook anger through a reappraisal of agency, fairness, and intentionality.

2.1 | Emotional consequences of (lacking) money

Earning a subjectively sufficient amount of money—or not—is an intensely emotional matter. For some people, negative emotions result from existential economic threats, but the main reason in wealthy capitalist societies is that money and the goods it can buy are status markers and ingredients for social approval (Cohen, Shin, & Liu, 2019; Collins, 2004; Frank, 2007; Turner, 2015). Feeling deprived of status is a painful experience (Kemper, 2017; Ridgeway, 2014; in a literal sense: Eisenberger, 2015). If people internalize responsibility for this deprivation,

they will experience a mix of negative self-conscious emotions, shame in particular, and tend to withdraw from social and political life (Lewis, 2016; Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007). If people identify an external cause, the experience of status deprivation has all ingredients for intense anger, which motivates action against this cause. This pocketbook anger is not restricted to short episodes but might sediment over time into a "moral emotion." In this case, it would be more accurate to speak of righteous anger, indignation, or possibly hate (Jasper, 2018, pp. 145–151).

Theoretically, negative emotions are not restricted to the experience of "objective" poverty. They can also result from frustrated attempts to "keep up with the Joneses." Status is relative to milieu-specific reference points (Kemper, 2017). Therefore, nothing speaks against pocketbook anger or shame in the middle class (Mols & Jetten, 2017).

2.2 | Political discourses and negative pocketbook emotions

Capitalist societies are often portrayed as benefitting from a "neoliberal" ideology of self-responsibility. Discourses based on this ideology individualize and moralize economic failure, while they idealize economic success (Boltanski & Chiapello, 2005; Lamont, 2019; Sennett, 2006). In short, they foster internal attribution and are conducive to shame (Salmela & von Scheve, 2017; Walker, 2014). The response should be self-deprecation/improvement rather than political action. In electoral research, voters are often seen as reluctant to blame governments for personal economic problems in this culture (Kiewiet & Lewis-Beck, 2011; Sniderman & Brody, 1977). However, the specific political context might matter.

Socio-economic problems are more likely to become politicized if they are perceived as collective, externally caused, and unfair—appraisals that should be accompanied by (moral) anger (Aytaç et al., in press; Marx, 2016; Smith et al., 2008). Several ideologies and discourses aim at constructing such mobilizing appraisals, for example, socialism. In recent years, populism has been particularly successful. Although it does not always address economic grievances explicitly, a defining feature of populism is the portrayal of social elites as selfish and intentionally harmful to ordinary people (Busby et al., 2019; Hameleers, Bos, & Vreese, 2017; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018). This discourse constructs a generalized externalization of blame, which people can apply to many problems, including their pocketbook. Moreover, socio-economic comparisons are usually at least implied in populist discourses. This can take the form of defending "hard-working" citizens against free-riders, criticizing redistribution to minorities, addressing the waste of tax money, or sometimes full-blown indignation about economic inequality and globalization (Cramer, 2016; Gidron & Hall, 2017; Hochschild, 2016; Lamont, Park, & Ayala-Hurtado, 2017; Mols & Jetten, 2017; Schumacher & van Kersbergen, 2016). It thus seems clear that populists try to mobilize voters through stirring anger, including anger about socio-economic outcomes.

2.3 | Populism and negative emotion: the psychological mechanism

The link between negative emotions and populist appeal is an emerging topic in the literature, but the mechanism is not always clear. One version of the argument is that populists benefit from, express, or channel voters' *pre-existing* anger (Rico et al., 2017). Magni (2017) draws, for instance, a causal chain from the 2008 crisis over attribution and anger to populist voting. Vasilopoulos, Marcus, Valentino, and Foucault (2019) show that anger resulting from the 2015 Paris Terror Attacks predicted voting for the radical right. Salmela and von Scheve (2017) argue that socio-economic problems can produce diffuse anger that results from repressed shame and that can be directed by radical right-wing parties at concrete targets. Other contributions put stronger emphasis on political agency. They argue that populist rhetoric *causes* external attribution and anger or that the link between anger and populism is recursive (Busby et al., 2019; Hameleers et al., 2017; Marx & Nguyen, 2018; Nguyen, 2019; Rooduijn

et al., 2016; Wirz et al., 2018). However, anger is rarely used as a dependent variable in these studies (but see Wirz, 2018).

Commenting on the link between emotions and populism, Jost (2019, p. 710) has recently called for more attention to "nonobvious psychological mechanisms—such as denial, projection, repression, and affect displacement." An example for such a mechanism comes from Hochschild (2016, ch. 15), who contemplates the possibility that populist agency is instrumental in transforming pre-existing negative emotions of depression and shame into more enjoyable collective emotions, including anger. Building on this intuition, I argue that people in capitalist societies, who experience some form of relative socio-economic deprivation, harbor a mix of negative pre-political emotions; some idiosyncratic combination of anxiety, guilt, shame, anger, sadness, and envy. Among these, self-conscious emotions that are associated with internal attributions are the more painful ones and people should be strongly motivated to avoid them (Lewis, 2016; Scheff & Retzinger, 1991; Tangney et al., 2007). The externalization of blame is the primary way to achieve this (Stuewig, Tangney, Heigel, Harty, & McCloskey, 2010; Turner, 2015). However, as mentioned above, externalization is to some extent constrained by cultures idealizing meritocracy and self-responsibility. If people in such a situation are exposed to populist anti-elite discourse, it means that they are offered a cognitive reappraisal that *plausibly* attributes responsibility to an external cause and that seems to be legitimized by the support of many fellow citizens. This should be intuitively appealing and cause a shift of the negative emotion mix towards the *least unpleasant* one: anger, particular in its collective form. In the real world, this implies that relatively deprived voters might intuitively select into anti-elite rhetoric. But here I focus on the second implication that *exposure to anti-elite rhetoric can increase anger about one's financial situation* (Hypothesis 1). Anger, of course, presupposes some form of negative pocketbook evaluation. As discussed below, the assumption is that many people in different socio-economic groups can find some aspect of their financial situation to be frustrated about, for instance through unfavorable social comparisons.

The argument suggests anger to serve as a coping mechanism for other negative pocketbook emotions. In fact, coping through re-attribution is well established in the psychological literature. As summarized by Tangney et al. (2007, p. 352):

> *shame and anger go hand in hand. Desperate to escape painful feelings of shame, shamed individuals are apt to turn the tables defensively, externalizing blame and anger outward onto a convenient scapegoat. Blaming others may help individuals regain some sense of control and superiority.*

Following this reasoning, anger induced through anti-elite rhetoric might serve, to borrow Hochschild's (2016, p. 226) metaphor, as an "antidepressant." This points to the possibility that *exposure to anti-elite rhetoric decreases shame about one's financial situation* (Hypothesis 2). This hypothesis comes close to the argument by Salmela and von Scheve (2017) about repressed shame as a basis for populist mobilization. The main difference is that in their argument, coping with shame occurs prior to discourse exposure, whereas I emphasize in addition the direct causal role of anti-elitism in shame coping (see Marx & Nguyen, 2018 and Spruyt et al., 2016 for related arguments and Jasper, 2018 for an overview of analogous strategies in social movements).

2.4 | Who becomes angry?

So far, socio-economic problems and deprivation were described in deliberately generic terms. Indeed, the argument can be applied for many different subjective problems, as long as the content of a political discourse allows *plausible* externalization of responsibility. Populism often denies this to the poorest in society. Particularly if they belong to minorities or do not work, they actually become scapegoats in some populist narratives (Lamont et al., 2017; Mols & Jetten, 2017; Schumacher & van Kersbergen, 2016). External attribution and anger could actually be easier to instill in members of the (lower) middle class who belong to the ethnic majority, because

it is easier for them to identify with populists' stylized "people." And although it is difficult to identify a typical populist electorate across countries (Stockemer, Lentz, & Mayer, 2018), it is often argued that populist parties have electoral strongholds in the lower middle class rather than the absolute bottom of the income distribution (Golder, 2016).

While the default amount of negative pocketbook emotions should decline with income, the middle class should be by no means immune (Lamont, 2019). Research on positional consumption suggests that income inequality and ensuing status competition are considerable stressors for middle-class families (Frank, 2007; Winkelmann, 2012). Relatedly, it has been argued that negative emotional reactions are particularly intense if relatively high but precarious socio-economic status becomes threatened (Mols & Jetten, 2017).

Beyond these considerations, the present article refrains from making a general argument about whether people in the lower or middle classes are more prone to respond to populist rhetoric with anger. Existing research offers little guidance on this question and it likely depends on the social and political context. Consequently, an inductive approach is adopted for this aspect.

3 | SURVEY EXPERIMENT ON POPULISM AND POCKETBOOK EMOTIONS

Hypotheses 1 and 2 are tested in a survey experiment conducted in November and December 2018 in three countries. For each country, about 1,500 participants aged 18 to 65 years were sampled from YouGov's online panel. YouGov claims representativeness, but common sense and research in survey methodology (Couper, 2017) cast doubt on this claim. It is reasonable to expect that opt-in recruitment compared to random sampling introduces bias in unobserved characteristics. It cannot be ruled out, for example, that politically engaged as opposed to apathetic citizens are more likely to select into the panel and that the former are more likely to make external attributions and to experience anger. That said, for experimental research such panels provide an affordable compromise of internal and external validity that allows at least a tentative generalization of the findings. For the present purpose, they moreover provide the indispensable variation in socio-economic background.

3.1 | Case selection and contexts

The experiment was conducted simultaneously in France, Germany, and the US. The goal of including several countries is not to isolate the effect of a specific variable, but to provide some background variation within the universe of advanced capitalist democracies. This anticipates unclear replicability as a frequent criticism of experimental research (Sniderman, 2018) and might form the basis for comparative hypotheses.

The three countries differ on a number of dimensions. They include, for instance, a presidential, semi-presidential, and parliamentary democracy, two- and multi-party systems, liberal and coordinated market economies, advanced and residual welfare states and different degrees of economic inequality. Also, the particular form and intensity of populist politics differ. In short, France is a case with a relatively long tradition of populist parties both on the political left and right. Populism's influence in French society was illustrated by the strong showing of populist candidates in the 2017 presidential election and the violent *Gilets jaunes* protests that erupted during the data collection in November 2018. Populism is weaker in Germany where only the 2015 "refugee crisis" led to the emergence of a radical right-wing party on the national level and where left-wing populism is not strongly developed. The US is the only case with a government that could be described as populist. Although its electoral system usually keeps populist challengers out, the US has a long history of populist rhetoric inside the main parties, from third candidates and in the media.

3.2 | Experimental design

The experimental design closely follows Marx and Nguyen (2018). As in their study, the goal is to activate populist anti-elite rhetoric. This is done by randomly exposing half of the sample (prior to emotion measurement) to three survey items, for which they can indicate their (dis)agreement on Likert scales from one to five. The control group receives the anti-elite statements *after* the emotion measurement. The statements are:

> *"Politicians often lie to get elected."*
>
> *"Politicians are mainly interested in their careers and not in the good of the country."*
>
> *"The politicians in [Paris/Berlin/Washington] have abandoned ordinary people."*

These statements reflect the typical anti-elite component of populist rhetoric, but are far from extreme versions of this criticism. The goal is to mentally activate a "populist lens" on one's pocketbook that, according to Hypothesis 1, should elicit anger by facilitating external attribution. The statements deliberately do not include direct references to specific ideologies or socio-economic problems. While the latter would arguably make treatment effects more likely, the chosen formulation allows assessing if participants translate general populist attributions into appraisals of their pocketbook situation.

A weakness of the design should be acknowledged. This way of mentally activating populism as an interpretative frame obviously draws on real-world experiences that experimental and control group share. The control group is therefore "contaminated" with exposure to populist discourse whose duration and intensity depends on the country. The statements will hardly provide a surprising or new framework for thinking about politics, so that any treatment effect should be interpreted as resulting from variation in situational salience of populism. While this is unfortunate, it is hard to avoid in research on relevant real-world phenomena. Moreover, it should raise the possibility of bottom and ceiling effects and hence stack the cards against significant treatment effects.

3.3 | Measuring emotions

The primary dependent variable is anger (Hypothesis 1), complemented with shame (Hypothesis 2). Following widespread practice, emotions are measured through self-reports based on emotion words. As advocated by Marcus et al. (2017), participants are asked to move sliders on scales between low ("Not at all…") and high intensity ("Extremely…") of the respective emotion (from zero to hundred). Anger is measured, for example, with the words "angry," "irritated," and "annoyed." The instructions read as follows:

> *We would like to ask you to take a moment and think about your personal financial situation. What we mean by that is how difficult or easy you find it to make ends meet with your budget and to afford the things you want. If you think about your personal financial situation: how does that make you feel? Please choose the location that shows how you feel. You can afterwards move the slider to the left or the right to change the location.*

Note that nothing in the formulation indicates a link to politics. Moreover, the wording has a "bottom-up" character because rather than specifying particular socio-economic problems or benchmarks, it leaves it entirely to respondents what standards they use to assess their financial situation. While "making ends meet" probably has a connotation of more existential problems, an inability to "afford things you want" could apply to just anybody. The downside of this

flexible approach is lacking control over and information about respondents' considerations. While negative emotions should imply some form of dissatisfaction, the thoughts causing pocketbook anger or shame remain a black box.

The emotion words are chosen from the modified Differential Emotions Scale (mDES; Fredrickson, 2013) and translated into French and German (Table A1 in the Appendix). To avoid overwhelming respondents and out of cost considerations, the number of emotion items is restricted to ten. The emotions that are central to the hypotheses, anger and shame, are measured with three items. In addition, to account for the possibility that other negative emotions are involved, sadness and fear are measured with two items.

A comment is necessary on shame measurement, which is not straightforward. The main reason is that expressing shame is stigmatized and, hence, shameful itself. As Scheff and Retzinger (1991) show, people therefore usually use indirect verbal markers to express it. Against this background, mDES shame words ("ashamed," "humiliated," "disgraced") are not perfect for the present context. Few people would arguably use such strong language to describe financial situations. "Humiliated" and "disgraced" are therefore replaced with "embarrassed" and "dissatisfied with myself." The former technically is a different emotion (Lewis, 2016), however, with fuzzy boundaries in colloquial speech. The latter is a verbal marker that seems appropriate to express milder forms of pocketbook-induced shame.

All emotion domains have satisfactory Cronbach's alphas in each of the countries (Table A1), so that the respective arithmetic mean is used in the analyses. However, it has to be acknowledged that the method did not work well in *differentiating between* negative emotions. The correlations of anger with the other negative emotions is high in each of the three countries, ranging between 0.65 and 0.86. Moreover, exploratory factor analyses (not shown) yield one-factor solutions in each of the countries. This issue, to which I will return in the final discussion, is a problem in particular for Hypothesis 2 which turns on the notion that anti-elite rhetoric can change the negative emotion mix.

3.4 | Operationalizations of socio-economic groups

The theory section raised the question in which socio-economic groups the susceptibility to respond to anti-elite rhetoric with anger can be observed. Hence, treatment effects could be moderated by respondents' financial situation. The analyses rely on natural variation in socio-economic position, which, to assess robustness, is operationalized in three ways (in line with the theoretical considerations, categorical moderators are used that do not assume a linear relationship). First, to capture its subjective dimension, a question is borrowed from the European Social Survey: "Which of the following statements comes closest to how you feel about your household's income nowadays?" The four answer options are "Living comfortably on present income," "Coping on present income," "Finding it difficult on present income," and "Finding it very difficult on present income."

Second, as an objective measure, household income is included by (a) deriving a pseudo-linear income variable by assigning the midpoint of YouGov's country-specific income bands; (b) dividing this variable by top-coded household size (as a crude equivalence scale) and (c) dividing the samples in quintiles.

Third, as a global assessment of socio-economic position, people are asked a typical "social-ladder" question: "There are people who tend to be towards the top of our society and people who tend to be towards the bottom. Where would you place yourself on the following scale nowadays?" Possible answers range from one ("Bottom of our society") to ten ("Top of our society"). Because the goal is to study effects of distinct positions in the class hierarchy, rather than linear effects of status, the variable is broken down into five categories, each comprising two scale points.

While all these operationalizations have blind spots if applied in isolation, together they should go a long way in capturing relevant aspects of socio-economic positions in post-industrial societies. The two subjective moderators were measured after the treatment (which, however, only influenced the question order). Income is a background variable provided by YouGov. As can be seen in Table A2, there is no post-treatment bias.

3.5 | Mean differences in negative pocketbook emotions

Figure 1 presents anger and shame distributions across countries and experimental conditions. Eyeballing these distributions immediately suggests strong treatment effects in France and Germany. In France, the proportion of very angry respondents grows considerably after receiving the treatment. In Germany, there is a decline of respondents with very low anger and a clear growth of respondents with (very) high anger (although from a lower level compared to France). Differences for anger in the US and for shame in all three countries appear modest or non-existent.

T-tests between control and treatment groups confirm these impressions (Table 1). The mean difference for anger is 9.3 in France and 8.7 in Germany and is highly significant in both cases. In the US, the difference is only 1.9 and insignificant. For shame, there is a significant but small difference in the pooled sample, which seems entirely driven by France.



FIGURE 1 Distribution of anger and shame by country and experimental condition.
Note: Grey: kernel density, white dot: median; thick line: interquartile range, thin line: upper to lower adjacent values

TABLE 1 Mean differences for anger and shame by country

	Anger			Shame		
	Control	**Treated**	**Mean diff.**	**Control**	**Treated**	**Mean diff.**
FR	*M* = 54.3	*M* = 63.6	**9.3**	*M* = 44.1	*M* = 48.1	**4.0**
	SD = 28.4	*SD* = 28.0	*p* < .001	*SD* = 24.2	*SD* = 24.7	*p* = .002
DE	*M* = 35.0	*M* = 43.7	**8.7**	*M* = 33.6	*M* = 35.7	**2.2**
	SD = 27.5	*SD* = 28.5	*p* < .001	*SD* = 24.4	*SD* = 24.2	*p* = .099
US	*M* = 46.1	*M* = 48.0	**1.9**	*M* = 42.0	*M* = 41.2	**0.9**
	SD = 28.3	*SD* = 28.7	*p* = .207	*SD* = 27.6	*SD* = 28.9	*p* = .557
Pooled	*M* = 45.1	*M* = 51.8	**6.7**	*M* = 39.9	*M* = 41.7	**1.8**
	SD = 29.1	*SD* = 29.7	*p* < .001	*SD* = 25.8	*SD* = 26.5	*p* = .022

Note: Mean diff. = Mean treated − Mean control. *P*-values based on two-tailed *t*-tests.

In passing, it is also worth looking at the other two emotions. In France, there are highly significant mean differences for sadness (7.0) and fear (7.1) that are smaller than for anger. In Germany, there is a significant effect only for sadness (4.2). In the US, neither variable shows a significant difference.

In sum, the treatment seems to be effective in generating negative pocketbook emotions in France and Germany, but not in the US. The patterns lend some initial support to Hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 2, however, does not perform well on this level of analysis. The conjectured negative effect could not be observed in any country.

3.6 | Treatment effects by socio-economic group

As indicated earlier, treatment effects can be expected to differ across socio-economic groups. Figure 2 therefore shows predictions of anger levels by experimental condition in these groups (based on regressions of anger on



FIGURE 2 Average pocketbook anger by country, socio-economic group and experimental condition with 95% confidence intervals.

Note: Labels in the graph present marginal effects of the treatment (*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$). Category "Top" in "Subjective status FR" dropped because of low cases numbers ($n = 9$)

the treatment indictor, the respective categorical group variable and their interaction). The marginal effects of the treatment by group are included as labels (see also Figure A1).

A first observation is that for all countries and variables, there is a clear socio-economic gradient. Unsurprisingly, the gradient is less clear for income quintiles, which is a rather crude measure and, compared to the subjective indicators, further away in the causal chain producing pocketbook anger. The fact that pocketbook anger does show the expected distribution should increase trust in the variable. Moreover, I would argue that the magnitude of the differences is important descriptive information in its own right. It suggests that citizens with unfavorable socio-economic positions experience considerable anger (and probably tend to externalize blame), even in the control group. Again, it might be possible that exposure to anti-elite rhetoric outside the experiment has contributed to this (which would lead to an underestimation of its effect in the experiment).

Turning to treatment effects by socio-economic group, there are some differences across contexts. But a general observation is that treatment effects do not decrease linearly with socio-economic position and that anger effects are far from being restricted to the bottom segments. In most cases, treatment effects do not differ significantly across groups.[2] In France, they are actually strikingly homogenous. The only exceptions are high subjective positions (interestingly, French participants were reluctant to place themselves in the two highest status categories; they only comprised nine cases and had to be dropped from the analysis). Hence, it seems that there is considerable potential for pocketbook anger across society and that the emotion measurement is flexible enough to capture the probably quite different sources of anger in the middle and the lower classes. In this context, it should be borne in mind that populism in France is spread across the political spectrum. This means that it could be easier to link the generic anti-elite rhetoric used in the experiment to different economic grievances, such as poverty or excessive taxation.

In Germany, treatment effects are only significant in the middle segments on the subjective scales (although the differences to the bottom segment are insignificant) and homogenous across income quintiles. Hence, also in Germany the middle class shows a clear tendency to respond to anti-elite rhetoric with pocketbook anger. The lack of significance in the lower segments of the subjective scales could partly be explained by lower cases numbers.

The finding regarding the middle class also holds for the US, but in a narrower and less consistent way. Here, we only observe a significant treatment effect among respondents in the second lowest category of subjective living conditions ("Difficult") and in the second lowest income decile. Hence, in the US it is only the lower middle class that shows some anger response.

In sum, there are some country differences in the socio-economic profile of respondents susceptible to pocketbook anger. Overall, the anger response is strikingly uniform in France and Germany and mostly absent in the US. The consistent finding across countries is that the lower middle class expresses more anger after having been exposed to populist rhetoric (with significant effects in eight out of nine models).

The equivalent of Figure 2 for shame as a dependent variable is shown in the Appendix (Figure A2). Taken together, there is no support for Hypothesis 2 in it. There are only few significant effects and among those few, most are clearly smaller in size than effects for anger. In fact, there is only one significant effect in the expected (negative) direction.

As a robustness check, Figure A1 in the Appendix compares marginal effects with and without control variables. This is relevant because the moderators are non-experimental and could capture unobserved heterogeneity. To reduce such potential bias, additional models control for age (square), dummies for gender, university, degree, and employment, self-placement on the left-right scale, political interest, residence in cities and country-specific region dummies. As can be seen from Figure A1, the marginal effects do not differ meaningfully across models with and without control variables. In a second step, responses to the anti-elite statements in the treatment are controlled for additionally. In many cases, effects become slightly stronger when anti-elite attitudes are controlled for, but the overall picture changes little.

Finally, one might ask if the socio-economic categories emphasized in this article are the only relevant comparison. An additional possibility—that can only be explored briefly here—is that political orientations moderate



FIGURE 3 Average pocketbook anger by country, political preference and experimental condition with 95% confidence intervals.

Note: Labels in the graph present marginal effects of the treatment (*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$). Left-right categories recoded from continuous 0–10 scale (Left: 0–3; Centre: 4–6; Right: 7–10). Party preferences refer to (a) France: Vote choice in first round of 2017 legislative election; (b) Germany: Vote choice in 2017 federal election; (c) USA: Party identification

the treatment. Figure 3 presents treatment effects by political leaning (left-right scale and party preferences, see figure note for details). It shows that there are indeed important differences. A result that stands out is that in Germany, voters of the right-wing populist *Alternative für Deutschland* (AfD) are extremely susceptible to the anti-elite frame. They show a highly significant treatment effect of around 17 (voting for "Other" parties and right-wing ideology have equally large effects in Germany). At the same time, AfD voters' bottom line anger is much lower than among French voters of *Rassemblent National* (who show a smaller but still significant treatment effect). A reason could be that German voters have not (yet) internalized to the same extent the still fairly recent anti-elite rhetoric of the radical right. Another striking finding is the clear treatment effect among voters of the traditional German center parties (CDU and SPD). This bolsters the interpretation that the middle of society is not immune to pocketbook anger. Similar observations can be made for voters of *En marche* in France or with a centrist ideology in the US (where there are, again, few significant effects). Finally, it is noteworthy that respondents who abstain or do not support any party ("none") tend to respond with anger. This could point to a mobilizing effect of anti-elite rhetoric among the apathetic.

Treatment effects by ideology show a similar pattern. In France, there are significant effects across the ideological spectrum. In Germany, there is a particularly strong effect on the political right, which is consistent with the observation for AfD voters. Interestingly, centrist voters in the US show a significant effect. Given the null results in the breakdown by party preferences, it is difficult, however, to provide a firm interpretation of this finding. Overall, political commitments appear to be more important moderators of the treatment effects than socio-economic position.

4 | DISCUSSION

Taken together, the analyses support Hypothesis 1. Anti-elite rhetoric in many cases has a causal influence on pocketbook anger. Regarding the research question of *who* becomes angry, there was rather consistent evidence for anger susceptibility in the (lower) middle classes. This fits into narratives of a "shrinking," "anxious," or "squeezed" middle (e.g., Mols & Jetten, 2017). But it should also be borne in mind that respondents at the bottom of the distribution already expressed much stronger anger in the control group, a phenomenon that deserves attention in future research.

A caveat in the present analyses was the strong correlation between negative emotions that are conceptually distinct. It might be that this relates to a weakness of measuring emotions with verbal markers whose meaning depends on the context. It could also be specific to the present topic of socio-economic status. Respondents might find it difficult (or might not be sufficiently motivated) to differentiate their complex pocketbook-related emotions in the context of a survey. The choice only to include negative emotions might have facilitated an undifferentiated response pattern even further. Interestingly, Aytaç et al. (in press) in a related study made a similar observation when their blame treatment simultaneously (and counter-intuitively) triggered anger *and* guilt among the unemployed (see their footnote 7). Finally, the shame mechanism might apply only to cases of intense socio-economic problems that were not captured by the rather abstract measurement in this article.[3] Generally, more research on negative pocketbook emotions is necessary. For this analysis, the strong correlations might raise concerns about whether anger really captured negative valence. However, as shown above, for anger there were considerably stronger and more consistent effects than for any other negative emotion. This suggests that the results are, to some extent, unique for anger.

As was to be expected, treatment effects on pocketbook anger differed across countries. It is tempting to interpret these differences in light of the countries' variants of real-world populism, but there certainly are many factors at play. In France, where the data collection coincided with the populist yellow-vest riots, where mainstream parties imploded in the 2017 elections and where populist mobilization is spread across the left-right continuum, treatment effects could be observed in most socio-economic groups. Again, it seems plausible that in this context respondents were relatively free to project a diverse array of economic problems on the abstract anti-elite attribution. In Germany, populism's arrival at the core of the party system is more recent and is mostly associated with the radical right. This could contribute to a context where it is easier for the middle class than for the most disadvantaged citizens to use anti-elitism as a re-attribution device.

The US was the case with the weakest treatment effects. It is not unreasonable to speculate that this might have something to do with the populist tendencies of the incumbent president. First, populists in power could simply weaken the treatment, because respondents get confused about whom exactly the label "Politicians in Washington" refer to. Second, the process of re-attribution gets complicated, because even supporters of populism have to ask themselves to what extent the "establishment" or the current populist government should be blamed. Third, populist discourses might lose their quality as empty signifiers if they are associated with policy approaches, such as tax cuts for the wealthy or protectionism for specific industries. Fourth, populist rhetoric might be so prevalent in political discourses that respondents show weaker responses to it than elsewhere. To verify these speculations, we would have to know more about emotion and attribution dynamics among supporters of populists who move into office. It also should be mentioned that the non-findings for the US could be explained by cultural factors. It is often argued to be a society with comparatively strong commitment to economic self-reliance (Lamont, 2019). This could be an independent cultural factor weakening the readiness to externalize responsibility (Sniderman & Brody, 1977).

Finally, the non-finding for shame merits discussion. As already explained in the beginning, shame is not easy to measure. This is certainly true for the type of shame the present argument emphasizes: the largely unconscious self-degradation through accepting economic failure as one's own fault. It might be that the used shame measurement of simply asking people about it is too naive. Of course, it might very well be that the argument about populism as shame coping is flawed. However, given the methodological limitations of the present paper, alternative (and probably more indirect) measures should be applied before dismissing it. This is even more so as

the high baseline levels of anger could be interpreted as suggestive evidence that some shame repression along the theorized lines has taken place already in real-world politics.

5 | CONCLUSIONS

This article has three messages that future research on the micro-political implications of socio-economic problems should take into account. First, people's pocketbook is a deeply emotional matter. Far into the middle classes, many respondents attached intense negative emotions to their financial situations. This does not necessarily keep them from considering material aspects, but it suggests that such cognitive factors have to compete with powerful affective influences. Given what we know from the psychology of emotions, this can have profound moderating effects on *behavior*. Anger might be precisely what makes the difference between mobilizing and de-mobilizing tendencies resulting from socio-economic problems (Aytaç et al., in press). This potential need not be cast in a positive light, because anger could simultaneously foster problematic tendencies towards harsher attitudes and polarization (Banks & Valentino, 2012; Suhay & Erisen, 2018; Webster, 2018). Second, the findings suggest that discursive contexts can influence the political meaning of socio-economic problems. Studying the interplay of discourse, emotion, attribution, and political behavior certainly is a relevant avenue for research in this area. Anti-elite populism arguably is only one example for a discourse that matters in this regard. And even for populism, this article has only started to tease apart the mechanisms through which it influences the emotional dynamic of personal finances. Third, we should not treat socio-economic position as a linear construct and assume that people in the absolute bottom are the most politically alienated. Rather, this research reinforces worries about the political integration of relatively deprived middle classes in advanced capitalist societies. Of course, pocketbook anger does not amount to political alienation and its behavioral manifestations still have to be established. However, it does seem plausible that the responsiveness to the treatment in this study does indicate considerable economic frustration paired with a willingness to blame politicians for it. How the middle class links current and anticipated economic grievances to politics is a critical question—scientifically and socially. An important gap in the present article is that such grievances were not measured directly. Future research should zoom in on this aspect and establish what exactly are the sources of pocketbook anger in different socio-economic groups.

Finally, the presented findings bear relevance for populism research as well. Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2018) have recently argued that debates about socio-economic determinants of populist appeal have reached an impasse. This is arguably the consequence of overly structuralist or simply vague conceptions of socio-economic factors (as illustrated by the losers-of-globalization debate). Departing from the psychological functions of jobs, money, and consumption might be a way out. If we take peoples' subjectivity seriously, we are forced to acknowledge that material rewards have no motivational force per se. Rather, they are linked to behaviors through complex, dynamic, and relational emotion processes. We are only beginning to understand how populists can benefit from *and* shape these processes.

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DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

The data that support the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author upon request.

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NOTES

[1] Pocketbook anger is a neologism inspired by the concept of "pocketbook voting" in the economic voting literature. I use it as a shorthand for anger about one's personal economic situation.

[2] The statistical comparison of groups is omitted for space reasons. The absence of treatment heterogeneity is documented by the strongly overlapping confidence intervals in Figure A1.

[3] Among respondents indicating (very) difficult living conditions, all emotions still load on a single factor and their correlations remain substantial.

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SUPPORTING INFORMATION

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ORIGINAL ARTICLE

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Occupational inequalities in volunteering participation: Using detailed data on jobs to explore the influence of habits and circumstances

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Abstract

In this paper we present empirical results that show that detailed occupations have distinctive patterns of association with voluntary participation. We draw upon data from four secondary survey datasets from the UK (coverage 1972–2012). Occupations are shown to link to volunteering in a wide range of scenarios and in individual, household, and longitudinal contexts. We argue that these linkages provide insight into social inequalities in volunteering, and that they can help us to understand the relative influence of "circumstance" and "habits" in enabling or inhibiting voluntary participation.

KEYWORDS
multilevel models, occupations, social class, social stratification, volunteering

1 | INTRODUCTION

Volunteering is an important component of the social fabric of contemporary wealthy countries. Services supported by volunteers provide contributions to a wide range of welfares, and are proactively encouraged by national and local governments (e.g., Ishkanian & Szreter, 2012). Voluntary organizations are also thought to enhance social cohesion and trust (e.g., Paxton, 2007), and to benefit volunteers, for instance with improved employability (e.g., Ellis Paine, McKay, & Moro, 2013; Kamerade & Ellis Paine, 2014; Wilson, Mantovan, & Sauer, 2019; Wilson & Musick, 2003) and well-being (e.g. Binder & Freytag, 2013; Konrath, 2012; Nichols & Ralston, 2011; Wheeler, Gorey, & Greenblatt, 1998). Nevertheless voluntary participation is socially structured. In general, formal volunteering—"giving unpaid help through groups, clubs or organisations to benefit other people or the environment" (Rochester,

Paine, & Howlett, 2010, p. 21, referring to the UK Citizenship Survey definition)—is more often undertaken by those with higher levels of education and those in more favorable socio-economic circumstances; by the younger and older rather than mid-aged; by women rather than by men; by host-country nationals rather than immigrants or ethnic minorities; and by those not living with disabilities (e.g., Alesina & La Ferrara, 2000; Dean, 2016; Lindsey & Mohan, 2018; Musick & Wilson, 2008; Rochester et al., 2010, c4; Shandra, 2017; Valentova & Alieva, 2018; Voicu & Serban, 2012; Wilson, 2000; Wilson & Musick, 1997). Some authors have highlighted issues of social inclusion in voluntary participation and explored strategies to reduce social inequalities in engagement (e.g., Rochester et al., 2010, c14).

Amongst other social inequalities, volunteering is associated with occupations. Wilson and Musick (1997) demonstrate that volunteering is more common for people in public sector occupations, for those in relatively more socio-economically advantaged occupations, and for those in occupations that provide skills relevant to the needs of specific volunteering roles (see also Kamerade 2009; Lengfeld & Ordemann, 2016; Paxton, 2007; Rotolo & Wilson, 2006). Based upon occupational indicators, many studies find that more advantaged jobs are associated with greater levels of volunteering, explained through greater flexibility and autonomy (Musick & Wilson, 2008); human capital (Wilson et al., 2019); and social connections (Wiertz, 2015).

Previous studies, however, have used quite simplistic measures of occupational status, most often operationalized as simply three or four categories based on high-level occupational classifications. Relatively more sociological information is captured by occupational data––in particular, recent interest in occupational "microclass" inequalities has shown that quite specific occupational differences are related to an array of social outcomes, grounded in the premise that occupations and their host organizations instil distinctive but consequential cultures and experiences upon their incumbents in a fine-grained manner (e.g., Weeden & Grusky, 2012). In the analysis that follows we show that enhanced insight about social inequalities in volunteering can be gained from using occupational information in more extended depth than has previously been common. In particular, we argue that data on occupations can help us better evaluate the relative roles of "circumstances" and "habits" as influences upon volunteering.

2 | HABITS, CIRCUMSTANCES AND OCCUPATIONS AS INFLUENCES UPON VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION

Recent longitudinal evidence has suggested that volunteering is often a stable, lifetime orientation, that is relatively robust to the vagaries of other life changes (e.g., Dawson, Baker, & Dowell, 2019; Lancee & Radl, 2014; McCulloch, 2014; Mohan & Bulloch, 2012; Taylor-Collins, Harrison, Thoma, & Moller, 2019). Likewise, sociological theories of volunteering often emphasize the influence of structural circumstances that may support or discourage volunteering and that tend to be largely stable over time—for instance, people's "human capital," such as their qualifications and occupational skills, and their "social resources," such as their networks and contacts (e.g., Wilson, 2000). In spite of this, policy-oriented literatures (and voluntary organizations themselves) often focus on the ways in which more localized and transient factors might encourage or discourage volunteering (e.g., Rochester et al., 2010, c14). As a device to foreground this divergence—and because we will argue that occupational data provide a helpful tool to study it—we suggest a conceptual distinction between "circumstances" and "habits" as influences upon voluntary participation.

"Circumstances" might be thought of as direct, tangible factors that can inhibit or enable an individual's ability to volunteer, but that are, in principle, readily changed (for individuals), or adapted to (by organizations). Time availability is often cited as an inhibiting "circumstance" in UK research, but many other barriers are also often mentioned (e.g., Low, Butt, Ellis Paine, & Davis Smith, 2007, as discussed in Rochester et al., 2010, pp. 193–200). Some barriers may be easy to recognize and communicate (for instance, childcare responsibilities, a lack of resources for transport, or a lack of knowledge about relevant opportunities). Some circumstances, however, may constitute barriers through a more indirect route (for instance, gender might inhibit participation if an organization uses gender-biased recruitment). Enabling "circumstances" may also facilitate volunteering—for instance, surplus

wealth to purchase relevant equipment; a privileged job that provides autonomy over working hours; a skill or capacity that enables a prospective contribution. Whatever the focus, we conceptualize circumstances as scenarios in which individual volunteering is responsive to specific lifestyle arrangements. Crucially, the relevant arrangements could be changed and/or adapted to: this may be through a personal change, such as young dependent children reaching school age; or through a change in organizational support, such as a transport subsidy.

We conceptualize "habits" by contrast as individuals' capacities, orientations, or propensities towards or against volunteering, which are maintained more or less irrespective of immediate lifestyle arrangements. Longitudinal evidence of persistent volunteering might suggest the influence of "habits." For instance, Dawson et al. (2019) decompose empirical persistence in volunteering and suggest that around two-thirds of it might be explained by "… unobserved heterogeneity or underlying behaviours of individuals," propensities akin to what we label as "habits" (see also Lancee & Radl, 2014). The development of volunteering as a habit is also supported by Taylor-Collins et al. (2019), who show that habits of social action formed by adolescents are predictive of their participation. "Habits" themselves may be substantially shaped by social background—for instance, values ingrained in childhood. Dean (2016) argues that the Bourdieusian concept of "habitus" (often understood as a person's structurally driven, learned social orientations) influences voluntary participation (although we prefer the term "habits" to avoid implying a specifically Bourdieusian approach). "Habits" could also include quite personalized or psychological factors—for instance, Rochester et al. (2010) argue that some individuals don't volunteer because they lack the self-confidence and self-esteem to believe that they could make a useful contribution.

If the difference between circumstances and habits as influences upon voluntary participation is worth investigating, our key argument is that detailed occupational data can make a useful contribution to this end. The social sciences in general, and the UK in particular, benefit from access to many larger scale secondary survey and administrative microdata resources that include data on organized voluntary participation (e.g., Li, 2015), and, amongst other information, detailed occupational records (that is, relatively fine-grained information on occupational titles, such as the 400 or so categories of a standardized occupational taxonomy). As far as we are aware, detailed occupational data hasn't previously been extensively analysed in terms of voluntary participation, but it might shed insight on volunteering in two ways.

First, detailed measures might often be the best available empirical proxy for other important influences. Occupations link to numerous important inequalities of experience that may influence volunteering. These include, but are not necessarily limited to, inequalities in socio-economic advantage; educational and training background; flexibility and autonomy in working activities and time use; circumstances of security or precarity; social networks and social capital; volume of and control over leisure time; demographic circumstances; and even systematic patterns in health and well-being (e.g., Oesch, 2013; Rose & Harrison, 2010). In principle, such factors could be directly measured in a social survey instrument, and their influence disentangled from others. Nevertheless, in practice, many such concepts may not be measured directly at all, or even if they are, they may be measured or analysed imperfectly; accordingly rich occupational data might often capture their indirect influence.

A second way that occupations might link to voluntary participation is if occupations define important social entities characterized by a shared cultural milieu. Previous studies in the microclass tradition have shown that occupational institutions that are otherwise very similar in terms of objective work arrangements still show residual differences in their empirical patterns, a finding that has been attributed to the shared cultural orientations and lifestyles of those in that occupation (e.g., Weeden & Grusky, 2012). For our purposes, therefore, if an occupation has a distinctive pattern of voluntary participation that does not seem to be the proxy function of another factor, it is plausible that the pattern reflects the influence of the shared cultural milieu of the incumbents of that occupation. To give an example, our results suggest that several occupations linked to the finance sector in the UK (bank managers, financial managers, marketing managers, sales representatives) have, net of controls, average or above average voluntary participation, but below average levels of civic participation, and below average patterns in sustaining voluntary participation through time (Table 6). This interesting pattern might suggest the influence in these domains of an individualistic work culture—perhaps people in these occupations will often make voluntary inputs when it suits them, but will steer clear of sustained commitments, memberships, or obligations.

As illustrated in the example above, detailed occupational data may provide enough information to support reasonable "post hoc" interpretations of the sociological mechanisms driving an empirical pattern. That is, given a distinctive association between participation and a detailed occupational code (net of other controls), it might be reasonable to speculate about the underlying mechanism that accounts for this relationship, given other knowledge about the occupation in question. Confident adjudication may require further analysis, perhaps with new controls for other direct measures, and there may be a good case for undertaking supplementary qualitative analysis to investigate further (e.g., Friedman & Laurison, 2019; Harding & Seefeldt, 2013). Critically, however, measures of detailed occupations may provide an efficient tool to identify (perhaps unanticipated) statistical patterns in volunteering.

Whether occupational data is helpful in this domain will hinge upon two empirical questions that frame the research analysis that follows. First is whether detailed occupational data does provide significant improvements in statistical fit in predicting outcomes related to organized voluntary participation, net of other controls. Second is whether differences between specific occupations in their relationships to organized voluntary participation can help us to suggest and adjudicate between plausible mechanisms that influence voluntary participation. As we will illustrate in the analyses below, we believe that there is a compelling argument that occupational data can readily be used to provide new ideas about the relative influence of "habits" and "circumstances" upon voluntary participation.

3 | DATA AND METHODS

Table 1 summarizes the four secondary datasets from which we present results. Each study is designed to support analysis that is nationally representative (subject to adjustments for sample design and response). It is useful to use multiple datasets because they span several different measurements of voluntary participation, as it is recognized that the way in which voluntary participation is recorded can be consequential to results (e.g., Rooney, Steinberg, & Schervish, 2004). In addition, the datasets span several different measures of occupations and by including the Oxford Social Mobility Inquiry (SMI, see University of Oxford and Oxford Social Mobility Group, 1978), the datasets span the UK from 1972 to 2012.[1] Two of the datasets, the British Household Panel Study (BHPS, see University of Essex and Institute for Social and Economic Research, 2010) and the Understanding Society study (also known as UK Household Longitudinal Study, UKHLS, see University of Essex and Institute for Social and Economic Research, 2018) include extensive longitudinal data on many respondents, which we can use to summarize trajectories of voluntary participation over time. Extracts from the BHPS, UKHLS, and Home Office Citizenship Survey (HOCS, see Home Office, 2006) have been used in previous studies of patterns of voluntary participation (e.g. Dawson et al., 2019; Kamerade, 2009; Kitchen, Michaelson, Wood, & John, 2006;

TABLE 1 Summary of datasets

	Data on volunteering	Data on occupations	Years used
British Household Panel Study (BHPS)	Volunteering activity (waves 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18); Association memberships (waves 1–5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 17);	SOC90 (3-digit, 363 units in data)	1991–2008
Understanding Society (UKHLS)	Volunteering activity (waves 2, 4); Association membership (w3)	SOC2000 (4-digit, 352 units)	2010–2012
Home Office Citizenship Survey (HOCS)	Volunteering activity and association membership (with detailed data on types of activity/organization (2001, 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10)	SOC2000 (4-digit in 2005, 331 units in data (2-digit in other years))	2005
Oxford Social Mobility Inquiry (SMI)	Association memberships	CO-1970 (3-digit, 220 units in data)	1972

Mohan & Bulloch, 2012) and civic association membership (e.g., Li, 2015; Li, Savage, & Pickles, 2003; Li, Savage, Tampubolon, Warde, & Tomlinson, 2002; Sturgis, Patulny, Allum, & Buscha, 2015).

Table 2 and Figures 1–3 summarize measures related to voluntary participation that we use. These are derived from various available indicators in the datasets. Table 2 summarizes a direct question on voluntary participation for the BHPS—responses are analysed as an ordinal outcome in statistical models. As we use multiple waves of the BHPS, we can use more than one answer from the same individual over different years—the first column in Table 2

TABLE 2 Volunteering participation questions in BHPS and HOCS

BHPS (1996, 98, 2000, 02, 04, 06, 08)			HOCS (2005)	% yes
"lactl", "How often....do you do unpaid voluntary work?"				
% of records				
% ever in categ.				
At least once a week	5.2	10.7	Civic participation in last 12 months	35
At least once a month	3.9	9.6	Informal help in last 12 months	65
Several times a year	5.1	12.3	Formal volunteering in last 12 months	41
Once a year or less	6.2	16.8	Employer volunteering in last 12 months	9
Never/almost never	79.6	90.2	Formal, informal or employer vol. in last month	73
N records (people)	55,718 (16,955)		Formal, informal or employer vol. in last month	49
			Categories derived from detailed measures of type and level of activity (e.g., 13 forms of civic activity, 12 types of informal help, etc).	



FIGURE 1 Regularity of volunteering for BHPS respondents. Figure shows volume of respondents by the proportion of BHPS waves in which they reported the relevant participation (sample limited to those present for 3 of more waves when relevant questions were asked—approx. 12k respondents on volunteering and 15k on association membership)



FIGURE 2 Individual, household, and alter volunteering patterns in the BHPS. Figure shows the proportion of respondents personally engaged in voluntary participation, and the proportion of respondents living in households where either any household member is engaged in voluntary participation (including themselves), or where a household sharer ("alter") is engaged in volunteering



FIGURE 3 Civic association memberships in the UK, 1972–2011

shows the breakdown of responses from all valid records (55,718, from 16,955 different individuals), whilst the second column shows what percentage of the 16,955 people were ever recorded in that category, in any year that they answered the question. The HOCS and UKHLS have similar but not identical questions about participation (the UKHLS measure is sufficiently similar that our analysis used a post-hoc harmonization designed to mimic the BHPS measure[2]). Table 2 also summarizes derived measures based upon the HOCS questions on voluntary activity. The HOCS has extensive information on civic participation and volunteering (as well as numerous supplementary questions about these activities that we did not exploit). "Civic participation" (for instance, membership of a club or society) is an important category of data on voluntary participation, and the BHPS, UKHLS, and SMI surveys feature similar (but not identical) questions covering civic participation (see, e.g., Figure 3).

Forms of voluntary participation are many and varied, and our measures do not necessarily assess all nuances of volunteering patterns. Like most literature, our analysis is weighted towards evidence on formal volunteering, which is also traditionally the focus of policy makers and volunteer-involving organizations (Williams, 2003). However, while the measures used by HOCS specifically distinguish formal and informal volunteering (Table 2), and the survey questions on civic participation will by definition involve an organization, the questions on active volunteering that we use from the BHPS and UKHLS (e.g., Table 2) do not unambiguously distinguish whether an external organization is involved.

Figures 1 and 2 summarize how variations over time and across households in selected questions across the datasets were analysed. For those who answered the same question in 3 or more years within the BHPS, longitudinal profiles of voluntary participation were summarized according to the proportion of time points in which individuals engaged in voluntary activities. As is evident from Figure 1, the "civic cor" (Mohan & Bulloch, 2012) of people who are regular and persistent over time in their voluntary participation is quite small (14%, 11% and 3% for association membership, "some volunteering" and "weekly volunteering", respectively), and there are generally as many or more respondents who contribute occasional volunteering that is not as persistent through time. This implies that measures based on longitudinal trajectories of volunteering have the potential to reveal different participation inequalities than those based only upon current behaviors.

Since all adults resident in a responding household are interviewed in the BHPS and UKHLS, for these datasets we were also able to construct measures indicative of responses on volunteering in the household as a whole. Figure 2 illustrates a measure indicating whether or not anyone in the household records the relevant participation, and, for residents of multi-person households, whether or not somebody else in the household participates. Both of these measures are of interest because it is plausible that aspects of an individual's occupation could foster circumstances or habits that influence the voluntary participation not just of themselves, but of their household sharers—an important sociological context that arguably deserves more research attention (e.g., Steele, Clarke, & Kuha, 2019).

Figure 3 summarizes data on civic association membership in the UK as recorded on the SMI, BHPS, and UKHLS. The surveys capture data on membership of different types of organization but most of our analyses use a single derived indicator, of whether or not respondents were members of any of the following types of civic organizations (ranked in order of the most common): religious groups; parents' associations; voluntary service groups; community groups; political parties; tenants' groups; and environmental groups. Data was also available on memberships of trade unions, other labor related organizations, organizations about gender, and sports organizations, but we excluded these from our derived measure (following Sturgis et al., 2015, on the grounds that these organizations represent "isolated" forms of civic participation which differ from other domains of participation). We considered several alternative categorizations of organizations, but variations in the results in terms of which operationalization was used seemed minimal. Although the components of association membership are similar across the surveys, the fluctuations in Figure 3 suggest that there could be artefactual differences between the three surveys in the way association membership patterns are reported.

To analyze the survey data, we fit statistical models where the outcome is a measure of voluntary participation.[3] Most models include an array of commonly used "control variables" covering socio-demographic and socio-economic characteristics, as described in the outputs below.[4] Descriptive statistics on all variables used in each analysis, and "Log files" giving supplementary details, including background information on the operationalization of measures, full details of the occupational codes, and additional details on statistical models, are posted online.[5]

In all models we consider whether parameters that capture occupation-to-occupation variations contribute to an improvement in model fit, compared to comparable models that don't allow for occupational patterns. The occupational influence is usually measured by allowing "random effects" for occupations in the detailed unit groups associated with the dataset (see Table 1, Column 3). Random effects models provide a convenient tool for assessing variations between occupations as well as for retrieving statistics on individual occupations in terms of their model-based residuals.[6] We are often interested in "random intercepts" associated with occupations: evidence

that, net of other things in the model, a specific occupation stands out as being above or below average on the outcome. In some scenarios it is also of interest to test for "random slopes" with occupational variations: evidence that, net of other controls, specific occupations are linked to an above- or below-average impact of another explanatory variable in its influence on participation.

4 | RESULTS

Figures 4, 5 and Table 3 summarize patterns of association between occupational unit groups and data about voluntary participation. Without taking account of any other measured factors, we see a modest but statistically significant association across a range of datasets and a variety of measures related to voluntary participation. Figures 4 and 5, for instance, shows plots of "Empirical Bayes" residuals for random effects for occupations in models predicting voluntary engagements. If the points are above or below zero, this indicates that incumbents of the occupation show, on average, greater or lesser levels of voluntary activity than the overall population (the vertical lines show plausible margins of error around those point estimates—if the lines do not overlap zero, we conventionally conclude that these are occupations whose incumbents have distinctively different patterns of engagement compared to the population as a whole). In these figures, the size of the points is proportional to the



FIGURE 4 Bivariate associations between volunteering and occupations, UK 2009. Graph shows residuals for specific occupations and voluntary engagement using UKHLS from 2009; circles mark the residual value and the vertical lines are 95% error bars for the residual; the size of the points is proportional to the number of respondents in the occupation, and the shading is darker the higher the occupation's CAMSIS score [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]



FIGURE 5 Bivariate associations between civic participation and occupations, UK 1972. Graph shows residuals for specific occupations by civic association membership for Oxford Mobility Survey 1972; other features as per Figure 4 [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

TABLE 3 Bivariate and conditional relationships between volunteering and occupations

Description	Data	ICC with occupations (*100)	ICC net of CAMSIS (*100)
(1) Any voluntary engagement (binary)	UKHLS, most recent[a]	8.5	3.1
	BHPS, most recent[a]	9.1	4.0
	BHPS, 1991–2008[a]	5.4	1.9
	ESS 2002	4.2	1.9
	HOCS 2005	5.5	2.6
(2) Level of voluntary engagement (ordered)	UKHLS, most recent[a]	8.6	3.2
	BHPS, most recent[a]	8.7	4.1
(3) (1) regularly over time… (in top quartile)	BHPS, most recent[a]	12.9	7.4
(…in top quartile)	BHPS, 1991–2008[a]	6.9	1.3
(…ordered scale for regularity)	BHPS, most recent[a]	9.9	4.3
(4) Any volunteering in household (2)	UKHLS, most recent[a]	5.8	2.5
	BHPS, most recent[a]	4.7	2.5
(5) Any vol. by alters in household (2)	UKHLS, most recent[a]	4.8	2.4
	BHPS, most recent[a]	4.1	1.6
(6) Any organizational membership (binary)	UKHLS, most recent[a]	4.5	1.3
	BHPS, most recent[a]	11.5	6.2
	SMI 1972	9.6	8.0
(7) As (6), excluding "isolate" orgs.	UKHLS, most recent[a]	9.1	3.9
	BHPS, most recent[a]	11.2	5.7
	BHPS, 1991–2008[a]	9.0	4.1
	SMI 1972	7.2	2.8
(8) Numb. of memberships as (7) (count)	UKHLS, most recent[a]	7.8	3.8
	BHPS, most recent[a]	10.8	5.4
	SMI 1972	5.4	1.9

Note: In all models, occupational-level random effects significantly improve model fit.

[a]BHPS and UKHLS figures may be shown either for "most recent" (most recent record with valid measure—UKHLS, N = 31,246; BHPS, N approx = 15k), or for all valid records in dataset, including multiple records per respondent (approx. 150k records from 20k respondents, using weights to deflate influence of repeated measures).

number of respondents in the occupation, and the shading is a function of the CAMSIS score for the occupation (see Lambert & Griffiths, 2018; darker shading implies a higher CAMSIS score, indicating an occupation whose incumbents enjoy more advantaged circumstances in the structure of social stratification). The patterns shown correspond to 8.5% and 7.2%, respectively, of the estimated proportions of variance in volunteering patterns that is associated with systematic differences between occupations (i.e., intra-cluster correlations of 0.085 and 0.072)—see Table 3. Indeed, the patterns suggested in Figures 4 and 5 seem to extend across a wide range of scenarios in the relationship between occupations and voluntary participation. Across the datasets described above, we have information on many different measures of participation, across a number of time points, and in all the cases that we have explored, comparable levels of association have been revealed—Table 3, Column 1, summarizes bivariate associations from selected permutations.

The description above concerns the bivariate relationship between occupations and volunteering, but some of that association seems to reflect an occupation's social stratification position. Arguably, detailed occupations are only important if some of their associations with volunteering persist net of controls for easily-measured heterogeneities that occupations might proxy. Table 3, Column 2, shows the occupational intra-cluster correlation (ICC) that persists net of a direct control for the CAMSIS score of the occupation. There is a substantial decline in

TABLE 4 Statistical models predicting levels of voluntary participation, with various specifications for occupational controls

	Level of voluntary activity (UKHLS, ordered logit)					Voluntary participation (HOCS, binary logit)	
	1a	1b	1c	1d	1e	2a	2b
Regression coefficient z-statistics							
Female	3.4*	1.5	0.5	1.1	0.7	4.1*	3.8*
Age in years	−13.1*	−5.8*	−5.1*	−4.8*	−6.7*	−2.5*	−2.4*
Age in years squared	13.6*	6.5*	5.3*	5.0*	6.8*	1.1	1.1
Female*Age						3.1*	2.9*
Married or cohabiting	8.8*	7.8*	4.3*	4.2*	4.9*		
Education score	17.9*	15.6*	17.8*	17.8*	19.5*	10.5*	9.1*
Occupational CAMSIS score	12.1*	8.2*	10.1*	10.6*	2.0*	4.0*	3.3*
Female*CAMSIS	−3.1*	−1.5					
Work is in Public Sector	8.4*	6.8*	6.2*	5.8*	6.1*		
Weekly working hours			−12.1*	−9.9*	−13.3*		
Works non-standard hours			3.0*	3.1*	3.6*		
Weekly hours spent caring			2.0*	2.2*	2.3*		
Weekly hours on housework			3.0*	2.3*	2.6*		
Female*housework hours			−3.7*	−3.0*	−3.5*		
Has children in hhld aged 0–4			−11.1*	−10.4*	−10.9*		
Has children in hhld aged 5–18			9.9*	9.0*	9.9*		
Average minutes spent travelling to work			−2.7*	−1.9	−2.6*		
Occupational random or fixed effects parameters							
Occ.-level intercept variance		0.045*	0.030*	0.041*			0.074*
% occ.-level variance (ICC*100)		1.4					
Occ.-level slope variance			0.004*	0.008*			0.003*
Fixed effects partial *r*−2					0.012		
Other model statistics							
N cases	40,390	40,390	40,390	38,143	40,390	4,116	4,116
N occupations	347	347	347	347	347	324	324
Deviance	35,687	35,647	35,261	*n*/a	34,804	4,043	4,031

*Parameter is statistically significant at 95% threshold. Models based on analysis of UKHLS data on individuals in paid work in waves 2 or 4 (approx. 2011–2014) (with weights to adjust for multiple records per person); and on HOCS data for 2005 for adults in paid work. "Random slope" in UKHLS is with the "hours of work" variable; in HOCS, it is with the education score variable. Model 1d uses sampling weights, other models do not.

TABLE 5 Statistical models predicting voluntary engagement with various specifications for occupational controls

	Voluntary association membership (UKHLS, binary logit)			Voluntary participation....	
				...of Alter in BHPS hh.	...for % of BHPS waves
	3a	3b	3c	4a	5a
Regression coefficient z-statistics					
Female	3.2*	1.3	1.3	−6.3*	−0.3
Age in years	3.7*	3.7*	3.9*	−3.0*	4.6*
Age in years squared	−1.6	−1.6	−1.8	3.8*	
Married or cohabiting	5.7*	5.6*	5.5*	−7.4*	
Education score	21.2*	19.0*	19.0*	9.8*	11.8*
Occupational CAMSIS score	7.8*	6.9*	6.6*	4.9*	7.8*
Female*CAMSIS	−1.2	−0.1	−0.1		
Weekly working hours	−11.1*	−11.2*	−10.1	−3.9*	−5.3*
Weekly hours spent caring	3.9*	3.6*	3.6*		
Has children in hhld aged 0–4	3.6*	3.6*	3.5*	−3.3*	0.6
Has children in hhld aged 5–18	15.3*	15.0*	14.8*	9.3*	5.9*
Average minutes spent travelling to work	1.1	1.6	1.7	−1.6	−2.4*
Sense of self-worth	3.6*	3.5*	3.6*		
Occ.-level intercept variance		0.056*	0.045*	0.038*	0.213*
Occupation-level slope variance			0.013*		0.069*
% occ.-level variance(ICC*100)		1.7		1.1	
N cases	23,389	23,389	23,389	10,130	12,915
N occupations		350	350	354	340
Deviance	24,312	24,242	24,220	11,705	

*Parameter is statistically significant at 95% threshold. Models 3a–c use UKHLS, unweighted, most recent valid record. Models 4a and 5a use BHPS, unweighted, most recent valid record. Model 4a predicts if any of household sharers have any level of voluntary participation, only for people living in a household with one or more adult alter. Model 5a models proportion of occasions over BHPS lifetime that reports volunteering (only for respondents to 3 or more BHPS waves). Random slope for Model 3c is with weekly working hours; for Model 5a with education score.

the ICC value (compared to Column 1), which indicates that much of the bivariate association is indeed about the social advantage of the occupation. Moreover, the ICCs in Column 2 remain modest but statistically significant.

Indeed, evidence of the distinctive influence of occupations is reinforced when more elaborate statistical models are specified. Tables 4 and 5 show results from selected models that use controls for several other factors that might be linked to voluntary participation and occupations. Most models use "random effects" parameters to allow for occupation-to-occupation variation in the outcomes.[7] The key observation at this point is that, even net of a wide range of controls, the random effects parameters for occupational variation are consistently associated with a significant improvement in model fit.[8] Some of these models also test occupational "random slopes," which evaluate the substantively interesting hypothesis that the impact of another explanatory factor upon voluntary participation varies significantly from occupation to occupation—in Models 1c, 1d, and 3c, this is seen to be the

case for the effect of weekly working hours on participation level; in Models 2b and 5a, for the influence of educational score.

We have shown that detailed occupations have some empirical connection to voluntary participation, but can this relationship be leveraged to gain more useful insights? By adding parameters for detailed occupational variations, one possibility is that the other coefficients in statistical models predicting volunteering might change in a consequential way. Some such examples are evident in Tables 4 and 5,[9] where we can point to modest changes in parameters that emerge when we control for occupational variations with random effects—for instance, a lessened direct influence of gender and of occupational and educational scores. Such changes mean that the appropriate control for occupations could modify our substantive story: it is plausible that the larger estimated influences of gender, education, and occupational advantage were spurious, but are now more appropriately estimated, once we have controlled for the more nuanced relationships with fine-grained occupations.

Another possibility is that individual occupations may emerge that are associated with a distinctive pattern of above- or below-average voluntarism. Such evidence could be both descriptively and analytically useful in understanding voluntarism: descriptively, such as by identifying pockets of society with unusual patterns of volunteering; analytically, if the occupational pattern could be given a useful theoretical interpretation. In Figure 5, for example, one of the largest occupations with a statistically significant positive residual (the large dark circle in the top right of image) are CODOT category 193 ("Primary and secondary school teachers"). This suggests that among men in 1972 (the sample survey was given only to males), teaching was unusually often associated with civic association memberships. This pattern might be consistent with a few hypotheses about voluntary engagement: perhaps it reflects a "habit" associated with teachers, such as pro-social cultural orientation; or perhaps a "circumstance" such as an enabling factor (say, if male teachers in 1972 had more spare time and flexibility than most other occupations). Figure 5, however, summarizes bivariate patterns, and more compelling evidence might emerge from examining the occupation-level residuals in random effects models that have ample controls for other factors.

Table 6 shows some of the occupations that stand out, in different scenarios, as having distinctively higher or lower levels of voluntarism compared to average and net of controls. A first notable point—already implicit in previous results—is that these occupations exist at all. Even though the overall empirical association between volunteering and occupations is modest rather than strong, we have found that standard secondary survey datasets are sufficiently powerful as to allow us to identify important social groups (occupations) that have distinctively above- or below-average patterns in voluntary engagement, net of a range of standard individual controls (age, gender, marital and family status, and broad characteristics of educational attainment and economic activities). A more powerful result, however, might arise if we believe that some of the occupations that emerge in Table 6 (or indeed, that emerge in other analyses aside from those that we have presented here), lead us to new and meaningful insights about the social determinants of volunteering. We believe this is the case—one example was highlighted in the preceding discussion, in the dual pattern of above-average one-off volunteering, but below average association membership and sustained volunteering, linked to several jobs in finance.

One interesting pattern in the "random slopes" results in Table 6 (i.e., the occupations with heightened or lessened effects of working hours or education) seems apparent in the patterns associated with educational effects. Across a handful of examples, there seems to be some pattern that occupations that tend to be more educationally homogenous (such as traditional professions) are characterized by a less positive individual level educational effect upon volunteering; in some occupations whose incumbents do not necessarily have high levels of education but that can be more heterogeneous in terms of formal education, individual educational background matters more. Further analysis might be necessary to substantiate this pattern, but the apparent suggestion is that in some occupations, only those individuals with higher levels of education will tend to volunteer, and in other occupations, the impact of individual education matters much less. Pragmatically, such findings might provide valuable market intelligence for stakeholders in the third sector.

What seems to us the most interesting pattern, in Table 6 and further results, concerns a post-hoc rationalization related to how "pro-social" occupations are. In Table 6, it is perhaps surprising to notice several examples

TABLE 6 Selected occupations with extreme residuals (net of standard controls) in random effects models of voluntary participation

	Above average voluntary participation…	Below average voluntary participation…
UKHLS (Table 4, Model 1b)	Senior officials in NGOs*; Housing officers; Educational assistants; Waiters; *Production managers; Personnel managers; Financial institution managers; Youth workers; Housing officers; Office assistants; Bar staff*	Software professionals; Medical practitioners; Secondary teachers; Primary teachers; Nurses; Cleaners
UKHLS (Table 4, Model 1c)	*Senior officials in NGOs**; Housing officers; *Educational assistants*; Waiters; *Production managers; Personnel managers; Financial institution managers; Youth workers; Housing officers; Office assistants; Sports assistants*; Bar staff*	Medical practitioners; Secondary teachers; Primary teachers; Nurses; Cleaners
HOCS (Table 4, Model 2b)	*Production managers*; Metal workers**	*Nurses*; Sales assistants; Kitchen assistants*; Cleaners**
	Above average civic association membership…	Below average…
UKHLS (Table 5, Model 3c)	Clergy*; Care assistants; Childminders*; Educational assistants; Waiters; *Primary teachers; Housing officers; Civil service administrators; Nursery nurses; Security guards*	*Marketing managers; Management consultants; Sales reps.; Motor mechanics; Sales assistants; Postal workers; Kitchen assistants*
	Above average persistent volunteering over time…	Below average…
BHPS (Table 5, Model 5a)	Local government officers*; Farmers*; Police officers*; Educational assistants; *Personnel managers; primary teachers; accountants; social workers; Welfare workers; Secretaries; Catering assistants**	Software engineers; Filing clerks; Sales reps.; sales assistants; Goods vehicle drivers; Bank managers*; *Financial managers; Property managers*; Medical practitioners*; Higher education professionals*; Clerks; Receptionists; Electricians; Motor mechanics**
	Less negative effect of working hours on participation…	More negative effect…
UKHLS (Table 4, Model 1c)	Senior officials in NGOs*; Higher education teaching professionals	*Accounts clerks; Receptionists; Kitchen assistants; Waiters*
	Less negative effect of working hours on assoc. membership…	More negative effect…
UKHLS (Table 5, Model 3c)	Secondary teachers; Primary teachers; cleaners; Marketing managers; *Higher education teachers; Civil service administrators; Local govt. clerks; Care assistants; Van drivers; Security guards*	*Retail managers; Hospital managers*; Counter clerks; chefs/cooks*
	More positive effect of education on participation…	Less positive effect…
HOCS (Table 4, Model 2b)	*Plumbers*; Painters and decorators*; Taxi drivers**	*Accountants*; Accounts clerks*; Skilled work in construction*; Sales assistants**
	More positive effect of education on persistent volunteering…	Less positive effect…

(Continues)

TABLE 6 (Continued)

	Above average voluntary participation…	Below average voluntary participation…
BHPS (Table 5, Model 5a)	*Lab technicians*; Artists*; Filing clerks; Metal workers; Gardeners; Care assistants; Cleaners*	Buildings managers; Software engineers; Computer programmers; Accounts clerks; *Production managers; Financial managers; Primary teachers; Nurses; Chefs/cooks*; Bar staff**

Note: Based on analysis of datasets described in Table 1. Occupations are categories of SOC2000 (UKHLS, HOCS) or SOC90 (BHPS). Not all extreme occupations are listed. Occupations shown are represented by at least 100 cases in the dataset (unless indicated *). Standard font: occupational residual exceeds its standard error by at least 2; italic font: occupational residual exceeds its standard error by less than 2 but more than 1.

when "pro-social" occupations seem to have lower rather than higher levels of volunteering, net of controls (for instance, doctors, teachers and nurses). We should reiterate that these are the patterns net of controls—there are generally positive effects of education, and of working in the public sector, on voluntary participation, and the occupational residuals show merely that these occupations do not tend to show quite as high a level of participation as might otherwise be predicted. Nevertheless, there is a plausible post-hoc rationalization that seems to be consistent with these patterns and suggests the force of "habits" rather than "circumstances": perhaps many people in "pro-social" jobs already feel that they make a sufficient positive social contribution through their occupation, and don't feel too much duty or pressure to do more through volunteering; by contrast, perhaps the same trade-off influences some people in much less "pro-social" jobs to be a little more inclined than average to volunteer—for instance, the above average volunteering of financial institution managers in Table 6 (Models 1b and 1c).[10] This rationalization is speculative, as other mechanisms might also account for the empirical pattern—but it seems to us to provide a plausible hypothesis about a complex pattern.

Hitherto our results have concerned how occupations are linked to the propensity to engage in voluntary activities, but it is a natural extension to ask if occupations have an impact upon the personal benefits or consequences of volunteering (cf. Wilson et al., 2019). This can be achieved by modelling other outcomes—for instance, personal well-being, or employment attainment—as a function of voluntary engagement (and other controls), and then, allowing for "random slopes" with occupational units on the effect of voluntary participation. These models would estimate a parameter for occupational-level variance in the impact of participation, and would allow us to calculate residuals that might indicate specific occupations that are associated with a more positive (or negative) impact of volunteering (for examples of the use of "random slopes" by occupations, see Lambert & Griffiths, 2018, c9). Using the datasets described above, we have tried out a range of models of this character (results not presented). Hitherto we have not found strong patterns that hold consistently across the different datasets. In the BHPS data, however, a similar pattern to that of Table 6 seemed to emerge in terms of a few occupations that stood out for being associated with a considerably more favorable well-being benefit from volunteering (i.e., more than the average premium, which is positive), and likewise a number of occupations that stand out at the other end of this distribution—occupations where the benefit of volunteering for well-being is more muted, or even negative. In the BHPS, we observed a pattern of lessened benefits from volunteering in occupations that might be seen as more "pro-social" (examples included nurses, restaurateurs, and university teachers), and heightened benefits for those that are rarely portrayed as pro-social (examples include marketing managers, accounts clerks, and bank managers). Nevertheless, although we find this a plausible social pattern, we were not able to replicate similar results when modeling well-being outcomes in a similar way using the UKHLS dataset (where we found no significant occupational-level random slope) nor using the European Social Survey (where we found a small occupational-level random slope, but the outlying occupations did not seem to have a similar pattern). It is not particularly clear, therefore, that the benefits of volunteering vary substantially by detailed occupations net of other controls, but it is possible that future research may find convincing, consistent patterns in such relationships.

5 | CONCLUSIONS

We have argued that the interpretation of detailed occupational patterns can sometimes be used to distinguish "habits" and "circumstances" as influences on voluntary participation. A distinction is worth making as it could inform relevant policies: for example, if habits matter more than circumstances, policies on volunteering might be re-directed to focus upon wider issues of socio-economic inequalities and social origins. Pragmatically, if an organization wanted to expand its voluntary participation and emphasized a model of circumstances, it might prioritize means of accommodating, say, flexible and part-time contributions; if it were persuaded that habits were relatively more important, it might direct its efforts towards managing its reputation.

Our results demonstrated that occupations were indeed associated with distinctive empirical links to volunteering net of controls for other factors, consistently across surveys, time periods, measures of volunteering, and across longitudinal and household contexts as well as at an individual level. That is, the empirical link applies at the individual level (an individual's job is associated with their current voluntary participation), but it also transmits through households and over time (data on an individual's job could help predict volunteering of their household sharers, and their patterns of volunteering through time). These patterns were consistently statistically significant, albeit often of only a modest effect size. Moreover, we stressed that some of the empirical association between occupations and volunteering is likely to reflect other measurable social inequalities that occupations can proxy. Nevertheless we also argued that the net relationships (controlling for many relevant direct measures) revealed specific patterns of participation that, we argued, could usefully be rationalized, drawing upon other knowledge about the occupation, to make plausible claims about the relative influence of "habits" and/or "circumstances."

A complex aspect of our argument is that the rich empirical insights that can come from analyzing detailed occupational positions in relation to volunteering do not unequivocally identify the underlying mechanism behind the associations that we find. We believe that many of our examples reveal some occupational patterns that reflect what can usefully be interpreted as the effects of "habits," and others that can helpfully be thought of as reflecting "circumstances." However, these interpretations are premised on post-hoc rationalizations that might readily be debated; a more conclusive statement about the underlying mechanisms could require further supplementary analysis. The exciting opportunity presented by analyzing detailed occupational data reflects that measured occupations provide rich data about circumstances in an unusually efficient way—knowledge of a specific occupation gives us a lot of insight into a person's circumstances, and so the depth of data that is captured in an occupational title has the capacity to suggest precise, sometimes unexpected, social processes. By contrast, most previous studies of social inequalities in volunteering have used relatively broad-brush occupation-based measures that provide little clue as to the precise mechanisms related to a pattern of association. Wilson et al.'s (2019) compelling evidence of social class differences in the benefits of volunteering, for instance, might reveal patterns that result from any number of social inequalities that are clustered in class categories (such as employment relationships, economic advantages, skills, and social environments). A focus on micro-occupational differences will not eliminate such ambiguities, but we believe it increases the chances of us identifying the most plausible specific mechanism.

Was there, then, anything in our results to adjudicate between the relative influence of "habits" and "circumstances" upon volunteering? Empirical results suggest, first, the coexistence of both mechanisms, as examples could be found that were consistent with either narrative. However, our results also suggest an asymmetry. There were a number of instances when occupational patterns seemed to reveal niche examples of "circumstances" that shape voluntary participation—for instance, outlying patterns for some jobs, such as in higher education, seem to reflect the unusual levels of day-to-day autonomy that might enable them to better accommodate voluntary engagement irrespective of working hours. Nevertheless, the weight of evidence from occupational variations seems to be more often illustrative of the role of "habits." For instance, there are several occupations with above- or below-average participation patterns, net of other controls, where there is no obvious example of a tangible circumstance that constrains or enables participation, but there is a plausible explanation in terms of "habit." The

model of habits might indeed be reinforced by our evidence on the influence of the occupations of a person's household sharers upon their own participation patterns (as it is plausible that the "habits" of one person shape those of the household). Much of the practical literature on supporting volunteering has historically concentrated upon identifying "circumstances" (e.g., Rochester et al., 2010), but our evidence suggests an argument for paying relatively more attention to "habits" such as lifestyles and cultural orientations as factors that link to voluntary participation.

Our results also suggest that other studies of influences upon voluntary participation ought to consider controlling for detailed occupational positions (which has rarely been done in previous analyses). In a statistical modeling analysis, failure to do so might risk "omitted variable bias," which can ultimately lead to inappropriate interpretation of statistical patterns and inappropriate statistical estimates. However, the same point also applies to other social research on voluntary participation (such as in the interpretation of qualitative interview data): attention to specific occupations might be important and should not be overlooked.

It is possible that some of our findings could be contingent on our context. Occupations themselves may change over time in their contents or influence. Our analysis showed evidence of occupational influences over quite a lengthy period in the UK (1972–2011), but detailed occupational data is available in the social sciences across wider periods and different countries in a format that might readily suit extending analyses to wider contexts. Likewise, our assessment of voluntary participation has largely been limited to that of "formal" volunteering, based upon available measures in secondary survey data. Our results did not seem to point to many substantial differences between occupational inequalities in voluntary activities, and association memberships, although these two categories have the potential to reflect different patterns, and might usefully be explored further. Likewise there may also be scope for interesting explorations of the links between informal forms of volunteering and occupations (which might have different features from those involving formal volunteering—e.g., Bradford, Hills, & Johnston, 2016).

One of the more interesting post-hoc rationalizations that may reflect "habits" was the evidence, across a few applications, of the influence of how "pro-social" an occupation might be. Freeland and Hoey (2018) argue that occupations are differentiated in an important dimension that is often overlooked but can be measured by patterns of deference—Freeland and Hoey describe this as a structure of "status," but it might equally be labeled one of the "goodness" or "pro-social character" of jobs. Our results from the UKHLS and BHPS might have tapped into that dimension and suggested a plausible post-hoc interpretation: perhaps those in "good" occupations already enjoy the "warm glow" of "doing good" and engaging with others that volunteering can sometimes provide, and tend to avoid taking on further commitments of this nature; by contrast, perhaps efforts to recruit volunteers might be most efficiently targeted at those in other occupations.

There are many other ways that increased understanding of the specificities of how volunteering relates to occupations could be useful. They might support insights that could lead to policy initiatives that facilitate more volunteering, and/or challenge existing social inequalities in volunteering. Ethnic and gender biases in volunteering activities might be confronted, for instance, by introducing policies targeted at occupations that have traditionally skewed gender or ethnic distributions. Evidence might also contribute helpfully to recent narratives that recognize the negative as well as positive aspects of some forms of voluntary participation. Some modes of volunteering might be seen as exploiting insecure workers such as interns, or obliging and pressuring contributors ("voluntolding" in the language of Kelemen, Mangan, & Moffat, 2017). Whilst above we have concentrated on evidence for facilitators of volunteering, in further work, the same relationships might also be cross-examined to build evidence and theory on negative aspects of voluntary participation.

One last point worth emphasizing is that voluntary participation remains socially structured. Detailed occupations can account for a moderate proportion of social inequalities in volunteering, but so too can many other measurable social heterogeneities across socio-demographic and socio-economic factors. It is sometimes suggested that traditional structural inequalities (including occupations) are increasingly less influential in shaping

voluntary participation in our more individualized or reflexive times (e.g., Hustinx & Lammertyn, 2003), but our analysis suggests quite substantial structural influences upon voluntary participation that persist to the present.

DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

The data that support the findings of this study are available from the UK Data Service. Restrictions apply to the availability of these data, which were used under license for this study.

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NOTES

[1] Although not presented here, we have also undertaken similar comparisons across countries by using data from the European Social Survey. Conclusions from these analyses, relating to the influence of occupations, are of a similar nature.

[2] The UKHLS question asks respondents to estimate their volume of engagement with voluntary organizations over the last 12 months, and offers 10 output options (variable *volfreq*), conditional upon if the respondent has indicated they engage in any volunteering (variable *volun*). Our harmonization created a new variable (*lactl*) of similar format to the corresponding BHPS measure, based on the following code using Stata: gen lactl = volfreq; recode lactl −9/−1=.m 1/3 = 1 4/5 = 2 6 7 9 = 3 8 = 4; replace lactl = 5 if volun==2.

[3] All analyses used Stata software (v14.1). Unless otherwise indicated, our statistical results apply to unweighted data from the surveys. All of the datasets have complex features that can potentially be built into the analysis using indicators of sampling design and/or sampling weights. We ran most of our analyses both with and without statistical controls for these features, but we did not observe any instances when the impact led to consequential changes in results (for one example, compare Models 1d and 1c from Table 4).

[4] Data on religion is not included among our control variables. We spent some time exploring the impact of including data on religious affiliation or participation in analyses, but we concluded that it did not make an important difference to results on other aspects of social inequalities in volunteering.

[5] Materials may be downloaded from github.com/paul-lambert.

[6] A particular attraction of the random effects formulation is that it exploits the relatively fine-grained differences between occupations but produces relatively robust estimates of occupational parameters and their standard errors, even for those occupations that are sparsely represented. This quality derives from the statistical property of "shrinkage." Importantly, this makes it more compelling to use relevant substantive information about different occupations in the analysis; by contrast, in other analytical strategies it is common practice to merge together sparsely represented occupational units into much smaller numbers of aggregated categories, with the undesirable consequence of ignoring relevant differences. Lambert and Griffiths (2018, chapter 9) discuss the use of random effects models to analyze occupations in this way.

[7] We also tested "fixed effects" models for occupational units (e.g., Model 1e in Table 4). A convenient feature of the random effects formulation is that it allows us to fit additional parameters for specific occupation-level effects (such as an occupation-level stratification scale score), in combination with random effects.

[8] We have marked the random effects parameters as statistically significant at the 95% level if they are associated with an appropriate reduction in deviance compared to the nested model without the parameter.

[9] For convenience we have shown the "z-statistics" for each coefficient in the relevant models—these statistics occlude the exact numerical impact of a change in the explanatory variable upon the outcome, but their magnitude can be read as broadly proportional to the relative influence of the variable upon the outcome. Outputs should be treated with caution because changes in coefficients between nested non-linear outcomes models are not necessarily consistent with changes in the relative influence of the variables (due to the fixed variance of the non-linear transformation function). For all models, we repeated analysis with linear probability models, and found the same patterns of change in coefficients.

[10] We thank our colleague Dave Griffiths for first highlighting empirical examples when people in jobs that are "good" for society volunteer less.

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SUPPORTING INFORMATION

Additional Supporting Information may be found online in the Supporting Information section.

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ORIGINAL ARTICLE

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"Who generates this city"? Socialist strategy in contemporary London

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Abstract

This essay, based on a "militant ethnography" of the attempts of the small radical grassroots activist group, Our London (a pseudonym), to mobilize a collective oppositional politics through activities around an election campaign, engages critically with E. Laclau and C. Mouffe's arguments on discourse and collectivity in *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy* (London: Verso, 1985). I argue, on the basis of my findings, that while their model does provide insights that help describe the process of building collectivity from among disparate perspectives and identities, we need to go beyond a focus on discourse alone and consider the ways politics is shaped by material contexts. This is necessary if we are to understand the continued appeal of class politics as well as the difficulties in mobilizing collectivity in highly unequal and fragmented cities. From an activist perspective, the essay also highlights how developing a conception of collective interests and a critique of overarching systems of exploitation can be important in building political unity.

KEYWORDS

activism, discourse, London, political identities, social movements

1 | INTRODUCTION

This essay addresses a central question within both political organizing and the study of the contemporary grassroots Left: how might a unified, collective, radical oppositional politics develop within an urban context characterized by the "individualization of labor" (Castells, 1996, p. 265), weakening class identification, and the erosion and hollowing out of social democratic institutions and cultures over the last 40 years (Crouch, 2004)? While the issue of Left mobilization under contemporary capitalism has been much discussed in abstract terms (e.g., Dean, 2012; Laclau & Mouffe, 1985; Riofrancos, 2018), this essay draws upon rich empirical data to consider in detail the dynamics through which political unity is negotiated, contested and won at a micro level.

I draw in this essay upon my PhD research, for which I carried out a critical "militant ethnography" (Juris, 2007) aimed at investigating the attempts of the small radical grassroots activist group Our London (OL)—a pseudonym—to mobilize a collective oppositional politics within a highly unequal city. The group was small, without formal structures, and ran on very few resources. OL's main focus during the research period was on building a program and support for a campaign for the 2016 London elections, in which the group stood a candidate. I was a founding member of the group studied, and heavily involved in its activities for much of the research period; my account is therefore necessarily a partial one informed by my own particular experiences, perspective, and interpretations.

This essay engages with Laclau and Mouffe's (1985) argument that, rather than emerging automatically due to essential commonalities between particular subjects, political collectivity results from the articulation of those commonalities through discourse. I will show how this framework is useful in providing some of the tools to help us describe both political discourses and aspects of organizing culture on sections of the grassroots radical Left in cities like London. However, I also argue that, in dealing abstractly with the question of unity, Laclau and Mouffe—like others influenced by poststructuralist perspectives—tend to neglect both the concrete dynamics of political activity as well as the extent to which that activity is rooted in, and therefore must respond to, material realities. There is a need to emphasize, to a greater extent than Laclau and Mouffe, the material context of what those authors call "discourse."

In respect to my case study, this theoretical framing allows me to consider the importance for the Our London project of identifying a common enemy as a way of uniting disparate perspectives and identities. I also discuss its attempts to move beyond a merely negative form of unity to develop a stronger sense of common purpose and shared social location, and suggest that both its successes and its failures in this respect must be understood in relation to the opportunities and challenges of organizing in a highly unequal and fragmented city like London. Below, I outline my theoretical framework in detail before applying it to analyze my case study.

2 | FROM CLASS TO RADICAL DEMOCRACY? HEGEMONY AND CHAINS OF EQUIVALENCE

Laclau and Mouffe's work has proven influential, in part because it is seen to explain contemporary political conditions characterized by multiplying struggles and identifications defined in terms other than class (Fenton, 2016). However, due to their insistence on the complete "autonomization of the political" (1985, p. 31) from the economic, Laclau and Mouffe pay little attention to the materiality of capitalist exploitation with which discourse and strategy must relate. Since Laclau and Mouffe deny both that material conditions produce political subjectivity and that class should have primacy, their model cannot adequately address the significance of objective material interests. I argue—and suggest that the empirical data I present demonstrates—that a notion of collective interests can in fact have an important role in mobilizing political collectivity: that a sense of common interests can unify in a way that more abstract appeals to radical democracy, like those proposed by Laclau and Mouffe, cannot. In this section, I outline the key features of Laclau and Mouffe's model and critically discuss its benefits and shortcomings.

Laclau and Mouffe's central argument in *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy* is that "there is no logical and necessary relation between socialist objectives and the positions of social agents in the relations of production." In other words, dynamics of capitalist exploitation and accumulation do not determine political consciousness and, therefore, any politics—socialist or otherwise—relies upon the establishment of particular identities, goals and concepts as "hegemonic" (1985, p. 86). While a number of theorists in the Marxist tradition—including, notably, Gramsci (1971)—focus on the importance of achieving hegemony, Laclau and Mouffe go further than others in denying that "class positions" are "the necessary location of historical interests" (1985, p. 85). For them, decentering class creates opportunities for socialists to engage, ally with and incorporate strands of social movement politics—from radical feminism to environmentalism—mobilized around oppressions and identities other than class; indeed, Laclau and Mouffe argue that the "hegemonic recomposition" associated with the rise of new social movements since the 1960s should prompt the socialist movement to "abandon its class ghetto and transform itself into the articulator of a multiplicity of antagonisms and demands stretching beyond itself" (1985, p. 58).

Laclau and Mouffe's model appears to present an appropriate strategic response to the contemporary conjuncture. They argue that the "new forms of struggle in the advanced capitalist countries, where during the last few decades we have witnessed the constant emergence of new forms of political subjectivity cutting across the categories of the social and economic structure" underline the need for a new model of socialism that can connect to these movements (1985, p. 13). This description of the way socio-political identities have changed is consistent with the findings of sociologists who have pointed to factors like the expansion of higher education, economic restructuring, the rise of networked, insecure work and the emergence of increasingly individualized subjectivities as undermining earlier patterns of class identity (Beck, 2007; Savage et al., 2015; Sennett, 2006).

Another way Laclau and Mouffe's work is useful is in terms of the implications of their model for the organizational structure, culture, and processes of radical political groups. This is an aspect of their framework that has received much less attention than their ideas around class, materiality, and discourse. Laclau and Mouffe argue that coalitions of subordinate forces must, in order to advance a common struggle, keep in view "the horizon of an impossible totality" (p. 122), but be aware that "the moment of the 'final' suture never arrives" (p. 86), in that both collective identities and hegemonic discourses will always remain partially open. This means that political spaces—at the level of national, international, and specific local political formations—should remain forever open and contestable to allow "the multiplication of democratic struggles" (p. 131).

Such a proposal is clearly incompatible with the model of the highly centralized Leninist party that Laclau and Mouffe criticize, and much more conducive to open, inclusive, and horizontal organizing cultures. For example, Tormey counterposes the Leninist party to the social forum structures that developed out of the turn-of-the-century global justice movement. Social forums were spaces characterized by "discussion, comparison, affinity," "affiliation," and "experimentation," and within which no one perspective, identity, or set of interests were able to dominate or own the space (2005, p. 404). Though the social forums have largely disappeared, organizing cultures on sections of the contemporary radical Left retain similar principles. Such cultures are likely more appealing than those of the Leninist party to a contemporary activist imaginary which, as Della Porta (2005) has noted, tends to define itself in relation to concrete goals rather than fixed social, ideological, or organizational belonging and which is tolerant of a range of political perspective and identities.

While Laclau and Mouffe produce some useful insights that can be applied to analyze the contemporary activist scene, their work has some shortcomings. Chief among these is their refusal to assign central importance to the material context within which politics takes place. A key element of Laclau and Mouffe's model is its emphasis on discourse as key to mobilizing political collectivity, and their related denial that material conditions in themselves necessarily produce particular political consequences. Laclau and Mouffe affirm that there is a material reality, but that what matters from a political perspective is how discourse interprets and constructs that reality: "an earthquake or the falling of a brick is an event that certainly exists … But whether their specificity as objects is constructed in terms of 'natural phenomena' or 'expressions of the wrath of God', depends upon the structuring of a discursive field" (1985, p. 108). While this statement is designed to reassure readers that the authors are not naive

idealists—that they do believe in a material reality—it in fact underlines Laclau and Mouffe's radical departure from the materialism of traditional Marxist perspectives. This is clear if we substitute "the falling of a brick" for a more politically consequential set of material realities. We might expect, for example, that an economy dominated by small yet heavily surveilled workplaces situated within cities that contain few public spaces where people can assemble, presents socialists with a very different organizing context to one characterized by large factories and numerous public squares; we might further anticipate that the routes and strategies through which workers can be mobilized and a sense of class subjectivity constructed in the two societies would differ greatly. Yet Laclau and Mouffe suggest that such realities are of less importance than, or at least possess no particular explanatory power outside of, the discourses through which these realities are interpreted.

It is because politics is produced through discourse rather than by material conditions that class and economics must forfeit their central importance in Laclau and Mouffe's model. Laclau and Mouffe argue that "workers' struggles … obviously cannot be explained by an endogenous logic of capitalism," that divisions between workers are "political, and not merely economic," and that the very different class configurations and forms of workplace organization across various capitalist countries illustrates that there is no such thing as an "economic" reality prior to politics; the "idea of a workers' identity around common interests, derived from a class insertion in the relations of production" is therefore false (1985, pp. 80-82).

Since there is no privileged subject constituted by objective conditions, politics cannot be based on the positive assertion of class—or any other objective—interests. What are required, Laclau and Mouffe argue, are "chains of equivalence" (p. 133) whereby diverse elements unite through negative identification against elites and oppressions; this is a unity that avoids total closure and the erasure of differences, and within which particular political projects maintain their specificity. Laclau and Mouffe suggest that, in the 1980s' context of an advancing neoliberal project that forces all identities to conform to market logics, a politics of "radical democracy" that seeks the multiplication of political identities, demands, and spaces might provide the basis for powerful chains of equivalence. Aside from their advocacy of radical democracy in the political sphere, Laclau and Mouffe do not advocate particular measures to restructure society and economy; this is unsurprising, since they insist there can be no particular set of interests from which such transformation can properly be deduced.

Laclau and Mouffe's firm rejection of a materialist politics makes their claim to be part of the anticapitalist tradition unconvincing. As Geras (1987) argues in his acerbic critique, Laclau and Mouffe succeed in demonstrating that material conditions are not the sole determinants of political struggle, but not that they are of no relevance. For example, we can consider Laclau and Mouffe's comments on the relationship between workers and their employers. While they correctly note that working conditions vary vastly between and within different countries, that the political arrangements that produce particular working practices are important, and that discourse can make sense of relationships of exploitation in a number of ways (1985, pp. 80–82), they fail, as Geras argues, to demonstrate why, "notwithstanding the wide diversity, a common structural situation, of exploitation, and some common features, like lack of autonomy or interest at work, not to speak of sheer unpleasantness and drudgery" should not be taken as a "solid, objective basis—no more, but equally no less—for a unifying socialist politics" (1987, p. 50). In other words, a broad shared experience of alienation and exploitation is one key element that socialist discourses must connect with and address.

It is important to note that such an overarching socialist critique need not ignore the numerous other forms and sites of subordination, oppression, and antagonism that exist—though Laclau and Mouffe are of course right that some strains of leftwing politics have been guilty of such neglect historically. One notable attempt to reconcile anticapitalist class politics with attempts to redress a multitude of oppressions comes from advocates of social reproduction theory (SRT). SRT argues it is a mistake to treat different forms of discrimination as separate and therefore amenable to different remedies, since the oppression faced by women, racialized minorities, and others is in fact integral to the capitalist system of exploitation as a whole. Unpaid housework carried out by women and poorly paid domestic labor performed by (largely female) migrant workers, for example, aid capitalists by enabling the free or cheap reproduction of labor power. On the basis of this analysis, the working class as a whole—broadly

defined—has a strong prima facie interest in abolishing all forms of oppression that contribute to capitalist exploitation (Bhattacharya, 2017).

Laclau and Mouffe's framework sees society as an infinitude of sites of antagonisms and resistance that are irreducible to one another; a socialist, anticapitalist politics, by contrast, conceives of a unified—if heterogeneous—subject whose labor sustains capitalism and which therefore possesses the agency to overthrow it. While Laclau and Mouffe's discourse-centric model does help us describe some aspects of contemporary radical activist practice, there are others—in particular, the continued appeal of class politics and the significance of the material context in shaping activist strategies—that it cannot account for. Below, I outline my case study, the small activist group Our London, before arguing that while Laclau and Mouffe's model helps us describe aspects of OL's approach, ultimately their framework cannot adequately explain either Our London's successes or its failures.

3 | CASE STUDY: OUR LONDON

Our London was founded in January 2015. The group's strategy was to create, using tactics similar to the Spanish "citizens' platform" Podemos,[1] a crowd-sourced "People's Programme" from demands suggested by thousands of Londoners, and to find "People's Candidates" for Mayor and Greater London Assembly to put forward this program at the London elections in May 2016. The initial group of around 30 Our London organizers was a mixture of experienced activists working on issues like housing, anti-racism, and environmentalism, and younger people who had connected with radical politics through either political education workshops for teenagers or through spoken word or other cultural activities. Demographically, there was a rough 50/50 split between those who self-defined as middle class and had more experience of activism, and black or Asian working-class young people who tended to have less experience of activism and a much weaker sense of allegiance to "the Left" (see Table A1 in the appendix for details). This political-demographic balance at the core of the group persisted throughout the entire research period, though the personnel involved gradually changed.

Our London went on to establish itself as a small but significant presence on the Left activist scene in London. From January 2015 onwards, the group held regular meetings and established a core group of activists. Some funding was secured in spring 2015 and used to develop a website, produce a promotional clip, and—in August 2015—appoint a part-time paid organizer. In October 2015, following the election of left-winger Jeremy Corbyn as leader of the Labour Party and the selection of Sadiq Khan as Labour's London Mayoral candidate, Our London decided not to stand a candidate for London Mayor nor for the proportionally elected party list element of the Greater London Assembly (GLA). Instead, the group would stand one candidate for a single GLA constituency.[2] Between May 2015 and March 2016, OL activists ran around 70 People's Programme workshops with a range of groups including college and university students, migrant workers, Kurdish-Turkish community organizations, young homeless people, gym workers, community centers, and youth clubs. The research period culminated in an election campaign in which a core group member, Laila, stood and received nearly 1,500 votes.

I define my research method as a critical form of "militant ethnography": "a politically engaged and collaborative form of participant observation carried out from within rather than outside grassroots movements," and oriented towards appreciating "the concrete logic of activist practice" (Juris, 2007, pp. 164–165). Given my close involvement with the object of my research, it was also appropriate to incorporate some elements of autoethnography (Denshire, 2014) into my research methods, including personal, subjective analysis of my thoughts, actions, and experiences during the campaign and open discussion of the degree to which I acted upon and influenced the research case study. The aim was to reveal rather than obscure my located role as an activist-researcher. My role as a founding member of the group studied meant there was, inevitably, a power imbalance between me and my research participants. I attempted to mitigate these by organizing focus groups to allow respondents to question or validate my conclusions, being interviewed by a fellow activist, and sending draft chapters to participants for

feedback. Despite these measures, this is no doubt a highly partial and personal study. Data referenced below includes interview transcripts, internal documents, emails, and observation notes. All names used are pseudonyms.

4 | UNITING THE FRAGMENTS: CHAINS OF EQUIVALENCE IN RADICAL LONDON

Laclau and Mouffe might argue that, in a city like contemporary London, the form of radical unity they propose—that is, a coalitional collectivity that respects the specificity of multiple perspectives, identities, and conceptions of oppression—is the only one viable. If, as Thompson argued in the 1960s, "'Radical London' has always been more heterogeneous and fluid in its social and occupational definition than the Midlands or Northern centres grouped around two or three central industries" (1963, p. 23), waves of deindustrialization, financialization and globalization, migration and turnover of population in the nearly six decades since Thompson wrote have further compounded London's diversity to the degree the city is now a byword for social heterogeneity and fragmentation (Massey, 2007). What Thompson described as the need for political "sophistication" in "knitting together" a radical polity in the UK capital (1963, p. 23) is therefore arguably greater than ever.

In some ways, Our London activists recognized this complexity and approached their task as one of building a unity-in-diversity from London's fragments. As Table A2 in the appendix shows, OL collectively spoke of multiple subjects, or a plural as opposed to singular subject, and—in line with Laclau and Mouffe's model—referred to a number of different forms of antagonism in descriptions of its constituency and purpose. Some of the categories we used referred to different sections of the population—for example, "riots society" versus "average income families"—while others identified different forms of oppression, like "People of colour, women, the LGBTQ+ community, religious minorities, people with disabilities."

Another way Our London's political practice seemed to follow Laclau and Mouffe's recommendations was in identifying a common enemy in order to build unity among the disparate groups discussed above. Instead of positively asserting a particular identity that encompasses or overrides all others, Laclau and Mouffe argue that unity is better won through negativity—through highlighting a "constitutive outside" in opposition to which a variety of groups can find common ground and construct "chains of equivalence" between them (1985, pp. 127–134). In line with this logic, OL consistently framed its project as an attempt to dislodge the entrenched power of London's super-rich and their political clients. For example, the speech Jenny, Will, and I delivered at the first OL meeting in January 2015 outlined the proposed core message of the campaign thus:

> *Politicians are a corrupt and self-serving bunch who have repeatedly cheated the people. They have run London for their wealthy parasite friends, and have exploited the people who actually do the work that makes this city profitable and a desirable place to be. (document, January 17, 2015)*

This discourse seemed to strike a chord with activists at the core of the group, and was echoed in Our London's public, collaboratively written communications: the "About" page on the OL website identified the adversary as "the super rich and the corrupt politicians who serve them," and noted that "bankers, billionaires and property developers have bought our politicians, ensuring that mayors, councillors and MPs meant to serve the people of our city instead only look after the interests of the elite" (document, September 3, 2015).

Although we often cast the enemy in purely economic terms, the varied politics, backgrounds, and perspectives at the core of the group meant that OL sometimes highlighted the gendered and racial characteristics of our "constitutive outside." The preamble to the Our London election manifesto published in April 2016, for example, defined the elite enemy in relation to politics, economics, and race: "the super-rich and the City of London, career politicians who don't represent us, exploitative landlords and estate agents charging rip-off fees, councils

colluding with property developers in gentrification, a racist, unaccountable police force and big businesses paying poverty wages" (documents, April 28, 2016).

5 | DECENTRALIZATION AND "OPEN SOURCE ORGANIZING"

Some activists felt that the plural and diverse London subject could only express itself through a pluralist conception of strategy and tactics. These activists supported an "open source organizing" approach bound up with an understanding of oppressions and identities—similar to that expressed by Laclau and Mouffe—as incommensurable and irreducible to one another. From this perspective, OL's project was one of radical democracy: to carve out numerous political spaces in the city so that groups could express their own—plural, multiple—identities, experiences, interests, and demands.

Calls for a decentralized model were motivated in part by critique of Our London's organizing culture as restrictive of activists' autonomy. Attempts to secure agreement from a group of activists with varied politics and understandings of strategy had frustrated those whose conceptions lost out, as well as placing huge burdens on weekly organizing meetings; allowing far greater autonomy for sub-groups of activists was seen as a neat solution. The specific example offered most often in support of the argument for decentralization was a discussion over a proposed event on Islamophobia during the last meeting before Christmas 2015. Nina cited this episode as an example of how meetings could be "disempowering and inefficient" (email, February 13, 2016). The result of the discussion was that Nina's proposal for a Muslim-led event on Islamophobia—intended to explore the relationships between contemporary Muslim identity and colonial or racializing discourses—was shelved due to disagreements over the ideal audience. A more decentralization model of organizing, it was argued, would remove the need for a single unified conception of our strategic role by allowing sub-groups of activists to organize however they wished.

The argument for a more decentralized organizing approach had become dominant by the time a February 2016 meeting agreed in principle to adopt Peter's suggestion of what he called the "open-source organizing" model: any group of activists (including those not previously involved with Our London) could run an event or protest action in the name of OL (notes, February 23, 2016). A shortage of activists and the decision to continue with the mammoth task of fighting the London elections meant little open-source organizing materialized during the research period. Nevertheless, activists continued to announce their commitment to the spirit of the idea throughout the spring of 2016. Laila, who had previously had mixed feelings on the decentralized model, began to argue for it—for instance, while giving her interpretation of the final weeks of the Ahora Madrid[3] election campaign she had heard about at a public event: "Citizens had taken the campaign and run with it, expressing it in their way through art, singing, whatever. We need to let go of the brand of Our London" (email, February 22, 2016). Similarly, in April 2016 she told a magazine: "my dream is to have people using OL to run with whatever ideas they want to, as long as they keep our key principles in mind to respect the needs of others" (article, April 15, 2016).

The preference for an open-source organizing model was associated with a conception of OL's role as empowering—as deepening democracy by opening up multiple political spaces in the manner proposed by Laclau and Mouffe. Arran, for example, argued that OL's role was to:

> *creat[e] spaces for people to speak from their positions of marginality … all these voices, when brought together, create a politics enthused with the struggles and reflections of people's everyday. … we are merely the vessel through which our audience becomes able to hear itself and act on the reflections that it did not, or had not given itself the time to listen to. Thus, our job is to create spaces in which that reflection is recognized as having power. (email, February 11, 2016)*

6 | CLASS POLITICS IN THE GLOBAL CITY

While some activists emphasized a plural and decentralized conception of Our London's political strategy, others strove to articulate a more strongly class-based collective subjectivity. Indeed, even some of those activists who argued that the radical London subject was irreducibly plural also spoke at other times in favor of a more unified collectivity. For long periods, particularly at the beginning of the project, the group as a whole seemed eager to move beyond the kind of negative conception of unity Laclau and Mouffe propose—in our case, a unity borne of shared opposition to London's 1%—towards a more positive vision of shared interests and identity. Activists often articulated this stronger conception of unity in terms of our shared experience of being exploited, both for our paid and unpaid labor and for our rents, by bosses, financiers, and property developers. A line—theatrically addressed to the city's exploitative elite—from a poem read out by Laila and Arran on a packed London bus captures this politics: "While you regenerate this city, it seems you've forgotten who generates this city" (clip, May 4, 2016).

One factor that pushed the group to think and act as a unified subject was that, despite some support at times for the "open-source organizing" model discussed above, the central tactic throughout the project was to develop a People's Programme to contest the London elections. Building a political program meant finding common ground among the activist core in order to develop a shared analysis of exploitation and oppression in London. In practice, this involved incorporating racial and other antagonisms within a broader aggregative frame, as seen in our attempts to link OL's approach to the housing crisis with race and gender during a speech at a conference in February 2015:

> *We want to argue that housing is a class issue—it is part of the class structure of London.*
>
> *And let us stress that by that we don't mean that class is the only basis upon which people in London are suffering over housing—there is a race dimension, in that the culture of gentrification is definitively white and pushing out other cultures, and there is also a gender dimension in terms for example of the disproportionate impact of benefit changes on women.*
>
> *What we do mean by saying housing is a class issue is that the housing situation in London reflects the balance of forces in this city between 1) economic and political elites, 2) their client group—which is at most 20% of the City's population, and 3) the rest of us—the vast majority (document, February 21, 2016).*

Though this kind of framing was broadly popular, there were debates over how our vision of unity should be expressed. Elena, for example, argued that Our London risked ignoring racial oppression in its focus on opposition between "the people" and political-economic elites: "We all realise how racialized capitalism is and so this should be mentioned and stated in our mission statement" (minutes, May 26, 2015). Elena also suggested that the group's focus on inequality within London itself was problematic, given the capital's exploitation of the global South: "although we're a London centric project, we can't think about London without thinking about its relationship to the rest of the world" (interview, January 16, 2016). As well as strengthening OL's internal unity, expanding our concept of the London elite to incorporate its involvement in global dynamics of exploitation would have helped develop what Massey (2007) characterizes as a politics of place that "looks from the inside out" (p. 193).

Despite these disagreements, and power imbalances related to race and gender that it is beyond the scope of this essay to discuss, it is nevertheless true to say that the desire to draw together a broad swathe of Londoners, along with our characterization of the elite in class, racial, and gendered terms, facilitated unifying dynamics. The final set of demands published in our program, for example, consisted of a mixture of essentially social-democratic, class-based policies like the restoration of the education maintenance allowance (funded through taxation of private schools) and "reclaim[ing] empty properties for social use," along with demands oriented to racial grievances such as: "Replace the Met … the Metropolitan Police remains a corrupt, unaccountable and racist institution. We need to replace it with an accountable and transparent police force" (document, April 28, 2016).

7 | "WHERE IS THE WORKING CLASS IN LONDON?"

The unified collective subjectivity glimpsed in the kinds of discourses outlined above was ultimately short lived. This was partly because the growth of the Corbyn project, along with Our London's underwhelming 2016 election result, raised the question of whether it was useful or tenable to keep the project alive. It was also clear that the expressions of collectivity noted above did not solidify into a stable and coherent group socio-political identity. While our sense of "them"—the elite enemy to be fought—was clear, the identity of "us" was never adequately filled in. We struggled to move beyond what Laclau and Mouffe term "negativity" (1985, p. 129) to develop a more substantive understanding of our own constituency. One element missing from our politics in this respect was a full sense of our own interests, as Oliver reflected:

> *What I would say is that identity is always the wrong place to start—you always have to start by thinking about interests. Identities only become crystallised when they are effectively expressing a set of objective interests. … So for example I think if you were gonna do this successfully in London you'd have to find a set of the most obviously identifiable interests, and the most obvious one is housing. … I think you would have to take a material issue like housing and make that the basis but then you'd have to create an identity that would invoke a sense of shared investment in that issue and in a project to change it. (interview, June 24, 2016)*

While Our London did compile a set of demands, its People's Programme, these were not discussed as emanating from the common interests of the core group of activists itself.

To understand why, we need to move beyond a focus on discourse alone and consider the material context in which Our London attempted to develop a radical collective politics. We found it difficult to articulate a commonality that could overcome social differences and inequalities both within the group and among the broader London working class. Laclau and Mouffe's model would interpret these difficulties mainly as a failure to achieve "relative closure" through discourse: we were unable to settle upon a unifying identity category or master signifier that could have galvanized the chain of equivalence connecting our different subject positions (1985, p. 132). This is one way to *describe* the way our politics developed, or failed to develop, at a discursive level, but it cannot *explain how* the material context of neoliberal London presented obstacles to building collectivity. What makes some discourses resonate while others fail to connect?

Part of the problem for OL was that we were, at times, more keenly aware of differences and inequalities within the group than of our commonalities. Becky and Steph, for example, were the only activists interviewed who were neither graduates nor current university students; they both articulated, in different ways, feelings of class insecurity and were acutely conscious of the differences between themselves and other young activists who had graduated. Steph lamented: "Everyone has a degree now—everyone has a degree … it's not an unusual thing any more, it's the norm. So for someone who hasn't even got a degree, it's even harder to find something that's worth doing that's not gonna kill you coz you're working 60 hr a week … Even apprenticeships—the amount of money you get paid on apprenticeships is ridiculous – I can't survive on that money' (interview, June 20, 2016). Will, moreover, was a graduate and privately educated: he admitted to having "difficulty in a way in fully identifying with the group that I'm talking about when I'm trying to appeal to a working-class person to get involved. So I feel some discomfort" (interview, July 18, 2015). These perceived internal differences and inequalities were also seen as linked to power imbalances within the group—the case of the shelved public event on Islamophobia (mentioned above) is one example of a conflict bound up with inequalities of power and confidence.

Activists also felt that London beyond the activist core was difficult to conceptualize in class terms, as Jenny reflected:

> *Like, where is the working class in London? … London's like a very very mixed city—like how do you get a unified identity when let's say you've moved here from Colombia and let's say you were really working-class in Colombia but you've come here as a student? And there's like the international politics of it, there's race, there's gender, there's housing, there's work, there's everything. So it's not a straightforward city, I suppose. (T148: interview, June 14, 2016)*

The argument here is that London's complexity and fragmentation made it hard for activists to develop what Jameson would call a "cognitive map" of the "properly unrepresentable totality which is the ensemble of society's structures as a whole"—that is, to conceive our own collective social location in networks of exploitation, and thus our collective capacity to resist and transform these relations (1991, p. 51).

Another way the social realities of London life presented obstacles to building a unified collectivity was around activists' divergent preferences on organizing culture and group structure; these dispositions were bound up with activists' experiences of work. Campaigning around a shared, unified conception of our own class interests and politics required a form of organizing that was unappealing to some, particularly younger, activists, many of whom preferred what was termed the "open-source organizing" model to practices based on extensive collective deliberation and agreement. Broader contexts of work and activist cultures are important here. Those activists most attracted to a decentralized model of activism based around the metaphor of multiple spaces were creative workers, and it is perhaps testament to the decline of traditional far-Left parties alongside the rise of social enterprises and the "creative industries" (McRobbie, 2015) that many of the core group of OL organizers initially became involved in activism through music and arts activities. Arran got active in the Black Lives Matter movement via a "poetry nonprofit" while studying in the United States, Elena started to engage with politics through "art interventions" and Nina was first politicized while volunteering on music projects in youth clubs while at university (interviews, January 12 and 16, 2016).

These activists' conceptions of political organizing seem bound up with a curatorial disposition concerned with producing motivating affects, safeguarding personal creative autonomy and operating within fluid organizational structures. Having rejected as career options both professional activism and academia, Nina explained that she would like to work in "arts spaces": "Really I'd love to do what I do now, but get paid whilst I do that … If someone paid me to be in [the music studios where I volunteer] for like all my life, that is where I'd be. That place is amazing" (interview, January 12, 2016). While Nina counterposed the alienation she anticipated a campaigning or academic career might involve with the satisfaction and freedom of art, Arran made a similar comparison between art and conventional activism, reflecting that his ideal balance would be "allowing conversations and dialogues from the politics to come into my art but" building his "own medium of expression to a point that I feel comfortable with" (interview, January 16, 2016).

The above comments recall McRobbie's (2015) stress on the centrality within the discourses, technologies, and practices of "post-welfare governmentality" of "passionate work"—an "escape from drudgery and monotonous work in favour of self-directed, and more autonomous activity" (pp. 91–114). In McRobbie's formulation, desires for autonomy and emotional fulfilment from work—and, I would add on the basis of my study, from activism—cannot be understood in merely linguistic or conceptual terms, but rather as subjectivities bound up with the material realities of contemporary capitalism. This illustrates the need to move beyond Laclau and Mouffe's discourse-centric model in order to understand activists' politics dialectically—as a product of both ideas and experiences, and the interrelations between the two.

8 | DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Like earlier studies into protest and social movement politics in post-Fordist societies (e.g. Della Porta, 2005), the findings of my study illustrate how contemporary radical mobilizations tend to be cross-cut with different

political identities, priorities, and strategies. Laclau and Mouffe (1985) argue that political unity can be won in such contexts by building chains of equivalence that unite subjects in shared opposition to, or disidentification from, a common enemy. Theirs is a partial and provisional unity that enables common identification and action but does not collapse multiple identities into one overarching collective subject.

Laclau and Mouffe's framework does capture elements of how Our London organized: in particular, our focus on identifying a common enemy as a way of uniting participants and our emphasis on multiplicity alongside unity are broadly in line with Laclau and Mouffe's recommendations. Furthermore, this study casts light on the implications for group structure of organizing on the basis of a plural and provisional unity of the type Laclau and Mouffe describe. What OL activists called the "open-source organizing" model was in some ways aligned with an emphasis on unity-through-negativity as opposed to a more totalizing form of collective subjectivity. It is also true, however, that some activists saw our failure to develop a stronger form of unified collective subjectivity to be more of a weakness than a strength, and the group's trajectory—including our difficulties in articulating a sense of common collective interests—suggests they may have been right.

While my study partially validates some aspects of Laclau and Mouffe's arguments, it also points to clear shortcomings in their framework. At the heart of these weaknesses is the fact that their model—because it denies that material conditions determine politics—cannot explain why class politics is centrally important, and often has a particularly potent appeal, in capitalist societies. Discourses that speak to economic interests and address the realities of economic exploitation are not important simply because they connect with identities, but because they resonate with our experiences and understandings of our social system. It is partly for this reason that growing inequality, social dislocation, and the implementation of austerity in the years following the 2008 financial crisis have given rise to a new wave of class politics. Recent left-wing electoral projects—such as Corbyn's Labour in the UK, Bernie Sanders' primary campaigns in the US, Sinn Fein in Ireland and Podemos in Spain—have placed criticism of austerity, privatization, tax avoidance, property speculation, and other features of neoliberal capitalism at the center of their politics. Our London activists similarly developed a critique of rentier capitalism in London as part of their efforts to go beyond a purely negative unity-in-opposition and develop a sense of commonality based on our common experience of exploitation. Borrowing Jameson's (1991) terminology, I argue that OL's denunciation of extractive industries like finance and property development helped to develop a "cognitive map" of our common social location and political agency within the city (p. 51).

Laclau and Mouffe's model cannot adequately explain the appeal of such discourses: they criticize the conventional Marxist tendency to center class exploitation on the dual grounds that, first, subjects are constituted by a multiplicity of overlapping oppressions rather than simply one master-dynamic and, secondly, that attempts to subject every social and political antagonism to a crude class analysis will likely alienate groups who define their struggle in other terms. My study conversely demonstrates that a class-centric politics (albeit one which does not deny the significance of other forms of oppression) can play a powerful unifying role. Indeed, as Oliver suggested, if the group had developed the materialist aspects of its politics further and spoken more clearly about shared interests, this could have made the project stronger and more sustainable. To use Gramsci's (1971) terminology, I argue that OL activists struggled to attain "consciousness … of the solidarity of [class] interests among all the members" (pp. 181–182) of our group of relatively young cognitive laborers, and that this difficulty was key to the project's weaknesses.

My study also confirms Riofrancos' (2018) emphasis on the importance of analyzing "the gritty politics and the exigencies of organizing" and her criticisms of Laclau and Mouffe's discourse-centric model for neglecting these. I argued above that some activists' attitudes towards group structure, internal democracy, and organizing culture—features I discussed as part of a "curatorial disposition"—must be understood in the context of contemporary capitalist cultures that value networked autonomy and fluidity, and within which younger activists in particular were deeply embedded. That activists' working lives shaped their approaches to political activity again highlights the deficiencies of a model like Laclau and Mouffe's that focuses on discourse and insists that material conditions

do not determine politics. We can instead agree that politics is not a product of economics, but argue that the latter does nevertheless play a role in "the setting of limits" for and "exertion of pressure" on the former (Williams, 2005 [1980], p. 34).

Laclau and Mouffe highlight important aspects of how collectivity and unity can be built in conditions of social fragmentation. However, my study suggests that a focus on discourse alone is not enough. To fully appreciate the dynamics involved in contemporary radical Left politics, we must consider the significance of objective interests, the dispositions and social locations of grassroots activists, and material changes in relations of exploitation that have opened the possibility for new political currents to develop—all aspects for which we will have to look well beyond Laclau and Mouffe's framework.

DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

The data that support the findings of this study are available on request from the corresponding author, Jacob Mukherjee. The data are not publicly available due to the need to safeguard confidentiality of research subjects.

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NOTES

[1] Podemos was a new political party formed in January 2014. It used a combination of digital democracy, social movement mobilization, and charismatic leadership to channel support for the huge Spanish anti-austerity and pro-democracy movements into the electoral arena (Fenton, 2016).

[2] The Greater London Assembly provides minimal checks on the Mayor of London. Its 25 members are elected by a mixed voting system, with London organized into 14 huge constituencies with one representative each and the remainder proportionally allocated; it was for one of these constituency elections that Our London stood (https://www.london.gov.uk/about-us/london-assembly/about-london-assembly).

[3] Ahora Madrid was, and is, a radical municipalist group and political party operating in the Spanish capital.

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APPENDIX

TABLE A1 Our London activists' social backgrounds

Name[a]	Age	Ethnicity (self-described)	Class (self-described)	Employment	Housing	Education
Antonio	20	Afro-European	Working class	Student/ retail	Social rent	BA (studying)
Arran	23	Mixed (Caribbean/ white)	Working class	Retail/ poetry/ photography	Social rent	BA (achieved)
Becky	22	White	Working class	Bar work	Private rent	A Level (achieved)
Elena	23	Armenian-Iranian	Working class	Freelance artist	Social rent	BA (achieved)
Laila	25	Mixed (black/ Chinese)	Working class	Freelance music teacher	Private rent	BA (achieved)
Nina	21	Algerian	Working class	Student/ community work	Social rent	BA (studying)
Ryan	23	Mixed (Caribbean/ white)	Working class	Temporary campaign work	Private rent	BA (achieved)
Steph	22	White	Working class	Electrical engineer	Private rent	A Level (achieved)
Jacob	34	Mixed (Asian/ white)	Middle class	PhD student/ hourly paid lecturer	Private rent	PhD (studying)
Jenny	27	White	Middle class	Teacher	Private rent	MA (achieved)
Josh	25	White	Middle class	Researcher	Private rent	MA (achieved)
Matt	36	White	Middle class	Fitness instructor	Private rent	PhD (achieved)
Oliver	44	White	Middle class	Academic	Owner	PhD (achieved)
Peter	29	White	Middle class	PhD student	Private rent	PhD (studying)
Will	34	White	Middle class	NGO campaigner	Private rent	BA (achieved)

[a]All names are pseudonyms.

TABLE A2 Selection of terms used to describe the Our London subject

Term [and activist[a]]	Format	Date
"Riots society" [Jenny]	Email to Jacob, Will	November 24, 2014
"Young people at schools, universities and colleges; precarious and migrant workers; people fighting attacks on their social housing and their services" [Jenny, Jacob, Will]	Speech at first OL meeting	January 17, 2015
"Average income families"	Blog post for sympathetic platform	August 17, 2015
"A growing group of disillusioned Londoners"	OL website "about" page	September 3, 2015
"The rest of us" [not "ultra wealthy global property investors"]	OL website "about" page	September 3, 2015
"From homeless young people, to cleaners and Kurdish youth"	OL website "about" page	September 3, 2015
"STUDENTS// PERFORMERS// ACTIVISTS// COMMUNITIES// WORKERS// MIGRANTS// LONDONERS" [Laila + Arran]	Election leaflet #1	April 9, 2016
"The people"	Election manifesto	April 28, 2016
"People of colour, women, the LGBTQ + community, religious minorities, people with disabilities"	Election manifesto	April 28, 2016

[a]Where activist not stated, phrase is from collectively agreed document.

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WILEY

The social stratification of time use patterns

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Abstract

Time use is both a cause of social inequality and a consequence of social inequality. However, how social class stratifies time use patterns is seldom studied. In this paper, I describe the time use patterns in the years 1983 and 2015 by social class, and gender in the British context. Using sequence analysis methods, I show how the diversity of time use patterns in British society is socially stratified. I find that 13 clusters capture the heterogeneity of time use patterns and that these clusters are associated with social class, gender, and day of the week. These clusters capture patterns of paid and unpaid work schedules, as well as leisure patterns. The results show that men have experienced a reduction of the standard Monday to Friday 8-hr working day, while women have experienced a general increase in this type of schedule. On the other hand, patterns of domestic working days have reduced for women and increased for men. Important differences exist in paid and unpaid work patterns between social classes. Working-class women have experienced an important increase in shift work on weekends. They are also much more likely to be doing unpaid work on weekdays compared to upper-class and middle-class women. Working-class men are more likely to experience non-working days and leisure days on both weekdays and weekends and are more likely to be doing shift work. They are also more often doing unpaid work on weekdays

compared to men in upper-class households. Patterns of childcare indicate that all families have increased their childcare time. Men in upper-class households in particular have experienced an important growth in childcare time between 1983 and 2015. I conclude by discussing how time use can further our understanding of social stratification.

KEYWORDS
gender, sequence analysis, social class, stratification, time use

1 | INTRODUCTION

Time use is an effect of social inequality as much as a cause of social inequality. From the time spent at work or at school to the provision of childcare, time use is central to fully appreciating the extent of a society's stratification. Because everything we do takes time, inequality also must be temporally stratified. Time use research often takes a narrow view on daily activities by focusing on one or two activities at a time (Altintas, 2016; Bianchi, Milkie, Sayer, & Robinson, 2000; Sullivan, 2010), making it difficult to grasp the overall structure and potential heterogeneous patterns of time use. A holistic approach is needed to better understand how activities in daily life are structured by gender, class, and social contexts (Vagni & Cornwell, 2018). The aim of this study is to explore the link between time use patterns and social stratification. I use sequence analysis to uncover time use patterns in Britain during 1983–2015. I then describe the link between these emerging patterns and social class by gender. I start by reviewing some of the most important trends in time use over the last few decades and then move on to the literature about time use and social stratification.

2 | PRIOR RESEARCH

2.1 | Time-use trends

Overall, paid work time has been declining over the last century. In 1870, it is estimated that people used to work about 60 hr a week (Huberman & Minns, 2007). In 1980, the figure dropped to 40 hr a week. The UK has some of the longest working hours compared to other European countries. From a historical comparative perspective, the UK did not always have the longest working hours; in fact, in 1870, the UK had the lowest working hours in Europe (Huberman & Minns, 2007). However, from the 1950s onwards, the UK has been above average in terms of working hours compared to its European counterparts.

During the Thatcher era, while working hours were either constant or in decline in continental Europe, working hours for men increased in the UK. It is only after New Labour came into power that working hours started declining and converging with those of the US, while still being much above Germany, France, and other European nations.

Women in the UK have lower working hours compared to women in other European countries, such as France and Sweden, as well as the US (see Figure 1), even though paid work has been increasing since World War II. Mothers in the UK have a relatively low level of employment, which can be partly explained by a very expensive private childcare system, and as a result, they experience one of the largest motherhood wage penalties in Europe (Grimshaw & Rubery, 2015).



FIGURE 1 Trends in working hours in four countries by sex (computed from *stats.oecd.org* [accessed August 2019]) [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

Like working hours, unpaid work—in particular, domestic work—has been on the decline. Large-scale time use studies show a decline in domestic work for women since the 1960s (Altintas & Sullivan, 2016; Gershuny, 2000). The decrease in women's domestic time has been followed by a much smaller but still significant uptick in men's share of domestic work (Sullivan, 2000). Evidence suggests that at the population level, there is a gender convergence in time use (Sullivan, 2006). However, it is unclear if the convergence has stalled in recent years (England, 2010). While domestic chores have declined since the 1950s, childcare, which is another form of unpaid work, has been increasing for both mothers and fathers (Sani & Treas, 2016).

Paid and unpaid work can also be combined to form a measure of "total work." Gershuny and Sullivan (2019) report that total work per day was 511 min for women and 573 min for men in 1961. They show that total work has declined by 1 hr and 30 min for men and by 17 min for women since the 1960s. In proportion of time, this means that in 2015, women's unpaid work represents 50% of their total working time (compared to 63% in 1965), while unpaid work represents 30% of total work for men nowadays (compared to 16% in 1965) (Gershuny & Sullivan, 2019, p. 37). Finally, leisure and other measures of free time have increased over the past few decades in the US context (Aguiar & Hurst, 2007), while these measures have been fairly stable in the UK (Gershuny & Sullivan, 2019).

2.2 | The social stratification of time

Population averages can mask important group-level heterogeneity. Aside from gender differences in time use, class- and education-based differences are important. Regarding paid work, historical differences in working time exist between the upper class and working class. While "idleness" was a symbol of social status a century ago, "busyness" is the new sign of high status (Gershuny, 2011). Beyond the social status aspect of working time, studies have pointed to a real emerging divide in working hours between white collar and blue collar occupations (Costa, 2000; Gershuny, 2011). Workers in professional occupations are now working the longest hours.

Harriet Presser stressed that work was moving towards a "24-hr, 7-day-a-week economy" (1999, p. 1778). The growth of the service sector, the interconnectedness of global markets and the increase in consumer demand for "on-call" work has changed the nature of the standard workweek and increased non-standard work schedules (Presser, 2005). Non-standard work schedules are socially stratified as members of the working class or lowly educated individuals have less control over their schedules (Breedveld, 1998; Lesnard, 2004). Even though evidence suggests that families use non-standard work schedules to manage work–family responsibilities (Presser, 2005), non-standard schedules can create negative externalities for families if imposed upon workers and families (Lesnard, 2008; Täht & Mills, 2015).

Work schedules can be an important mechanism in the creation or reinforcement of social inequalities (Lesnard, 2008). Working hours directly and indirectly impact the consumption of leisure. Non-standard work schedules affect the possibility of enjoying leisure in synchronicity with the rest of society and might, therefore, affect the enjoyment and quality of leisure (Cornwell, 2015). Time use research has highlighted important gender differences in leisure, such as the fact that women's leisure is more fragmented and more likely to be shared with children (Bittman & Wajcman, 2000). Studies have documented a divergence of leisure time between educational groups and show that lower-class individuals are enjoying an increase in leisure over time compared to highly educated individuals (Aguiar & Hurst, 2007; Sullivan & Gershuny, 2004).

Regarding the content of leisure, Bourdieu's influential work highlighted the stratified nature of leisure consumption along the highbrow/lowbrow axis (1984). Even though the highbrow/lowbrow patterns might have moved towards a model of "omnivore" consumption patterns (Peterson & Kern, 1996), time use research still shows that highly educated individuals spend less time watching TV and more time going to the cinema or theater and reading (Gershuny, 2000). So, even though leisure time might be higher for low-income individuals, the content of that leisure might not necessarily contribute to their cultural and human capital. Another important leisure-related

time use activity that appears to be stratified is eating and, in particular, eating together in families (Putnam, 2016). Evidence for the UK shows that individuals in managerial and professional occupations spend significantly more time eating with partners and children compared to working-class families (Jarosz, 2019). Working-class individuals are also more likely to skip meals and spend less time eating on average. Shift work also plays a significant role in the propensity of skipping meals, which can create health risks (Jarosz, 2019).

Childcare appears to be a highly stratified time use activity. Even though childcare has been increasing steadily over time, educated fathers and mothers spend more time doing childcare activities on average, even after controlling for other socio-demographic characteristics (Altintas, 2016; Sani & Treas, 2016; Sullivan, Billari, & Altintas, 2014). Some evidence suggests that in the US context, the educational gap in childcare has been increasing over time (Altintas, 2016; Putnam, 2016; Sani & Treas, 2016). Childcare is an important component of social stratification and inequality (Fiorini & Keane, 2014; Fomby & Musick, 2018; Schneider, Hastings, & LaBriola, 2018). Childcare, and more generally parent–child interactions, can have long-lasting consequences for a child's life course (Bono, Francesconi, Kelly, & Sacker, 2016; Hsin & Felfe, 2014; Kalil & Mayer, 2016; Rowe & Goldin-Meadow, 2009). Childcare therefore might be an important mechanism in the creation of social inequality (Ermisch, 2008; Hoff-Ginsberg, 1998; Huttenlocher, Waterfall, Vasilyeva, Vevea, & Hedges, 2010; Rowe, 2008). Even though childcare is a heavily stratified activity, its determinants are less understood. While some researchers argue that resources and constraints are the main determinants in the provision of childcare (Bennett, Lutz, & Jayaram, 2012; Chin & Phillips, 2004), others show that class differences in parenting practices exist beyond resources and constraints (Weininger, Lareau, & Conley, 2015). Moreover, working time constraints alone do not fully explain a mother's involvement with her children, as full-time working mothers are capable of providing a similar level of childcare compared to other mothers who work part time or who do not work (Hsin & Felfe, 2014).

2.3 | The social and political context of this study

The UK has undergone important socio-demographic changes during the last few decades. Since the end of the 1950s women have entered the labor market in large numbers (Tilly & Scott, 1989); therefore, the proportion of dual-earner couples has gradually increased (Bonney, 1988). At the same time, fertility declined and more and more couples decided to stay childless. The number of lone-parent families also grew over time. Parents started to spend an ever growing amount of time with their children. These changes are often referred to as the Second Demographic Transition (Lesthaeghe, 2014).

However, these changes did not spread equally between social classes (Bonney, 1988; McLanahan, 2004). Working-class women have lagged behind in terms of working hours and full-time employment compared to middle-class women. Lone parenthood has disproportionately affected working-class households. These factors are relevant to understand how everyday life potentially became more unequal over time.

It is also during this period of time that income inequality started to diverge[1] (Atkinson, 2015a). Especially after 1980, the Gini coefficient increased in the UK (Atkinson, 2015b).

Since the 1980s, the UK has progressively shifted towards to a "workfare state" (Esping-Andersen, Hemerijck, Myles, & Gallie, 2002). Unemployment benefits have diminished over time and means tests have become stricter, pushing individuals to seek employment rather than to rely on social benefits. Flexibility in the labor markets and deregulation became core principles for promoting growth and economic development for both Thatcher and New Labour. Important changes in the legislation regarding employment took place during the Thatcher era (see Deakin & Reed, 2000, for the full list and for a comprehensive review for the UK). Collective bargaining was slowly dismantled towards more individual- or firm-wage bargaining.

New Labour did not reverse collective bargaining or employment protection policies set by previous conservative governments. In some cases, New Labour furthered deregulations, such as with the Sunday Trading Act 1994, which gave shops the right to open on Sunday (Boulin & Lesnard, 2016). The Working Time European

Directive, setting a limit on 48 hr a week, was implemented in 1998 during the New Labour government. It is worth contrasting this figure with the French government's attempts to set a 35-hr workweek in 2000 (Pailhé, Solaz, & Souletie, 2019).

This set of policies makes the UK an interesting case study. The UK has often been described as belonging to the "liberal" welfare states regime characterized by free-market principles and means-tested benefits (Esping-Andersen, 1990). But it is arguable that the UK has more regulations than the US, so the two countries cannot simply be conflated. The US can be considered the epitome of a free-market capitalist society with low employment protections, low collective bargaining, and low social expenditure. The US also lacks federal working-time regulations and does not guarantee parental leave at the federal level.

The UK is much less regulated and has less family-friendly policies compared to other European countries. Parental leave is much more limited in the UK (Daly & Ferragina, 2018, Gauthier, 2002, Thévenon 2011). The cost of children is substantial for most British families, which translates into lower enrollment of children under 2 years old in formal childcare compared to other European countries, such as France, and a lower employment rate for mothers (Boeckmann, Misra, & Budig, 2014). France and Germany would be closer to the ideal type of European style "managed" capitalism or state capitalism (Schmidt, 2002, 2003) with a highly regulated labor market, high level of employment protections, high social expenditure and important coverage of social security benefits (e.g., unemployment, childcare, etc.).

The UK lies somewhere between these two ideal types (see the Online Appendix for some illustrations).

3 | Summary and research questions

This paper aims to provide a general description of time use patterns from the 1980s to 2015 by social class and gender in the British context. I am interested in uncovering which time use patterns exist in British society and how these patterns are stratified. Because past research never focused on time use patterns but only on averages, it is difficult to make hypotheses about what kind of patterns we expect to find. However, I draw a general picture of the expected findings. Following previous literature, I expect working hours to be lowering over time for working-class men compared to upper-class men. For women, I expect a general increase in working hours between 1983 and 2015. I expect working-class individuals to be experiencing more non-standard working hours over time, especially during weekends. Because class is related to temporal autonomy, assuming that shift work and non-standard work schedules contain undesirable hours, I expect to see more working-class people in these types of schedules. I thus expect an increase in leisure time or free time during weekdays for working-class households. Finally, I expect men to increase and women to decrease their domestic time over this period, but I also expect upper-class households to increase their childcare time at a faster rate compared to working-class households.

3.1 | Data

I use two time use surveys for this study: the ESRC Time Budget Survey 1983/84 (UKTUS 1983) and the United Kingdom Time Use Survey 2014/2015. The UKTUS 1983 is a stratified national random sample of all households in the UK. The survey took place during autumn 1983 and winter 1984. It was collected by SCPR, the University of Bath and the University of Sussex. A total of 78% of households completed the household interview, and 51% of eligible members returned diaries. The UKTUS 2015 was collected by NatCen for the Centre for Time Use Research between April 2014 and March 2015. It drew a random national sample of households in the UK with a response rate of about 40%. The sample includes 1,501 individuals aged 30–69 years (for more information about the sample selection, see the Online Appendix).

3.2 | Harmonization process

I harmonized the time use activities from the original codes for the two surveys, and mapped the detailed activities into a 10-activity schema. The 10 activity categories are: (1) childcare; (2) domestic work; (3) eating; (4) leisure; (5) paid work; (6) sleep; (7) travel; (8) TV; (9) other; and (10) unknown. I harmonized social class using the National Statistics Socio-Economic Classification (NS-SEC) (Rose, Pevain, & O'Reilly, 2005). The NS-SEC has become the standard socioeconomic classification used at the Office of National Statistics in the UK. One important theoretical distinction with this schema is the difference in employment relations between, on the one hand, the "service relationship" and, on the other hand, the "labour contract" (Rose et al., 2005, p. 16). The service relationship concept is based on the idea that there is a long-term mutually beneficial relationship between employers and employees and that the amount of effort and work put forth by the employee is not directly commensurable by a "wage per hour" but rather by long-term, deferred benefits, such as career opportunities, pension, and so on. In the service relationship, the employment is stable, and employees look to future opportunities for career development. Contrarily, the labor contract captures the idea of a worker only being committed to the job for a certain number of hours, often with no long-term perspective. In contemporary society, one can think of the jobs generated by the new service economy (e.g., Deliveroo) and by seasonal workers (e.g., fruit picking). A continuum exists between these two ideal types of employment relations. Social class has been widely used in social science because it has been shown to be a good measure of economic condition in the long run. Class not only captures income differences but employment security (e.g., becoming unemployed) and, more generally, economic security (Goldthorpe, 2000). Therefore, it is a natural stratifying variable to use in this study. We used the so-called "dominance model" proposed by Erikson (1984) to attribute social class to families or households rather than individuals. Even though we analyze men and women separately, our social class variable is a household variable.[2] Therefore, it reflects the household social position rather than the individual social position. This is important, even though I did not conduct couple-level analyses, because time use allocation, such as paid work or childcare time, is decided at the household level. Classifying individuals based on their own social class can also underestimate the total household resources at an individual's disposal; in particular, this is true for stay-at-home parents. We coded the original NS-SEC categories in a 3-class schema: Class I (managerial class), Class II (professional and intermediate class) and Class III (working class). I kept the managerial class separate, even though in the 1980s, the proportion of managerial households was rather small; I did this primarily because I am interested in comparing the behaviors of the most privileged social class (managerial or upper class[3]) to the most unprivileged class (working class) to capture potential divergence patterns.

3.3 | Control variable

My analyses disaggregate the results by class, gender, year, and day of the week. So in effect these factors are accounted for. I will only use one additional control variable in my analysis: family status. I distinguish between couples with children, couples without children, single parents, and single-person households. Family status will control for the fact that the distribution of these family forms is not even between social classes. Other control variables available did not make much sense in the context of this study (e.g., working hours, employment status). I conducted additional regressions including education,[4] age, and age of the youngest child but the results did not change (see the Online Appendix). I believe that family status captures the most relevant heterogeneity in time use in this context (Gershuny, 2000).

The approach I take in this paper is close to a population approach, where I focus on exploring global patterns of time use. The spirit of the analysis is descriptive, not causal, therefore readers must keep this limitation in mind.

3.4 | Analytical strategy

I take a holistic approach to considering how all daily activities have changed over time. Given the descriptive purpose of this paper, I use sequence analysis to uncover time use patterns (Lesnard, 2008; Vagni & Cornwell, 2018). Lesnard introduced sequence analysis in time use research a decade ago, and I follow the standard steps of this method (Lesnard, 2010). The overall goal of the method is to create a finite set of clusters made of homogeneous sequences, not unlike a latent class analysis. However, it is worth noting that sequence analysis is much broader than the clustering approach I use in this paper (Aisenbrey & Fasang, 2010; Cornwell, 2015; Gabadinho, Ritschard, Mueller, & Studer, 2011).

The first step is to run a matching algorithm to create a pairwise distance matrix between all sequences. Then, I apply a clustering technique on that distance matrix to create homogeneous groups. I used the matching algorithm proposed by Lesnard called Dynamic Hamming (Cornwell, 2015; Lesnard, 2010). The algorithm is built on the Hamming distance, which is a simple count of simultaneous events only using substitution costs (Hamming, 1950). Lesnard introduced an important modification to the method related to the weighting of the substitution costs.

Lesnard's original empirical example has only two states: doing paid work ($e = 1$) and not doing paid work ($e = 0$). The sequences are strings of zeros and ones from 1, …, T (T equals 24 hr in time use diaries). Distance algorithms are always applied to pairwise sequences (for instance, comparing sequence i to sequence j).

In the most basic Hamming distance, each matched episode (or event) is counted 1, so that the Hamming distance between i and j is simply a sum of matched events or states (e) of pairwise sequences.

$$\text{Hamming}\,(i,j) = \sum_{t=1}^{T} 1 - \left| e_t^i - e_t^j \right|$$

Dynamic Hamming reweights t according to the transition frequencies for each time period. The transition matrix is simply the probability of transitioning from one state to another from$t\text{-}1$ to t.

Let us express the transition matrix between (t_{-1},t) and (t,t_{+1}) as a transition weight (w), where t, rather than denoting the starting and ending point of an episode (e.g., 10:00 a.m., 10:10 a.m.), represents an interval of time [10:00 a.m., 10:10 a.m.]. The low transition rate between states around the interval t would suggest that these states belong to different trajectories, while high transitions rate at a certain time would suggest similar trajectories.

We can then simply write the following:

$$\text{DynamicHamming}\,(i,j) = \sum_{t=1}^{T} 1 - \left| e_t^i - e_t^j \right| \cdot \frac{1}{w_t}$$

The substitution costs are, therefore, time-varying and are inversely proportional to transition rates (Lesnard, 2010). I then use the Ward hierarchical clustering to group the pairwise distances into a small number of homogeneous discrete groups (Gabadinho et al., 2011). Using the derived set of clusters, I investigate their distribution by year, social class, gender, and weekdays/weekends. No consensus on how to best choose the optimal number of clusters exists. Time use sequences are particularly difficult to group due to the high number of episodes and the often high number of states. I follow some heuristic criteria to determine the number of clusters (see the Online Appendix).

I finally use multinomial logistic regressions to study cluster membership by social class and to control for family status. I am presenting the predicted probabilities using marginal effects at representative values. I used the following values for the dummy control variables: childless couples at 0.41, single parents at 0.04, and single person at 0.19 for the women's regressions. For the men's regressions, I used the values 0.46 for childless couples, and single person = 0.14 (there is no single parents in the men's sample). The reference being “couples with

children" in the models. All the other variables are fully specified. I show in the Online Appendix the predicted probabilities with all the variables, including the controls, fully specified.

4 | RESULTS

Before describing the results from the clustering analysis, let me describe some general changes found when comparing the sequences by social class and gender (see the Online Appendix for the Figure A.1).

I find that on weekend days, leisure, domestic work, and TV occupy most of the day, while paid work fills most of the time during weekdays. I find a decline in paid work on weekdays between 1983 and 2015 and a general increase in leisure time. On weekends, I find that paid work seems to have slightly increased between the two periods. We can clearly see that childcare increased on weekends between the 1980s and 2015. TV and domestic chores have, on the contrary, decreased.

Important class differences structure men's lives both on weekdays and on weekends. First, we see that men in Class I are working longer hours during weekdays compared to working-class men. They also travel more, eat at more structured times and watch less TV. Working-class men seem to be working at earlier times in the morning in 2015. We can see that they also do more domestic chores than upper-class men. Middle-class men have patterns that seem to lie between the two other classes. They work on weekdays more than working-class men but enjoy more leisure during the day compared to upper-class men. Over time, we see that men from all classes work less and are enjoying more leisure time during weekdays. The patterns on weekends seem less stratified than those on weekdays; however, we note than upper-class men watch less TV and provide more childcare, especially in 2015.

Regarding women's time use, we first see that they are doing much more domestic work compared to men, regardless of their social class. In 1983, working-class and upper-class women had fairly similar weekdays and weekends. However, it seems that time use on weekdays has diverged over time by class for women. Women in Class I are spending a much greater proportion of their day working for pay in 2015 than working-class women. Domestic work has reduced for all women between the two periods; however, it seems to have reduced at a faster rate for upper-class women. Overall, childcare increased between 1983 and 2015. However, we see that upper-class women are spending much more time providing childcare on weekdays compared to working-class women. Time spent traveling has also increased over time. I also find that working-class women have started to work more on weekends, while upper-class women barely spend any time working for pay on weekends. Finally, upper-class women seem to have given up domestic work at a much faster rate than working-class women on weekends.

4.1 | Typology of daily activities

Overall averages and distribution can hide heterogeneous patterns. This is why I turn to the clustering of sequences to reveal hidden sequence time use patterns. I derived 13 clusters that are able to capture the patterns of activities found in the two time use surveys (see the Online Appendix for more details). I found six clusters that capture paid work patterns (two clusters capture standard work schedules patterns, four capture shift work patterns); five clusters that capture unpaid work patterns; one cluster that captures leisure, TV, and personal care activities; and one residual cluster ("Other"). Figure 2 shows the distribution of activities throughout the day by cluster.

4.1.1 | Paid work clusters

Six clusters capture the patterns of paid work with two subgroups. One subgroup captures patterns of standard "full-day" work patterns while the second captures shift work and non-standard schedules patterns. Cluster 1,



FIGURE 2 State distribution graphs showing the proportion of members in each Dynamic Hamming-distance-based cluster engaging in certain activities at each time point throughout the day [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

Paid Standard I, captures 8:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. standard work schedules. Paid Standard II captures a slightly shorter working day with an earlier work ending point. The four shift work clusters capture morning shift, afternoon shift, evening shift and night shift, respectively.

4.1.2 | Unpaid work clusters

Five clusters capture unpaid work patterns. The Unpaid Childcare cluster captures individuals spending a large proportion of their day providing childcare. The Unpaid Domestic I cluster is a mix of domestic work, childcare, and afternoon leisure. Unpaid Domestic II captures mainly afternoon domestic work. Unpaid Domestic III captures individuals who spend most of their day doing housework. Finally, individuals in the Unpaid Domestic IV cluster have a morning housework shift.

4.1.3 | Leisure and other clusters

The leisure cluster captures individuals who spend most of their day enjoying free time, leisure activities and personal care, with a bit of time still dedicated to domestic work.

These 13 clusters capture the heterogeneity in time use patterns in the data. However, I further reduced these patterns to study their association with class and gender. Informed by the similarities and qualitative differences between these clusters, I collapsed the two Paid Standard working day clusters into one cluster. I also collapsed the morning, evening, and night shifts into a single cluster. I excluded the afternoon shift because I noticed that the association between afternoon shift and class is quite different from the one of the other clusters. I grouped the unpaid "shift" domestic clusters together (Unpaid I, II, and IV) and left the childcare cluster and the full day domestic work cluster separate (see the Online Appendix). This results in 8 final clusters. Nonetheless, I present the complete regression tables with the 13 clusters in the Online Appendix.

4.2 | Class and clusters

In this section, I explore the distribution of clusters by social class and gender for weekdays and weekends. I present both the regressions tables (on the 8 clusters' schema) and the predicted probabilities of the multinomial models. The reference category for the regressions is managerial class, with family status set to couples with children and the year set to 1983. For weekdays, I took the paid standard work schedule cluster as the reference category and I took the leisure cluster as reference category for the weekends.

Table 1 shows the multinomial regressions for men on weekdays; Table 2 shows the regressions for men on weekends. We can see that both middle-class and working-class men have more chances to work morning and evening shifts on weekdays ($p < .01$). Working-class men are also more likely to be found in the long domestic work cluster ($p < .05$) and the leisure cluster ($p < .05$) on weekdays. The regressions suggest that middle-class men ($p < .001$) and working-class men ($p < .10$) have fewer chances of being in the childcare clusters on weekends compared to upper-class men. Working-class men are also less likely to be in the long domestic work cluster on weekends ($p < .05$).

Figure 3 shows the predicted probabilities for men on weekdays in the upper panel and weekends in the bottom panel.[5] The predicted probabilities for men on weekdays show that men in the managerial class are found in greater proportion in the paid standard cluster (around 55% in 2015) compared to working-class men (28% in 2015). We can note that the proportion of this cluster has been diminishing over time for all men on weekdays. The proportion is rather stable over time on weekends. We can note the more important proportion of working-class

TABLE 1 Multinomial regression on the 8 clusters for men on weekdays

	Cluster of reference: Paid Standard						
	Shift morning/evening	**Shift afternoon**	**Unpaid childcare**	**Unpaid domestic**	**Unpaid domestic long**	**Leisure**	**Other**
	(1)	**(2)**	**(3)**	**(4)**	**(5)**	**(6)**	**(7)**
Middle class	1.062**	−0.286	−0.528	0.477	0.192	0.290	0.058
Working class	1.478**	−12.970	−1.316	0.744+	1.171*	1.072*	1.291*
Year 2015	0.360	0.469	0.464	0.093	0.576	0.245	0.535
Childless couples	0.227	−0.138	−1.305*	1.127***	1.177**	1.165***	0.810+
Single person	−0.566	−0.592	−1.069	1.451***	0.546	1.249**	0.742
Constant	−2.459***	−1.934***	−2.133***	−2.094***	−3.055***	−2.641***	−3.421***
n = 614							
dev.base = 2,136.1							
aic = 2,114.6							
dev.full = 2,030.6							
McFadden.R^2 = 0.049							

+p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.

TABLE 2 Multinomial regression on the 8 clusters for men on weekends

	Cluster of reference: Leisure						
	Paid standard	**Shift morning/evening**	**Shift afternoon**	**Unpaid childcare**	**Unpaid domestic**	**Unpaid domestic long**	**Other**
	(1)	**(2)**	**(3)**	**(4)**	**(5)**	**(6)**	**(7)**
Middle class	0.466	0.266	−0.049	−1.987**	−0.064	−0.380	−0.353
Working class	0.161	−0.474	−1.071	−1.693*	−0.316	−1.272**	−1.133*
Year 2015	−0.023	−0.179	0.612	2.314*	−0.107	−0.659*	0.366
Childless couples	−0.563	−0.936**	0.295	−2.648***	−0.038	−0.508+	−0.380
Single person	−0.642	−0.742	1.390+	−2.046+	0.013	−0.323	0.255
Constant	−1.310*	−0.348	−2.964**	−1.908+	0.580+	0.537	−0.865+
n = 620							
dev.base = 2,181							
aic = 2,177.5							
dev.full = 2,093.5							
McFadden.R^2 = 0.04							

+p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.



FIGURE 3 Predicted probabilities from the multinomial regression models for men by year and social class on weekdays and weekends. Social class is displayed on the x-axis (Class I, II, III)

men in this type of schedule on weekends. Middle-class men are right in the center in terms of proportion of paid standard work schedules (7% in 2015). In 2015, about 15% of working-class men were found in the morning or evening shift cluster on weekdays, compared to only 6% of men in the managerial class. The third figure displays the proportion of the childcare cluster, and we can see that about 4% of upper-class men have this type of pattern on weekdays compared to less than 1% for working-class men. Looking at weekends, we see that the proportion of upper-class men in that cluster grew dramatically from less than 1% to almost 7%, compared to less than 1% to 2% for working-class men.

The long domestic work cluster seems to have declined during 1983–2015 for men on weekends while slightly increasing on weekdays. The proportion diminished from 26% to 14% for upper-class men and from 11% to 6% for working-class men. Finally, the proportion of men in the leisure cluster is highly stratified. On both weekdays and weekends, working-class men have more likelihood to be found in that cluster.

Table 3 shows the results for women on weekdays, and Table 4 shows the results for women on weekends. The regressions suggest that working-class women also have higher likelihood of being found in the leisure cluster on weekdays compared to upper-class women ($p < .10$). Working-class women have more chances of having morning or evening shifts on weekdays ($p < .05$). They also are more likely to be found in the two domestic clusters ($p < .01$) compared to upper-class women with standard work schedules on weekdays. On weekends, I find that working-class women are more likely to have standard work schedules ($p < .10$) and more likely to have long domestic work-type days ($p < .10$).

The predicted probabilities for women shows that all women have increased their time spent at work and diminished their domestic work time (Figure 4). However, important class differences still exist between working-class and upper-class women. As the regressions showed, upper-class women are more likely to have standard working days compared to working-class women on weekdays. The proportion increased from 20% to almost 30% for women in Class I, compared to 10% to 15% for women in Class III. However, working-class women are more likely to be working a standard, full-day schedule on weekends. The proportion rose from 1% to 5% for working-class women, but stayed constant (around 1%) for upper-class women. We can also see that working-class women are more likely to have a full day of housework on weekends compared to upper-class women. We do not find significant differences in the patterns of childcare between classes for women.

5 | DISCUSSION

In this paper, I explored the time use patterns structuring British society in the years 1983 and 2015. I found meaningful patterns that capture the heterogeneity of daily time use. This paper is one of the first efforts to bridge time use research and social stratification research. The "sequence pattern approach" offers insights that looking at average time spent in activities cannot provide. For instance, the average time spent at work cannot distinguish the multitude of shift work schedules (Lesnard, 2008). Linking these heterogeneous patterns to class, I found an important divide between social classes.

I found that upper-class men and women have a higher likelihood of standard work schedules on weekdays and a lower likelihood of working for pay on weekends. Non-standard work schedules, such as morning, evening, and night shifts, are more prevalent in working-class households. Working-class men have experienced an important reduction in their standard work schedule and in paid work more generally and have experienced an increase in non-working days and in domestic work (especially during weekdays) over the years 1983–2015. Working-class women are more likely to be clustered in the housework clusters, both during weekdays and on weekends. Over time, I found a higher proportion of working-class women working for pay on weekends, doing both shift work and a standard working day. Finally, the results show that the childcare cluster (i.e., a full day spent providing childcare) has been increasing over time, but the results suggest that the increase has been particularly important for men in upper-class households on weekends.

TABLE 3 Multinomial regression on the 8 clusters for women on weekdays

	Cluster of reference: Paid Standard						
	Shift morning/evening	Shift afternoon	Unpaid childcare	Unpaid Domestic	Unpaid domestic long	Leisure	Other
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Middle class	0.431	−0.159	−0.521	−0.363	−0.178	−0.012	−0.541
Working class	1.138*	0.523	0.327	0.996**	0.866*	0.830^{+}	0.175
Year 2015	−0.349	−0.172	0.450	−0.575*	−0.785**	−0.575^{+}	−0.179
Childless couples	−0.500	−0.287	−2.999***	0.178	0.396	0.949^{+}	0.128
Single parent	−0.214	−1.013	−2.021*	−0.452	−0.386	1.029	0.389
Single person	−0.474	−0.313	−3.043***	0.300	0.334	1.839***	0.334
Constant	−0.801^{+}	−1.205*	0.190	0.389	−0.075	−2.006***	−1.174*
n = 783							
dev.base = 2,979.7							
aic = 2,887.7							
dev.full = 2,789.7							
McFadden. R^2 = 0.064							

$^{+}p < .1$; $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$.

TABLE 4 Multinomial regression on the 8 clusters for women on weekends

	Cluster of reference: Leisure						
	Paid standard	Shift morning/evening	Shift afternoon	Unpaid childcare	Unpaid domestic	Unpaid domestic long	Other
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Middle class	0.906	0.631	0.567	−0.462	0.062	0.205	−0.239
Working class	1.514^{+}	0.710	−0.043	0.253	0.455	0.704^{+}	−0.070
Year 2015	0.985	0.693	−0.325	0.654^{+}	−0.630**	−0.730**	0.132
Childless couples	−0.803	−0.672	0.710	−3.888***	−0.131	−0.863**	−0.747^{+}
Single parent	0.026	0.367	−10.577	−0.898	−0.555	−0.067	−0.252
Single person	−1.607^{+}	−1.028	−14.967***	−3.314***	−0.308	−1.068**	−0.433
Constant	−2.904**	−2.101**	−2.831**	0.225	1.358***	1.093**	−0.222
n = 773							
dev.base = 2,517.6							
aic = 2,454.3							
dev.full = 2,356.3							
McFadden. R^2 = 0.064							

$^{+}p < .1$; $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$.



FIGURE 4 Predicted probabilities from the multinomial regression models for women by year and social class on weekdays and weekends. Social class is displayed on the x-axis (Class I, II, III)

The reduction of paid work and unpaid work during 1983–2015 is in line with the literature (Gershuny, 2000; Robinson & Godbey, 2010). My results suggest that the class divide in working hours is a real phenomenon (Gershuny, 2005). I found strong gender differences in the distribution of time use clusters. Gender is an important factor of time stratification. Women are more likely to be in the domestic/housework clusters and less likely to be in the standard work schedule cluster compared to men (Gershuny & Sullivan, 2019). I also found a large proportion of women to be working shifts. Working-class women are particularly over-represented in these types of schedules.

My study took place in the British context from 1983 to 2015. The goal was not to analyze a particular policy, but we can speculate on the role of social policy in shaping time patterns. A comparative study of time use patterns shows little difference at the population level between the UK and other countries such as the US and France (Vagni & Cornwell, 2018). However, we can still reflect on how institutions and policies, in affecting inequalities, might impact time patterns. The scheduling of work is an obvious area where policies can make a difference. For instance, a study focusing on the French 35-hr workweek reform showed how an exogenous change in working hours affected general time use allocation (Pailhé et al., 2019). Gershuny and Sullivan note that "it appears that public policy regimes involving the kinds of state regulatory activity on production and consumption … have a greater effect on the time that people spend in paid work" (2003, p. 223). They do not find differences in domestic work and leisure across regime. Domestic work is more strongly associated with individual characteristics, such as education, than with welfare regime (Gershuny & Sullivan, 2003). Even though to my knowledge no study has shown how work-related policy affects inequality in daily time use patterns, we can hypothesize that the paid work clusters might be the ones most affected by policies and institutional contexts. My results support the idea that working-class individuals, especially women, have proportionally more shift work on weekends compared to upper-class women. Obviously, it is unclear if shift work is the result or the cause of inequality, but it is nonetheless an important dimension of inequality because it is stratified. Work schedules are not randomly assigned to people but are structured by class. Temporal autonomy and control over schedules are important dimensions of social stratification. A comparison between the stratification of time use patterns in the UK with more regulated economies, such as in France, Germany, or the Scandinavian countries, could be informative in our understanding of the link between inequality and time patterns.

As pointed out by Goodin, Rice, Parpo, and Eriksson (2008), social institutions matter depending on household types (e.g., dual-earning families, lone parents, etc.). To fully understand the role of welfare regime, one should explore how social stratification and family status interact. In this study, I simply controlled for family status. The next natural step will be to explore the interaction of family structure and class. Different regimes will impact the temporal autonomies of single households, dual-earning parents, and lone parents differently. Because working-class households are the most affected by single parenthood, political regimes will affect inequalities in different ways and, thus, will impact time use patterns differently. Further research should try to combine a social stratification approach of time use patterns with a cross-country comparison approach focusing on different family status.

The limitations of this study should be highlighted. One limitation is that the analyses focused on individual time use rather than accounting for household time use patterns. Further work should investigate this issue using multiple diaries per household. Another limitation is the lack of a longitudinal link between time use and the life course. Linking life course to time use patterns will offer researchers a more complete picture and a better understanding of these patterns.

This study is exploratory and descriptive in nature. My aim was to establish associations between time use patterns and social class stratification. Further work should tackle the question of mechanisms and causality. How do these patterns emerge, and what causes them? Time is a crucial component of everyday social contexts. Everything takes place in time. The time to commute to work, to the nursery, or to school, as well as the time spent at work and to sustain basic needs—all these spatio-temporal factors are intimately linked to differential opportunities that are socially stratified. Embodied time in the context of human capital accumulation is an important

link between time use, life course, and social stratification, as well as gender inequalities (DiPrete & Eirich, 2006). More effort is needed to understand how the class of origin shapes time use and how time use shapes class destination from a longitudinal point of view. The same can be said about the life course. How do life course events interact with time use patterns and social stratification? In this paper, I controlled for family status, but it is likely that family status or different stages of the life course interact differently with class and time use contexts.

Despite these limitations, this study is the first to explicitly explore the heterogeneity in time use patterns for men and women in a social stratification context. I show how the sequential pattern approach can help unveil hidden patterns (Lesnard, 2010; Vagni & Cornwell, 2018). This paper contributes to the field by showing what these patterns look like, how they change over time and how they are stratified by class and gender.

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DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

The data that support the findings of this study are openly available at https://www.timeuse.org/mtus/download

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ENDNOTES

[1] Income inequality in the UK follows a U-shape pattern over the 20th century (for a detailed discussion see Atkinson, 2015a).

[2] Single parents are attributed their own social class.

[3] To help the manuscript read more easily, we use the terms Class I, managerial class, and upper class indistinguishably.

[4] Available upon request.

[5] The probabilities for the clusters "Shift Afternoon" and "Other" are not displayed.

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ORIGINAL ARTICLE

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"They love death as we love life": The "Muslim Question" and the biopolitics of replacement

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Abstract

This article approaches the analytic of the "Muslim Question" through the prism of the discursive and conspiratorial use of demographics as an alleged threat to Europe. It argues that concerns about "Muslim demographics" within Europe have been entertained, mobilized, and deployed to not only construct Muslims as problems and dangers to the present and future of Europe, but also as calls to revive eugenic policies within the frame of biopower. The article begins by sketching the contours of the contemporary "Muslim Question" and proceeds with a critical engagement with the literature positing a deliberate and combative strategy by "Muslims" centered on birth rates—seen by these authors as a tactical warfare—to allegedly replace European "native" populations. The analysis continues by focusing on two images juxtaposing life and death as imagined within the replacement discourse, and that capture that discourse in powerful albeit disturbing ways. Finally, the article proposes reading the population replacement discourse as a deployment of biopolitics and one of its many techniques, namely, eugenics.

KEYWORDS

biopolitics, conspiracy theories, demographics, eugenics, Muslim Question, racism

1 | INTRODUCTION

Today "Muslims" exist as a controversy of sorts; "Muslims" are a problem, discursively crafted as a question longing for answers and interventions.[1] In Europe, so the story goes, Muslims do not integrate into the nation-state and remain isolated from society and its values, they do not speak the national language, they are underachievers in schools, have lower rates of employment and higher birth rates vis-à-vis "Western natives."[2] Muslims live in an archaic world of gender inequality. Muslim men oppress Muslim women, and the most pristine example of such oppression is the hijab. This atavistic world of inequality also renders Muslims intolerant toward sexual diversity and sexual minorities. Islam may or may not be the ultimate factor behind all of this, but certainly plays a role, for it represents a religious force, as the story continues, that does not, and might inherently not be able to, respect the separation between religion and the state which is taken to be a central feature of Western civilization. This premodern world, moreover, in sharp contrast to Western civilization, is considered to hold an innate sense of violence that, at best, is barely contained, and lurks in Muslim subjectivities, waiting to be activated through processes of radicalization, extremism, Islamism, and ultimately terrorism. The ontological differences between Muslims and Westerners are so immense to the point that, allegedly, these two constructed groups hold diametrical opposed conceptions toward live and death, "They [violent Muslims] love death," we have been told, "as we [Westerners] love life" (Roy, 2017, p. 2).

Slight variations of this discourse have been uttered in French, Dutch, German, English, and many other languages. Iterated by politicians, journalists, academics, judges, teachers, and many others, on a broad spectrum of different political views, but more prominently from the (far) right. A critique of this discourse has emerged through the concept of Islamophobia, which reveals the stereotypes surrounding the figure of the "Muslim," while also surveying the different processes of discrimination faced by Muslims (Sayyid, 2014; Klug, 2012; Kundnani, 2014; Law et al., 2019; Bayrakli & Hafez, 2017). Islamophobia's usefulness as a concept, however, has also been contested, both etymologically for its imprecision (Halliday, 1999; Vakil, 2010),[3] and analytically and historically for its detachment from larger trajectories such as Orientalism, colonial racial formations, and its "family resemblance" with the 19th-century European Jewish Question, although there have been important efforts to entangle these histories (Medovoi, 2012; Meer, 2013; Meer & Modood, 2009; Said, 1985).

More recently, the analytical frame of the "Muslim Question" was brought to scholarly discussions and analyses of Muslims and Islam in Europe (Anidjar, 2012; Farris, 2014; Norton, 2013; O'Brien, 2015; Mansouri, Lobo, & Johns, 2015).[4] This conceptualization further traces the problematization—which, following Michel Foucault (1988), refers to the processes of how and why something or somebody is turned into a problem—of Islam and Muslims in Europe and seeks to apprehend the systematic character of this process. We understand the analytic of the "Muslim Question" to revolve around two dimensions. First, the accusation of being *an "alien body" to the nation* (Farris, 2014, pp. 296–297) and second, the *demands of integration and assimilation* (Farris, 2014, p. 296). The production of material and symbolic difference is, in other words, entangled with forceful calls, as well as concrete measures, to regulate, control, and refashion Muslims' lives and subjectivities. The "Muslim Question" can thus be considered as a form of what Foucault calls governmentality, or "a mode of power concerned with the maintenance and control of bodies and persons, the production and regulation of persons and populations, and the circulation of goods insofar as they maintain and restrict the life of the population" (Butler, 2004, p. 52).

In this article, we seek to further think through (the analytic of) Europe's "Muslim Question" by means of approaching it from one particular angle, namely the discursive and conspiratorial use of demographics as an alleged threat to Europe. The problematization of Muslims in Europe is particularly and anxiously concerned with demographics, and more particularly with two key demographic processes determining the size and composition of a population, that is, birth and migration. Discourses on "waves" or "floods" of migration as well as on high birth and fertility rates among "migrant" populations have gained considerable traction all over Europe in the past decades, and provide fertile ground for the "fear of replacement." Within the context of the "Muslim Question," this fear entails that Muslim populations will "replace" the white/Christian populations that are considered to be "native" to

Europe. This predicament, moreover, is often framed as the result of a deliberate and combative strategy on the side of Muslims, and hence labeled as "demographic warfare" and "demographic Jihad."

We investigate this contemporary discourse of "replacement" in its articulation with Europe's "Muslim Question," and as a prism into that question, in the following manner. First, we offer a concise and schematic account of the rise of the "replacement" discourse through a brief discussion of some of its major articulations. Borrowing from Kyra Schuller (2018) we propose reading this discourse as a *palimpsest*, a discourse that accumulates layers through time, a discourse in which every (re)iteration adds layers of meaning (fiction, statistical, racial, conspiratorial, theological), while still bearing traces of or keeping intact the core idea (a deliberated Muslim plan to replace "native" European populations). Second, we do a close reading of two recent images that juxtapose life and death as imagined within the replacement discourse, and that capture that discourse in powerful albeit disturbing ways. We selected these images because they represent nodal points of the current demographic discourse, while at the same time also being incitements to discourse. Finally, our close reading of these images provides the ground to develop an argument on biopolitics and also eugenics in the context of the "Muslim Question;" we argue that demographic questionings and biopolitical-eugenic answers constitute a key discursive site where the "Muslim Question" articulates and unfolds nowadays.

2 | LE GRAND REPLACEMENT: THE PALIMPSEST OF DEMOGRAPHIC WARFARE

Over the past decades, Muslims and Islam in Europe have increasingly been framed and approached through the specter of demographics, in which the optic of migration, always already framing Muslims as recent arrivals to Europe (thereby erasing both long-standing colonial entanglements and century old and deep-rooted Islamic presences in various parts of Europe), has been increasingly joined by an optic of birth rates. From seemingly innocuous reporting on how the most frequent given name to newborns in certain cities or neighborhoods is now Mohammed instead of Jan (in Brussels) or Hans or Johann (in Berlin) (Bruzz, 2018; BZ, 2019) to heated and racially charged polemics, such as Austria's first baby of 2018 derogatively being called "a newly born terrorist" (Torrens, 2018), there is a heightened public interest in the procreation of Muslim populations. This interest, and sometimes moral panic, is part of a more elaborate discourse that has developed under various signatures, such as "demographic jihad" or "population replacement," that suggest that those populations who consider themselves native to Europe—that is, white and Christian populations—fear they will soon be outnumbered and thus "replaced" by Muslims.

While its core ideas have been in the making for several decades, the discourse has expanded significantly in the last two to three years in a synergic interplay between marginal extreme right-wing political subcultures—in the meantime readily referred to as the alt_right—and mainstream and best-selling authors and commentators.[5] We have seen the rise of a conspiratorial-confrontational genre with slight national variations, but overall committed to paint a civilizational chasm between Islam and the West in general, and Europe in particular, in which Muslims are systematically depicted as a problematic population posing a series of difficulties and menaces to Western societies and governments. This discursive genre, moreover, portrays a waning and decaying Europe that is going through "civilizational decline" as well as a "demographic winter," and needs to be defended against Muslims and Islam. In what follows, we give a brief account of the main arguments of this discourse of demographic threat, as they are developed and disseminated through best-selling books and authors. We also highlight how this discourse over its period of formation and proliferation has acquired layers of meanings through its different iterations, rendering it, as it were, into an unfinished palimpsest.

One of the first post-colonial elaborations linking demographic concerns about the high birth rates of non-Europeans with the destruction of Europe can be found in Jean Raspail's (1973) apocalyptic novel *Le Camp des Saints*. The novel is structured around a single and straightforward plot: one million desperate and starving Indians embark on one thousand old ships from the Ganges to Europe, and through a set of contingencies they end up on

the shores of southern France. The Indians are led by a nameless character identified only as a "giant turd eater," who is accompanied by a child-monster of evil character (Raspail, 1973, pp. 9–12). Once the plot is set up, the novel alternates between the reactions of different sectors of French society (the media, politicians, a professor) toward the imminent arrival of the ships and the immigrants, and the description of what transpires on the ships. According to Jean-Marc Moura (1988, p. 119), Raspail developed and turned neo-malthusian concepts—proper to the 1970s and concerned with the relationship between estimated global population growth and the depletion of resources—into a fiction that heavily resonated with the rise of the "new far right" in 1970s France and its vociferous opposition to migration. In Raspail's racially charged nightmare, migration from the "Third World" would eventually bring the apocalypse of the West (the book opens with an epigraph of the Bible's book of Revelation, setting up the eschatological tone of the novel), beginning with France yet expanding throughout Europe. Once the migrants reach the French coast, they embark upon a path of destruction and murder heading into the continent, and they are joined by migrants who were already there (Arabs) and French anarchists. The novel concludes with the destruction of Switzerland.

Mounted on the liberty provided by fiction, *The Camp of Saints* inaugurates a genre that in the ensuing decades will find translations into history, sociology, theology, demographics, and political sciences, and where the destruction of Europe is produced by the convergence of two processes. On the one hand, the migration of non-Europeans to Europe—migrants who allegedly have higher birth rates compared to Europeans, and who are considered to inaugurate a process which will eventually lead to a deleterious transformation of the social, political, cultural, and "racial" make up of European societies. On the other hand, the complicity of (weakened) European elites, who take part in the destruction of Europe, by—willingly or not—enabling and accepting "waves" of migrants who end up shattering the meanings of what is supposed to be European. The convergence of these two processes mobilizes the call to defend Europe, including the call for a stronger European leadership with a more aggressive stance towards migration. This genre, moreover, is framed within a Manichean and confrontational world view, antagonizing the *West* versus *the Rest*, to use Stuart Hall's (1992, p. 275) phrase.

In a paragraph capturing the fears and anxieties of an imminent racial war, Raspail narrates a scene worth quoting at length since it delineates many themes of the demographic warfare palimpsest that will continue to appear in the following decades through new iterations. While chaos reigns the shores of the Ganges, a local Indian official has a phone conversation with a Belgian consul, explaining to the consul the following:

> *Look here, my friend. Why cling to the hope that my government still has some say in all this? What's happening out on those docks is the fringe of the problem, the part we can see. Like the lava that shoots up out of the crater. Or the wave that breaks on the beach … Yes, that's what it is, a wave, with another one rolling behind it, and one behind that, and another, and another. And so on, out to sea, back to the storm that's the cause of it all. This mob of poor devils attacking the ships is just the first wave. You've seen their kind before. Their misery is nothing new, it doesn't upset you. But what about the second wave, the one right behind? Would it shock you to learn that thousands more are on the move? Half the country, in fact. Young ones, handsome ones, the ones that haven't even begun to starve … The second wave, my friend. The beautiful creatures. God's perfect specimens, these people of ours. Like statues, in all their naked glory, out of our temples and onto the road, streaming toward the port. Yes, ugliness bowing to beauty at last … And behind them, the third wave, fear. And the fourth wave, famine. Two months, my friend, and five million dead already! … Then the wave we call flood, stripping the country, destroying the crops, laying waste the land for five long years. And another one, off in the distance, the wave of war. More famine in its wake, more millions dead. And another, still nearer the storm, the wave of shame. The shame of those days when the West was master of our land . . . But through it all, through wave after wave, these people of ours, rubbing bellies for all they're worth, to their bodies' and souls' content, to bring more millions into the world to die …* Yes, that's where it all begins. *That's the eye of the storm, no matter how it's hidden. And you know, it's really not a storm at all, but a great*, triumphant surge of life …

> *There's no Third World. No, not anymore. That's only a phrase you coined to keep us in our place. There's one world, only one, and it's going to be* flooded with life, *submerged. This country of mine is a roaring river. A river of sperm. Now, all of a sudden, it's shifting course, my friend, and heading west … (Raspail, 1973, pp. 14–15 [our emphasis])*

The Indian official announces "the end of the Third World," by which he means the end of the West, through a "surge of life," represented by "a river of sperm." The image that Raspail conjures up establishes the life of the Other as tantamount to the death of Europe. The fertility of migrants washing up on European shores carries the seed of Europe's destruction. *The Camp of Saints* mobilizes and weaponizes the construal of non-Europeans' higher birth rates and migration as a deliberate and unstoppable warfare tactic against Europe. In the novel at large, and this paragraph in particular, Raspail unfolds the blueprint of a discourse that will, slowly but steadily, burgeon throughout Europe and the US, and is elaborated in multiple sites and in different layers, yet has become particularly attached to the Muslim subject.[6]

An early scholarly articulation of this discourse can be found in Samuel Huntington's (1993) highly influential essay *The Clash of Civilizations?*, later developed into a monograph with the same title, albeit without a question mark (Huntington, 1996), which became a highly influential layer within the palimpsest of demographic warfare. Future global politics and wars will not be between ideologically opposing super-powers as in the Cold War era but rather between civilizations holding diametrically opposed cultural values, Huntington argues. In this scheme, Islam represents the ultimate threat to Western civilization for, according to Huntington, "Islam has bloody borders" (Huntington, 1993, p. 35), that is, where there is Islam there will be blood. This menace emerges not only from Islam's assumed link to violence, but also from its demographics: "Islam is exploding demographically with destabilizing consequences for Muslim countries and their neighbours" (Huntington, 1996, p. 103; for a critique see Said, 2001). This demographic explosion, he continues, has been particular expansive in the age cohort of 15 to 24 years, which "provides recruits for fundamentalism, terrorism, insurgency, and migration" (Huntington, 1996, p. 103). Ever since its publication, *The Clash of Civilizations* thesis became a paradigmatic and highly influential frame positing a belligerent argument to understand world politics as the outcome of the warlike confrontation between the West and Islam.

At the beginning of the 21st century, in the wake of the War on Terror, the concern with demography was elaborated more systematically and burgeoned all over Europe. A crucial concept in this further development is that of Eurabia, which succinctly captures many of the themes of Europe's "Muslim Question" and the demographic warfare trope. Eurabia functions as a nodal point articulating different interrelated discourses: the problematization of Muslims writ large, the idea of Europe waning, and the demographic threat posed by Muslims which is also linked with the construal of Muslim hypersexuality, or, as it is sometimes labeled, "Muslim fecundism" (BareNakedIslam, 2013). The Eurabia narrative can be seen as embedded within the wider frame of Huntington's clash of civilizations and echoing Raspail's ordeal, but it adds extra layers in the form of conspiracy theories of an alleged plot of Muslim domination, and the waning of a complicit Europe. Oriana Fallaci (2004; for a critique of the Eurabia conspiracy see Carr, 2006; Bangstad, 2013) was the first author to seriously popularize the term Eurabia in her best-seller book *The Force of Reason*.[7]

According to Fallaci, Eurabia is the code word for a not-so-hidden conspiracy between Arab and European government elites, plotted in 1974 with the end goal, as it were, of sending Arab immigrants to Europe in exchange for oil (Fallaci, 2004, pp. 137–138). Given that "the sons of Allah breed like rats" (Fallaci, 2002, p. 137), Fallaci concludes that "Europe is no longer Europe, it is 'Eurabia', a colony of Islam" (Fallaci & Varadarajan, 2005). Leaving the dehumanization of Muslims and the irony of portraying Europe as colonized aside for a moment, Fallaci's relevance in regard to the development of the population replacement discourse resides in her mainstream articulation of "Muslim hypersexuality" and higher birth rates with an upcoming calamity, that is, the destruction of Europe. In a sense, Eurabia takes Huntington's idea of "Islam exploding demographically" to the arena of secret plots and conspiracies, as the demographic explosion in Fallaci's writings is not only the outcome of "natural" processes, but also a deliberate and combative Muslim strategy.[8]

The term Eurabia became even more prominent through the writings of Giselle Litman, pen name Bat Ye'Or (2005), and the publication of her book *Eurabia: The Euro-Arab Axis*. Although Fallaci and Ye'Or predicate the same conspiratorial fears, Ye'Or's exposition takes on a more academic tone and structure than Fallaci's, and as a result Ye'Or's publications are couched in an aura of scientific validity. In *Eurabia*, she fleshes out the alleged secret plan whereby European civilization has become "subservient of the ideology of jihad and the Islamic powers that propagate it" (Ye'Or, 2005, p. 9). According to Ye'Or, this secret plot has been transforming Europe culturally as well as demographically by means of an "increasing Islamic *penetration* of Europe" (Ye'Or, 2005, p. 10 [our emphasis]) that will result in the "alteration and substitution of one civilization by another" (Ye'Or, 2005, p. 35). In short, Europeans will be "substituted" by Muslims.[9]

Ever since Ye'Or's publication, the discourse proliferated in different arenas and across borders, with books developing eerily similar lines of argument such as Melanie Philips' (2006) *Londonistan: How Britain Is Creating a Terror State Within*, and Bruce Bawer's (2006) *While Europe Slept: How Radical Islam Is Destroying the West from Within*, to mention only some of the most prominent ones (see also Murray, 2017). These publications keep adding layers to the palimpsests of population replacement, making it local, that is, London, or mixing the demographic threat with Islamic terrorism, while highlighting the alleged complicity of European governments and elites.

In the 2010s, the Islamic demographic threat discourse was further "refined," and made *salonfähig*, notably in Germany by the politician and writer Thilo Sarrazin (2010) through the publication of his best-selling book *Deutschland schafft sich ab* (*Germany Abolishes Itself*). While taking up the same themes present in the writings of Fallaci, Ye'Or, and Philips, Sarrazin frames his argument in a sociological fashion and relies on the "hard facts" of statistical knowledge (for a statistical critique of Sarrazin's theses see Foroutan, 2010). With Sarrazin, Raspail's nightmares have become full-fledged "facts." At the outset, Sarrazin presents himself as concerned with the current and prospective economic consequences of the current demographic trends in Germany, for the birth rates of the "smarter" and accomplished "native Germans" (*einheimische Deutsch*) (Sarrazin, 2010, pp. 60–62) are dwindling vis-à-vis the birth rates of the underachievers and the more prone to criminality Muslim migrants (Sarrazin, 2010, pp. 260–262). By deploying statistics to "prove" the demographic threat and the displacement of "native Germans" by Muslims in Germany, and by presenting himself as an academic expert, Sarrazin mainstreamed, in German-speaking countries, the thesis of the higher birth rates of Muslims as a menace leading to a displacement (*Verschiebung*) of the German population and eventually to Germany's self-destruction. Sarrazin's portrayal of the demographic threat, moreover, postulates different levels of hereditary intelligence between the German "native population" and Muslims, the latter being depicted as underachievers in schools. The higher birth rates of Muslims will therefore ultimately result in Germany "becoming dumber" (Sarrazin, Ulrich, & Topçu, 2010).

In 2018, Sarrazin published another book centered on the demographic threat, now relabeled as *Feindliche Übernahme* (*Hostile Takeover*). Here, Sarrazin develops an iteration of the discourse not in terms of statistics but on the basis of the Qur'an, where he "seeks answers" for his "concerns" (Sarrazin, 2018, p. 12). For Sarrazin, the Qur'an functions as a window to understand Muslim mentality (Sarrazin, 2018, p. 21), whatever that might be. Once more Sarrazin predicts the population displacement of "native Germans" as the majority by Muslims, but this time the root of the problem is a cultural one, that is, the "Muslim mentality," which, in turn, is exclusively formed and shaped by the Qur'an. To the palimpsest of population replacement Sarrazin has added a biopolitical deployment of statistics, upon which he has written Orientalism's textual attitude, namely, the epistemological premise postulating that everything that Muslims do and think can be understood by referring to the Qur'an (Said, 1978, p. 93).

While *Germany Abolishes Itself* made waves in the public debate in Germany, the novelist and essayist Renaud Camus delivered a speech entitled *Le grand remplacement* (*The Great Replacement*) in a small town in the south of France.[10] Camus' formulation would give the discourse emerging in different places in Europe, and drawing on different terms (such as alteration or substitution), one of its more recognizable epithets, that is, the replacement thesis. Camus' diagnosis of replacement relies on a stark distinction between "an official doctrine" which approaches the French nation in more legal terms—that is, of a citizenry that is founded on a formal principle of

equality of citizens—versus an ethnic or racial "common sense" of belonging. According to that "common sense," Camus asserts, France has become unrecognizable. To make this distinction between "official doctrine" and "common sense" tangible, Camus mobilizes the figure of a hijabi woman who asserts, "I am as French as you are" ("*je suis aussi française que vous*") (Camus, 2011, p. 19). In Camus' eyes, this figure is "crushing" and "difficult to tolerate" (Camus, 2011, p. 19), as she takes the tension between the "official doctrine" and "common sense" to an "unbearable extreme." If her claim to French citizenship holds, Camus argues, to be French has become meaningless, and France has been reduced to a territory. Camus' line of argumentation, which is drenched in a sentiment of loss and nostalgia, effectively and dangerously erodes and berates the juridical underpinnings of contemporary definitions, regulations, and practices of citizenship. He understands those to be rooted in the "absurd" affirmation that only one "species" (*espèce*) of French exist, which he considers to be the result of the "dogmatic anti-racist regime" that came into being after the Second World War and made it impossible to speak of racial distinction. Thus, according to Camus, "replacement" also occurs in language,[11] and part of the war is semiotic. For Camus, there is no doubt that different "species" exist among the current French population, and "race" is a way of distinguishing humanity and conceptualizing the French—as a race, whose "replacement" is obscured and facilitated by the formal and legal categories of citizenship currently in place. In sum, Camus attacks a civic-legal notion of citizenship, and asserts a racial conceptualization of the national population. Unsurprisingly, this racial thinking comes with an arresting dehumanization of non-white French in general and Muslims in particular—a dehumanization that is perhaps most on display when Camus speaks of Muslims in France as "replacements" ("*remplacants*").

It is clear that Camus, and indeed many of his followers, approach the current state of population dynamics as a situation of war. Camus, more specifically, talks about colonization. Quoting Frantz Fanon (which he names as one of his favorite authors), Camus deplores the "enslavement of indigenous populations" of France. And while this strikes us as an ironic reversal of the positions of colonizer and colonized entrenched in the history of European modernity, there is little sense of irony nor reversal in Camus' writings: he takes on a negationist stand towards colonialism as he asserts that the French never really colonized (Camus, 2011, p. 55). He suggests, moreover, that North African, previously colonized populations have long been focused on colonizing Europe. This joins a prominent trope elaborated within Eurabia conspiracy theories, which Camus "substantiates" with a quote from Houari Boumédiène's speech at the UN in 1974, in which the Algerian political leader would have said:

> *One day, millions of men will leave the Southern Hemisphere to go to the Northern Hemisphere. And they will not go there as friends. Because they will go there to conquer it. And they will conquer it with their sons. The wombs of our women will give us victory. (Quoted in Camus, 2011, p. 53)*

Suggesting a deliberate plot to replace Europe's native population by means of higher birth rates, these words perfectly align with the key ideas of the replacement thesis. The quote, however, is fabricated. Boumédiène did deliver a speech at the UN in 1974 in the context of discussions on international prices of raw materials and that speech contains nothing even remotely close to these words nor ideas.[12] Yet this is a powerful fabrication that "works"—that is to say, it captures the minds and attention of many, as it became a widely shared meme in the right-wing blogsphere that supposedly lays bare, in a very concise manner (i.e., in a meme-able quote),[13] the "real intention" of postcolonial (Muslim) migrants to Europe. The quote thus articulates a myth at the heart of conspiracy theories that are part of Europe's "Muslim Question," as it succinctly captures some of the ideas central to anti-Muslim racism: migration of Muslims to Europe as colonization, as conquest, and the central role of demographic and reproductive warfare in that conquest. This renders the quote into a conspiratorial fabrication that operates, we argue, at the very heart of Europe's "Muslim Question" in a fashion not unlike the manner in which the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, fabricated in the early 20th century, was operational at the heart of the Jewish Question, that is, as a way to "prove" and incite fear of religious/racial "others" who are allegedly conspiring to dominate white and (culturally) Christian Europe. Even though the *Protocols* and contemporary conspiracies such as Ye'Or's *Eurabia* or Camus' *Great Replacement* differ significantly in terms of their context of appearance and

content, the conspiracies "display strikingly similar discursive dynamics in their attempt to racialize Jews and Muslims as the ultimate Other determined to destroy Us" (Zia-Ebrahimi, 2018, p. 314).

While this demographic discourse, both in terms of content and confrontational style, is situated in a postcolonial and contemporary context, it can be approached as an articulation of what Foucault (1997) has identified as the discourse on race war or race struggle (Foucault, 1997, p. 65). The historical discourse on race war posited the understanding of history, social relations, and power as the outcome of "a confrontation between races" (Foucault, 1997, p. 69). The race war discourse, furthermore, was structured and predicated upon a binary conceptualization of society, two races, "them and us" (Foucault, 1997, p. 74). Following Foucault's (European) genealogy, this discourse was subjected to a series of important changes during the 19th century. First, the war, the struggle itself was conceptualized differently, "it is no longer a battle in the sense that a warrior would understand the term, but a struggle in the biological sense: the differentiation of the species, natural selection, and the survival of the fittest" (Foucault, 1997, p. 80). Second, society is no longer seen through a binary prism, instead it is approached as a whole "threatened by a certain number of heterogenous elements which are not essential to it … hence the idea that foreigners have infiltrated this society" (Foucault, 1997, p. 81). At this point racial discourse took over and reworked the race war discourse, and then the idea of "race purity replaces that of race struggle." In similar yet ongoing fashion, the "population replacement" discourse appraises history and social reality as driven by a struggle between the West and Islam—this war or clash is underpinned by cultural and biological themes and a concern for the survival of Europe or the West, threatened by the infiltration of foreigners who calculatedly seek to overtake Europe through migration and birth rates.

Our discussion has focused on mainstream(ed) articulations of the discourse on replacement, yet we are fully aware that this discourse is developed in interplay with a large field of more fringe right-wing commentators and blog writers as well as (far) right-wing political groups. The replacement thesis has proliferated in the blogosphere, on sites such as the *Gates of Vienna* and *Jihad Watch* from the US, and *Politically Incorrect* from Germany, where more virulent, aggressive, and racially charged layers have been added, and where labels such as "Demographic Jihad" and "Muslim fecundism" were coined (Furness, 2017; Truthies, 2018). A myriad of far-right groups, moreover, has embraced, embedded, and predicated the construal of the demographic threat into their political platforms. In France, Marine Le Pen—an admirer of Raspail's fiction—has taken on Camus' thesis in her political speeches from 2011 onwards (Valerio, 2013). By the time the nationalist and anti-Islam movement Pegida (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the Occident) rises in 2014, first in Germany but soon with local groups all over Europe, it is able to solidly build on the demographic replacement discourse and call for a defense of the "occident" [*Abendland*] against an ongoing Islamization, which in its view comprises not only the construction of mosques on German soil and the arrival of Muslim refugees, but also a population replacement of "native Germans." And while Pegida represents a far-right movement outside of the parliamentary arena, various political parties have appropriated the language and images of Pegida in their own political campaign, such as the AfD in its 2017–2018 electoral campaign in Germany, or the *Forum voor Democratie* 2019 campaign in the Netherlands. Today, almost every European far-right political party has adopted the discourse on Islamic demographic threat and relies on its dissemination to succeed.[14]

While a careful study of the interplay between the more far-right fringe and the mainstream commentators falls beyond the scope of this article, we do want to comment on one feature of this interplay that struck us while researching the mainstream(ed) demographic anxieties: even though both the Eurabia literature of the 2000s and the replacement thesis literature of the 2010s comment elaborately on what they consider to be problematic about the current make-up of the population in West European countries, their diagnoses tend to focus on migration, cultural erosion, or the imminent danger of Islam, while shying away from the question of procreation. Moreover, when biological reproduction does come to the foreground, it isn't always in ways one might expect: Camus, for instance, is outspoken about how nationalist natalist politics and "more French (meaning white) babies" cannot be a solution to the problem as he sees it. This is due to his neo-Malthusian take on today's ecological crisis, a concern that also appears in Sarrazin's statistical diagnosis. If the mainstream(ed) authors come up with

political solutions, they tend to focus on the realm of cultural politics (affirming norms and values), border regimes (limiting migration), and (revoking) citizenship. Camus, for instance, suggests to revoke French citizenship from those who do not "associate with France" (Camus, 2011, p. 24) as he puts it—an idea that is gradually finding its way into legislation and citizenship reforms all over Europe (Camus, 2011, p. 62).[15] Sarrazin on his side, is more focused on optimizing German productivity and global competitiveness by making up a population of the "smartest" and "most qualified," that is, "native" Germans. In sum, while these authors paint catastrophic pictures about the current situation, their calls for action remain both general and vague as well as limited to what we might call the biopolitics of borders and migration, and culture and citizenship. The biopolitics of procreation and indeed eugenics are tangible but, by and large, remain unspoken. This shifts drastically when considering the written and visual material produced by more fringe far-right commentators, who do put forward calls for action as well as political solutions in terms of biological reproduction—in particular a call for "more white babies." In some of these more extreme calls for action, moreover, reproductive biopolitics go hand in hand with the necropolitics (Mbembé, 2003) of (calls to) terrorism: the ideas of Eurabia and great replacement were important factors in the white supremacist violence perpetrated by Breivik and Tarrant respectively.

The replacement discourse, moreover, is versatile: one of its recent notorious moments includes its mobilization at the white supremacy rally *Unite the Right* in 2017 in Charlottesville, US, where the chants "you will not replace us" and "Jews will not replace us" became prominent slogans of the demonstration. Drawing on Foucault (1997) and Stoler's (1995) elaboration of discourses and their "polyvalent mobility," we can consider the discourse on population replacement as an open text, subjected to multiple iterations whereby some core ideas are mobilized and coupled with older and newer discourses, targeting different populations and serving a plethora of political aims. The chant "Jews will not replace us," for instance, does not seek to communicate a "demographic replacement" of whites by Jews, but rather that the latter are the ones orchestrating the replacement (ADL, 2017) and thus the population replacement palimpsest is threaded along with old anti-Semitic conspiracy theories postulating "Jewish world domination." The population replacement palimpsest, in other words, is not only mobilized against Muslims, but also against other "populations" who are constructed as threatening as they are seen as seeking to replace whites, as the 2019 murderous shooting in El Paso Texas showed.

3 | "IT'S THE BIRTHRATES": IMAGES OF LIFE AND DEATH[16]

We now turn to two images which we analyse in more detail with the aim of further unpacking this demographic discourse on the rise. The two images we selected are not so much representative as they are nodal parts of the discourse—as well as incitements to discourse. At the same time, the images differ in various respects: while one comes from the sphere of party politics and more specifically political campaigns, the other one belongs to the alt_right blogosphere. The messages they convey also differ, and in a sense the images are complementary and express an interplay or intertextuality: if one focuses on the need both to control who belongs to the nation as well as to produce "more white babies," the other stresses the danger, the terror, of "too many Muslim babies." Our analysis of these images relies on Stuart Hall's (1997) approach to the examination of visual forms of representation. As Hall points out, the meanings of images are always ambiguous, that is, images carry several messages, which might even contradict each other. The work of representation entails the attempt to fix one particular meaning, to privilege one upon the other. This process occurs through the proliferation of dominant discourses as well as through intertextuality. The latter can be understood as a process in which the meanings of an image accumulate when read across other images and forms of representation (Hall, 1997, p. 232). Concretely, we follow Hall's proposition to subject images to two levels of analysis: the denotative, that is, the description of the event, and the connotative, the suggested or implied meanings of the image. Our analysis of the connotative level, furthermore, is complemented with W. J. T. Mitchell's proposition of shifting the location of desire to images, and interrogate "its construction of desire in relation to fantasies of power and impotence" (Mitchell, 1996, p. 77).

As part of its political campaign for the German Federal Elections in 2017, the far-right political party *Alternative for Germany* (AfD) developed a series of 10 posters to be displayed nationwide epitomizing their political program, as it were, its alternative for Germany's future (AfD, 2017a). Nearly all of the posters directly or indirectly referred to Islam, Muslims, and migration as problems for that envisioned future. One of the posters, entitled "New Germans? We'll make them ourselves; Trust yourself Germany" [Authors' translation], (AfD, 2017b) depicts a pregnant white woman lying on a blanket in the grass on a sunny day. While we don't see her entire face, and as such she is not an individually recognizable woman—she might be any white woman—we do see a wide, confident smile. With one hand she touches, in a protective manner, her partially uncovered belly, which is visibly pregnant. She wears jeans and a striped t-shirt white and blue, the colours of the AfD (Figure 1).

Denotatively, the caption stabilizes the preferred meaning of the image: this is about regulating and controlling the contours and content of the German population. The question "who is German?", the post asserts, should be decided by "we," the Germans. The text suggests that Germany has lost its confidence to settle this question, and mobilizes Germans to regain that confidence. In the interplay between image and text, the poster mobilizes the idea of women as the symbolical, cultural, and biological reproducers of the nation (Yuval-Davis, 1996)—this includes the well-established trope of representing the nation as female as well as nationalist norms of making women responsible for the "proper" reproduction (both cultural and biological) of the nation (Yuval-Davis, 1997), which encompasses preventing and punishing miscegenation (Goldberg, 2002). The poster conveys multiple messages when it comes to the German nation and its reproduction. The text suggests that something is wrong with how "new Germans" are currently conceived of, and it is time to change this conception. "New Germans" typically refers to former migrants from the 1960s "guest worker" programs and their line of descent ad infinitum. Ultimately, the belated reform of German citizenship in 1999 supplementing the *ius sanguinins* principle with a *ius solis* one, allowed many long-time residents to formally acquire German citizenship. This reform, however, did not shatter the racial construction of Germanness as whiteness, and the construal of being German exclusively through (white) heredity. Thus, the qualification "new" has come to function as a mark of distinction, a form of racial characterization,

FIGURE 1 'New Germans? We'll make them ourselves, trust yourself Germany' (Valodnieks, 2017) [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

suggesting indeed that there are different "kinds" of Germans, and that some Germans, allegedly "new arrivals" to Germanness, might structurally be cast in the position of never being able to fully arrive (Boersma & Schinkel, 2017). These "new Germans" continue to have "a migration background" that routinely is associated with problems and deficiencies. By questioning the current making of "new Germans" the poster is questioning the 1999 citizenship reform that gave birth, so to speak, to "new Germans," or "Passport Germans" as the AfD also likes to call them.[17] As such, the poster seeks to refute the current citizenship regime and its formal and legal understandings of German nationality, and calls upon Germans—"old" Germans, who are white Germans—to have the confidence to "make" "new Germans." The text, in other words, questions the social reproduction of the German population at large, and does not necessarily refer to biological reproduction: "new" Germans can notably be made by new citizenship laws. Yet the visual focus of the image, the pregnant belly, immediately puts the question of birth rates center-stage. The poster thus represents a key moment within the discourse on replacement: the division of labor which we observed between more mainstream and fringe texts is recast *within* this poster, in the interplay between text and image. As a result, questions of migration and procreation are firmly articulated with each other: the more established (anti)migration discourses usher in the public's attention and unabashedly direct that attention to the question of procreation. The call for Germans to take care of the social reproduction of the nation at large, in other words, confidently puts procreation at the center of that project and suggests that white Germans ought to make (*real*) "new Germans." While there is no partner in sight, the message the AfD seeks to convey would not work if the partner and the baby were non-white. Against the background of an ageing population, stagnant birth rates, and the construction of migration as a threat to German values, identity, and ultimately to Germanness, the poster envisions a future where the German population would ideally be homogenously white.

With W. J. T. Mitchell's (1996) question "what does this picture want?" in mind, we might say that the election poster aspires to mobilize the targeted subject, namely, the adult white German voter, to three actions: first, to trust the AfD and vote for it in the elections; second, to revise established and formal notions of "new Germans" in the current public debate; and third, to biologically reproduce and "make new Germans." The poster thus seeks to stimulate the feeling of trust in a twofold manner, trust in the AfD, and trust in oneself, in one's Germanness. At the same time, tacitly, it also incites to heteronormative and reproductive intercourse. These desires compressed in an image and a few lines of text are further articulated in the AfD's political manifesto (AfD, 2016). In the chapter devoted to *Family and Children* the party is clear on wanting "Larger families instead of mass migration" (AfD, 2016, p. 41). In the discussion of family politics, the AfD lays out the challenges—in equilibrium and health—that the German population faces, and appraises that "mass immigration, mainly from Islamic states" (AfD, 2016, p. 41) will only accelerate deleterious ethnic-cultural changes in the German population, for migrants from Islamic countries "attain below-average levels of education, training and employment" (AfD, 2016, p. 41)—an argument copy-pasted from Sarrazin's textbook. Migrants from Muslim countries, the argument goes, do not integrate into German society. This will only lead to a "critical escalation of the demographic crisis" (AfD, 2016, p. 42). Furthermore, the AfD's envisioned politics also take as a focal point of concern abortion for (white/*real*) German women, since the party "welcomes all unborn and newborn children" (AfD, 2016, p. 43). They subsequently criticize the "exempt of punishment" for interrupted pregnancies due to social reasons, which according to their estimations represents around 97 per cent of all abortions in the country. In sum, the poster, in conjunction with the AfD's manifesto, articulates different dimensions of the population replacement palimpsest and suggests two interrelated biopolicies should be implemented. Moreover, it raises a twofold concern regarding German demographics, (a) the deleterious effects of migration from so-called Islamic countries; and (b) the need to revise and even reform who belongs to the German body politic. At the same time, and more particularly on the visual level, the poster puts biological reproduction center-stage, as it, in a suggestive manner, raises the question of not having enough white babies, while offering a solution to it that establishes control over women's bodies, and incites white reproduction.

To the AfD electoral poster campaign, which represents an image that was easily accessible in the public sphere during the election period, we want to juxtapose another image, more explicit and disturbing, which circulates widely within the alt_right blogosphere.[18] In a cartoon called "The Other Islamic Bomb", blogger D. T.

Devareaux (2006a) visually articulates the sense of an Islamic external threat.[19] The cartoon portrays a heavily pregnant female figure, dressed all in black. This female figure also remains faceless, yet this time not because of the framing or cutting of the image, but due to what in global media is represented as the "Islamic garb" par excellence, that is, the burka. This woman also touches her pregnant belly, with a protective gesture of her hands. Yet her hands represent death: they lack human flesh and skin and consist merely of bones. With skeleton hands and a black cloak hiding her face, she invokes the mythical personification of death, the Grim Reaper, whose face we don't get to see, as the story goes, until the moment he comes to collect us. This image, too, is visually centered on a pregnant belly, yet this belly does not stand for life, but is represented as a ticking bomb about to explode. She is thus carrying, and will be giving birth to, death and destruction—in just a matter of time (Figure 2).

This cartoon activates two racial tropes through allegorically signifying a double death. The first trope, instant and literally explosive, conjures up the figure of the Islamic terrorist, the suicide bomber blowing up himself (and only rarely herself) with the final goal of destroying the West. This racial figure both inhabits and exemplifies what Talal Asad (2007) pointedly analyses as (the dominant representation of) the "Islamic culture of death" and Salman Sayyid (2014, p. 4) conceptualizes as one face of the "Double Muslim," that is, one "of the most iconic images of



FIGURE 2 "The other Islamic bomb" (Devareaux, 2006a) [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

the War on Terror" who represents the "fanatic par excellence," bringing immediate and explosive death to enemies and to himself. In terms of gendered representations, the cartoon is striking in different ways. Moreover, it represents a quintessential figure of femininity, that is, a pregnant woman. At the same time, her gender is more ambiguous, because of the garb she dons (the burka is often suspected of "concealing what is underneath," and more specifically of possibly concealing a man and/or a bomb), the (male) trope of the suicide bomber she embodies, and the (male) mythical figure of death she personifies. We might understand this as an effect of the deep representational connection between violence and Muslim masculinity at large—as, for instance, expressed by the Dutch right-wing politician Geert Wilders when he characterizes Muslim and migrant men as "Islamic testosterone bombs" (Al Jazeera and AP, 2019). In order to emphasize her violent character, in a way that overrides the vulnerability that often marks representations of pregnant women, she needs to display some signs of a soldier, some suggestions of masculinity—while the femininity of her pregnant belly remains center-stage. This is violence, death, and destruction by a careful (her protective hand) and nurturing (her life-giving womb) conception of life. Her fertile body embodies death—by (bearing) Muslim life. Hence, a basic signifier of life—pregnancy—is turned into death, and the living body itself becomes a weapon of destruction (Mbembé, 2003).

Thus, the second death articulated by Devareaux's cartoon anticipates the future of the population to which she is the alien body, the Trojan horse, that is, a population that is European, Western, white. This individual "demographic bomb," in other words, brings forth gradual death on a mass scale, as she is not alone. With an army of "demographic bombs" the European (white) population is slowly but steadily replaced by Muslims by means of calculated higher birth rates, echoing the fabricated quote of Boumédiène. She is therefore an apocalyptic figure, announcing the apocalyptic future feared by Raspail, which we might understand in terms of what Jasbir Puar (2007, p. xx) has qualified as *paranoid temporality*, a discourse of "negative exuberance—for we are never safe enough, never healthy enough, never prepared enough—driven by imitation (repetition of the same or in the service of maintaining the same)." The image, in short, constitutes the visual representation of the demographic replacement palimpsest, and indeed is often used as an illustration for alt_right blog posts or articles about "demographic warfare." In an appalling fashion, it expresses the "weaponization of the (Muslim) womb" that these conspiracy theories consider to be central to the postcolonial predicament and that we consider to be central to the construction of the "Muslim Question."

Turning once more to Mitchell's (1996) question "what does this picture want?" we might argue that, in line with its (alt_right) context of production as well as its (meme-like) format, this image seeks to powerfully, disturbingly capture and convey the meaning as well as the threat at the heart of the replacement theory, and further disseminate it. And it is drenched in a not-so-subtle desire as well as incitement: this reproduction of life-death, this replacement, must be halted.

4 | BIOPOWER AND EUGENICS

These kinds of representations, we argue, call for a closer scrutiny of and engagement with the technology of power centered on the production of the population as a political problem, that is, biopower (Foucault, 1997), and one of the myriads of techniques deployed by it: eugenics (Schuller, 2018). We now turn to a more elaborate discussion of how biopolitics and biopower can be understood as shaping and informing the population replacement palimpsest to then return to and offer a second reading of the images against the background of biopolitics and eugenics.

Although the notion of biopower was not coined by Foucault, he established the concept and approach as critical tools to examine the production and management of populations on the social scientific agenda.[20] Ever since its Foucaultian elaboration, the concept of biopower has taken a life of its own, it has become a traveling theory (Willaert, 2012), subjected to further elaborations, amendments, and critiques. These critiques have expanded not only the Eurocentric architecture of the concept by taking into account how colonial history and the colonies "as

laboratories of modernity" were crucial in the formation of this technology of power (Stoler, 1995, p. 15), but also amendments have appeared engaging with some of the precepts upon which Foucault built the concept, namely: his Eurocentric location of the "birth of racism" in the 19th century (Stoler, 1995; Weheliye, 2014); his limited and problematic conceptualization of race and racism (Weheliye, 2014); the insufficiency of biopower to capture contemporary forms of subjection of life to the power of death (Mbembé, 2003, p. 39), the sudden break between sovereign power and biopower (Sheth, 2011),[21] as well as the preponderance of race over sexuality in *Society must be defended* (Schuller, 2018). In this sense, while we consider Foucault's concepts of biopower and biopolitics to be crucial in accounting for the appearance and proliferation of the population replacement discourse, it is also the case that questions of race, colonization, and dehumanization, which are central to the workings of biopower, remain undertheorized in Foucault's writings (see Bracke & Hernández Aguilar, 2020) and need to be brought to the fore when considering a discourse of population replacement, which, as mentioned, mobilizes different layers and categories of analysis. Population replacement discourse seeks to reverse European colonial history and erode existing legal understandings of citizenship, while activating racial tropes and an idea of race war. Moreover, this discourse, centered as it is on life and death, also conjures up sex and sex differentiation.

As a technology of power focused on the production of the *population as a political problem*, biopower's emphasis centers on the human as a living being and therefore is concerned with "a global mass that is affected by overall processes characteristic of birth, death, production, illness and so on" (Foucault, 1997, pp. 242–243). It seeks to "treat the population as a set of coexisting living beings with particular biological and pathological features, and which as such fall under specific forms of knowledge and techniques" (Foucault, 1997, p. 367). Biopower, in other words, operates at the level of the production, control, and regulation of populations, and it does so by further crafting (racial) caesuras within the continuum of the population and by recruiting and proliferating racial differentiations with long histories (Weheliye, 2014) as well as sex and sexual categories of differentiation (Schuller, 2018). Biopower transformed the race war discourse in significant ways: the race war discourse transmuted into the idea that "We have to defend society against all the biological threats posed by the other race, the subrace" (Foucault, 1997, pp. 61–62) that lives among us, that is internal to the nation. Within the biopolitical frame the race war discourse was recoded as a prism to understand power relations and how they divide the social body, in which in order to live you must kill, which, in a racist logic, gets translated into "if you want to live, the other must die" (Foucault, 1997, p. 256). Within the biopolitical frame, racism performs a fundamental function, for it creates a break in the continuum of population, assigning value (life) to the superior race and lack thereof (death) to the inferior race, while also establishing a correlation between the life and death of the races. Killing the other race, in the context of the biopolitical race war, amounts not only to "the elimination of the biological threat" (Foucault, 1997, p. 256) but also to the *improvement* of the species, an issue unspoken but present in the AfD's poster. However, as Schuller (2018) has argued, biopower's central aim of letting live (the superior race) and letting die (the inferior race) is not only predicated upon racial characterizations and differentiations, but, equally important, necessitates sex differentiation as the vehicle to incite and safeguard the reproduction of the superior race and thus of the national population.

One of the ways in which the analytics of biopower can be and have been extended, and which is particularly significant for our current discussion, is through thinking of eugenics. Even though Foucault recognized eugenics as one of the most important innovations in the technologies of sex (Foucault, 1997, pp. 7–10; Foucault, 1990, pp. 148–159), while also hinting toward the relevance of eugenics programs in the context of biopower, he did not fully pursue how, in effect, eugenics was a paradigmatic deployment of power both seeking to regulate sex at the individual level, and the health and safety of the population with the end goal of governing heredity transmission and thus the nation's stock, that is, the population. More recently, Kyra Schuller (2018) has unravelled the convoluted relations between eugenics and biopower, while expanding the analytics of biopower geographically—to the US—and conceptually, as being also informed by the sciences of impressibility. Schuller proposes a broad conceptualization of eugenics that is not reduced to the appearance of the gene as the ultimate decisive factor in heredity. In general terms, eugenics has been usually apprehended "as the early 20th century movement to encourage 'fit'

women to increase their birth rate and to rob 'unfit' women of the capacity to conceive, an agenda that reached its nadir in Nazi Germany" (Schuller, 2018, p. 22). Albeit accurate, this understanding of eugenics does not consider the larger trajectory of the idea and the practices it prompted beyond German territory. Heredity, the focus of eugenics programs, was not always deemed immutable, but also impressible, Schuller argues, that is to say, it could be transformed, reshaped, and refashioned through experiences.[22] In this sense, biopolitical eugenics has operated through two complementary frames—one purportedly fixed in genetic material and therefore deemed unchangeable, and the other approached as open and subjected to change through interventions—both, however, predicated upon the twinning of racial characterization and population's regulation and improvement. Having set the workings of biopower and eugenics as conceptual tools to approach the replacement discourse we return now to the images and read them under this light.

The AfD poster and "the other Islamic Bomb" meme share a set of interrelated themes and complement a vision hovering on life and death—lives that are worth living and lives that are not, lives that are worth protection and lives that are a form of death, lives that are at risk by the lives of Others, for "they love death as we love life" (Roy, 2017, p. 2).[23] Both images express or suggest the "weaponization of the womb." One image offers a concrete political strategy—a strategy or indeed a campaign one can vote for (and that more than 10% of the German population has voted for on several occasions)—that proposes white natalist politics in which the wombs of white women are mobilized to reproduce more white babies.

As we pointed out before, the white women's body is not represented in its entirety: the way in which parts of her body are cut off by the frame and her bodily integrity is not part of the representation, emphasize the part of her body that matters here: the womb. The weaponization, then, consists of how her womb is enlisted in a nationalist project (Yuval-Davis 1996), that is, a warfare project of a white nation. The other image conjures up a spectacular fantasy of the "replacement thesis" in its most extreme form: here the birth of Muslim babies signifies the death of the West. Here "womb" is "bomb" is "tomb," in a representation of the weaponization of the womb that is attributed to the "Islamic Other." The womb of the "Other" becomes the Other's "other bomb." Thus, this fantasy of the other is a mirror image of the Self, a projection of the Self, which portrays the weaponization of the white womb as merely a form of "self-defense" in the face of horrific death. And the abundant light, background greenery, and wide smile surrounding the pregnant belly all convey the innocent character of this self-defense.

Furthermore, it is possible to keep interrogating the images by asking what do they want in terms of lack, that is to say, what desires are articulated in terms of impotence, those desires that the image wants because it lacks them (Mitchell, 1996, pp. 77–78). In this vein, the AfD poster aspires to control and determine white reproduction, yet that desire reveals a lack, namely, the means to enforce positive policies aimed at procreating and reproducing the white population, and negative policies with the end goal of blocking those deemed unfit to reproduce. In the German context, the poster aspires to grant life to those deemed "native Germans" (*einheimische Deutsch*) and let die—or at least not continue living, as part of the Germany nation, in the future—those Germans "with migration background." If only white "native Germans" were to procreate "new Germans" there is no possibility for "Passport-Germans" or "Germans with migration background" to live. The poster desires eugenics. In terms of dormant desire, the image aspires to revive the absolute control over German heredity, a control that the AfD currently lacks.[24] The image, therefore, can be seen as articulating the desires of the productive side of eugenics, it calls for policies oriented towards procreating those (considered to be native Germans) deemed fit to the healthy reproduction of the German nation. This call, moreover, necessitates seizing control over "native German" women's bodies.[25] These desires, moreover, are also underscored by a historical intertextuality that must inform further readings of the image, that is, the background of Nazi propaganda with its own images, texts, and posters that called upon "Aryan women" to bear white children for Nazi Germany (Bock, 1983).[26]

In their interplay which is simultaneously complex and multi-layered as well as a simple mirror, both images conjure up race, religion, gender, and sexuality. These categories are strategically deployed while complementing each other in activating the biopolitical discourse of "the defense of the society by itself" (Foucault, 1997). In this light, the images we have analyzed, and the "replacement thesis" they articulate, pursue a logic of eugenics, as a

deliberate proposal to intervene in the racial constitution of a population. This proposal consists of mobilizing the wombs of white women—a part of the proposal that is put to the plebiscite—as well as fueling deadly fantasies of non-white wombs turning into bombs and tombs. Taken together, the images articulate the two sides of eugenics, positive and negative policies, the former granting life, the latter letting die. In other words, the images call for the deployment of biopower and the discourse on defending the (European) society from its internal enemies, that is, Muslims.

Moreover, both images and their supplementary ideas about life and death activate and deploy biopower. However, as Schuller (2018) has pointed out, biopolitics not only operate through a caesura in the population performed by race, determining those who may live and those who may die, but equally through a sex differentiation superimposed in this first caesura that distinguishes within those who may live, between female and male sensibilities and impressibilities. While the AfD and Devareaux's vision introduce a racial categorization and division between Westerns/Europeans/Germans and Muslims, their biopolitical future, and the defense of the Western/European/German societies also necessitates a sex differentiation within the former, for it requires the control, and regulation of the white female body to secure the reproduction of the white sociopolitical body. As Schuller puts it, "Sex difference represents one of the key mechanisms through which race fragments the biological into governable units" (Schuller, 2018, p. 65). In this sense, the biopolitical protection of the health of the population and the maintenance of its equilibrium requires both racial and sex differentiations "with distinct claims to life" (Schuller, 2018, p. 65).

5 | THE BIOPOLITICS OF THE "MUSLIM QUESTION"

So, what is then the "Muslim Question?" If the "Muslim Question" can be seen and approached as the general problematization of Muslims as "Muslims," a problematization which includes the characterization of Muslims as an alien body to the nation, then the "Muslim Question" is biopolitics. It is part, and indeed has become central, to the regulation, management, and control of (national) populations in Europe, and in the West at large. One of the significant features of the population replacement palimpsest is that it reiterates the discursive production of the population itself and at the same time it introduces a caesura within this continuum: it breaks down the population inhabiting Europe into Europeans and Muslims. The population replacement discourse crafts this artificial reality and frames it in a wider civilizational confrontation where Europe—allegedly weakened for many reasons but also because of its stagnant birth rates—needs to be defended, safeguarded from the double death that Muslims come to represent: the immediate death of terrorism; and the long-term but large-scale death brought forth by the combative strategy of higher birth rates. Equally important, the demographic threat within the contours of the "Muslim Question" has also been a way to characterize and construct Muslims as an alien body to Europe. Some strands of the population replacement discourse diagnoses problems within Europe's current demographic development in terms of an ageing population and not enough newborns to replace the labor force to keep Europe's economic competitiveness. Yet this demographic problem only exists in so far as Muslims are not considered and counted as Europeans, in so far as their newborns have not been seen and cannot be seen as part of Europe, in so far as they remain "alien" to the European nations.

The biopolitics of the "Muslim Question" unfolds through a particular discourse we have laid out in this article, that is, the discourse of replacement. This fantasy of replacement—an "alien body" that comes to settle, colonize, reproduce itself, and finally replace a white and Christian Europe—is entertained, animated, and conspired in a way that grounds a politics that understands itself as merely a "response" to a demographic threat, and presents itself as seeking to "halt" this alleged replacement, relying on various kinds of actions drenched in natalist and eugenic desires. In this respect, the "Muslim Question" represents a—paranoid and apocalyptic—reading of the postcolonial predicament from the mindset of the former colonizer. It is an interpretation in which the postcolonial is experienced and framed as a situation of loss and of threat, and in which forces are mobilized to "fight back" in

many arenas, against the plot, against feminism, against civic notions of citizenship and even against the history of Europe by reversing the roles of the colonized and the colonizer.

Commenting on the shortcomings of Foucault's biopower, Lemke (2011) argues that the notion fell short since it neither included nor allowed the examination of modalities of power aimed at inculcating forms of self-government and the government of others, while, following Lemke (2011), the production of the population as a political problem unlocked the grid of governmentality. Once the population became the object of government's consideration it also fell under the calculations about the best way to defend, govern, and improve it. In this article, we focused only on one dimension of the "Muslim Question," its biopolitical aspect, while the construction of Muslims as an "alien body" has also been paired with forceful calls of assimilation and integration, which is where governmentality, as an analytical tool, comes in. But a call for integration requires a prior distinction, a biopolitical one. Analytically, then, the contemporary Muslim Question recruits and operates two technologies of power. On the one hand, it deploys biopower in its pursuit of crafting the Muslim population as a problematic "alien body," while desiring eugenic techniques that would present solutions to the problem. On the other hand, it calls for a series of discourses, policies, and techniques to govern the "integration" of Muslims, that is, it deploys governmentality. Although at times, these two technologies may operate independently, by and large they overlap and complement each other in producing a social and political reality where Muslims are deemed an inherent and dangerous problem.

While our examination of the demographic replacement also lends itself to advance the argument that race, religion, gender, and sex are never merely descriptive categories, but rather should be understood as produced, and indeed co-produced, in particular contexts, we opted to focus on tracing the formation and dissemination of the replacement discourse, to offer a reading of this discourse against the light of biopolitics and eugenics, and to situate the emergence of this discourse within the contours of Europe's "Muslim Question."

DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

Data sharing is not applicable to this article as no new data were created or analyzed in this study.

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NOTES

[1] This work is part of the research programme *EnGendering Europe's Muslim Question* with project number 016.Vici.185.077, which is financed by the Dutch Research Council (NWO).

[2] Our analysis of the contemporary problematization of Muslims is focused on Europe. This does not imply, however, that the problematization of Muslims and Islam is confined to Europe, as Executive Order 13,769 (the "Muslim ban") in the US, the Citizenship Amendment Act in India, or the Xinjiang "re-education camps" in China, to name but a few examples, testify to.

[3] By framing our analysis as the "Muslim Question" our intention is not to discard the work done by the concept Islamophobia, for it has been of paramount relevance in shedding light on the different processes of discrimination and violence faced by Muslims or those deemed as such. Yet we find the analytical framework of the "Muslim Question" apt to address the plethora of interrelated discourses that indeed encompass racial formations but surpass it.

[4] Gil Anidjar seeks to interrogate not the "Jewish" and "Muslim Question" per se, but rather the subject who keeps posing these questions: Europe and the process whereby this entity called Europe has pursued to construct its integrity and unity "through the institutionalization of Others as 'problems'" (Anidjar, 2012, p. 40). In this context, Anidjar, moreover, deconstructs the tenuous and fragile distinction between a question and a problem by arguing that these questions reveal not only how questioning turns subjects into problems to be solved, but also how all of these questions hint toward approaching Europe itself as a Question and as a problem.

[5] A small but vocal group of intellectuals has been decisive in developing the discourse on population replacement by providing the themes and overall frame of the discourse. The books these intellectuals have produced not only immediately became best-sellers, but also established powerful frames of thought to understand both the West and the alleged threat that Islam represents. On the internet, as Yasemin Shooman (2012) has documented, an international and highly connected network of actors has been at the forefront of disseminating stereotypes and hatred against Muslims, including the discourse on population replacement. There seems to be a symbiotic relation between these

two spheres, the public intellectuals and the internet, while the former delimits the structure and rules of the discourse, the latter fills in the details, magnifies the threats, and reaches wider audiences.

[6] An English translation of *The Camp of Saints* was particular well received in the US (Blumenthal and Rieger, 2017). The cover of the first edition joined the title of the novel with the heading "a chilling novel about the end of the white world" (Blumenthal and Rieger, 2017). And ever since its publication, Raspail's novel has gained the admiration of prominent figures of the far right such as Marine Le Pen, who exhibits a copy of the book in her office (Valerio, 2013), and also Steve Banon—former chief strategist of the Trump administration—who on repeated occasions has used the title of the book to describe the so-called refugee crisis of 2014–2015, "The whole thing in Europe is all about immigration… It's a global issue today—this kind of global Camp of the Saints" (Banon, quoted in Blumenthal, 2017).

[7] Fallaci (2004, p. 138) reports that the term is not hers: "No, it is not mine this terrifying term Eurabia. It is not I who conceived this atrocious neologism which derives from the symbiosis of the words Europe and Arabia, Eurabia is the name of the little journal founded in 1975 by the official perpetrators of the plot, of the conspiracy: the Association France-Pays Arabes in Paris."

[8] As Dyrendal et al. (2018, pp. 7–8) point out, conspiracy theories can be *in*, *about*, and *as* religion, in other words, the relation between conspiracy theories and religion is not straightforward, but often conspiracy theories join the dots between religion, politics, and terrorism and violence. Moreover, either secular or majority religious groups can recruit and mobilize conspiracies to demonize and cast out religious minorities, anti-Semitism being a paradigmatic example.

[9] Ye'Or consistently uses "alteration" or "substitution." The term "replacement" does figure in her writings as in "replacement theory" in the realm of theology, where she constructs the argument that, while the Vatican has formally denounced supersessionism, Muslims consider Islam as a perfected final version of Abrahamic monotheism, thus superseding Jews and Christians.

[10] *Le Grand Remplacement*, speech delivered on November 26, 2010, in Lunel, Dep. Hérault in France, published in Camus (2011) (Neuilly-sur-Seine: David Reinharc, 2011).

[11] Camus calls this "the second career of Adolf Hitler," by which he means a "less bloody but more lasting" effect that the term race has become a taboo (Camus, 2011, p. 67, authors' translation). Many critical race scholars have documented how, after the Shoah, "race," as an analytical category, has become the unspeakable in Europe in general, and, for different reasons, in Germany and France in particular (see, e.g., Lentin, 2008). As race became unspeakable, it could be argued, it went "underground" and provided fertile ground for a new substantive racial and racist thinking, of which Camus is a prominent example, which is now finding its way into mainstream public debate again.

[12] The full video of Boumédiène's speech [in Arabic] can be retrieved from the United Nations' archive: (UN General Assembly, 1974a). An English translation of the 2,208th Plenary meeting can be found in UN General Assembly (1974b).

[13] The use of memes understood as "small cultural units of transmission … spread by copying or imitation" (Shifman 2011, p. 188) has been crucial in the proliferation and dissemination of the population replacement conspiracy in the internet. Geert Lovink and Marc Tuters (2018) argue that memes can be seen "as a kind of vernacular cultural compression technique, a means by to 'decode' and 'encode' the operative dynamics of dominant hegemony." The fabricated quote of Boumédiène along with his portrait has been composed into a meme able to travel and be understood easily and swiftly. The meme comprises the core idea of the replacement thesis and offers itself to be consumed in an instant.

[14] European parties embracing versions of the population replacement palimpsest: The Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) and the Alternative for Germany (AfD) both predicate the idea of population replacement (*Bevölkerungsaustausch*) (APA, 2019; Gauland, 2017). Representatives of Vox in Spain have also spoken about an "Islamic invasion" (Gonzalez, 2019) while the British National Party fears a "Demographic Jihad" (Furness, 2017). Golden Dawn in Greece prefers the term "demographic alteration" (Ellinas, 2013) while Lega Nord in Italy talks about "organized invasion" (Padovani, 2018). In the Netherlands, Geert Wilders' PVV and Thierry Baudet's Forum voor Democratie both speak about "omvolking" (which could be translated as re-population).

[15] All over Europe propositions have found their way into political and legislative bodies that would make it easier to remove citizenship from non-white citizens—or, "with a migration background" as the official designation often goes—in specific circumstances (e.g., fighting for a foreign militia, polygamy, but also, see the CDU proposal of April 29, 2019, for not living under German "*Leitkultur*"). This trend erodes the civic definition of citizenship and increasingly culturalizes or racializes citizenship.

[16] "It's the Birthrates" (repeated three times) is the opening line of the manifesto, entitled "The Great Replacement," by gunman Tarrant, responsible for the bloodshed in the Al Noor mosque and the Linwood Islamic Center in Christchurch, New Zealand, on March 15, 2019, killing 51 human beings. A concern with birth rates and the Eurabia plot also runs through Breivik's manifesto, who was responsible for killing 77 human beings in 2011.

[17] Lately Passport-Germans (*Passdeutsche*) has been the preferred compound word used by the AfD to denote those who, although legally German (holding a German passport), are constructed as not "real" Germans (cf. Martens, 2018).

[18] A reverse image search shows that this image is widely disseminated on the internet: it is to be found on millions of web pages.

[19] The image was created by the online person D. T. Devareaux and posted on their no longer existing blog entitled *The Study of Revenge*. The blog and illustrations of Devareaux were archived on another anti-Islam blog: *Planck's Constant*: *The Study of Revenge* (2006b).

[20] Biopower's origins, according to Thomas Lemke (2011, p. 9), can be traced back to the work of Rudolf Kjellén in Sweden at the beginning of the 20th century, where biopolitics entailed thinking of the state as a living entity. This organicist conceptualization of the state was reworked during the National Socialist era in Germany, where racial discourse matched and expanded biopolitics, while articulating two interrelated ideas: (a) the Nazi regime operated through the supposition of "self-enclosed communities with a common genetic heritage" (Lemke, 2011, p. 11); and (b) Nazi ideology presumed that biology could be the explanation to different social and political problems. Moreover, Nazi biopolitics were predicated upon the premises of "heredity biology" as the determining factor in the constitution of population and "racial hygiene," as the policy regulating the heredity patterns and stock of the population with the end to improve the "efficiency in living" of the German Volk (Lemke, 2011, p. 12). The means whereby this policy was pursued were a combination of laws, practices, and regulations based on "negative and positive eugenic practices" (Lemke, 2011, p. 12) working toward "the development and maintenance of genetic material… only possible through [the] protection against the 'penetration of foreign blood' and the preservation of the 'racial character' of the German people" (Lemke, 2011, pp. 12–13). This is the background against which Foucault elaborated his notion of biopower, as a challenge to analyses grounded in the assumption of biological factors influencing different aspects of politics and social life.

[21] According to Falguni Sheth (2011, p. 53), Foucault's abandonment of sovereign power in the frame of biopower leaves the crucial role that "sovereign authority" holds in "ascribing racial divisions" unattended; that is, states still determine the contours of the nation and often rely on racial adscriptions and characterizations to enact divisions within the national population.

[22] Following Banu Subramanian, Schuller conceptualizes eugenics as, "a broad-based and multi-species discourses and practices of evaluating the fitness of biological variation and assessing the relative influence of heredity versus environment, a practice that encompasses a wide range of scientific, social, and agricultural agenda" (Schuller, 2018, p. 22).

[23] This sentence seems to have its origin in a speech of Osama bin Laden in the late 1990s, Rafaello Pantucci (2015) traces it as "We love death as you love life" while Oliver Roy reverses the sites of enunciations "They love death as we love life."

[24] As Schuller (2018, p. 197) has documented in the Anglo-American context, eugenics was predicated upon three principles: "coercing sterilization, illegalizing immigration, and preventing cross-racial relationships."

[25] It is therefore not surprising that the discourse of demographic replacement holds condemnatory views towards feminism, for it postulates European women's empowerment as a direct cause of the decay of Europe, "Well congratulations to Western European women. You've succeeded in harassing and ridiculing your own sons into suppressing many of their masculine instincts. To your surprise, you didn't enter a feminist Nirvana, but paved the way for an unfolding Islamic hell" (Breivik quoted in Bron, 2019).

[26] See also earlier imprints on the palimpsests of population replacement and its relation with eugenics during the National Socialist regime and its propaganda: "Nazi eugenics exhibitions," *Volk und Rasse*, 1936, available at https://research.calvin.edu/german-propaganda-archive/volkundrasse1936-8.htm (viewed July 23, 2019).

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ORIGINAL ARTICLE

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The contextual effect of trust on perceived support: Evidence from Roma and non-Roma in East-Central Europe

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Abstract

In recent years, trust has been conceptualized as an important source of social capital, setting off cross-disciplinary research on both the benefits and predictors of trust at the individual and contextual level. In this paper, we turn to the individual outcomes of living in a trustful context, and explore the relationship between trust, itself one of the main components of social capital, and social support, seen as one of the most important effects of social capital. In particular, we ask how social capital—and the relationship between trust and social support—functions in the context of unequal societies. We model perceived support as an outcome across three levels, from no support to proximate to distal support, and using a cross-national study of Roma and non-Roma across 12 European countries, we track the relationship between trust and support across both mainstream and marginalized populations. Our findings suggest that living in contexts with more trust has protective effects particularly for members of marginalized groups: the Roma are more likely to have distal support in contexts with higher trust. We conclude that contextual trust helps to broaden the circle of support beyond family and friends; thus, trust can indeed be a synthetic force that binds individuals together in broadened structures of support.

KEYWORDS

Roma, social capital, social support, trust

*Authors are listed alphabetically to denote equal contribution.

1 | INTRODUCTION

Trust has been linked to a wide range of economic, political, and social phenomena. It has been conceived as a glue, a "synthetic force" that binds societies together, but also a social good that, when lacking, can have devastating consequences for both individuals and social systems. In recent years, trust has been notably conceptualized as an important source of social capital (Putnam, 1995, 2000), setting off cross-disciplinary research not only on the benefits of trust, but also on its predictors (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2002; Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman, & Soutter, 2000; Glanville & Paxton, 2007; Paxton, 2002).

A considerable body of research in sociology has thus made great strides in modeling the individual and contextual characteristics that *predict* trust. But less work has been done looking at the effects of trust. Therefore, working with an ecological conceptualization of trust (aggregated to the country level) which we draw from economics research showing that contextual measures of trust can predict individual behaviors (Glaeser et al., 2000), here we turn to the individual *outcomes* of trust. We thus explore the relationship between trust, itself one of the main components of social capital (Paxton, 2002), and social support, seen as one of the most important effects of social capital (Lin, 2001). In particular, we ask how the relationship between trust and social support functions in the context of unequal societies.

Individuals can reach out to different sources of support, often divided into proximal (i.e., family and friends) and distal support (i.e., ties in the larger community and beyond) (Cornwell, 2016; Cornwell & Behler, 2015). Marginalized individuals, however, are less likely to have proximal support because their proximal individuals are equally disadvantaged (on this broader point, see Granovetter, 1973). But the marginalized are also less likely to count on distal support due to widespread stigma (Verdery & Campbell, 2019). This often means they are caught in a double-bind when seeking support. We therefore look at trust as a lubricant of social interaction, particularly with unknown others (Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994), and so as a contextual characteristic that may improve perceptions of support. In the process, we seek to gain purchase on how the nexus between support and trust works for those who are disadvantaged on both counts (Cornwell & Cornwell, 2008; Smith, 2010; Wilkes & Wu, 2018).

We model this relationship between trust and support with a focus on the Roma, Europe's largest minority group, and one that is highly marginalized. The Roma face tremendous economic inequality, cultural recognition gaps, and disparate social outcomes (FRA, 2012). Using the 2011 Regional Roma Survey that was conducted across 12 Eastern and Central European countries, we show that living in a context that is more trustful is indeed associated with increased perceptions of support, and in particular an increase in perceived support from distant individuals and institutions. In this sense, trust is indeed a "synthetic force" across societies. But when we analyze Roma and non-Roma respondents separately, we find that it is only for the Roma that we see a relationship emerge between trustful contexts and distal support. Through our analyses, we therefore gain a richer model of social capital, one that relates trust with social support. And we see that it is precisely for the most marginalized that trust can be most efficacious in broadening circles of support.

2 | TRUST IN CONTEXT

Putnam's (1993) now classic finding that social capital improves institutional performance and democracy set off an explosion of research on the topic, across many disciplines (Fukuyama, 1995; Glaeser et al., 2000; Inglehart, 1999). Both here and in *Bowling Alone* (2000), Putnam elaborates an understanding of social capital that involves membership in social associations, horizontal governance structures, and trust. Much research, including by Putnam himself, has explored the links between these three aspects of social capital (Putnam, 1993, 1995, 2000).

In economics, this renewed attention to social capital, and in particular to trust, proved to be the impetus for a cultural turn in the discipline (Guiso, Sapienza, & Zingales, 2006). Following work on trust from political science, in particular from Putnam and Fukuyama, economists began integrating trust into standard economic models, with

the goal of predicting the economic payoffs of trust (Knack & Keefer, 1997; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1997). With trust conceived as "the subjective probability with which an agent assesses that another agent … will perform a particular action" (Gambetta, 2000, p. 217), the concept could be intuitively understood as an important lubricant for social and economic exchange (see Coleman, 1988 for an early view on the relationship between trust and efficient transactions).

But the common operationalization of trust seemed to have limited utility in fully exploring the outcomes of trust, setting off a debate on the matter. Measures of trust have typically been based on attitudinal questions: since 1972, the General Social Survey has measured generalized trust with the following question: "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?" While interesting, the vagueness of the question makes it difficult to interpret, a problem also brought up by Putnam: "since trust is so central to the theory of social capital, it would be desirable to have strong behavioral indicators of trends in social trust or misanthropy. I have discovered no such behavioral measures" (1995, p. 68; see also Delhey, Newton, & Welzel, 2011). The difficulty, in other words, arises when attempting to draw an association from trusting beliefs to a range of behaviors, especially those pertaining to social capital.

Subsequent experimental research confirmed that there was some cause for concern, finding that an individual's generalized trusting beliefs have a complicated relationship with individual trusting behavior. Early work found that expressing trust does not predict that an individual will behave in a way that is more trusting of others, but does predict trustworthiness (Glaeser et al., 2000). Glaeser et al. (2000, p. 813) thus concluded that "[w]hile attitudinal trust surveys at best weakly predict any individual's level of trust, they may be good at predicting the overall level of trustworthiness in society." And using the same experimental methodology (i.e., the classic trust game), a meta-analysis from Johnson and Mislin (2012) similarly found that across cultures, country-level social trust would predict trustworthiness but not trusting behaviors, a finding underscored in a study which showed that social trust could also predict cooperation (measured through a public goods game; see Anderson, Mellor, and Milyo, 2004). More recently, new research has moved to constructing new measures of general trust that can better predict trusting behavior (Yamagishi et al., 2015). Taken together, the literature finds that ecological factors, including trust, play an important part in determining individual outcomes, and that this contextual trust can predict individual outcomes above and beyond—and sometimes better than—individual-level trust.

We build on these insights in order to conceptualize trust contextually, as an important component of political cultures that could, in turn, affect individual outcomes. In other words, we average out generalized trust to the country level. This echoes macro approaches in both economics and political science, which have found that country-level trust affects a range of social goods, increasing economic growth (Fukuyama, 1995; Knack & Keefer, 1997) and judicial efficiency (La Porta et al., 1997), and decreasing corruption (La Porta et al., 1997). And indeed, important work in sociology has similarly modeled country-level generalized trust as a predictor of democracy, and even future contextual trust (Paxton, 2002).

Here, meanwhile, we look to a contextual measure of generalized trust as a predictor not of other contextual characteristics, but of the support individuals perceive from their proximate and distal ties. While social capital can be understood as a contextual characteristic, it is nonetheless an individual resource determining (and determined by) one's position within a field (Bourdieu, 1984). Through our approach, we therefore seek to understand how contextual- or field-level trust determines an element of social capital, namely social support, that we operationalize at the individual level. And given extensive economics research on the matter (Knack & Keefer, 1997; La Porta et al., 1997), we have reason to believe that this contextual-level trust should affect individual-level outcomes such as social support.

3 | FROM TRUST TO SOCIAL SUPPORT

Social support is a product of social relationships and, according to some, the most important aspect and effect of social capital (Song, Son, & Lin, 2011). It encompasses resources that individuals have access to (Wellman &

Wortley, 1990), typically including emotional, instrumental, and information support, from care to goods and services to knowledge and skills (Berkman, 1984). Access to such resources represents a crucial form of social capital that can be mobilized in response to unexpected events (Hurlbert, Haines, & Beggs, 2000), thus helping individuals to overcome periods of adversity (Gielen, McDonnell, Wu, O'Campo, & Faden, 2001).

Social contexts can deeply affect the shape and availability of social support, and studies show that living in disadvantaged neighborhoods is associated with lower levels of actual and perceived social support (Cornwell & Behler, 2015). But support is itself contextual in that it occurs at multiple levels of proximity to the source of support. Lin and colleagues situate social support across multiple layers of social life, and define it as "support accessible to an individual through social ties to other individuals, groups, and the larger community" (1979, p. 709).

However, proximity has yet to be given adequate attention in the literature (see Caito, 2018 for an exception). While sources of social support have been differentiated by kin and non-kin (Nguyen, Chatters, Taylor, & Mouzon, 2016) and by proximal (e.g., within-household) versus community-level (Cornwell, 2016; Cornwell & Behler, 2015), previous work has not considered these different levels of support within the same model, and for the same population. In particular, the bulk of the literature on social support has looked at differential access to proximal social support based on the family and friends in an individual's social network (e.g., Nguyen et al., 2016), and it has generally ignored more distal sources of support (Upenieks, Settels, & Schafer, 2018).

4 | TRUST AND SUPPORT AMONG EUROPEAN ROMA

Past research has shown that marginalization affects both trust and social support. Experiences of marginalization are typically linked to decreased trust (Smith, 2010; Wilkes & Wu, 2018; Ziller, 2017). And there are well-documented disparities in social support between marginalized and non-marginalized groups, at least in the United States. For instance, African Americans have been found to have less access to influential and supportive social ties than Whites (Cornwell & Cornwell, 2008). This is especially pronounced for financial support, with African Americans having lower access to financial assistance from their close personal ties (Sarkisian & Gerstel, 2004).

But the two have rarely been modelled together, and in particular, we do not know whether contexts with higher trust improve the support perceived by minority groups. This is especially important for marginalized individuals who cannot access support from equally disadvantaged family and friends; more distal sources of support can become even more relevant here, yet may be difficult to access due to the stigma that marginalized individuals face (Pescosolido & Martin, 2015; Verdery & Campbell, 2019). Thus, while for the marginalized, distal actors may have a stronger ability to offer support, stigma can reduce the likelihood of the support being received or offered.

Indeed, this is an important aspect of social capital more broadly. As argued by Granovetter (1985, p. 503), "we should expect pressures toward vertical integration in a market where transacting firms lack a network of personal relations that connects them… On the other hand, where a stable network of personal relations mediates complex transactions and generates standards of behaviors between firms, such pressures should be absent." Extrapolating to individuals rather than firms, we can see that distal support will be necessary when proximal support is unlikely to exist: this is what Granovetter calls "vertical integration." He writes about a lack of "personal relations" among firms, but the same would apply, we argue, in contexts where proximal actors simply cannot offer support (Cornwell & Cornwell, 2008; Sarkisian & Gerstel, 2004).

Thus, in our models, we track, first, whether individuals have some support at all, but also the variables that predict reliance on distal rather than proximal support. This is because distal "weak ties" are generally helpful in accessing non-redundant social resources (Granovetter, 1973), but they are particularly necessary for the marginalized. And we would argue that this shift from proximal to distal support is more likely in more trusting contexts which will, even given a lack of a "network of personal relations," nonetheless improve and guarantee "standards of behaviors," including perhaps a decreased likelihood of stigmatizing behaviors (quotes from Granovetter, 1985, p. 503; see also Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994). Here, we look to trust particularly as a lubricant

for social relationships (Coleman, 1988). Marked by belief that people in general can be counted on (as trust is, indeed, typically defined; see Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994), trustful contexts would render individuals more likely to *engage* with others in general, and perhaps even *ask them for help*.

And we can certainly track this relationship between trust, support, and marginality when looking to the Roma, who are a deeply stigmatized and marginalized community across Europe. Ninety percent of Roma live in households below their respective European nations' poverty lines and only 15% of European Roma graduate from high school or vocational school (FRA, 2012). Seen as a Europe's "perennial others," the Roma have faced waves of inclusion and exclusion (Powell & Lever, 2017; see also Ladányi & Szelényi, 2006). And while considerable resources have, in the past few decades, been expended on improving the welfare of European Roma, these efforts have had little success (Sigona & Trehan, 2009; but see Creţan & Turnock, 2008). Across the continent, a wide range of resources and institutions reinforce the limits of Roma belonging to Europe (Sendroiu & Mogosanu, 2019; Yuval-Davis, Wemyss, & Cassidy, 2017), and Roma face marginality whether they are wealthy or poor (Creţan & Powell, 2018).

At the same time, bridging social capital has been found to contribute to social mobility and poverty alleviation among Roma communities (Méreiné Berki, Málovics, Toth, & Creţan, 2017). Indeed, past research has shown that Roma face the particularly dual struggle—between stigmatizing distal institutions, and supportive but similarly marginalized proximal ties—that renders the shift from proximal to distal support particularly important. Málovics, Creţan, Méreine-Berki, and Tóth (2019), for instance, show that Roma face a "contradictory situation" characterized by strong bonds to their proximal others but important feelings of alienation. In what follows, we explore whether contextual trust contributes to improving this "contradictory situation," such that proximal support is perceived as more likely among Roma and non-Roma alike.

5 | DATA AND METHODS

The 2011 Regional Roma Survey was meant to comprehensively track Romani individuals' socio-economic contexts, while comparing with those of their non-Romani neighbors, and was conducted across 12 Eastern and Central European countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, and Slovakia (see Ivanov, Kling, & Kagin, 2012 for full sampling details).

A total of 20,018 Romani households and 9,782 non-Romani households compose the sample, with the focus on communities where the Roma are most overrepresented and often most marginalized. The sampling universe for the Roma was composed of all households in "areas of compact Roma population," while the non-Romani sample was those households "living in close proximity" to the Roma (Ivanov et al., 2012, p. 14). The latter was defined in this survey as living within 300 meters of a settlement where 50% or more of the population is Roma. In our study, we focus on questions from a survey module on "Individual Status and Attitudes" that was administered face to face with one randomly selected adult person from each household. Altogether, removing those with missing data on key variables (less than 1% of the sample), we retain an analytic sample of 11,913 individuals.

5.1 | Dependent variable: Perceived social support

Our dependent variable is perceived social support. Studies consistently show that *perceived* social support has greater explanatory power than *actual* support in predicting many outcomes, especially physical well-being (Uchino, 2009). Research shows that perceived support captures generalizations that have emerged from numerous real instances of help, whether large or small, supplied by one's social ties (Hobfoll, 2009). Measures of perceived support are thus "likely to reflect both the support that has been received in the past and the support

that is currently not needed, but is readily available" (Shaw, 2005, p. 505). Perceived support, in other words, may better relate to a holistic perception of social relationships and so to the social capital and trust available in a given relationship or context. In particular, perceived support can be deeply related to trust, as both support and trust are future-oriented outcomes that represent "hope about the future reliability of other actors" (Rothstein & Stolle, 2003, p. 11).

Our dependent variable of perceived social support was thus derived from a survey item that asked respondents to "[t]hink about an emergency situation that requires [them] to raise [an amount corresponding to the national average monthly income] in a couple of days, for example to cover the cost of an urgent repair of [their] house." The interviewer asked each respondent to list whom he or she could count on in such a situation (the respondent was not shown a list of options to choose from). We divided the answers into three categories: those who said "no one," those who said they could rely on family and friends (proximal support), and those who said they could rely on any other individuals and institutions such as neighbors,[1] banks, or local NGOs (distal support). These make up our perceived support variable, divided into no support (34% of sample), proximal support (27% of sample), and distal support (39% of sample).

Our data only contained a measure of perceived *financial* support; as a result, a profitable line for future inquiry could be to extend this framework with measures of more types of social support (e.g., emotional, informational) (see Berkman, 1984). However, our measure of perceived financial support holds two advantages for our study. First, close to 90% of our respondents qualify as "extremely deprived" by European Union standards. The belief in the availability of others to lend financial support during times of emergency may thus help individuals weather periods of extreme hardship and adversity. Second, compared to other commonly used measures of perceived social support (e.g., emotional support; see Berkman, 1984) that may be ambiguous and perhaps also culturally specific (e.g., "If you needed to talk about your problems and private feelings, how much would the people around you be willing to listen?"), our measure of perceived financial support relates to a specific task that is easily understandable and interpretable for respondents across contexts. Past research has thus shown perceived financial support to be more accurately reported than other forms of social support (Krause, 1997).

Given our three categories of no support, proximal support, and distal support, we model perceived social support using multinomial logistic regression. This method is preferred because it makes no assumption about the *order of categories*. We consider proximate support as the baseline, a decision that was theoretically informed, since we are especially interested in the move from *proximal support to distal support*. We can therefore, within any one model, see how the same variables affect each source of support, and especially the theoretically important question of the predictors of proximal versus distal support.[2]

Because our data contains information on individuals' townships and countries, we include predictors of the different sources of perceived support at the individual, town, and country levels, and also use clustered robust standard errors both at the town and country level to ensure accuracy of probability values (see Nichols & Schaffer, 2007).

5.2 | Individual-level variables

At the individual level, we include a measure of ethnicity (1 = Roma, 0 = Not Roma). We also measured individual experiences of discrimination (1 = any experience of discrimination; 0 = no discrimination). Our models adjust for a range of individual-level variables that past research has found to be correlated with social support (Schafer & Vargas, 2016; Verdery & Campbell, 2019). These include demographic controls such as age (in years), gender (female = 1), years of education, activity status (1 = in work or school; 0 = all else), personal income standardized at the town level (with standard deviations over 3 recoded to 3), and marital status (1 = married or with a cohabiting partner; 0 = other). We also include measures of health (ranging from 0 chronic health conditions to 3 or more health conditions), life satisfaction (range 1–10, from completely dissatisfied to completely satisfied), and religiosity (range

0–7, from never attends religious services to attends more than once a week). Finally, we also included a measure of whether a respondent is an ethnic minority within her particular town (1 = minority; 0 = not minority).

Given that our measure of perceived social support asks individuals to identify people or institutions they could count on for financial help in a time of crisis, we also include measures of the economic capability of the targets of perceived social support across each level of consideration (i.e., individual, town, and country). The inclusion of these measures helps to account for respondents only listing individuals (e.g., friends or family members) or institutions (e.g., banks) that they perceive to have the financial *means* to help them in a crisis. At the individual level, we include adjustments for household income and whether the respondent's household meets criteria for severe material deprivation according to EU standards (FRA, 2012). Meanwhile, the town and country variables are described below.

5.3 | Contextual-level variables

Moving beyond individual measures of marginalization, we also measured the extent to which individuals live within marginalized contexts, looking at the association between contextual marginalization and perceived support. We therefore first aggregated three variables to the town level: whether respondents can name any institution that has been helpful in the past year (1 = yes, 0 = no), the extent of anti-Roma stereotypes within the town (coded as 1 if the respondent holds anti-Roma stereotypes and 0 if the respondent holds no anti-Roma stereotypes), and measures of perceptions of economic safety within the town (1 = totally economically unsafe and 0 = relatively or totally economically safe).

As noted at the outset, we also include variables measured at the country level. In order to account for country-level targets of perceived support, we controlled for 2011 GDP per capita and Gini coefficient (with data from the World Bank). We also include a measure of repression from Freedom House (see Zhou, 2013). This measure ranges from 2 to 14 in our sample, with higher values representing more repression. Finally, we adjust for a measure of state corruption, using data from Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index for 2011 (range 1–10, with higher values denoting higher perceived corruption).

Descriptive statistics for the entire sample, and segregated by ethnicity, can be found in Appendix Table A1. Descriptive statistics for all contextual variables that we considered can be found in the online Supporting Information document.

Finally, we note that despite relatively high correlations among our measures of corruption and repression ($r = 0.72$), and between our measure of contextual trust and the corruption index ($r = -0.53$), multicollinearity was not a problem in our models. The mean variance inflation factor (VIF) in our fully adjusted model was 1.67, which falls well below the standard of a VIF greater than 10 as problematic (e.g., see Meyers, Gamst, & Guarino, 2006).

5.4 | Focal independent variable

Our main independent variable is trust, aggregated at the country level (see Kim, Baum, Ganz, Subramanian, & Kawachi, 2011; Paxton, 2007). Since the 2011 Regional Roma Survey did not contain a measure of trust as generally conceived, we rely on the 2008 European Values Survey (EVS), the only nationally representative data set that we are aware of which contains the standard generalized trust measure for all 12 countries included in our sample. This is measured as a country-level percentage of people who agree that, "most people can be trusted." Despite the 3-year time gap, supplementary analyses (available upon request) show that trust is very stable over time, a finding also substantiated in past research (Bjørnskov,). The more extensive battery of trust questions (Delhey et al., 2011) was not available for most of our sample. However, we ran additional tests using this data for the countries available and found that our findings do hold.[3]

6 | RESULTS

6.1 | Individual-level predictors of proximal and distal support

We begin our analysis by assessing how the variables that past research has identified as affecting perceived social support track across our model. Table 1 shows relative risk ratios (RRRs), which represent the change associated with each independent variable in the probability of being in either the "no support" or respectively the "distal support" categories when compared to the baseline of "proximal support." These ratios can be interpreted in the following way: if the relative risk ratio is 1 (or close to 1), it suggests no difference in the likelihood of reporting "no support" relative to the baseline of "proximal support" (or alternatively, no difference in the likelihood of reporting "distal support" relative to "proximal support"). Meanwhile, a relative risk ratio greater than 1 suggests an increased likelihood of either perceiving no support or distal support, while a risk ratio less than 1 suggests a reduced likelihood.

In Model 1, we see that across our demographic indicators, women are more likely to have proximal support than men (RRR = 0.86, $p < .05$), but are not more likely to have distal support. Instead, an increased propensity to have distal support is explained by higher educational attainment, being married, being in school, or having work, and having a higher individual income.[4] We also find that while household income has no association with perceived support at either level, severe material deprivation portends an increased likelihood to have no support (RRR = 4.35, $p < .05$).

In Model 1, we also included three additional variables that past research has shown to be positively associated with social support: life satisfaction, health, and religious attendance (e.g., Cornwell, 2015; Krause, 2006; Traunmüller, 2010). We thus see that higher scores on the life satisfaction scale portend a lower likelihood of perceiving no support. We do not find a similar association between life satisfaction and perceived distal support, which is noteworthy. However, we should note that the mean life satisfaction score in our sample is 5.68 on a 10-point scale. Data from a broader range of countries in the most recent wave of the World Values Survey (2010–2014), for instance, reveal a much higher life satisfaction score (mean = 7.13) on the same 10-point scale, which may explain why the association with distal support that we might expect does not manifest in our sample.

We also see that each additional health condition reported by the respondent increases the likelihood of them perceiving no support. It is not surprising that impaired health could lead to diminished social support. Health impairment may cause individuals to withdraw from the social circle of the ill person (Cornwell, 2015), making them vulnerable to having no support. Poor health is also associated with a lower likelihood of perceiving distal sources of support.

With regards to religious attendance, relative to those who never attend religious services, each additional increase in frequency of religious service attendance is associated with a lower likelihood of having no support. Since religious communities serve as important sources of support for congregants (Krause, 2006), it is not surprising that one's frequent presence at religious services is associated with the knowledge that support is available. Interestingly, we also find that those attending religious services more than once a week are less likely to report perceptions of a distal source of support (RRR = 0.66, $p < .05$). Since religious communities can be relatively insular, they may hinder exposure to other people and institutions that form the basis of distal support, instead encouraging members to stay within the congregation to obtain help.

Model 1 therefore shows that even when modeling social support at different levels, findings from our demographic and control variables typically fit patterns from previous academic work, and we should note that all the results described in Model 1 maintain these associations across all four models.

Beyond these demographic indicators, we have two measures related to ethnicity: being Roma and being a minority within one's town. We see in Model 1 that being a minority had no significant association with the likelihood of perceiving no support or of perceiving distal support. Our results, however, suggest that the Roma are more likely to have no support (RRR = 1.32, $p < .001$) relative to non-Roma, while Roma ethnicity has no

TABLE 1 Multinomial logistic regression models of perceived social support, 2011 Regional Roma Survey (relative risk ratios shown with clustered standard errors), *N* = 11,913

	Model 1						Model 2					
	No support vs. *Proximal support*			*Distal support* vs. *Proximal support*			*No support* vs. *Proximal support*			*Distal support* vs. *Proximal support*		
Individual level	**RRR**	***Pr*>|z|**	**Std.Err.**	**RRR**	***Pr*>|z|**	**Std.Err.**	**RRR**	***Pr*>|z|**	**Std.Err.**	**RRR**	***Pr*>|z|**	**Std.Err.**
Female	0.86	*	0.06	1.00		0.06	0.88	*	0.06	1.00		0.06
Education	0.96	***	0.01	1.03	**	0.01	0.97	**	0.01	1.03	*	0.01
Income (personal)	1.06		0.05	1.12	**	0.05	1.05		0.05	1.13	**	0.05
Household income	0.93		0.07	1.05		0.07	0.91		0.09	1.06		0.07
Severe material deprivation	4.38	*	4.15	0.76		0.52	3.83	*	2.18	0.75		0.51
Age	0.99		0.00	1.00		0.00	1.00		0.00	1.00		0.00
Marital status	1.16	*	0.08	1.33	***	0.09	1.17	*	0.08	1.32	***	0.10
Work/School status	0.90		0.08	1.45	***	0.10	0.93		0.08	1.43	***	0.10
Life satisfaction	0.88	***	0.02	1.01		0.02	0.89	***	0.02	1.00		0.02
Health conditions	1.11	**	0.03	0.93	*	0.03	1.09	**	0.03	0.94		0.03
Religious attendance	0.55	**	0.11	0.66	*	0.11	0.56	**	0.11	0.64	*	0.11
Minority	1.06		0.05	0.89		0.07	1.00		0.11	0.93		0.08
Roma	1.32	***	0.11	1.09		0.09	1.39	***	0.12	1.07		0.09
Discrimination	0.90		0.09	1.18		0.11	0.92		0.09	1.15		0.12
Town level												
Town stereotypes							0.95		0.41	1.02		0.32
Town no helpful institutions							2.08		0.92	0.53	*	0.15
Town economic insecurity							5.15	***	2.40	0.51		0.21
Country level												
Trust												
Corruption Index	◇		◇			◇			◇			
Repression Index	◇		◇			◇			◇			
Gini coefficient	◇		◇			◇			◇			
GDP	◇		◇			◇			◇			
Constant	3.81		3.91			0.74			25.06			

(Continues)

TABLE 1 (Continued)

	Model 3					
	No support vs. *Proximal support*			*Distal support* vs. *Proximal support*		
Individual level	RRR	Pr>|z|	Std.Err.	RRR	Pr>|z|	Std.Err.
Female	0.88		0.06	1.00		0.06
Education (years)	0.97	**	0.01	1.02	*	0.01
Income (personal)	1.05		0.05	1.13	**	0.05
Household income	0.91		0.07	1.07		0.07
Severe material deprivation	3.80	*	2.07	0.74		0.48
Age	1.00		0.00	1.00		0.00
Marital status	1.17	*	0.08	1.35	***	0.09
Work/School status	0.92		0.07	1.45	***	0.10
Life satisfaction	0.88	***	0.02	1.00		0.02
Health conditions	1.09	**	0.03	0.95		0.03
Religious attendance	0.56	**	0.11	0.66	*	0.11
Minority	1.00		0.11	0.93		0.08
Roma	1.39	***	0.12	1.05		0.09
Discrimination	0.92		0.09	1.15		0.11
Town level						
Town stereotypes	0.95		0.41	0.96		0.32
Town no helpful institutions	2.09		0.92	0.50	*	0.14
Town economic insecurity	4.97	**	2.32	0.58		0.23
Country level						
Trust	1.00		0.02	1.03	*	0.02
Corruption Index	0.66		0.18	0.96		0.24
Repression Index	1.02		0.11	1.11		0.11
Gini coefficient	1.00		0.02	0.94	**	0.02
GDP	1.00		0.00	1.00		0.00
Constant	0.77			6.23		

◇ Variable included in model, but coefficient not shown (see endnote 4).

***$p < .001$, **$p < .01$, *$p < .05$.

statistically significant association with the likelihood of distal support. These distinctions between the minority and Roma variables, and their associations with perceived support, are important. Minority status—a marker of a respondent's position within her immediate town context—is not associated with a drop in perceived support. Being Roma—an indicator of broad (national and even continental) marginality—is associated with an increase in the odds of having no support, writ large.

In Model 1, we also move beyond ethnicity to employ a specific measure that gauges whether discrimination was actually experienced by a respondent. But we find no differences in the likelihood of reporting no support or in reporting distal support associated with having experienced discrimination.

6.2 | Perceived support in marginalized contexts

Marginalization—and cultural schemas for addressing marginalization—are not simply individual-level phenomena, but may in fact have considerably more contextual roots (Lamont, 2018; Small, Harding, & Lamont, 2010). Here, we are interested in economic indicators of contextual inequality, but also in the contexts marked by recognition gaps, which Lamont defines as "disparities in worth and cultural membership between groups in a society" (2018, p. 419). This is precisely what our town and country level variables help us to measure. In Model 2, we look at whether perceived support is affected by economic inequalities or recognition gaps at the town level.

Model 2 therefore adds in three contextual variables in addition to all those present in Model 1: anti-Roma stereotypes, perceptions of there being no institutions that are helpful, and perceptions of economic insecurity. These are all town-level variables created by aggregating responses to the town level and assigning each individual the average of the town where he or she lives.

Here, we see that town anti-Roma stereotypes had no bearing on support. This lack of an association between town stereotypes and perceived support seems contrary to what might be hypothesized based on previous research, but this finding may be the result of assessing town stereotypes across the whole sample (i.e., not limiting the analysis simply to Roma respondents).

In contrast, higher town-level perceptions of economic insecurity were associated with a higher likelihood of reporting no support (RRR = 5.15, $p < .001$), and perceiving that there are no helpful town institutions was associated with a lower likelihood of distal support (RRR = 0.54, $p < .05$). In other words, we see a main effect of these two variables that does not manifest for town stereotypes. This may be because economic insecurity and perceiving that institutions are unhelpful are beliefs that are prone to affect everyone, and may not solely be conditional on individual characteristics, such as ethnicity.

6.3 | Considering country-level trust as a predictor of perceived support

Model 3 adds in our aggregated level of trust at the country level. Here we will also address our other country-level variables, which we have not yet discussed in order to improve explanatory clarity (see endnote 2), but which have been included in both previous models. In Model 3, our primary goal is to understand how the level of trust in a country may influence individual perceptions of support.

Results from Model 3 suggest that a higher Gini coefficient had no association with perceiving no support, but was associated with a lower likelihood of perceiving distal support (RRR = 0.94, $p < .01$). Lower inequality at the country level thus seems to be efficacious for engendering social support (see also Hastings, 2018). Meanwhile, neither GDP nor repression were associated with either level of support.

Turning to our focal independent variable of contextual trust, results from Model 3 suggest that contextual trust seems to have no bearing on perceiving support, but has a positive association with distal support (RRR = 1.03, $p < .05$). In other words, individuals residing in countries with higher levels of trust are more likely



FIGURE 1 Contextual trust and social support, full sample (*N* = 11,913)

to perceive sources of support beyond their immediate circle of friends and family, while having no influence on people's closest ties. And this association between contextual level trust and perceived distal support held above and beyond a wide range of indicators commonly thought to affect social support at both the country, town, and individual level.

In Figure 1, we show the predicted probability of receiving each type of support considered across three levels of contextual trust: at the mean level of contextual trust in our sample, and then, at one standard deviation above and below this mean level (95% confidence intervals are also displayed). As can be seen from comparing the likelihood of distal support across the three levels of contextual trust, individuals have an 8% greater likelihood of reporting distal support where there is high contextual trust (prob. of perceiving distal support = 43%) versus low contextual trust (prob. of perceiving distal support = 35%). Ethnically stratified analyses by Roma/non-Roma ethnicity shown in the next section explore whether this finding manifests in a similar fashion for each group.

6.4 | Ethnically stratified analyses by Roma/non-Roma status

Thus far, we have considered a stepwise multinomial regression model of how individual, town, and country-level factors influence social support across three levels. While these analyses are important to determine the general patterns of how these layers of predictors track across levels of perceived support, our study was also motivated by the question of whether contexts with higher trust improve the support perceived by minority groups. In this section, we conduct an ethnically stratified analysis of Roma and non-Roma respondents to see whether the association between contextual trust and perceived support works differently for these two groups. Ethnically stratified analyses are preferred here over conventional multiplicative interaction analyses for a few reasons (and have, for instance, been used in Dobbin, Kim, & Kalev, 2011). By stratifying the sample, we can assess differences in perceptions of social support across all independent variables *without having to conduct multiple interaction analyses* (see Sun, Briel, Walter, & Guyatt, 2010). Second, the 2011 Regional Roma Survey contains nearly twice as many Roma individuals as non-Roma individuals (7,830 and 4,083 in our analytic sample, to be precise). In an interaction term, the assumption of homogeneity of variance between the groups is likely violated (McClelland & Jude, 1993), and so a stratified analysis can often be preferred. And despite the disparity in sample size between groups, both the Roma and non-Roma subgroups are adequately large to permit significance tests in a stratified sample (Behrens, Winkler, Gorski, Leitzmann, & Heid, 2011).

We should also note that we make *no attempt* to compare effect magnitude between the Roma and non-Roma samples. We are only interested in whether our covariates of interest vary in their significance across the two different samples. Table 2 displays results from these analyses.

TABLE 2 Ethnically tratified analyses, 2011 Regional Roma Survey (relative risk ratios shown with clustered standard errors)

	Roma (*N* = 7,830)						Non-Roma (*N* = 4,083)					
	No support vs. *Proximal support*			*Distal support* vs. *Proximal support*			*No support* vs. *Proximal support* *No support* vs. *Proximal support*			*Distal support* vs. *Proximal support*		
Individual level	RRR	*Pr*>|*z*|	Std.Err.	RRR	*Pr*>|*z*|	Std.Err.	RRR	*Pr*>|*z*|	Std.Err.	RRR	*Pr*>|*z*|	Std.Err.
Female	0.83	**	0.06	0.93		0.06	0.95		0.11	1.12		0.11
Education (years)	0.97	**	0.01	1.01		0.01	0.95	**	0.02	1.04	**	0.01
Income (personal)	1.03		0.06	1.15	*	0.07	1.11		0.06	1.10		0.06
Household income	0.94		0.08	1.09		0.09	0.86		0.11	1.03		0.11
Severe material deprivation	2.65		2.19	0.78		0.67	3.76	*	2.01	0.71		0.51
Age	1.00		0.00	1.00		0.00	1.00	**	0.00	1.00		0.00
Marital status	1.11		0.09	1.24	**	0.10	1.27	*	0.13	1.48	***	0.15
Work/School status	0.89		0.09	1.29	**	0.11	0.91		0.09	1.62	***	0.18
Life satisfaction	0.89	***	0.02	1.00		0.02	0.88	***	0.02	1.02		0.03
Health conditions	1.07	*	0.04	0.97		0.04	1.12	*	0.05	0.89	*	0.04
Religious attendance	0.54	**	0.12	0.72		0.14	0.66		0.16	0.53	**	0.13
Minority	0.98		0.15	0.85		0.10	0.91		0.12	1.15		0.16
Discrimination	0.87		0.09	1.10		0.12	1.07		0.16	1.33		0.22
Town level												
Town stereotypes	1.02		0.46	0.89		0.32	0.78		0.35	1.04		0.39
Town no helpful institutions	1.93		0.85	0.43	**	0.14	2.43		1.28	0.62		0.18
Town economic insecurity	5.32	**	2.63	0.62		0.28	4.43	**	2.28	0.54		0.22
Country level												
Trust	1.00		0.02	1.04	*	0.02	0.99		0.02	1.02		0.02
Corruption Index	0.69		0.21	1.03		0.28	0.59		0.17	0.89		0.25
Repression Index	1.00		0.12	1.09		0.11	1.07		0.13	1.15		0.13
Gini coefficient	1.01		0.02	0.93		0.02	0.98		0.02	0.94	**	0.02
GDP	1.00 *		0.00	1.00		0.00	1.00		0.00	1.00		0.00
Constant	0.96			6.22			3.49		5.91			

***$p < .001$, **$p < .01$, *$p < .05$



FIGURE 2 Contextual trust and social support amongst the Roma (*N* = 7,830)

Before we turn to trust, we should note that there are a few variables that produce divergent associations in this ethnically stratified analysis compared to our full analytic sample. First, the finding that females are less likely than males to report no support is observed only amongst the Roma subpopulation (RRR = 0.83, $p < .01$). In addition, education only predicts a higher likelihood of perceiving distal support among non-Roma respondents. This may be because the advantages associated with increased education apply only to less marginalized individuals. With regard to severe material deprivation, this was only associated with a higher likelihood of perceiving no support among non-Roma respondents (RRR = 3.76, $p < .05$). This may suggest that since Roma likely occupy a marginalized position, household material deprivation makes little difference in perceived support net of ethnicity and a host of other demographic indicators.

Moving to our focal independent variable and considering the Roma sample, we find that contextual levels of trust matter for perceiving distal levels of support (RRR = 1.04, $p < .05$). More precisely, in patterns that echo findings from the broader sample, higher levels of contextual trust increase the likelihood that Roma will report a distal source of social support, but have no association with perceiving no support. Figure 2 presents a visualization of the predicted probability of Roma perceiving each type of social support across the levels of contextual trust (the mean and one standard deviation above and below the mean, with 95% confidence intervals shown). As before, the pertinent comparison here is between the likelihood of perceiving distal support in contexts of low trust versus high trust. The Roma are 9% more likely to perceive distal support in high trust contexts (prob. of perceiving distal support = 40%) than in low trust contexts (prob. of perceiving distal support = 31%).[5]

Interestingly, these patterns do not hold when we turn to the non-Roma sample. Among these individuals, we do not see a significant association of contextual trust with either perceiving no support or perceptions of distal support. We reiterate that our purpose here is not to compare the magnitude (effect size) of the coefficients for contextual trust between the Roma and non-Roma sample. Our goal in this portion of the analyses was only to assess whether the main association of contextual trust with perceived distal support documented in the main sample was significant among Roma and non-Roma respondents, given the discrepant sample sizes of the two subgroups (Dobbin et al., 2011; McClelland & Judd, 1993; Sun et al., 2010). Taken together, our ethnically stratified analyses suggest that the positive association between contextual trust and perceived distal support that we observed in the full sample is likely driven by how national levels of trust operate among the Roma.[6,7]

7 | CONCLUSION

While trust is an important "synthetic force" in society, many factors can work to lower trust. Marginalization, in particular, can decrease trust (Glanville & Paxton, 2007). What does this mean, then, for the marginalized? In the

research described here, we track the effects of trust on different levels of perceived social support. We find that living in contexts with more trust is protective for members of marginalized groups. Across 12 European countries, the Roma are more likely to perceive distal support in contexts with higher trust. Contextual trust, in other words, broadens the circle of perceived support beyond family and friends. It expands perceived support almost akin to a form of permission for individuals to lean on—and indeed perhaps trust—those who are more unknown. And our analysis allows us to track this relationship: by looking to the Roma, a group that is marginalized across Europe, we can thus conduct a *cross-national* analysis of the effect of contextual trust on individual perceived support.

Our findings, while using an operationalization of trust elaborated in economics, also provide an important addition to this literature. Building on concerns that attitudinal measures of trust may be an unreliable predictor of individual outcomes (Putnam, 1995; see also Delhey et al., 2011), experimental research in economics has shown that trusting beliefs do not have a straightforward relationship to trusting behaviors (Glaeser et al., 2000; Johnson & Mislin, 2012). Economists thus look at trust contextually, as we have done, but most of this research nonetheless assesses the effects of contextual trust on other contextual variables. We find, however, that contextual trust does have an important effect on individual outcomes, in this case shaping the forms of perceived social support available to individuals.

Future research could, meanwhile, involve more fine-grained measures of ecological trust, going beyond the country level to the communities within which individuals spend their lives. While our main survey did not include this trust data, now that we have seen that country-level trust has individual outcomes, it would be important to detect whether collective trust levels are different for disadvantaged communities compared to the rest of a country, with any such divergence in turn affecting individuals.

Moreover, by focusing on the predominantly low-trust countries of East-Central Europe, we take an essentially extreme case of contextual trust and how it affects individual outcomes. While we cannot conclude that our findings will necessarily hold across other contexts, they nonetheless point to the necessity of such cross-national work on the effects of contextual trust for marginalized minorities. This is particularly the case since our findings imply that at the policy level, improving social trust can have important benefits for the engagement of marginalized individuals with social institutions. But in future work, we would ideally need to know whether this only works in more extreme cases such as East-Central Europe where trust is generally low (suggesting that increases in trust are felt more strongly in extreme cases) or broadened social support is a benefit of trust more generally (and if so, whether the benefits of trust vary according to regional baselines).

Additional spread across measures of marginality would also be helpful in drawing out the implications of our study. Ours is a predominantly marginalized sample, with the sampling strategy focusing specifically on the communities where the Roma are overrepresented and likely most marginalized. But not all Roma face economic hardship (Creţan & Powell, 2018), and additional work could look to the trust profiles of wealthier Roma, getting at the intersection of marginalities shaping the availability of social support.

Nonetheless, taken together, our study extends the existing multi-disciplinary literature, which has mostly looked either at the predictors of trust or its contextual correlates, to track the effect of trust on a closely related individual outcome. And in contrast with a social support literature that has predominantly focused on proximate support, we model perceived support as a multi-level outcome, tracking the predictors of perceived support across three levels from no support to proximate to distal support. Thus, by connecting trust and social support, we elaborate a broader conceptual model of social capital, and bring together two related literatures that have been rarely put in conversation, especially not within a single model. We find that trust can indeed be a synthetic force that binds individuals together in broadened structures of perceived support.

Trust is therefore part-and-parcel of marginalization in the truest sense: those already marginalized can better access perceived support—and therefore diminish marginalization—when living in more trustful contexts. Whereas trustful contexts are less relevant for individuals who have not experienced substantial marginalization, we see evidence that trust activates perceived social support for those most in need of it. Thus, trust and social support, considered together, can help us fulfill the early promise of social capital as a measure of democracy, and especially inclusive democracy (Putnam, 1993).

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DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

The data that support the findings of this study are openly available from United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), at: https://www.eurasia.undp.org/content/rbec/en/home/ourwork/sustainable-development/development-planning-and-inclusive-sustainable-growth/roma-in-central-and-southeast-europe/roma-data.html

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ENDNOTES

[1] Supplemental analyses considered "neighbors" a form of proximal support, but results were substantively similar.

[2] Supplemental analyses present the results of all statistical models employed in our study using "no support" as the reference category (see Online Supporting Information Tables S1 and S2).

[3] Adjusting for the same covariates as Model 3 of Table 1 (n = 4,985), results suggest that both in-group and out-group trust operate in the same way as our measure of contextual trust: they have no influence on perceiving no support or distal support in the main sample. However, both in-group and out-group trust are associated with an increase in distal support amongst the Roma sample in these five countries (n = 3,317), replicating our main finding.

[4] For ease of presentation, we include but do not show the relative-risk ratios for our country level controls until Model 3 (GDP, Gini coefficient, corruption index, repression index). In Models 1 and 2, a higher GDP is associated with a higher likelihood of perceiving distal support. A higher Gini coefficient (more inequality) is associated with a lower likelihood of perceiving distal support while higher scores on the repression index are associated with a higher likelihood of perceiving distal support.

[5] Additional analyses considered whether social class conditions the relationship between our contextual measure of trust and perceived financial support amongst the Roma sample only (N = 7,830). We used two indicators of social class: (a) professional employment status (1 = yes, 0 = no) and (b) holding a high school education or equivalent (1 = yes, 0 = no). Neither interaction term reached statistical significance at either level of our multinomial regressions. However, that so few Roma held a professional occupation (9.49%) or had the equivalent of a high school education (6.54%) likely renders these interaction terms underpowered, and thus makes it difficult to detect class-based contingencies between contextual trust and perceived social support.

[6] Results (available upon request) were also consistent using multilevel modeling with Generalized Structural Equation Modeling (GSEM).

[7] To check for reverse causality between contextual trust and perceived social support, we conducted a two-stage least squares (2SLS) analysis. This analysis can be found in the Online Supporting Information document and Table S3.

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SUPPORTING INFORMATION

Additional Supporting Information may be found online in the Supporting Information section.

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APPENDIX

TABLE A1 Descriptive statistics, 2011 Regional Roma Survey

	Total Sample	Range	*SD*	Roma	*SD*	Non-Roma	*SD*
Dependent variable							
No support	0.33			0.39		0.24	
Proximal support	0.27			0.26		0.30	
Distal support	0.39			0.35		0.46	
Individual-level variables							
Female	0.58	0,1		0.57		0.59	
Education	7.33	0–23	4.26	5.88		10.13	3.44
Income (personal)	−0.02	−1.18–3	0.70	−0.08	0.61	0.08	0.83
Household income	0.001	−1.92–5.38	0.43	−0.03	0.40	0.07	0.45
Severe material deprivation	0.95	0,1	0.05	0.96	0.04	0.94	0.08
Age	41.56	16–92	16.60	38.70	15.21	47.04	17.73
Marital status	0.67	0,1		0.69		0.63	
Work/School	0.36	0,1		0.31		0.45	
Minority status	0.38	0,1		0.37		0.19	
Life satisfaction	5.31	1–10	2.44	5.31	2.44	6.37	2.27
Health conditions	0.83	0,4	1.16	0.83	1.16	0.78	1.07
Religious attendance	3.19	1–7	1.94	3.19	1.94	3.57	1.80
Roma	0.66	0,1					
Roma majority town	0.63	0,1		0.63		0.19	
Discrimination	0.28	0,1		0.36		0.13	
Town-level variables							
Town stereotypes	0.68	0,1		0.68		0.68	
Town no helpful institutions	0.69	0,1		0.69		0.68	
Town economic unsafe	0.55	0,1		0.55		0.54	
Country-level variables							
Trust	0.19	0.11–0.30	0.06	0.19	0.06	0.19	0.06
Corruption Index	3.81	2–9–4.6	0.52	3.82	0.52	0.19	0.06
Repression Index	4.38	2–7	1.60	4.44	1.58	4.26	1.62
Gini coefficient	32.09	26.39–44.05	4.61	32.09	4.61	31.75	4.59
GDP	70,990.6	4,538.2–227313.2	72,645.17	70,990.6	72,645.17	74,988.36	72,047.33
N	*11,930*			*7,830*		*4,083*	

Note: Standard deviations not shown for categorical variables.

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"Involved in something (*involucrado en algo*)": Denial and stigmatization in Mexico's "war on drugs"

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Abstract

This article responds empirically to the question posed by Stan Cohen about "why, when faced by knowledge of others' suffering and pain—particularly the suffering and pain resulting from what are called 'human rights violations'—does 'reaction' so often take the form of denial, avoidance, passivity, indifference, rationalisation or collusion?". Our context is Mexico's "war on drugs." Since 2006 this "war" has claimed the lives of around 240,000 Mexican citizens and disappeared around 60,000 others. Perpetrators include organized criminal gangs and state security services. Violence is pervasive and widely reported. Most people are at risk. Our study is based on qualitative interviews and focus groups involving 68 "ordinary Mexicans" living in five different Mexican cities which have varying levels of violence. It investigates participant proximity to the victims and the psychological defense mechanisms they deploy to cope with proximity to the violence. We found that 62 of our participants knew, directly or indirectly, one or more people who had been affected. We also found one dominant rationalization (defense

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mechanism) for the violence: that the victims were "involved in something" (drugs or organized crime) and therefore "deserved their fate." This echoes prevailing state discourses about the violence. We argue that the discourse of "involved" is a discourse of denial that plays three prominent roles in a highly violent society in which almost no-one is immune: it masks state violence, stigmatizes the victims, and sanctions bystander passivity. As such, we show how official and individual denial converge, live, and reproduce, and play a powerful role in the perpetuation of violence.

KEYWORDS
bystanders, denial, Mexico, stigmatization, victims, war on drugs

> We all know from experience how the human tendency to self-delusion likes to declare dangers null and void even when we sense in our hearts that they are real.
> Stefan Zweig, *Beware of Pity*
> Knowing what not to know becomes not only an art of survival but the basis of social reality.
> Michael Taussig, *Law in a Lawless Land: Diary of a "Limpieza" in Colombia*
> The only logic is that of acquiescence.
> Joan Didion, *Salvador*

In the terse opening paragraph of *If this Is a Man*, Primo Levi recalls life under Italy's racial laws. He describes how, in the years preceding his arrest by fascist militia in December 1943, he lived "in an unrealistic world… a world inhabited by civilized Cartesian phantoms" (1987, p. 19). These phantoms—faith in reason and its power to deliver civility—were so powerful that on his arrest, Levi immediately declared himself Jewish in the tragic belief that it would save him from the certain torture and death that would follow, instead, any disclosure of his anti-fascist activities. Levi was promptly taken to a transit camp near Modena where around 650 others were also detained. The arrival of a German SS squad did nothing to arouse their suspicions: "we still managed to interpret the novelty in various ways without drawing the most obvious conclusions… despite everything, the announcement of the deportation caught us all unawares" (p. 20). The group was beaten while being forced onto buses that took them to the Auschwitz-bound train. "We received the first blows and it was so new and senseless that we felt no pain… only a profound amazement" (p. 22). The group then boarded one of the "notorious transport trains, those which never return, and of which, shuddering and always a little incredulous, we had so often heard speak."

"Unaware," "amazed," "incredulous." These words shed light on the necessary self-deception that protected Levi and his companions from the horror that awaited them at the end of their journey. Only after travelling for five grueling days, arriving at the camp, and being stripped, shaved, and tattooed did the grip of denial loosen. "We are tired of being amazed… we seem to be watching some mad play" (p. 31).

Earlier in the century this phenomenon had been labeled "repression" by Sigmund Freud (1954 [1900]) but subsequently assumed the more popular nomenclature of "denial." It is this latter which concerns us here. Differently from Freud we are concerned with *denial as a social phenomenon* in mass atrocity contexts and are guided by Stan Cohen's seminal work on denial and human rights (2001). Following Cohen we ask "how ordinary, even good people, will not react appropriately to knowledge of the terrible. Why, when faced by knowledge of others'

suffering and pain—particularly the suffering and pain resulting from what are called 'human rights violations'—does 'reaction' so often take the form of denial, avoidance, passivity, indifference, rationalisation or collusion?" (1993). However, where Cohen is concerned with the passive consumers of information about "distant suffering" (Boltanski, 1999), we instead animate this question in relation to proximate—and often intimate—bystanders to atrocity and suffering *who are also at risk*. Our context is Mexico's so-called "war on drugs," about which news and other media regularly circulate accounts and images of executions, mass killings, and newly discovered mass graves, including images of corpses and dismembered bodies deliberately discarded in public places. What is more, international and national human rights organizations all produce high profile and widely publicized reports on human rights abuses perpetrated by the police and military against civilians including torture, extra-judicial killings, enforced disappearance, and opportunistic violence. Perhaps most significantly, however, many Mexicans have experience of kidnappings, disappearances, violent detention, torture, and killings because their family members, neighbors, colleagues, and other intimates have been directly affected. This complexifies bystander agency because many are likely vicariously traumatized by their proximity to violence, and as a result of the often indiscriminate and random nature of both criminal and state violence, coupled with high numbers of victims, are also vulnerable to victimization themselves.

With so much information available and experience of the violence so widespread, no-one in Mexico can claim not to know. And yet, there is clear evidence of political and social denial of the violence. Our task is to understand the nature of denial in this context, and to show how political and social denial collude to generate and perpetuate a powerful narrative about "who is to blame." Our study involved qualitative interviews and focus groups involving 68 "ordinary Mexicans" living in five different Mexican cities of varying levels of violence. We wanted to investigate participant proximity to the victims and to explore their psychological defenses. We found that 62 of our participants knew, directly or indirectly, one or more (and up to seven) people who had been illegally detained, kidnapped, killed, or disappeared. We also found that their psychological defense mechanisms—primarily victim-blaming—echoed prevailing state discourses about the violence. One dominant rationalization for the violence was produced and reproduced by the state and society more broadly: that the victims were "involved in something" (drugs or organized crime) and therefore "deserved" their fate. We argue that this discourse of "involved" plays three prominent roles in a highly violent society in which no-one is immune. The first of these is political: justification for the state's "war on drugs." The second and third are social: stigmatization of the victims and sanctioning of bystander passivity. In sum, we show how official and individual denial converge, live, and reproduce in a highly violent society.

1 | DENIAL

Since Freud introduced the concept of denial (repression) to psychoanalysis it has become a catch-all term to refer to a range of psychological strategies for handling information—truths or emotions—too difficult to admit into consciousness. Denial is a psychological defense mechanism that facilitates the *selection of information* about one or another theme, issue, topic, feeling, idea, or memory over another. It "ensures that what is unacceptable to the conscious mind, and would if recalled arouse anxiety, is prevented from entering into it" (Davis, 2004, p. 803).

Denial has a rich life in popular discourse and a vocabulary all of its own. It is commonly expressed by sayings such as "burying your head in the sand," "wearing blinkers," "looking the other way," or "turning a blind eye." It also goes by the names of suppression, repression, avoidance, passivity, indifference, rationalization, minimization, collusion, and disavowal, amongst others. These are all "general and fairly nonspecific terms for matters that are left out of awareness in order to avoid the noxious emotions specific to the personal significance of such awareness" (Edelstein, Nathanson, & Stone, 1989, p. ix). Denial can be parsed into three rough types: outright denial (the overt denial of a fact, emotion, or behaviour); minimization or rationalization (acknowledgment of the fact, emotion, or behavior but downplaying or rationalizing its significance); and projection or misattribution (attributing a fact, emotion or behavior to someone or something else).

1.1 | Denial as negative

Edelstein notes that "despite the attitude of scientific objectivity" that characterized Freud's original work on denial "it has since taken on a negative connotation, and those who use this avoidance system are seen as the lesser among us" (Edelstein et al., 1989, p. ix). This negative interpretation is, with good reason, dominant in contemporary work on the relationship between denial, state crimes, and human rights (Cohen, 1993, 1996, 2001; Cohen & Seu, 2002; Seu, 2003, 2010, 2013). This body of work is most salient to our discussion because it concentrates on two phenomena central to human rights and their violation—one political, one social. The first is denial by the state of crimes such as torture and genocide. The second is bystander passivity towards violence and suffering.[1]

Cohen's distinctive and powerful typology of denial—literal denial, interpretive denial, and implicatory denial (2001, pp. 7–9)—has been central to advancing a sociological analysis of both state denial and bystander passivity. In Cohen's scheme, literal denial refers to the type of denial in which the fact or knowledge of the fact is denied outright, for example "X was not tortured"; "there was no massacre"; "nothing happened here." By contrast, interpretive denial does not refute the basic facts but imputes a different meaning to them, for example: "it's not really torture, just 'enhanced interrogation'"; "it's not ethnic cleansing but 'population transfer'"; "the victims were not really victims because they were 'involved in something'." In interpretive denial "officials do not claim that 'nothing happened', but what happened is not what you think it is, not what it looks like, not what you call it" (2001, p. 7). It is characterized by minimization and passivity. The third type—implicatory denial—does not attempt to deny the facts nor their usual interpretation. Instead it denies, rationalizes, or minimizes the moral, psychological, or political *implications*. For example, "the suspect is a ticking bomb and torture is justified under the special circumstances [insert Cold War, war on terror, war on Iraq, or whatever ongoing concern] in which we find ourselves".[2]

Each of these types of denial have their own, internally varied, psychological status. Literal denial might be a result of genuine ignorance, blatant lying, a psychological defense against an intolerable truth, or a "cultural not-noticing because the reality is part of your taken-for-granted view of the world" (Cohen, 2001, p. 9). Interpretive denial might be "a genuine inability to grasp what the facts mean to others," or a cynical re-description to avoid moral responsibility or legal accountability. Implicatory denial often draws upon popular explanations ("banal folk techniques") "invoked with mystifying degrees of sincerity" to avoid moral or psychological censure (2001, p. 9), such as "it's always gone on… what can you do about it?"

While Freud's intra-psychic model of denial is the building block on which Cohen and Seu develop their theses, they use it as a window onto their discussion of denial as a political and social phenomenon. For Cohen, the main objects of analysis are "public, collective and highly organized" denials that are structured and made possible by the massive resources of the state (1995). For Cohen, "denial is… not a personal matter, but is built into the ideological façade of the state" (2001, p. 10). The recent denial by senior Myanmar officials of the genocide against Rohingya Muslims comes to mind (see Beech & Nang, 2018). By contrast, Seu (2003, 2010, 2013) examines broader social or cultural denial through the example of public reactions (namely passivity) towards human rights appeals such as those by human rights organisations such as Amnesty International. She investigates the ways in which social or cultural denial is manifest in a range of everyday "folk tales" that are invoked to neutralize moral claims: "giving money's like putting a little bandage on a big wound"; "it's just the same thing, over and over"; "what difference can I possibly make?" Cohen argues that there is a "mutual dependency" between these two phenomena, between "official lying" and "cultural evasion" (2001, p. 11). In our case, this is reflected in the way in which the Mexican government's narrative of "involved in something" has permeated popular discourse, as we will show, and has become a routine political and popular explanation for hundreds of thousands of deaths and disappearances in Mexico.

Cohen's and Seu's work on denial and human rights is especially interesting, we think, if read as an extension of Becker's (1973) influential work on death denial.[3] Becker argues that bloody ideological conflicts—wars against communism, terror and so on—are the inevitable outcome of "immortality projects," which are defense mechanisms arising out of "our" (modern, Western) fear of death. According to Becker, we attempt to transcend death by

giving ourselves over to grand schemes—moral, ideological, religious, or otherwise—through which we participate in something we believe to be of great and lasting worth and for which we are prepared to shed blood *en masse*. The connection with Cohen and Seu lies in an irony. Where Becker's denial of death *engenders* war, genocide, torture, and the rest, Cohen's and Seu's denial can be read as a coping mechanism that both alleviates the discomfort of proximity to violence, suffering, and death *and* avoids responsibility for it. On this account, denial appears as the *constant* companion of violence, both contributing to its appearance *and* its continuation, as we will discuss.

1.2 | Denial as positive

Despite the dominance of the negative view of denial, Edelstein refuses to attach a judgment to it, wishing, rather, to preserve the "scientific objectivity" of Freud's original idea. In this spirit, he argues that "the mechanism of denial is not immutably pathological but may be used in the service of psychological health" (Edelstein et al., 1989, p. 173). The word originally used by Freud to refer to "defence mechanism" is synonymous with "shield," thus denoting the psychic strategies that protect humans from reality. This is what we mean by "positive denial" insofar as denial actively serves positive psychological ends in contexts where there are few options but to re-describe what is happening, even if, as we argue later, the social and political consequences of this re-description are negative. On this interpretation, denial can be seen as a "skill and a defence" insofar as "what is denied cannot be solved and is best left unanswered" (1989, p. x).[4] Seu (2016) describes this as "adaptive denial," which is employed when no alternative course of action is available. This is sometimes expressed as an *active* turning away. Some of our respondents demonstrated this. Leticia said "I pretend that this is no longer happening… I used to watch or listen to the news, but only the minimal details… because I don't want to hear about beheadings. That disturbs me." Maria-Angel responded that "I don't look for news about violence in the papers… I avoid it. It doesn't give me anything positive to be reading this stuff. Absolutely nothing." These quotes show our participants trying to continue to function in a deeply disturbing reality of widespread and seemingly random violence.

This positive interpretation is not fully acknowledged in prevailing analyses of denial and human rights—with which we are in dialogue—and we aim to explore and address this in our analysis. We pitch our discussion between these negative and positive perspectives in order to argue that social denial accrues complicated cultural significance in the context of societies in which atrocities are widespread, ongoing, and in which bystanders are at risk. While our analysis contributes to thinking about bystander passivity as a significant negative consequence of denial, we also aim to extend a legacy of thinking about denial as a survival mechanism, originated by studies following the holocaust.

2 | HORRORISM AND TERRORISM: MEXICO'S "WAR ON DRUGS"

Some context is necessary. The presiding narrative about recent violence in Mexico marks its beginning with the controversial 2006 presidential election which saw Felipe Calderón beat his opponent, Manuel Lopez Obrador, by less than a percentage point. The election was distinguished by irregularities, recounts, and widespread civil protest and came at the height of a summer of spectacular criminal violence particularly in the state of Michoacan, which has a long history of drug production and trafficking (Maldonado Aranda, 2013). One notorious episode in Uruapan, one of Michoacan's largest cities, saw five severed heads dumped onto a dancefloor along with a *narcomensaje* (threatening message) left by the killers. [Correction made on 30 June 2020, after first online publication: *'narcomanta'* has been corrected to *'narcomensaje'* in the preceding sentence] In another, seven corpses, shot in the head, were publicly displayed with *narcomensajes* pinned to their chests with ice picks. [Correction made on 30 June 2020, after first online publication: *'narcomantas'* has been corrected to *'narcomensajes'* in the preceding sentence] The men, thought to be windscreen washers who worked the busy roads, were each sat upright on seven of those generic white plastic

garden chairs and placed on a roundabout at a busy junction in Uruapan. Like an impromptu and surreal theatrical performance. In another episode, a severed head was left next to an infant playground in Veracruz. And in another, a man denuded of arms and legs was discarded on a dirt road, laid out on his front with his head propped up on his chin, his hair still gelled, unnervingly, in place. Dancefloors, roundabouts, and playgrounds are not places one would normally expect to encounter a corpse, still less a dismembered one. Such "horrorism" (Caravero, 2011) is distinguished by massacre and disfiguration in which "the end melts away and the means become substance. More than terror, what stands out is horror" (p. 1). Horrorism is primarily deployed by criminal organizations to exact revenge and compete for power. It is endlessly creative in its barbarism and has become the distinctive feature of Mexico's "war." Yet, there is another crucial but under-reported story to tell: that of state terror.

Shortly after his election and in spite of the fact that there had been no notable increase in criminal violence for 20 years (Escalante Gonzalbo, 2011), Calderón announced his "war on drugs"—which he dressed up as a moral appeal to the family to mourn and transform Mexico's "drug affected sons"—to underwrite his tenuous political legitimacy with a show of force.[5] Calderón promptly commissioned Mexico's military to the streets along with large numbers of federal police to "combat drug trafficking" and "create an atmosphere of peace, security and social stability" (Sedena, 2012, p. 134). This "war" was to become Calderón's own immortality project and the insignia of his political leadership. It was to seal his authority, his political fame, define his premiership, and outlast it.

Since the launch of this "war", the number of illegal detentions, torture, and killings carried out by the security services (military, navy, and police) under the guise of controlling drug trafficking, increased dramatically (Atuesta, 2017; Pérez Correa, 2015, p. 17; Treviño-Rangel, 2019). Military and police checkpoints now pockmark Mexico and are frequent sites of extortion and violence, witnessed by the mass graves that cluster around them (Paley, 2014, p. 110; author interview with forensics expert, 2015). The military and police perpetrate serious, widespread, and random violations of human rights to the extent that "torture and ill-treatment" have become "generalized in Mexico" according to Méndez, UN Special Rapporteur on torture (2014). The situation is compounded, *facilitated* rather, by the fact that official investigations into killings and disappearances are rare. Between December 2006 and January 2011 of 35,000 homicides attributed by the authorities to organized crime, only 22 led to criminal convictions (HRW, 2011, p. 15). *Twenty-two*. That is, 0.06%. That means, for practical purposes, 0% (Schedler, 2014, pp. 11–12). Put otherwise, impunity rates for that period run at 100%.

Calderon's "war" was, ostensibly, launched against criminal organizations with the aim of controlling a set of illegal economies including but not restricted to drugs, such as the illegal extraction of profit from transnational migration, human, sex, and organ trafficking, arms trafficking, the extractive industries, fuel siphoning, water appropriation and other natural resources, commercial agriculture and fishing, as well as an expanded business portfolio that includes investment in construction, tourism, restaurants, and the automotive industry. However, the government and its institutions is implicated in, and profits from, the exercise of many of these activities through what is a historic, almost century-long relationship between the state and organized crime (Astorga, 2005; Encisco, 2010). Some of the most recent evidence of this relationship emerged in December 2019 when Genaro García Luna, former minister of public security under Calderón and an architect of the "war on drugs," was arrested in Texas on charges of protecting the drug-trafficking activities of El Chapo Guzman's Sinaloa cartel in exchange for millions of dollars of cash bribes. And iconic of Mexico's atrocities is the case of Ayotzinapa, in which 43 (still missing) students were abducted in 2014 in Iguala, Guerrero by police officers working with criminal gangs. It is well documented that the state works with criminal organizations and profits from their activities (Correa-Cabrera, 2018; Mastrogiovanni, 2014; Pansters, 2018; Pimentel, 2000; Treviño-Rangel, 2018), that criminals are protected by the state and act with impunity (Flores, 2014), and that some cartels have military origins, notably *Los Zetas* (Correa-Cabrera, 2017). Organized crime works with the police, public servants, and judges in one or more levels of government (municipal, state, federal) or all at once (Schmidt & Spector, 2015, p. 1). Members of the police and military work as or with *sicarios* (hired killers), or they protect criminal activities. Indeed, criminal activity cannot flourish without the complicity of, and protection by, the authorities (Schmidt & Spector, 2013). The fact that criminal organizations flaunt their crimes in public, confident of their immunity, is evidence of both tacit and active complicity by public servants and institutions. As such, the

distinction between the state and organized crime is nonsensical in Mexico and, it follows, any alleged "war" by the state against organized crime.[6] This enduring relationship makes the subjects (who is involved?) and objects (what is it about?) of this "war" obscure. Who or what is at war with who or what?

As a result, we avoid the regular term "organized crime" (*crimen organizado*) altogether. Much more apt and powerful, we think, is Schmidt and Spector's term "authorised crime" (*crimen autorizado*) (2013, 2015). This has the advantage of a phonetic similarity to the original with a clever subversion. It compresses everything you need to know about crime, violence, and impunity in Mexico in one pithy phrase.[7]

Calderon's war continued under the administration of his successor Peña Nieto (2012–2018) and continues today under that of Lopez Obrador (2018–present). Contrary to official claims it has not led to a reduction in violence but has killed almost 270,000 and disappeared around 60,000 people to date (Comisión Nacional de Búsqueda de Personas, 2020). Homicide statistics for 2019 stand at 34,582 (Secretariado Ejecutivo del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública, 2019a, 2019b), the highest since records began. *The homicide increase is so significant that it has contributed to a reduction in the country's projected life expectancy* (Csete et al., 2016, p. 1433). Yet Calderon and Peña Nieto both denied state responsibility for the increase in homicide rates. They claimed that it was the result of confrontations between drug cartels and have persistently and consistently presented those detained and killed by security forces as "involved in something" (drugs and/or organized crime), and therefore "getting what they deserve." This "cartel wars discourse" is distinguished by "an almost exclusive reliance on state and government sources for information, a guilty-until-proven-innocent and victims-were-involved-in-drug-trade-bias, and a foundation belief that cops involved in criminal activity are the exception not the rule, and that more policing improves security" (Paley, 2014, p. 35).

Under such conditions—widespread atrocities, indiscriminate violence, the involvement of organized criminals and the state in its perpetration, state denial and the failure of state institutions to address it—what option do "ordinary Mexicans" have other than to look away?

3 | RESEARCHING DENIAL

Data were collected through semi-structured interviews and focus groups involving 68 Mexicans resident in Mexico.[8] The decision to include focus groups was based on an intuition that a group setting might provide a more generative environment in which to speak given the sensitivity of the subject matter, and thus deepen the findings. This was sometimes confirmed where there was a mute response to a question until one person spoke, then others, previously silent, offered more information. Participants sometimes seemed more willing to talk about traumatic experiences when they felt that these were shared. Focus groups also occasionally facilitated memory prompts.

Residents of five cities—Aguascalientes, Mexico City, Guadalajara, Durango, and Torreón—were selected due to the varying levels of violence in those cities, listed here in order of least to most violent.[9] We were concerned to generate a "general picture" rather than determine differences in responses according to more or less violent cities. Participants were recruited by snowball sampling which was appropriate to the sensitive nature of the data being collected. Recruitment was controlled to ensure that the group characteristics broadly corresponded with those of the population: it contained men and women aged 18–65, from different class backgrounds, geographic areas, and occupations. Participants were also selected on the basis of their "ordinariness": they were not, to our knowledge, members of political parties, journalists, members of the security forces, nor members of criminal gangs, nor were they socially or politically involved in drugs war activism.[10]

Participants were asked whether they *knew directly* (a relative, friend, neighbor, colleague, or acquaintance), or *knew of* (someone known *to* a relative, friend, neighbor, colleague, or acquaintance) anyone who had been illegally detained, kidnapped, killed, or disappeared. They were asked about their perceptions of the violence (context and causes), their attitudes towards the victims, whether they had acted on information about violence (reported it to the authorities, for example), and whether they had taken any personal precautions (to determine whether they

had *acted* to protect themselves). Participants were also asked about the responses of authorities to reported crimes, whether cases were investigated, and whether they thought that they or families of the victims could "do something" to change the current situation. They were also asked if they had engaged in any social protest about the situation.

We encountered a number of difficulties in researching denial, two of which stand out. First, in the process of asking questions it was difficult to avoid prompts, to which participants sometimes modified their responses. They might recall something forgotten, for example. As a result we became implicated in the "breaking" of denial and changed, however subtly, the thing we set out to study. This problem is intrinsic to all research to varying degrees, but became more "live" in the context of the subject of this study. Concomitantly, we potentially disturbed a crucial defence mechanism by probing it. Second, we risk appearing to criticize our research participants. However, our intention in this study is to consider denial as both positive and negative, and also to illustrate empirically Cohen's argument that "the rationalisations that governments produce are not mere rhetorical flourishes" but are nationally and culturally rooted (1996, p. 542).

4 | KNOWING THE VICTIMS

We found that most participants had *intimate familiarity* with the violence—62 out of 68 participants *knew directly* or *knew of* someone who had been illegally detained, kidnapped, disappeared, or killed since 2006.[11]

A number of participants reported arbitrary and illegal detentions by the military, police, and navy, many based on trumped-up charges or extortion. Some led to disappearances within the detention system itself. Laura said "I know many cases. The main one happened last year. A person went to jail but not for something wrong he did. It was a mistake… he is still there". Libra reported, "I know not only one, but hundreds of cases and I know directly those affected, and I can see the impotence they feel because they can't do anything about it." He went on "there were no motives. And every branch of the security forces—the municipal police, state police, federal police, the military and the navy—does this kind of thing." Another said "a friend of mine had some dope on him. Just one spliff. Nothing else. It was less than 30g, which is legal for personal use here. But he was illegally detained by police officers who beat him up and planted a kilo of dope on him and he was taken away." Others reported illegal detention with extortion: "my cousin was detained by members of the federal police who bribed him. 'Look, you piece of shit, if you don't give us money we will…' And he had to give them money." A picture emerged of significant knowledge of arbitrary detentions by security forces. The victims were frequently illegally detained on the assumption of being "involved in something" or knowing someone who was. Illegal detentions appeared random, as did subsequent releases, where these took place.

Some reported kidnappings. Christian reported "at least seven people who have been kidnapped." Another said:

> My son was travelling from Culiacan… He had his young son with him. They went to eat tacos and he got out of his car to order them, but left the kid in the car. When he got back to the car, someone trained a gun on him and said "take the car away". The gunman said "Don't pretend you're not who you are". They threw him into the back of the car. Another guy got in the car and they were driving with my son and grandson for two hours around the city. The child was vomiting out of fear, and asking "father, what are they going to do to us?". After two hours one of these guys called someone on a radio and my son could hear the person on the other end saying "Just kill him. Kill him off". But the kidnappers were saying "he seems to be clean, he doesn't seem to be involved in drug trafficking and he has a child with him".

Many reported knowing someone who had been disappeared. A disappearance is countable as such *if the person has not reappeared* either alive or dead.[12] "Disappearance" can refer to any number of things, including detention by

security personnel, kidnapping by criminal gangs for ransom, forced labour, or sex-trafficking. One participant spoke of a famous case in Aguascalientes: "They went to a nightclub and there were builders, workers and managers working there, and they took them all. They never reappeared." Jesús said "my cousin is missing. He was living in Leon. He went missing in 2010, his wife pregnant, and we haven't heard anything from him. We don't know if he was killed, kidnapped or had an accident." Laura spoke of "the uncle of my ex-boyfriend. He was picked up by the federal police… He's been missing for a year." She added, "however, he was a former member of the federal police," as though this explained the disappearance. Jessica did not seem to remember at first but then said, "actually, a father of a friend. Well, it wasn't a disappearance. It was a kidnapping. He came back alive." Maria said "no, I don't know anyone. *Only my nephew*," as if this did not warrant mention. She went on: "he was kidnapped in front of a school and the school had cameras so we know it was the police because they were wearing police uniforms." Others reported variously that: "the father of a student of the French School was kidnapped. He was… never found. They don't know where he is. He was in his 80s and he was sick"; "Paco's son disappeared. Nothing is known about what happened. It seems he was mistaken—his brother was involved in bad stuff—but he was kidnapped and was never found."

Many knew people who had been killed. Claudia said "he was taken away and… killed after two months. But a year went by, and the family was still being asked for money." Paco reported that "the uncle of a very good friend of mine… was kidnapped and later his head and fingers were found in an icebox on the highway towards Zacatecas." Diego said "yes… He wasn't really my friend, more like an acquaintance. He'd been selling drugs for a long time… he was shot in a bar along with his brother and another guy and they took their corpses and hanged them [in a public place]." Nina said "there was a party… all the people in the party were killed." (Interviewer asks "ALL of them?"). She responded, "there were not too many. Just four or five," as though it was an insignificant event. Alejandro said "yes, a distant relative of mine… his head was found somewhere." Laura reported knowing five people who had been killed. Another said "the son of a couple I know. He… got involved with narcos. He made a lot of money. He moved to another city, maybe because of problems… he was disappeared when he was leaving a nightclub. He was found… with terrible signs of torture."[13]

Many of the focus group participants knew someone who had been killed or were perhaps more willing to talk about it in a group setting: "a friend from junior high school. We all knew that he started using and then selling drugs, and so on. He was my neighbour and was killed a few years ago… His body was disposed of in front of his house. His mother crossed the street to get rid of the garbage and she found the body of her son there"; "my neighbour was found dead on the street outside his place"; "a friend of mine was working in a bar. He was picked up and left outside his house in little pieces"; "a young guy was disappeared. His family was looking for his remains, and I know that they found them"; "they were looking for the person until they found them dead. In the first case organised criminals did it. In the second case, I don't know. People even talk about a satanic sect because the murder was extremely brutal." This last comment echoes the ways in which people construct folk tales—"satanic sects"—to explain what happened. Another said "I know one person killed by narcos, one professor of the school I studied at was kidnapped, then later he was found in little pieces in a garbage can"; "a friend was taken away whilst he was working in a bar, and he was found in little pieces outside his house." Heads, fingers, little pieces. Many participants bore witness to horrorism. It underpinned a credible fear of unchecked violence.

5 | BLAMING THE VICTIMS

The most striking and sometimes visceral responses were directed towards the victims. Participants expressed a strong belief that victims were "involved in something." This refrain came up time and again. Not coincidentally, it was also the key state justification for the vastly increased rates of disappearance and homicide since 2006. These increases, the governments of Calderón and Peña Nieto claimed, were the result of "criminals *killing each other*" (Presidencia de la República, 2010).[14] Calderón repeatedly stated that this accounted for 90% of deaths.[15] We found this justification (including, sometimes, this "statistic") to have been internalized by our research participants

and, by extension we argue, Mexican society more widely.[16] At the same time there was a significant awareness that *anyone could be affected*. Many participants knew victims who had not been "involved" and seemed aware that both criminal organizations *and* state security forces were implicated. This contradictory state of awareness presents an important fissure, an instability in denial, to which we return in our concluding discussion.

5.1 | Involved in something

Alicia stated that "victims are connected to narco-trafficking… I really don't believe that victims are civilians. They are directly in contact with the narcos and are involved in narco-trafficking. I don't see that a completely innocent person could be kidnapped." Jessica said "I don't think oh, they've killed some saints. I think these people are involved in some kind of conflict. I don't think they're killed randomly… What I really think is… that… victims have done something." Maria said "they must have been involved in *that* milieu in order for something to happen to them," and Tonita that "almost all of them are involved in drugs. This is what happens to mafia members." Monica argued that "victims are people who are within the same circles (as narcos). Always. Of course, they *had* to be involved in something… this is the way it is. This is what happens to the poor guy who was working as a dealer, and the guy working as an informant. These are the people who are killed." Alejandro said "you realise that in general victims are involved. At the very least, they have a contact… So, in general, when you hear that so many people were killed, you always think well, it's because they were involved in something." Another said "people… are killed because they are *sicarios* (hit men) or because they were in conflict with narcos." Another, echoing the official narrative, that "90% of these people have some kind of relationship with narco-trafficking." When asked about the discoveries of mass graves (500 bodies had been found in Torreón at the time of the study), participants said, variously: "perhaps they were bad guys"; "these people were involved in something"; "they were people who were involved in those things"; they "were involved with drug trafficking"; "victims… found in mass graves were involved with the narcos." "Involved in something" was the dominant and crucial narrative that *both* stigmatized the victims *and* provided a psychological defence against the possibility of the same thing happening to them. As one participant put it: "if you aren't involved, there is no risk."

5.2 | They get what they deserve

Some participants were convinced that the victims got what they deserved. This "just deserts" narrative seemed more prevalent amongst the focus groups, which suggests that it was more strongly generated in a group rather than an individual setting. Miguel said "in the end he deserved what happened"; Paco that "all these people involved in bad things… deserve it. They know what they're exposing themselves to"; others that "this is just about revenge between criminals. People who are involved with cartels"; "… the fact that so many are being killed in such an ugly way is due to the kind of life they have chosen. *They get the death they choose*"; "this is more or less what we all think. When we talk about this issue… we say is that these people were behaving badly so had to be taught a harsh lesson"; "they deserve what they get… if they're linked to violent and brutal criminal gangs, they're exposing themselves… they are involved. It's going to happen"; "if criminals are fucking with people, they should be fucked." "Getting what they deserve" is an important narrative in Mexico. It expresses an underlying belief—or more likely hope—that some kind of social order is being maintained, that there is justice even if it is "rough" ("criminals killing each other"). These examples of victim-blaming evince a "just world theory" (Lerner, 1980) or cognitive bias towards the idea that "bad" behavior is punished "in the end" and that "good" behavior is rewarded. Lerner suggests that this belief might be important for the maintenance of well-being insofar as it serves psychological defense. This is especially powerful when innocent people are thought to be suffering. In such cases, Lerner argues, events

are rearranged in order to reinterpret the victim as deserving of their fate. Our research provides a powerful illustration of this theory.

5.3 | Staying away from them

Some respondents said that it was better to stay away from victims. Participants were asked "what would you think or do if you heard of a neighbour disappearing?" One said "it'd depend if the victim was involved in something." Another added: "I would think badly of him." A third said "I would take care myself, because this person was definitely involved in something so criminal activity could also affect me." Paco put it like this: "my neighbours would gossip about it… my neighbours would probably avoid the relatives of the disappeared person… because we don't want to be seen as related to them. People think the same will happen to them if they don't distance themselves… ." A symbolic boundary, charged with stigma, is created. "They" (the victims) are different from "us," they put us at risk and are best kept at arm's length. Victims and their families are thus polluted by the experience of "something happening to them." "Staying away" has a social impact on the victims and their families, who frequently feel isolated and stigmatized by their communities.[17]

5.4 | Not all victims are equal

Some respondents expressed ambivalence about the victims, saying that some were innocent, that no one is completely safe. However, an acknowledgement of innocence was often quickly followed by a shift of attention to those who were not, in the view of the speaker, or was preceded by an assumption of involvement. Lalo said "of course, anyone can be [a victim]. However… [for those] that are on the edges or involved, it's more likely that something will happen to them." Another said "If I hear that the victims were families, or children or teenagers I think that's terrible, but if they're the victims of the settling of accounts amongst narcos then I think that's good because they were involved in something so that's the way they had to end." Another said "when I think about victims I can't avoid reaching the conclusion, first, that they were doing something wrong… second, I think, well, who knows? There have been cases of many people that were in the wrong place at the wrong time, that they were confused, and you know, criminals never forgive. But the first thing I think is that they were doing bad things." Another agreed: "I think exactly the same."

Sometimes participants expressed helplessness or "feeling bad" for victims who were not involved. For Jessica, "if something happened it's maybe because the victim was involved in something. Maybe not. But anyway, you… can't go and rescue them, can you?" Miguel said "I feel bad because I think it's unfair that these people are paying for the problems of other people." These views were sometimes differently inflected depending on the proximity of the victim to the speaker. One participant said "we take this (that they were involved) for granted. If it's someone who is not close to you, you can't think otherwise."

5.5 | Awareness: Everyone is at risk

The dominant perception that victims were "involved in something" was often accompanied by the conflicting perception that anyone was at risk. Participants said: "ordinary people tend to be victims because those in power are untouchable"; "you can no longer label those who get killed 'as something' (that is, as a cartel member)"; "*anyone* can be killed or disappeared": "I think we are all potential victims, but I think you have to *carry on doing your stuff*." "Carrying on regardless" sometimes accompanied this acknowledgement of vulnerability. It was an expression of helplessness.

"Everyone is at risk" conflicts strongly with the idea that victims are "involved in something." It seemed rooted in the high level of belief that the security forces—police and army—were killing innocent people. Participants said: "when I see these heavily armed trucks, with these assholes on the top of the trucks with their machine guns you think… these beasts will accidentally start a stupid shoot out if they drive on a bumpy road! Pulp fiction! Far from making us feel secure, they scare us!"; "I think it's stupid that security forces are on the street because the only thing they do is to… provoke deaths. There are many reports… even about children who are shot because they didn't stop at a checkpoint"; "I'm scared of the police. When I pass in front of them or when a police van drives next to me I feel very anxious." Yet others implied that the police were involved with cartels. One said "those who are Zetas are clearly recognised by the police. And they are never touched. I think there's some kind of agreement between Zetas and the police."

These simultaneous states of awareness—that victims are criminals and that the army and police are also killing innocent people—create a psychological conflict that produces discomfort and anxiety. They are also evidence that denial is precarious rather than stable. The attempt to stabilize the narrative results in the stigmatization of the victims and the attempt to secure the self through the general (and widely shared) idea summarized by one participant's comment that "if I'm not involved in illegal stuff, if I'm not doing anything outside of the norm, if I live a normal life, if I don't mess with specific people, nothing should happen to me."

6 | "DENIALISM" AND "DENIAL PROPER"

The political discourse that the victims are "involved in something," inaugurated by Calderón and perpetuated by Peña Nieto, is a powerful example of denial. It does not entail *literal* denial (the first of Cohen's three types): the state acknowledges that people have been killed, tortured, and disappeared. However, it does entail *interpretive* denial, the second of Cohen's types, insofar as officials and bystanders claim that "what happened is not what you think it is" (2001, p. 7). As such, the moral significance of state violence is *minimized* by the suggestion that those killed were involved in criminal activities and were therefore not "really" victims. The discourse of "involved" is also an example of *implicatory* denial, the third of Cohen's types. Implicatory denial rationalizes the political and social consequences: the victims were criminals and *therefore got what they deserved*. It provides a *rationale* for their deaths and, by extension, for the "war on drugs" and the militarization of public security. It is effectively a "denial of the victim" (Cohen, 1996, p. 531). Interpretive and implicatory denial are characterized, respectively, by minimization and rationalization. They are abundant in the Mexican political and social discourse on the "war on drugs."

We argue that two types of denial in Mexico might be distinguished theoretically as "denialism" and "denial proper." Denialism is a position that systematically refuses the facts for ideological purposes (Nelken, 2016, pp. 453–454). This describes the state discourse of "involved" that underpins the "war." But further than that, "Denialism is Denial writ large—when an entire segment of society, often struggling with the trauma of change, turns away from reality in favour of a more comfortable lie" (Specter cited in Nelken, 2016, p. 456). Denialism thus captures the ways in which political and social denial are interconnected and made more powerful by virtue of that interconnection. By contrast "denial proper" might be understood as the psychological defence mechanisms that ordinary Mexicans deploy to distance themselves from the violence. It is mechanically distinct from "denialism" insofar as it has no *ideological* impetus, but is driven by *anxiety* and *fear*. However, denial proper can *look like* denialism insofar as it draws on and reproduces political ideologies (comfortable lies) such as "involved."

7 | CARTESIAN PHANTOMS *REDUX*

The discourse of "involved" has accrued such popular authority that it now masquerades as common sense and plays two prominent roles in a highly violent society in which no one is immune. The first of these is political:

justification for the "war on drugs." The second is social: stigmatization of the victims. It has become the unrivalled "cartesian phantom" (rationalization) that stigmatizes the victims, sanctions bystander passivity, and masks state violence. Let us look at these consequences in more detail.

First, the discourse of "involved" generates a symbolic boundary that distinguishes those who are "involved" from those who are not. As Epstein argues, symbolic boundaries manifest "collective agreements about certain connotations that are… persistent" (1992, p. 236). These are "particularly acute during times of social change and upheaval" when "distinction blares out… as a trumpet call to arms… and becomes institutionalized in the patterns and practices of our lives" (p. 232). The political and social stakes in making and maintaining these boundaries are especially high in Mexico. Its political genesis is traceable to Calderón's inauguration, as we have shown. However, we have also shown that it has assumed a diffuse social life insofar as it also provides a social distinction between those who are "involved" and those who are not, which feeds into *both* the political justification for militarization ("they get what they deserve") *and also* the popular rationale for the increase in homicides ("just criminals killing each other"). We have shown how state and individual denial converges, how it lives and reproduces, how it shapes both perceptions of the victims (they are "involved") *and* behaviors towards them: killing them (the state) or staying away (bystanders). Its repeated articulation plays a role in producing and shaping political action and reinforcing the language and habits of everyday life. We have also suggested that this symbolic boundary has arisen out of the mechanisms of social control both at the level of the state—which has the power to shape a specific social reality that is advantageous to it and disadvantageous to others—and to the extent that it shapes social attitudes and behavior. Our data illustrate empirically Cohen's argument that there is a "mutual dependency" between "official lying" and "cultural evasion" (2001, p. 11). This has resulted in material consequences. The victim category now designates a social boundary, an *objectified* form of social difference, insofar as it is manifest in unequal access to resources such as justice.[18] Evidence of this is implied in the impunity statistics cited earlier in our discussion, which, arguably, are material manifestation of the discourse that the victims "got what they deserved." We might infer from these statistics that reported disappearances and killings are not considered to merit full and proper investigation. Habits of thought such as "classifying and demarcating" (Veblen, 1979 [1899]) are central to the mechanisms that produce boundaries between groups, particularly where the stakes in maintaining the distinction are high. They are central to the production of a moral distinction between those who "get what they deserve" and those who are unaffected by violence.[19] Victim-blaming is thus bound up in the elaboration of a moral order which structures and regulates perceptions within a community (Durkheim, 1965 [1912]).

Second, victim-blaming is connected to a fear of pollution by the victims. This, we suspect, might have been behind the tendency of many of our participants to at first "forget" that they knew someone affected and only "remember" when prompted or when another member of the group volunteered that they knew someone affected. Victim-blaming is related to a fear of "being next" and thus attempts to psychologically secure bystanders from risk, albeit in a "phantasmic" way to use Levi's phrase. As a result we argue that the discourse of "involved" is a "pollution belief" that arises out of the impulse to impose order on (or "purify") that which is inherently "untidy" (Douglas, 1966, p. 5). The untidiness of the classification "involved" was sometimes acknowledged by participants, and presented a threat to psychological security. They said that some victims *might* be innocent, that *anyone* might, inadvertently, be targeted, and they expressed a lack of trust in the security forces to target the "right people." Such ambivalence causes "cognitive discomfort" (Douglas, 1966, p. XI). This was clear in some of the responses where an expression of ambivalence about the victims would be quickly followed by a re-assertion of blame. Matias said "whether they were involved or not, nobody deserves this kind of death. However, generally, you think that these people must have been involved, it was revenge, the criminals were after them." This statement provides an insight into the attempt to assuage psychological discomfort, without which the speaker might be overwhelmed by anxiety and terror. Blaming sometimes varied according to the proximity of the speaker to the victim. The "involvement" of those close to the participant (such as a relative) was sometimes questioned. Angel said "my nephew was killed on the highway along with another young guy who was travelling with him… he was unlucky in being picked up. Some people are unlucky. They are sold or taken to *Los Zetas*. He wasn't involved in

illicit activities." Perhaps, after all, they simply happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time. More distant victims, such as neighbours, were perhaps involved in something and it was considered preferable to stay away from them. Distance of association sometimes seemed more closely correlated with stigmatization.

Third, "involved" has both positive and negative dimensions. On the one hand, it operates as a psychological protection against a reality too terrible to contemplate and about which people can do very little. One said "if you've already been to the authorities and nothing has happened what else can you do?" Many reported feeling that they could do nothing to change the situation. Some spoke of their experience of trying to report a violation, of their exasperation, worry that the report was going nowhere, and fear of persisting. As Edelstein et al. argue, "in such situations, continued attention to pain and distress renders the organism dysfunctional; where denial can be used to foster a focus on the possible… then denial is a healthy mechanism" (1989, p. 2). We argue that this, positive, aspect of denial is not fully acknowledged in work on denial and human rights. For instance, Bauman argues that bystanders always play a "reprehensible role in the evil act" (2003, p. 137) and are on a continuum with perpetrators (see also Staub, 1989). This, he argues, is because they are always in danger of taking on the perpetrator's ideology and rhetoric. Certainly, we have provided evidence to confirm this in the case of Mexico. The psychological defenses of bystanders have incorporated and reproduce state propaganda. At the same time it is difficult to determine whether the bystanders are gullible dupes (although unlikely, since many demonstrated awareness of state complicity in atrocities), whether they are identifying with the state (some were), or whether they are simply drawing on the state narrative as a way of functioning under deeply threatening circumstances. The narrative of "involved" plays an immediate and plausible role in the management of anxiety and feelings of terror. Taking these things into account, we argue that denial should also be understood as an expression of vulnerability, and want to present a case for more nuanced and empathetic consideration of bystanders than Bauman's claim would allow. Such an approach might be recovered from early work such as that by Latané and Darley (1970), originators of the "bystander" term, who identify a particular stage of assessment (being able to help/make a difference) as a key step in the decision-making process leading to acting or not. Their work helps to make sense of why our participants, who clearly feel overwhelmed and helpless, fail to act and instead reach for the prevailing explanations that justify their inaction and disavow the victims. To this we would add that denial may also neutralize action that bystanders might also take *to protect themselves* since they believe themselves to be immune from risk if they are not "involved," as our participants suggested. These positive and negative attributes of denial taken together create what we call the "denial paradox." This paradox was evidenced by an important incidental finding of our research about forced displacement in Mexico. Some victims were reported as protecting themselves by moving away from their home towns.[20] By contrast, bystanders were not taking such action. This finding illustrates the denial paradox at work: denial might provide psychological protection, but simultaneously expose those in denial to risk because belief in immunity from violence prevents bystanders from taking potentially self-protective action, such as moving to a less violence-affected town or city.

Fourth, we found that denial is *unstable*. Bystanders hold contradictory attitudes towards the victims (they are "involved"/"potentially innocent") and towards the military (they are "killing criminals"/"killing innocent people"). This instability is supported by social boundary theory: no social category is internally consistent. As Epstein puts it "often the contents of the category are so unclear that it exists largely in terms of its symbolic boundaries" (Epstein, 1992, p. 236). This is particularly the case in Mexico where the distinction between "involved" and "not involved" is one that is so complex and socially embedded all the way from the street to the senate, with young kids acting as *halcones* (look-outs) for cartels in bus stations and taxi ranks, and politicians taking dirty money to influence political campaigns. [Correction made on 30 June 2020, after first online publication: *'alcones'* has been corrected to *'halcones'* in the preceding sentence] This instability is perhaps the most salient and positive finding with respect to thinking through the possibilities for changing the discourse, because while the distinction between victims and bystanders might appear to restrict social change, its "muddiness" may also permit it (Epstein, 1992, p. 236). On this account it might be possible to conceive of bystanders in Mexico as on a continuum with victims (differently from Bauman's conceptualization of them as on a continuum with perpetrators) insofar as

many are traumatized by proximity to violence and also highly likely to become victims themselves. The possibility of bystanders becoming victims, and their consciousness of the precariousness of the distinction between them, might provide a source of challenge to the prevailing discourse. At the same time, the proximity of bystanders to victims might be a source of reinstating the distinction with more vigor: the higher the potential for victimization, the greater the need to instate psychologically the distinction from victims. That is to say, on the basis of our analysis we would speculate that the instability of denial in the Mexican context at least, in which violence is extreme and widespread, could make it susceptible to challenge *or* deeper entrenchment. In, again complex, illustration of this, Obrador's administration has taken some measures to change the official narrative about victims. It created the *Programa Nacional de Búsqueda y Localización* early in 2019, which seeks to find the more than 40,000 disappeared people in Mexico, investigate around 1,000 clandestine graves, and identify some 26,000 dead bodies that have been recovered by officials. This move has so far assisted the public visibility of victims and the legitimacy of their cause, and promises to challenge the established narrative. At the same time, state denial has proven to be highly adaptive. The drugs war discourse—originated by Calderón as a response to the specific political conditions of his election—allowed the government to benefit from organized crime while appearing to be "doing something" about it. Crucially this paradox persists today, albeit differently, under Obrador who campaigned in 2018 on the promise of investigating disappearances, human rights abuses committed by security forces, and advancing migrant rights. While Obrador appeared committed to human rights he simultaneously increased military funding and even added a new wing to it, the controversial new *Guardia Nacional* (see Corcoran, 2019; Meyer, 2019), which has taken on federal policing functions. Obrador has effectively further entrenched the militarization of public security, which is likely to lead to *more violations* of human rights, while appearing simultaneously to be *addressing violations* of human rights. Obrador also launched a new campaign against drugs that *stigmatizes drugs users by linking them to violent crime*. The campaign—*Juntos por la Paz* (together for peace)—attempts to unite state and society against the "real" enemy: drugs users. This program also lends legitimacy to the extension of military powers via the new Internal Security Law which "goes against Mexico's international obligations, as it perpetuates the military's presence in the streets and assigns them [sic] security tasks that are incompatible with the nature of their institutional mandate."[21] This potentially contributes to a new wave of victim denunciation. So, while as Solnit puts it, "key to the work of changing the world is changing the story," it is clear that this is a complex and fraught process in Mexico and does not have a linear trajectory. In fact, Obrador's policies show denial's ability to renew itself.

Finally, "involved" has become *the* mode of classification "natural" to the "war," the *par excellence* linguistic category that has been used to describe, launch, and justify violent political action. It has simultaneously made bystanders complicit with the crimes. As such, denial has become deeply implicated in the preservation of the dominant political order. The discourse of "involved" designates the victims as criminals and in so doing, scaffolds the state's distinction between violence perpetrated by the state versus that by criminal gangs and justifies the "war on drugs." A final question to ask, then, is what system is being preserved by denial? And what is at stake in its preservation? In response to the former, we have illustrated the ways in which denial supports and perpetuates political ideology by providing a justification for state violence, and structures social order through stigmatization. These findings are plausibly extendable to other violent contexts in which the state is committing atrocities, criminal violence is widespread, and the general population is at risk, such as in Columbia or El Salvador to name a couple of examples. What is at stake in its preservation in Mexico is concealment of the deep enmeshment of the state with organized crime even though the veil on this relationship is occasionally lifted, such as in the recent trial in the US of El Chapo Guzman which saw claim that Peña Nieto accepted a $100 million bribe from El Chapo after taking office in 2012 in return for dropping the "manhunt" for him. Despite evidence, the drugs war discourse attempts to conceal the fact that the state and cartels co-profit from a relationship in which bribes are accepted by state officials in return for various protections, and, more significantly, profit from the operation of host of illegal economies including but not restricted to drugs, such as migration, land appropriation, the plunder of natural resources and so on. In other words, it disguises a de facto state of "authorized crime" which is central

to mass killings and disappearances and in so doing, provides an artful concealment of the fact that the Mexican state is, effectively, at war with itself.

In sum, we have provided an empirical illustration of the ways in which drugs war discourses "provide an efficient smokescreen," provoke "moral panic in the population," and "calcify and exaggerate divisions among communities" (Paley, 2014, p. 19). We have also argued that "involved in something" has become the "vital lie" (Goleman, 1985) that enables the state to commit atrocities with impunity while "ordinary Mexicans" look away. It is the discourse most urgently in need of challenge.

DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

Data cannot be made available due to the security-sensitive nature of the research.

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ENDNOTES

[1] This body of work has special relevance for our discussion because it focuses on political and social denial, although it separates the two. We advance this work by showing in our study how these phenomena are conjoined. Other works on denial of sociological note include Zerubavel (2006), who examines conspiracies of silence around the everyday (alcoholism) and around large-scale historical events (genocide). Additionally, Chancer and Andrews (2014) attempt to reunite sociology and psychoanalysis in order to facilitate thinking about the relationships between *psychic repression* and *social oppression*. In so doing, they aim to enrich sociology by renewing an interrupted conversation with psychoanalysis from which sociology had been, the authors argue, "unhappily divorced."

[2] Note that this justification acquired vigorous life in the post-9/11 context, favored by neo-cons such as Alan Dershowitz, and liberal intellectuals such as Michael Ignatieff alike.

[3] The origins of the death denial thesis also lie in the origins of psychoanalysis. Freud wrote that we "have shown an unmistakable tendency to put death aside, to eliminate it from life… We cannot, indeed, imagine our own death; whenever we try to do so we find that we survive ourselves as spectators… every one of us is convinced of his immortality" (1918). Note that Becker's thesis is not without controversy and opposition. See Lofland (1978) and Kellehear (1984) for sociological critiques.

[4] Seu's account of adaptive denial also includes an active turning away when alternative actions *are* available—an "I could but I won't" theory of denial.

[5] The widespread narrative that Mexico is at war with organised crime emerged in 2006 and was fostered by the Calderón administration. This is the dominant narrative in most studies of violence in Mexico: 2006 is seen as the 'year zero' from which time the 'war on drugs' unfolded and violence increased exponentially. We do not concur with this narrative about violence and crime in Mexico. The perpetration of state crimes against Mexican citizens is historic and not contemporary, and the involvement of state agents in criminal activities can be traced to the beginning of the 20th century. This is not a story of change, but of continuity.

[6] Notwithstanding Tilly's general argument that state-making and war-making qualify "as our largest examples of organised crime" (1985, p. 169).

[7] It also presents an alternative paradigm to those of the "absent" or "failed" state, both of which have been used, inadequately, to describe Mexico.

[8] The interviews and focus groups were carried out in 2012–2013 and should be read against the period of the "drugs war" from 2006 to 2013. Since then, the "war" has persisted and homicide rates increased and our findings can plausibly be extended to the present.

[9] At the time when the interviews were conducted Durango and Torreon were highly violent cities (50 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants). Guadalajara was a city with medium levels of violence (20 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants). Mexico City had medium to low levels (12 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants). Aguascalientes was a city with low violence (4 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants). See Inegi (2018).

[10] Participants' names have been changed to ensure anonymity.

[11] This calculation must be treated with caution as research methods were not designed to deliver precise quantitative data. Our methods of recruitment mean that we cannot rule out people reporting knowledge of the same incident. At the same time, a good degree of mitigation of this is provided by the fact that participants were not all associated and resided in five disparate cities.

[12] Disappearances are not countable as killings unless remains have been found and identified, so some reports of disappearances may also be killings.

[13] Participants would sometimes state that victims were narcos or "involved." Yet when asked "how do you know that your brother/friend/neighbour/niece was involved?" it turned out that they had been informed of this by the police who often said things like "your relative disappeared because he was involved in something so stop with your enquiries or the same may happen to you."

[14] Contradictorily, there is evidence of an increase in disappearances and killings in places where state security forces are deployed (Atuesta, 2017).

[15] "We have a serious problem with violence that results from the confrontation between criminal groups… last year, according to our investigations, based on the profiles of these people, on the activities they carried out, more than 90% of those who died are people who have been involved in one group or another, or distributed or transported drugs" (Calderón, 2009).

[16] Note that it was not possible within the parameters of our research to establish which discourse came first, the political or the social, since our data on social denial were collected in the wake of the announcement of the "war" by the state. As such, we focus on the ways in which the political and social discourses within the period under research were mutually sustaining.

[17] Ongoing but as yet unpublished research by Moon with the families of victims appears to confirm this.

[18] We draw here on Lamont and Molnar's distinction between a symbolic and a social boundary where "social boundaries" are "objectified forms of differences manifested in unequal access to an unequal distribution of resources… and opportunities" (2002, p. 168).

[19] While Veblen theorized distinctions between economic groups his insights are nonetheless relevant here.

[20] Indeed, Mexico has a largely unacknowledged yet significant forced displacement problem on account of the violence (CONAPO y UNFPA, 2019; Papadovassilakis, 2019). Note that the CONAPO y UNFPA (2019) report cited here attributes forced displacement primarily to violence caused by criminal organizations rather than by the state. We would query this since the general levels of violence have massively increased since the state launched its "war" in 2006.

[21] See https://www.wola.org/2018/11/mexico-supreme-court-internal-security-law/

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ORIGINAL ARTICLE

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Life and labor on the internal colonial edge: Political economy of kolberi in Rojhelat

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Abstract

Through the investigation of *kolberi* (cross-border labor), this paper sheds light on the state's policy of de-development (or internal colonialization) of the Kurdish region (known as Rojhelat) in Iran. While the most dangerous form of labor, kolberi has become a dominant employment opportunity for Rojhelat Kurds in the last decade. There are no Iranian state laws criminalizing kolberi, and yet those laborers die on a regular basis—being shot or thrown off mountain cliffs by the state forces, stepping into minefields, and so forth. Nevertheless, there is not a single scholarly paper on this subject. Using the mixed methods research approach, our study analyzes the existing data along with in-depth interviews with 20 people who are currently engaged in kolberi to contextualize this understudied phenomenon. Our finding demonstrates that kolberi is a direct outcome of a uni-ethno-religious policies of development and part and parcel of the state's Perso-Shi'ification strategy in Kurdistan. Therefore, kolberi is more of a political phenomenon than an economic one.

KEYWORDS

apartheid economy, kolberi, Kurdistan, mixed methods research, Perso-Shi'i state

1 | INTRODUCTION

In his 1965 work, Pablo González Casanova describes internal colonialism as the "rule of one ethnic group … over other such groups living within the continuous boundaries of a single state" (pp. 130–132). Casanova employed the concept in the context of multi-ethnic societies. For him, then, internal colonial relations are not necessarily

limited to the economic one (Love, 1989, pp. 906–907). Inspired by Casanova, Andre Gunder Frank states that internal colonialism is a form of "uneven development" signifying unequal structural relationship manifest in "metropole–satellite" or "center-periphery" (Frank, 1971). As an analytical tool, internal colonialism has been adopted by many scholars, particularly in the context of Latin America and the United States (Marquard, 1957; Peckham, 2004; Portes & Bach, 1985).

The internal colonialism in Iran has given rise to the internal center and periphery relations through a sustained de-development of non-Shi'i and non-Persian regions.[1] In the Kurdish region—the subject of our study—the asymmetric and unequal political, economic, cultural relations have been perpetuated by the formation of sovereign versus non-sovereign communities, severe securitization and de-development, which remains very much understudied.[2] The state's securitization and de-development policies in Kurdistan have engendered a situation that can only be characterized as an *apartheid economy*, which in turn has given birth to kolberi over the past ten years.

In Kurdish, *kolberi* refers to the (young and old) cross border labor in which people called *kolber*s carry goods on their backs across the borders of Iran, Iraq, and Turkey (see also Bozcali, 2019). It is an extremely dangerous form of labor as kolbers are regularly shot by Iranian armed forces, or die from falling off mountain cliffs, walking into the minefields, and exposure to extreme cold (see BBC report).[3] Kolberi as a phenomenon evidences an entrenched de-development in Kurdistan, which is the byproduct of exceptional security conditions created by the state itself. Kolberi is a symptom of an exceptional politico-economic situation (see, Agamben, 2003) or what Mudimbe, in a more general context, calls "colonializing structure," which produces paradigmatic dichotomies such as "subsistence economies versus highly productive [ones]" (1988, p. 17). Similar dichotomous economic paradigms in Iran have engendered kolberi, which illustrates a form of economic apartheid in Kurdistan.[4]

Kolberi showcases the foundational ethno-cultural dynamics and resultant economic and political disparity in Iran, where the sovereign Shi'i ethno-nation has monopolized all forms of power and means of production. In Rojhelat, the economic relations do not seem to constitute the basis for the socio-political structure. Such relations do not determine the political representation, distribution of resources and communal inclusion. Rather, the determinative factor is the communal sovereignty, or more precisely its lack thereof. Such inequalities are driven by and tailored along ethno-linguistic and religious cleavages. Kolberi, then, is an outcome of the political and *internal colonial system* imposed on Kurds by the Islamic Republic of Iran (henceforth IRI) and its Perso-Shi'i constituency.

The legal status of kolberi is unclear as it serves the state's overall policies of control and assimilation in Kurdistan. Although, kolbers often hold state IDs, it is up to the Iranian border patrol to recognize or refuse them. More often than not, kolbers are shot by the said forces for doing cross-border transfer of goods. Therefore, the subjection of kolberi to the arbitrary exercises of a capricious state constitutes a manifest example of the *state of exception*: neither entirely legal nor clearly criminalized. It signifies Kurdish liminal economic life that can both be tolerable and warrant death. While the Islamic Republic of Iran keeps other borders relatively open to the international trade, it arbitrarily kills those Kurds who carry goods on their backs as their only means of eking out a living.

It must be noted that, here, we equate internal colonialism with what Sara Roy terms as "de-development": a process through which a hegemonic power adopts hindering strategies to "deliberately block internal economic development and the structural reform" (Roy, 1995, p. 6; Yadirgi, 2017). Such de-development policies are adopted in places like Kurdistan—inhabited by an excluded ethno-nation. Kurdistan is considered a security zone and historically has been subjected to different sets of rules. The center's juridical system—which is the product of non-Kurdish sovereign power, for example, has always treated signifiers of Kurdishness as security threats (Naficy, 2012, p. 102). Due to their linguistic and religious difference, Kurds have been subjected to unique economic, socio-political and cultural punitive measures.[5] Therefore, kolberi should be seen as a result of a well-thought state strategy. It signifies structural inequalities and the uni-ethno-religious policies of development, adopted by the Perso-Shi'i state to impede any level and form of Kurdish sovereignty.[6]

The elites of the sovereign ethno-nation have legitimized the state's de-development policies or what Persian scholar Mehrdad Boroujerdi calls dominating non-Persians (Boroujerdi, 1998, p. 43). The state has been striving to

impose Persian identity on the entire polity or what they call "the national." Such a situation has resulted in creating a polity that has to become Persian either voluntarily or by force.[7] Such an approach to non-Persian's resistance to the state has paved the way for the state's violent erasure of "the regional" and has legitimized the existing uni-ethno-religious policies of development typified by kolberi. This is the reason why kolberi must be viewed as a direct result of colonial Persianization that has facilitated the dispossession and peripheralization of Kurds.[8]

Before further venturing into the discussion, we should note that in the following sections we first explain our methodology. Then, we will present our findings and reflect on our interviews with kolbers to portray their world through their own narratives. Lastly, we will analyze the politico-economic and historical conditions that have given rise to kolberi. Through our discussion of the state's de-development policies, we hope to demonstrate that kolberi is a manifestation of a kind of economic apartheid, which in some ways, is even comparable to that in the South African context.

2 | DATA COLLECTION AND RESEARCH METHOD

Our study employs a mixed methods research approach which allows us to utilize a mixture of quantitative and qualitative data and inferences (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003).[9] In the process, 20 kolbers were interviewed both face to face and online. Our quantitative data on kolberi is partly drawn from *Hengaw Organization* and *Kolber News* (Kolber Telegram Group to [https://t.me/Kolbarnews]).[10] We have cross-checked the available data gathered by various human rights and activist organizations against other sources such as local reports and our own ethnographic research. Table 1 represents such a process of data collection (see also Figure 1).

To ensure the maximum variation criterion in our interviews, we have taken samples from different age group, social status, years of working as a kolber, and cities of residency. We have selected our interviewees from six Kurdish border cities, where kolberi is most prevalent: Sardasht, Piranshahr, Mahabad, Oshnavieh, Baneh, and Mariwan (see Tables 2 and 3).

To analyze the interviews, we transcribed, refined, translated them into English and then imported to MAXQDA software. The analytical procedure of the data was guided by grounded theory to systematically analyze the data and generate a substantial theory from the lived experiences and personal narrative as reflected in the interviews (Glaser & Strauss, 2000). "*Living on the Edge*" was designated as the *core category* that serves as "*analytic gestalt*," converging the kolbers' lived experience of their life and labor.[11]

We will begin our paper with a somewhat extensive discussion on the rise of kolberi and its socio-political and economic context. The remainder of the paper consists of a number of sections, which as whole is an attempt to draw a picture of the conditions of kolberi through kolbers' own narratives and their lived experiences.

3 | A CREEPING APARTHEID ECONOMY AND THE BIRTH OF KOLBERI

Kolberi is a relatively recent phenomenon. While the classic form of smuggling has had a long history in the borderland regions, kolberi in its current practice became prominent decades after the 1979 Revolution era. Nevertheless, "it only took three weeks from [Khomeini's] arrival in Tehran on February 1, 1979, before clashes between Islamist revolutionaries and Kurds broke out" (Elling, 2013, p. 47). Soon after his return, Kurds faced full-fledged military campaigns, their cities were sieged, and their civilians were massacred.[12] The "*fatḥ* (conquest) of Kurdistan"[13] ushered in a new era of political enclosure and economic breakdown and soon was exacerbated with the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988). "An estimated 50,000 Kurds lost their lives in 1978–1988, which includes the Iran-Iraq War" (Elling, 2013, p. 48). This War, which helped the regime to consolidate its power, also became a pretext for greater militarization of Kurdistan and for turning it into a combat zone. The militarization, in turn, facilitated

TABLE 1 Kolbers (cross-border laborers) killed or injured (2015–2020)

			Year						
			2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Total
Incident	Injured	Count	19	49	148	226	178	16	636
		% within Incident	3.0%	7.7%	23.3%	35.5%	28.0%	2.5%	100.0%
		% within Year	27.1%	52.7%	62.7%	64.2%	70.1%	80.0%	62.0%
		% of Total	1.9%	4.8%	14.4%	22.0%	17.4%	1.6%	62.0%
	Killed	Count	51	44	88	126	76	4	389
		% within Incident	13.1%	11.3%	22.6%	32.4%	19.5%	1.0%	100.0%
		% within Year	72.9%	47.3%	37.3%	35.8%	29.9%	20.0%	38.0%
		% of Total	5.0%	4.3%	8.6%	12.3%	7.4%	0.4%	38.0%
Total		Count	70	93	236	352	254	20	1,025
		% within Incident	6.8%	9.1%	23.0%	34.3%	24.8%	2.0%	100.0%
		% within Year	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	6.8%	9.1%	23.0%	34.3%	24.8%	2.0%	100.0%



FIGURE 1 Kolbers killed or injured (2015–2020)

TABLE 2 Demographic characteristics of interviewees

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean
Age	20	22	74	35.80
Number of children	20	0	6	1.55
Education (years)	20	5	22	12.75
Duration of kolberi (year)	20	1	15	4.85
Marital status	Married: 9	Single: 11		
Valid *N* (listwise)	20			

TABLE 3 Word – in context/*'Ajam*, Shi'is and Sunni in context

Document name	Context	Keywords	Context
kolber Baneh 1:	the greatest of dangers is that	*'Ajams*	say stop and then they shoot you
kolber Mahabad 6:	Unlike in	*'Ajam*stan	our representatives repeatedly make empty promises
kolber Piranshahr 10:	everything is given to	*'Ajams*	We are powerless.
kolber Sardasht 17:	You can easily find a job in	*'Ajam*stan	, our region is intentionally left behind
kolber Baneh 2	Mines can explode or	*'Ajams*	might shoot at us.
kolber Piranshahr 12:	Paid 70,000 toman per load and	*'Ajams*	seized my ID at the…
kolber Oshnavieh 20:	You can get arrested or shot by	*'Ajam*	, you leave in constant fear
kolber Mahabad 5:	workers from Kurdistan or	*Sunnis*	will not be hired.
kolber Piranshahr 13:	when you get closer to Kurdish	*Sunni*	areas you begin to the poverty and deprivation

the IRI's internal settler colonial projects (through military projects and expansion), land seizure, water transfer, cultural dominance, and the intensification of uni-ethno-religious economic development.

Unlike the sovereign Persian community, Kurds have been systematically marginalized. In some subtle ways, the IRI's practice resembles that of the South African apartheid regime. The Perso-Shi'i ethno-nation—through its use of "double game of sovereignty"—articulates the discourse of belonging, sets the rules for the moral community, and uses this very discourse of inclusion to marginalize the "*ashrar* (deviant)" Kurds economically, culturally, and legally.[14] Marginalizing the non-sovereign Kurdish community and regulating their dispossession, resembles the constituting policies of the apartheid regime in South Africa.

In South Africa, the core of the apartheid policies was founded on discriminatory laws regarding ownership, access to resources, and occupying property (Lowenberg, 1989; Williams, 1989, p. 121). In Kurdistan, the systematic de-development policies of IRI approximate the strategies of the South African apartheid regime for dispossessing the black community. The IRI has been destroying farming, thwarting raising animals, depopulating rural areas through building enormous dams and transferring natural resources (e.g., water and revivers) to non-Kurdish Shi'i regions. Such strategies evidence the IRI's plan for radical transformations in Rojhelat and complicating Kurdish livelihood on the other side of the border (in the South). While the Islamic state has kept other Iranian borders relatively open to the international trade—through securitization of Kurdistan—it has suppressed Kurdish economic activities and violently dealt with those who use their own body for the cross-border labor.

In Iran, Kurdish exclusion is constitutionally sanctioned. The IRI's constitution disqualifies non-Shi'is to occupy key state positions such as the presidency (see Article 116 of the IRI's constitution).[15] They cannot run for presidency. Nor can they become a member of the cabinet, National Security Council, the Expediency Council, the Guardian Consul, or the Consul of Experts. In the last four decades, not a single Kurd has been allowed to serve in the key state-decision-making positions (see Boroujerdi & Rahimkhani, 2018). The state bureaucracy, laws, and organizations are all structured around the exclusion of non-Shi'i and non-Persian communities (e.g., Kurds). Kurds have also been barred from entry in the key intelligence and military positions.

The IRI is a segregationist state whose policies and laws are founded on certain constitutional stipulations, shielding categorical uni-ethno-religious organization of the polity. Discrimination against Kurds holding lower offices is not stipulated in the constitution. Nevertheless, all discriminatory appointments and institutional exclusion correspond to the spirit of the constitution as it necessitates ordering the state and society in accordance with the two pillars of the official identity: Shi'i Islam and Persianism. In other words, the constitution "creates a legal-political order that fundamentally discriminates against … all non-Shiites" (Elling, 2013, p. 51). The ruling Persian ethno-class as well has always regarded Kurdish politics and identity as an existential threat to the integrity of their *imagined Iran* (see Boroujerdi, 1998). The sovereign ethno-nation strives to tribalize Kurdistan and obstruct its contact with the capitalist modernity and concurrently, it has framed Kurdish demands as signs of "regional backwardness."

Throughout the Iran-Iraq War, Kurdish cities were under constant airstrikes and bombardments. Consequently, raising livestock—a main pillar of Rojhelat rural economy—was mostly decimated. Significant spaces of Kurdish economic activities such as farms, gardens (orchards and wineries), and pastoral lands were turned into minefields (see Table 4). During the War, the regime planted millions of landmines—more than 16 million of which still remain uncleared—disrupting traditional practices of farming and raising livestock. While the state devastated the economic life of rural Kurdistan, it made no investment in any infrastructure or alternative employment opportunities in any other areas. Even for employment in the "public sector," the state pursued the policy of *deindigenization* (discussed below). The "public sector" employment was also used to co-opt Kurds in the state's expansionist projects.

In the last four decades, the regime—under the pretext of "exceptional security situation"—has obstructed industrial and economic development in Kurdistan. This reality is evidenced by the fact that there is only one sugar factory—built in 1968—in the entire Kurdish inhabited regions of the West Azerbaijan.[16] The state has used the discourse of the "security situation" in Kurdistan: (a) to expand and reinforce non-Kurdish control and to fracture Kurdishness both geographically and politically, and (b) to transfer the region's natural resources to non-Kurdish

TABLE 4 The number of landmine victims (1988–2003)

Province	Frequency	Percentage
Kurdistan (province)	889	23.9
Ilam	596	16.1
Khuzestan	451	12.1
Kermanshah	1,273	34.3
Western Azerbaijan	494	13.3
Border Strip	10	0.3
Total	3,713	100

Source: Mine Explosion and Human Casualties (2006). Tehran: The Research Center of Janbazan for Engineering and Medical Science, 77.

ones and perpetuate its de-development policies in Kurdistan. In this sense, the state policies in Kurdistan are also comparable with that of the South African apartheid regime, where the Pact government of 1934 laid the foundation for the apartheid system by initiating its job control and reservation policies (see Lundahl, 1992, pp. 166–167). These policies were foundational for the discriminatory distribution of resources, dispossessing black farmers and reducing their wages and products. In South Africa, such policies turned blacks into unskilled and semi-skilled cheap labor forces who were eventually compelled to flock to the White industrial zones (Jones & Muller, 1992, p. 183). Similarly, in Kurdistan, the IRI's de-development and colonial dispossession policies have produced three types of cheap and unskilled labor forces: migrant, seasonal laborers, and the subject of our study: kolberi (see, Khani & Zarghami, 2013; Mohammadi, 2015).

The state utilized the Iran-Iraq War to expand its military infrastructure and occupy all Kurdish towns and villages with its military facilities. Kurdish cities and villages "were heavily militarized while the civilian population suffered under indiscriminate bombings, claiming huge casualties and causing rapid depopulation" (Elling, 2013, p. 54).[17] While significant portions of the cities' space and their surroundings were allocated for military expansion, due to lack of medical facilities, people had to go the provincial capitals in Kurdish provinces for any proper medical treatments. Meanwhile, the state's militarization process radically decreased raising livestock and reduced farming. The regime inflicted greater misery on the people by expanding minefields and banning the farmers' movements in pursuit of pastoral lands. The latter was supposed to disrupt organic ties between people in the rural areas and Kurdish fighters. This way, the regime expedited the destruction of the Kurdish enclave's economy through its economic and spatial investment in the militaristic infrastructure and ecological terror.

Since the early 1980s, the state armed forces have determined Kurdish public life, its legal culture, and investment in civil infrastructure and yet they enjoy an absolute lack of public accountability. Over the last three decades, "the Islamic Republic has turned all the Kurdish cities into a big military garrison" (see a report by Radio Farda).[18] Currently, in Kurdistan, Persian and Shi'i military personnel makes up for 2–3% of the population of every city. This is in addition to the fact that over 50% of the state bureaucracy consists of non-Sunni/non-Kurds. The presence of the state in Kurdistan is mostly in the form of its military. Mostly, Kurdish regions "have been administered from military bases and through martial law, and economic investment has often focused on military infrastructure. Since locals' relations with central authorities were thus often conducted through military representatives, these circumstances further cemented a feeling of being under occupation among [Kurds]" (Elling, 2013, p. 54). The state armed forces function like typical occupying forces, constantly expanding the security and surveillance nets. Through well-planned expansionist strategies, they expand Shi'i/Persianism and increasingly reduce symbolic and physical manifestations of Kurdishness.

The segregationist policies of the IRI are not limited to the aforesaid ones. The state mobilizes its educational system for Perso-Shi'ification and the advancement of its uni-ethno-religious de-development in Kurdistan. Scholars of South African apartheid inform us that apartheid policy required separate educational systems,

designed to perpetuate an inferior Black education (Lipton, 1986, p. 24). Analogously, the educational system of the IRI guarantees an inferior and *de-indigenizing* non-Persian/non-Sunni education. The IRI—through its colonial acculturation system—has pursued a two-tiered educational policy. (a) Its de-indigenization (*bumizodayi*) strategy blocks local people from working in the state institutions, schools, and universities and replaces them with non-local Shi'is and Persians. In some non-Shi'i provinces, up to 80% of the educators consist of non-locals (reported by Deutsche Welle New Service).[19] Elling is right to state that "the administrative infrastructure is arranged in a way so that Sunnis arguably do not constitute a majority in any province" (2013, p. 51). De-indigenization raises locals' unemployment and gradually de-indigenizes the bureaucracy and educational cadres. (b) Higher education *zoning* (*qotb bandiye âmuzeshi*) is another strategy that bars Kurdish students' admission to institutions outside their localities.[20] They deal with such constraints, while the Iranian education system is a Persian-centered one and almost all the prestigious universities are in Persian central cities like Tehran. Entry to such institutions has never been easy for students from Kurdistan (see Sorkh, 2007).[21]

While the first component of the IRI's education policy eliminates local job opportunities for Kurds and Sunnis, the second impedes Kurdish students' enrollment outside their local educational zones.[22] The colonial Persianization had already created an uneven playing field for non-Persians. It disallows the instruction of non-Persian languages and so reduces Kurdish students' ability to compete with the native speakers of Persian. Also, the state's securitization of their habitus, subjects Kurdish students to an intense regime of surveillance. Within the education department, there exist several specific security organizations, each of which is tasked with profiling Kurdish students and teachers for their possible political and religious dissent, their behaviors, writings, speaking, their habits of dressing, networking, and social media activities and so forth (Soleimani & Mohammadpour, 2019b). Student profiling starts from the middle school, a process through which the state apparatuses determine whether or not a given student be allowed to pursue higher education or be employed in the "public sector." The backgrounds of the close and far relatives of the students are also all determinative factors in their approval by the state (Soleimani & Mohammadpour, 2019b).

In 2009–2010, along with the spike in state militarization, Kurdistan witnessed the opening of temporary border markets in Mariwan, Sardasht, Piranshahr, and Baneh. The local merchants were allowed to import goods from Iraqi Kurdistan and transport them to non–Kurdish cities. This coincided with a sudden flow of an enormous amount of cash to the Kurdish urban areas. This situation resulted in the further depopulation of the rural areas and encouraged people in the countryside to abandon their farms in pursuit of a better future in those cities. The aforementioned Kurdish cities became the main destination for the rural migration. For instance, in the city of Baneh, the number of shopping malls grew from 4 (in 2005) to 250 (in 2016), inducing the people's fundamental reliance on those transient markets.

With the introduction of these fleeting markets, the state further destroyed the local economy and brought down the rate of school attendance among the youth as education is often perceived as a gateway to governmental jobs. Opening these temporary markets was mostly decided by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards' Corp (IRGC), aimed at the depoliticization of Kurdish society. The state also hoped to use the borders—their openings and closings—as an instrument for controlling Kurds on both sides of those borders. Ahmadinejad and the IRGC gradually materialized their policy of keeping Kurds in a liminal economic space (see the 2009 Kurdish Human Rights Report). This was taking place after the birth of a constitutionally recognized Kurdish entity on the other side of the border (in Iraq). The emergence of the Kurdish entity was viewed by the Persian ethno-national class as "a serious threat to the national security of the Islamic Republic" (Bujmehrani & Poor Islami, 2014, pp. 87–94). It aroused a strong *Kurdophobic* sentiment to an extent that even Persian "postcolonial writers" like Hamid Dabashi (2017) declared a possible Kurdish independence "as a disaster for the region."

After the collapse of the regime of Saddam, the Iranian state adopted greater forms of expansionist policies through proxy wars, arming and funding various terrorist groups in the region. The IRI perceives Iraqi Kurdistan as a threat, a battleground against the US and Israel, and a place to compete with Turkey. Iraqi Kurds' administrative and internal divisions and their fraudulent politics has facilitated the IRI's successful execution of its strategies.

TABLE 5 Age average of some of the killed and injured kolbers (2015–2020)[a]

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean
Age	262	13	65	29.53
Valid *N* (listwise)	262			

[a]We only had access to age detail of 175 cases out of 1,025.

The IRI creates and then closes temporary job markets in Kurdistan so it can circumvent American sanctions and lure Kurdish youth into an evanescent economic facade at the expense of further Kurdish control and de-politicization. Overall the de-development policies of the IRI have generated various forms of Kurdish dispossessions, most tragic of which are the rise of kolberi and seasonal works outside Kurdistan.

Beside working on the borders, each summer thousands of Kurdish families are forced to migrate to non-Kurdish regions (e.g., Tehran, Isfahan, Shiraz, and Tabriz), where they work in privately owned brick factories, farms, and gardens. The work conditions in the brick factories are particularly inhuman and nothing short of modern slavery. The workers are paid based on the number of bricks they produce daily and (therefore regardless of age, sex or health conditions) all family members must work overtime, 7 days a week. The majority of these families experience existential crises: they are regularly subjected to various forms of abuse, live in isolated work-camps with no sanitary conditions or medical facilities. Given these inhumane conditions for seasonal labor, people often prefer kolberi. No matter how dangerous the latter may be, kolbers believe they can preserve their dignity. Unlike working in brick factories, kolberi is mostly done by one member of the family. This is the reason why kolberi is no longer a job exclusive to mature, illiterate, and unskilled men—as it would be in the classic form of smuggling.

The medium age of kolbers becomes increasingly younger and it ranges from 13 to 65. From 2015 to 2019—based on our findings—the average age of both injured and killed kolbers is 29 years (see Table 5).[23]

Now, kolbers' backgrounds are diverse. Kolbers could be accomplished athletes or promising MA and PhD students. For instance, Keivan Keivanfar, from Paveh, received an MA degree in Urban Planning and Baqer Ahmadi, from Mariwan, had secured the rank of 12 in the nationwide university-admission-exam and received an MA in Urban Planning.[24] Taha Ghaffari—who has been forced to kolberi—is a renowned athlete and the winner of multiple national and international awards. Nonetheless, a typical kolber carries a load between 5 and 80 kilos. They are paid between 5,000 and 20,000 tomans (33 cents–$1.25) per kilo, depending on their age and physical ability. A kolber might be able to make 5–10 trips a month and earn 1,000,000 tomans ($67), which is far below the poverty line of $600, declared by the state, in 2017.

4 | KOLBERI: A ZONE OF INDISTINGUISHABILITY

Kolberi is not technically illegal, but it is punishable by death without ever being designated as a crime. Kolbers are both inside and outside the juridico-political order (see Figure 1). There are no laws criminalizing kolberi, and yet they are regularly shot or thrown off cliffs by the state forces or die in the minefields, and so forth. There is not a legal mechanism, however, that allows redressing the grievances of those kolbers who fall victim to the state violence.

Since 2015, direct shooting has taken the greatest toll of kolbers' lives (see Figure 1). In that year alone, 126 kolbers were killed as a result of direct shooting. According to the Kurdish Human Rights Network (KHRN) report, 42 kolbers were also shot dead in 2016—70.3% of them were married and three of them were under the age of 18. Similarly, in 2017, the state's forces direct shooting left 73 kolbers dead and 154 others injured. The state forces killed 25 kolbers in the first 6 months of 2018 alone (see Hengaw's report, n.d.).[25] Some of them like Ali Nasiri and Farhad Zandi were shot in the head. Nasiri was married and had two children.

While 70% of the slain kolbers are victims of direct gunfire, a significant number of them die either because of being thrown off mountain cliffs by the state forces or they fall while running for their lives. For example, on May 16, 2018, Mohammad Karim Rahmani was thrown off a cliff for arguing with soldiers.[26] On November 9, 2018, Younes Ebrahimi, from Sardasht, fell off a cliff and died while he was running for his life. On the same day, Shirzad Ebrahimi also fell to his death while being chased by state forces.[27]

The atrocities are not limited to killing and injuring kolbers. Unlawful arrests, torture, even hiding kolbers' dead bodies have all become common state practices. Often weeks or months after their death, locals find kolbers' corpses, marked by undeniable signs of torture. For instance, on February 11, 2018, the body of Shwane Rasuli, from Baneh, was found. His legs and hands were tied, and all signs indicated that he had been tortured before he was shot dead.[28] After 70 days of imprisonment and torture, the dead body of Abubakar Mowlania, from Makoo, was returned to his family. He had been previously reported missing.[29]

Shootings are the most frequently reported incident on social media. From 2015 to 2020, 725 kolbers, or 70.73% of all kolbers in such incidents, were wounded or killed as a result of direct shooting. Add to this incidents of escaping from or being beaten by border soldiers that often led to severe injuries or death (see Figure 2). The majority of injured kolbers refuse to seek medical treatment out of a fear of state persecution, which in turn may lead to their death. Since 2019, the number of missing kolbers has drastically increased. Kolbers become easily disoriented and get lost in the winter and end up freezing to death. Farhad (see Figure 3) and Azad Khosrawi (14 and 17 years old) were two brothers who worked as kolbers and were found dead on December 12, 2019, after they went missing for three days. The tragic death of these two brothers shows the greater fragility of under-aged kolbers. Just like adults, the under-aged are the target of state forces' direct shootings (Table 6). It must be mentioned that state de-development polices in Rojhelat have even compelled women to engage in kolber work.

As indicated earlier, in the 1980s the state planted millions of mines, particularly in the four provinces of Western Azerbaijan, Kurdistan, Ilam, and Kermanshah. Three decades later, the uncleared landmines continue to take a great toll of the lives of villagers—mostly women and children. With the rise of kolberi many kolbers die or suffer serious injuries due to the explosion of mines. Nevertheless, despite their severe afflictions, the state courts often fine the affected kolbers large sums of money. For instance, in 2017 Loqman Vahid—who had lost one leg and one eye in a mine explosion—was fined to pay 11 million tomans for an illegal border crossing.[30] Many kolbers end up dying as a result of their attempts to avoid state forces' ambushes. Many die of hypothermia if they don't fall from mountain cliffs during their nightly journeys.[31]



FIGURE 2 Typology of kolbers' death and injury occurrences (2015–2020)



FIGURE 3 The conceptual relationship between code "*Ajams*" and other codes and sub-codes
Note. The boldness of the line's points to the accumulation and interconnectedness of two different concepts.

TABLE 6 The under-aged kolbers killed or injured in 2019

Afshar Sayyadi Niaz	Mariwan	15	March 13, 2019	Falling from Mountain	Dead
Aram Zarde Shwane	Oshnavieh	17	May 14, 2019	Drowned	Dead
Hemen Salehpour	Baneh	16	June 25, 2019	Direct Shooting	Dead
Ismaeil Savojinezhad	Mariwan	16	August 8, 2019	Direct Shooting	Killed
Ashkan Fattahi	Nowsood	17	Nov. 11, 2019	Direct Shooting	Injured
Hadi Hosseini	Rabat	17	Dec. 15, 2019	Direct Shooting	Killed
Farhad Khosrawi	Mariwan	14	Dec. 12, 2019	Freezing	Dead
Azad Khosrawi	Mariwan	17	Dec. 12, 2019	Freezing	Dead

Kolberi represents life and labor on the edge, not just in its legal, political, or economic sense. It also and often leads to a psychological impasse for people who embrace those life-endangering journeys to overcome the peril of poverty. One frequently hears stories similar to the following account by an educated kolber that:

> *I never forget the day when a friend of mine, who was also married, fell on the ground with his load on his back …. I approached him to help. … He was crying, shivering from the cold and exhaustion. His blood sugar level had severely dropped. The weather was frigid and biting, and his load was heavy. With a shaking voice, he said that he no longer wanted to live. He handed over his knife to me: "Please end my life with this knife …." I took his loads down and hid it somewhere to deliver it to the owner by the next day. Had not I stopped him, he would have killed himself right where we were.*

5 | LIVING ON THE EDGE AND ITS EXPRESSIONS

Our analysis of kolber narratives along with the data—collected from long hours of conversations and documented reports—suggest that kolberi must be perceived as a multi-faceted configuration of a life situated at the juncture of biopolitics, political economy, and Kurdish identity. The core concept, "living on the edge," characterizes the

spatial and temporal dimensions of kolbers' lives and labor as reflected in their own narratives (see below). It illustrates the fragility and precarity of kolbers' lives. The phrase "on the edge" depicts kolbers' lifeworld as a microsome of the world of marginality and perilousness of the non-sovereign Kurds' lives. For a better grasp of a typical kolber's life and labor, it is imperative to provide an overview of the main categories from which the living on the edge is extricated (Table 7).

Building on *structural grounded theory*, here, we elaborate upon how kolbers' personal stories portray Rojhelat Kurds' economic and political predicaments. For instance, in our participants' narratives, the *national oppression* category is underlined as a determinant condition for kolberi. *National oppression* refers to the institutionalized injustices against Kurds for their ethno-linguistic differences. Kolbers frequently raise issues of *ethnic*, *religious*, and *language* identities as determinative factors in the impoverishment of their region. The following story by a kolber from Mariwan illustrates such institutionalized injustices:

> *I have published several academic papers on city planning and management … and submitted them all to our city mayor and city council. I decided to apply for a PhD program and obtained the rank 12 in the admission exam for the Urban Planning …. However, the officials disqualified me despite my academic success …. This was the beginning for the darkest days in my life … I started looking for jobs but all doors were closed on me. Our city's mayor and the governor told me that they could not hire me …. I was also a member of wrestling team but I had to abandon wrestling for kolberi …. I became a kolber just 9 months ago. I am not the only person whose entry to the universities has been barred. Many Sunni Kurdish youth share my fate.*

TABLE 7 Concepts, categories, and core category

Core concept	Main categories	Concepts/codes
Living on the edge	National oppression	Hiring Shia, job discrimination, misusing kolbers, MPs powerlessness, indifference, MPs promises, Political root, government, Ajam, Soldier, ethno-religious discrimination, Shia, Sunni, and in vivo codes.
	Life circumstances	Credentials, helplessness, dignity, academic efforts, kolberi while studying, hand to mouth, social gaze, quitting for kolberi, reasons for kolberi
	Work circumstances	Availability, kolberi time, longitude, ownership, load weight, no-future job, work group, tough life, laborious job
	Material location	Bribing guards, temporal job, earning, breadwinning, desperation
	Family issues	Emotional pressure, the fate of kolber family, family misery, parents concern, family concern.
	Dispossession of life	Health issues, changing routes, dangerous routes, guard shifting, abusing power, a security issue, interrogation, car accident, beating, injuring, seizing loads, arrest, escaping, freezing, mine explosion, killing, ambushing, falling from Mountain, risking life, shooting

National oppression, in addition to some in vivo codes, is constructed from codes: *hiring* Shi'is, *job discrimination*, *misusing kolbers*, *Kurdish MP's powerlessness*, *indifference*, and *empty promises*, *the state*, *'Ajam*, *soldiers*, *ethno-religious discrimination*, and Shi'a–Sunni *divide*. The politico-cultural gap between Kurds and the sovereign Persian ethno-nation signifies structural inequities between the center and periphery.

The abovementioned asymmetries have formed two types of citizens: *sovereign* versus *non-sovereign* and *desirable/hirable* Shi'is (job–discrimination) versus *undesirable/unhirable* Sunni Kurds. The following excerpts show how kolbers invoke the idea of *national oppression* in their own language.

> *Even neighborhood schoolteachers are* bêgane *(foreigners). (kolber Oshnavieh 20)*
> *They don't care about Kurdish Sunni cities. You can't find even a small factory that can employ 50 people. The same is true about Sistan and Baluchistan whose inhabitants are Sunni. (kolber Piranshahr 13)*
> *Its workers are mostly non–Kurds [memo, he refers to the sugar factory in Piranshahr]. (kolber Piranshahr 10)*
> *There is a petrochemical factory in Mahabad; all the employees are from Khorasan. (kolber Mahabad 5)*
> *As a Kurd, you spend all your life studying and you will become a* kolber *at the end [memo: a* kolber *with high educational profile]. (kolber Mariwan 9)*
> *Code: ● Living on the Edge\National Oppression\Job discrimination.*

Kolbers tend to believe that the abject poverty and de-development, which has given rise to kolberi, is an outcome of a well-thought-out state strategy: "if state officials wanted, they would have eradicated kolberi completely" (kolber Oshnavieh 20). Therefore, kolbers rarely differentiate *'Ajam* (non-Kurdish Shi'is and Persian) from the state itself. Kurds' reference to Persians and those who represent the state as *'Ajam* exhibits their communal self-differentiation and a "socio-political distance" to the center. As exhibited in Figure 4, the code *'Ajam* is viewed to be organically associated with job discrimination, lack of investment, ethno–religious discrimination, and several codes of other categories.

The scope and depth of the distance between the center and periphery and their asymmetric power relations also find expression in the *national oppression* phrase. Kurdish kolbers use this phrase to show their distance to those who work for/with the state, even if they are fellow Kurds. Kurdish MPs, for instance, are viewed as those who—especially during their election campaigns—try "to normalize Kurdish oppression with their empty promises and catchy slogans" (kolber Baneh 1). Participants express their anger with Kurdish MPs' attempts to frame kolberi as just another symptom of the economic mismanagement rather than a result of asymmetric power relations between Kurds and the center. A kolber from Sardasht opines: "as far as I know, some of these MPs instead of

FIGURE 4 Code (*'Ajams*)—subcodes—segments

eradicating this perilous thing from our region are trying to institutionalize kolberi. They want to make it even more prevalent by giving kolberi IDs and insurance."

6 | INTERACTIONS/PROCESS OF KOLBERI

The *interaction-process* categories describe the ways in which kolberi is interacted with or interconnected to its context (*national oppression* category). As the *material location* category indicates, for many Kurds living on borderlands, kolberi has become a path to survival. While the participants refer to kolberi as a low-income transient, unreliable, and dangerous work, they desperately stick to it as their only means for economic survival. "Desperation, low earning" and "being the only breadwinner" are among the most frequently mentioned words in kolbers' narratives.

> *So much danger one has to face only to make 3 thousand tomans per each kilo of load. (kolber Oshnavieh 20)*
> *it is not enough even for buying toys for kids … and yet sometimes we do not get paid in cash. (kolber Mahabad 4)*
> *with the income that we earn we cannot even purchase a bottle of cooking oil. (kolber Mahabad 5)*
> *Code: ● Living on the Edge\Material location\Earning free*

Life circumstances is another interaction category that illustrates the life and labor of a typical kolber. The category of *life circumstances*, is mostly composed of codes "no choice," "social gaze" and "academic credentials":

> *To succeed, I did whatever I could. I had to do kolberi while I did my BA because my family could not support me. Since I had no other free times, I had to work on holidays. At times, I took my exams just right after I returned from kolberi. I was exhausted and unfocused. Kolberi was the only job available. After my graduation, I looked for other jobs. But again kolberi was all that I could find. I did kolberi even when I was preparing for the MA admission exam, I got in a Geography and Urban Planning Program. Nevertheless, in the second semester, I had to quit because I could not survive economically. (kolber Sardasht 16)*

Kolbers view their circumstances to be a direct outcome of the existing political realities in Kurdistan. Therefore, they cannot decouple kolberi from their Kurdish identity. To them, despite its precious nature, kolberi evidences their moral fiber and standing by the principles at trying times, or in their own words:

> *I keep a piece of fabric with my blood on it. It is dear to me as it indicates the price I have paid for my cause. The day I was injured, I was carrying an extra load to make more money. The heavier the load, the better you get paid. My foot slipped, I fell on a rock and rolled several times. I hurt my right shoulder and the fabric got soaked in my blood. My friends divided my load among themselves and carried it for me to the destination. (kolber Sardasht 18)*
> *Is not kolberi better than stealing and doing undignifying things? (kolber from Piranshahr)*
> *I am prepared to be arrested, even to be killed. I would rather die than begging for money. … So, when I return to my city, I can help some low-income families as well. For each load that I carry, I will donate $ 4 to indigent families that I know. (kolber who is handicapped)*
> *Code: ● Living on the Edge\Life Circumstances\Dignity*

Work circumstances: As stated earlier, kolberi is not a normal form of labor in normal circumstances. It is a fiendish ordeal and fraught with fatal dangers. As a kolber from Mahabad describes it: "there is no guarantee that we ever make it home again safe and sound, whenever we leave for *kolberi*." And yet, it is available only a few times a month.

"When the routes are clear, we can take three loads of goods in a month" says the above kolber. Kolberi requires a significant level of physical ability as it involves carrying a load in 8 to 17 hr-long trips on mountain trials. To make a little more money, many kolbers carry heavier loads. A kolber from Baneh recounts that, "I have seen young men carrying a 180 kg refrigerator on their backs" (Code: ● Living on the Edge\Work Circumstances\Load weight).

Kolbers do not own their loads. This will cause a great deal of anxiety and concern. In order to receive their payments, they have to bring their loads to the designated places on time. However, kolbers often have to run for their lives as they constantly face the state's armed forces. In such circumstances, to save their lives, they would have to abandon their loads. As a kolber from Sardasht relates: "at times, we will have to compensate the owners for the loss (Code: ● Living on the Edge\Work Circumstances\Ownership).

The category of *family issues* characterizes both the process/interaction and consequences of kolberi; it illustrates the interaction between a kolber and his family and the ways in which his work may endanger them. As a kolber from Baneh testifies, kolbers' family lives are also fraught with anxiety, "even if you don't have a wife and children, you sense your mom's gaze on the door as she is anxiously awaiting your safe return" (Code: ● Living on the Edge\Family issues\Parents concern). The families of kolbers grapple with the omnipresent fear of losing their "breadwinner." If their breadwinner is killed, injured, or disabled, there is no one for the families: no social support, no medical insurance. Their families will end up in the absolute state of loss and despair (Code: ● Living on the Edge\Family issues\ Fate of kolber Family).

Kolbers' constant exposure to harms might lead to fatal inflictions that could throw their marital relationship into an utter state of disrepair. A kolber from Baneh relates a story of "how one *kolber* became impotent, unable to sleep with his wife ever again after carrying 150 kg on his back." (Code: ● Living on the Edge\Family issues\Family issues). In some cases, physical harm of kolberi results in dysfunctional family relationships or divorce. "Sometime during the trips, some kolbers receive phone calls from their wives, resulting in intense fights" recounted a participant from Baneh.

7 | CONSEQUENCE: "DISPOSSESSION OF LIFE"

The category of *dispossession of life* depicts the consequences of kolberi as a product of national oppression. This category delineates how a kolber's life, work, and family are interrelated. It traces incidents that may directly or indirectly cause kolbers' death, injury, or any other factors that could deprive a given kolber from a healthy life. Shooting, falling from mountain cliffs, injuries, land mine explosion, dangerous routes, escaping state forces, being arrested or ambushed, load seizure and hypothermia are among the frequently cited incidents by the participants. Shooting kolbers, as reported in quantitative section, is the most frequent and deadliest incident. The participants describe their lived experience of being shot at by "*Ajam*s":

> *There were moments when the bullets barely missed hitting my legs and threw the dust on my face. (kolber Baneh 1)*
> *There were showering everywhere, one kolber was shot dead, right before our eyes. (kolber Mahabad 6)*
> *Code: ● Living on the Edge\dispossession of life\Shooting experience*

Many kolbers die or become seriously injured after falling off mountain cliffs or rocks while escaping from the state forces' attacks. Hypothermia is also reported as another main cause for kolbers' death. At times, kolbers fall into the second ambush or walk into a landmine or get caught in snow when they try to change their routes to avoid the first ambush.

> *we took another route but caught as we walked into the second ambush. (kolber Mahabad 6)*
> *Code: ● Living on the Edge\Dispossession of life\Ambush*
> *We might fall off mountains especially when we are forced to take an unfamiliar trial. (kolber Baneh 3)*

Code: ● Living on the Edge\Dispossession of life\Falling from Mont
the extreme cold turns your foot bluish (blackish) and you will have to cut it off. (kolber Piranshahr 11)
Code: ● Living on the Edge\Dispossession of life\Freezing
I lost my legs, a brother, and a sister in landmine explosions in Piranshahr. (kolber Piranshahr)
Code: ● Living on the Edge\Dispossession of life\Mine explosion

In all this, *the state is there to kill*. Two in vivo codes can best describe the scale of state violence against kolbers in borderland regions:

sometimes 'Ajams *get money [bribe] but still shoot at us or seize our loads. (kolber Piranshahr 13)*
Code: ● Living on the Edge\Dispossession of life\Shooting
The great danger is that the 'Ajams say stop and they shoot when you do. (kolber Baneh 1)
Code: ● Living on the Edge\Dispossession of life\Shooting

The participants point to episodes of arrest, load seizures, and interrogations by the state officials. Khezr, a 74–year-old kolber, tells the story of his interrogation resulting from his interview with a BBC reporter. He recounts that the interrogators "said you have dishonored our country. I replied that I did nothing wrong; the BBC guy was going to help me, and I just thanked him. … just talked about my life and my job. The security officers took my ID and never gave it back." The category of dispossession of life demonstrates the centrality of state violence in kolbers' lived experience. The concepts that we have constructed from the data are strongly supported and confirmed by our quantitative data sources.

8 | CONCLUSION

This paper sought to examine kolbers' lives and labor under the rule of the Perso-Shi'i state in Iran. We argued that kolberi is a direct outcome of the hierarchical ethno-nationalist and religious system that has segregated Kurds and their economic life through its division into sovereign versus non-sovereign ethno-nations. Kolberi is an economic situation but it is first and foremost a symptom of a broader political, juridical, and cultural context of Iran, which has given birth to this economic apartheid system. This is why kolberi is first and foremost a political phenomenon and should be studied in light of the state's Perso-Shi'ification strategy. The state strategy, inherently discriminatory and racist, keeps Kurdistan economically segregated and systematically prevents its development.

This is especially the case, since the existing juridical power is solely punitive and disciplinary in Kurdistan. It is not a mechanism for the dispensation of justice or to safeguard citizens' equality before the law. In Kurdistan, for the last 40 years, the sovereign power has practically ruled through marshal law, enacted and reenacted the state of emergency and its daily violence against the Kurds. This situation has created a space where the sovereign power implements or suspends its laws at will. The Kurds' status is, at best, that of "enemy minority" like Armenians in Turkey during World War I or the Japanese and Germans in the United States during and after World War II.

As our participants repeatedly noted, the state deliberately obstructs Kurdistan's economic developments. Kurds are the target of a state policy of de-development and economic apartheid, which has been sustained through the exertion of state's extreme violence in the last 40 years. The IRI through its securitization, military violence, and legal exclusion of Kurds has turned Kurdistan into an undeclared military zone where lives of the entire community are at the mercy of state forces whose violence has resulted in the death of hundreds of kolbers so far.

Integrating qualitative and quantitative approaches, we attempted to investigate and offer a fuller picture of the context, processes, and the consequences of kolberi. Both approaches showed that kolberi is a product of national oppression and exertion of a rule of one ethnic group over another, which is a classic case of internal

colonialism. As our data illustrates, ethno-religious differences play a determinative role in the production of economic apartheid in Kurdistan. Therefore, as shown, kolberi is not a mere economic condition; rather it is an outcome of a certain state strategy. Kolbers' liminal life world, as our data suggests, is characterized by ephemerality and fragility. Their social and family life is entangled in anxiety, ambiguity, physical disability, and more important of all, dealing in a deadly state force that perceives Kurds as killable. They therefore are constantly exposed to death, losses, and economic dispossession with no access to any form of justice for their grievances to be redressed.

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DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

The data that support the findings of this study are available from the authors upon reasonable request.

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NOTES

[1] Turkish sociologist, Ismail Beşikçi was the first scholar, after the 1963 work by the Kurdish leader and political activist Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou, to refer to Kurdistan as an "international colony" (see, Beşikçi, 1990; Ghassemlou, 2006). Such an approach to Kurdish studies seems to have gained a wider acceptance in the recent scholarship (cf. Gambetti, 2009; Yüksel, 2011). Recently, Mehmet M. Kurt, a Kurdish sociologist, published an important paper on Islamism and internal colonialism in which he, for the first time, investigates the colonial trends of Islamism (Kurt, 2019). Also, the authors of the current paper have published three papers on the colonial conditions in Kurdistan. Therefore, here we shall avoid repeating what has already been discussed elsewhere (see, Mohammadpour & Soleimani, 2019; Soleimani & Mohammadpour, 2019a, 2019b).

[2] Over the last decade, Abbas Vali, a prominent Kurdish scholar, has produced a significant body of scholarship on Rojhelat (see for instance, Vali, 1998, 2003, 2014, 2015). Nonetheless, Rojhelat remains the least studied part of Kurdistan at large.

[3] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=khgdcuS5YRI (accessed March 10, 2019).

[4] It must be noted that, in the current study, we do not use terms like "ethnic economy" or "ethnic enclave economy (derived "from the historical sociology of Max Weber and Werner Sombart." See Berger, 1991)). That is because they fall short of explaining the political economy of Rojhelat, despite the fact that the first has a more general application (Light, Sabagh, Bozorgmehr, & Der-Martirosian, 1994, p. 1). The two terms are used to describe formal and informal (Light, Bhachu, & Karageorgis, 1993) immigrant minority businesses and employment sector that coexist with the general economy (Bailey & Waldinger, 1991). Nor can the term "segregated work settings" used by Reitz (1980, pp. 154–156) adequately capture our case, since it also is specific to immigrant communities in Canada. All these terms are deployed in the study of immigrants and their segregated economic life. Unlike kolberi, the above economies and case studies are situated within the legal boundaries of the host societies and states. All the above concepts focus on migrants. Conversely, kolberi has an *ambiguous legal status* and is a product of an *economic apartheid*, conjured up by a hegemonic power to suppress and marginalize a non-sovereign ethno-nation.

[5] This situation was particularly intensified and accelerated after the 1979 Revolution as Rojhelat Kurds overwhelmingly rejected the Islamic Republic (as a political system) and its constitution in two consecutive referendums. Henceforth, Rojhelat has exemplified what Agamben refers to in his paradigm of bare life, a political and "juridical order solely in the form of exclusion" (1998, p. 112). It should be noted that a very significant segment of Kurdish Muslims are Shi'is and they don't fare much better than Sunni Kurds under IRI's rule. However, our study particularly focuses on Kurdish Sunni regions since kolberi is more prevalent in these regions.

[6] The sovereign ethno-nation's supposed pro-democracy groups also habitually remain oblivious to the fact that a democratic system can be founded only on the principle of *sovereignty for all* or popular sovereignty. As Amy Guttmann puts it, those who "are ruled only by habit … are incapable of constituting a society of sovereign citizens" (1987, p. 51). Therefore, the sovereign ethno-nation's "pro-democratic" groups fail to grasp that, without *sovereignty for all*, a system can be democratic only for the supreme or "heroic race" like Turkey's example where the constitution regards expression of Kurdishness to be "denigrating the Turkish nation" (see Article 301).

[7] The sovereign ethno-nation and its elites provide the epistemic ground and ethical legitimacy for the elimination of non-Persian cultures and languages. Take the example of pro-Islamic state academics, like Nematullah Fazeli, who presents Persian identity as "the national" and "the rest ethnic." He claims that Pahlavi Persian Academy "intended *to employ Persian folk language and literature for purifying the Persian language* and strengthening *national identity over* other *ethnic and regional identities*" (2006, p. 53; emphases added).

[8] Iranian ethno-religious nationalism (colonial Shi'i Persianization in disguise) has buttressed the dominance of Persianism. Since the early 20th century, non-Persian self-differentiations have been viewed as a threat to "the national unity." "The national," however, has always been synonymous to a Persianized Iran, which in the words of Iranian scholar Mehrdad Kia, was imposed and pursued by the first Pahlavi king with his primary reliance on his "military, police and bureaucracy" (2006, p. 19). The Islamic Republic, which is also an amalgamation of Persian religious nationalism, perceives Kurdish community as its both ethnic and religious Other and therefore has turned Kurdistan into a militarized zone. The IRI has imposed punitive measures that are exclusive to the Kurds as a result of the latter's refusal to be assimilated (for more see, Stansfield, 2014).

[9] We used a *concurrent—parallel* mixed methods design.

[10] These organizations/their websites provide information about kolbers' casualties on a daily basis. It should be noted, however, that despite the accuracy of our information, due to the daily killings, it is impossible to provide the exact number of casualties.

[11] We coded our data line-by-line; during first stage of coding (open coding), 47 concepts were identified that were condensed in 6 main categories. In the second stage (axial coding), we built the conceptual relation among the main categories. Finally, the core category (living on the edge) was determined.

[12] Cf. http://kurdane.com/article-6930.html. Also, http://www.bbc.com/persian/iran/2013/09/130912_25_anniversary_kurds_executed_nm

[13] A term that is often used by the regime itself.

[14] For more on the sovereign's double game see Oren Yiftachel (2006, pp. 37–45).

[15] http://archive.fo/5CPWY (accessed March 20, 2019).

[16] http://archive.fo/aseu2 (accessed April 1, 2019).

[17] For example, Sardasht—a Kurdish city that was gassed by Saddam in 1988—has the highest rate of unemployment and the highest rate of kolbers.

[18] http://archive.fo/x8gXc (accessed April 1, 2019).

[19] http://archive.fo/XcZ2r (accessed April 7, 2019).

[20] http://archive.fo/5i2wb; also http://archive.fo/j0jUI (accessed April 7, 2019).

[21] http://archive.fo/I9E5f (accessed April 7, 2019).

[22] http://archive.fo/Gybkr; also, http://archive.fo/pZ4WY (accessed April 7, 2019).

[23] This average has been calculated based on the age information of 262 kolbers (as this was the only information available).

[24] In Iran, the university entrance exam takes place annually and it is a sole criterion for regular (non-ideological) student admission. The exam is daunting as it lasts for 4.5 hr. Iranian students often spend years preparing for the exam. The admission ranks start from 1, being the best, and goes up to tens of thousands. Those students whose rank is within 3 digits have the best chance for admission in competitive schools.

[25] https://hengaw.net/en/news?Category=statistics (accessed April 13, 2019).

[26] https://youtu.be/23Ylt9mGPHE (accessed April 20, 2019).

[27] http://archive.fo/oEIY6 (accessed April 20, 2019).

[28] http://archive.fo/vzgO2 (accessed April 25, 2019).

[29] http://archive.fo/38ZUN (accessed April 30, 2019).

[30] http://archive.fo/Aa9tC (accessed May 10, 2019).

[31] http://archive.fo/Npf5b (accessed May 10, 2019).

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ORIGINAL ARTICLE

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Foreign aid and the rule of law: Institutional diffusion versus legal reach

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Abstract

This paper examines the role of bilateral foreign aid in supporting the diffusion and enactment of common models and institutions of the rule of law among aid-recipient low- and middle-income countries. We ask whether aid targeted at security-sector reform and the rule of law influences the adoption of constitutional and legal reforms over time (institutional diffusion), and whether aid also supports more effective implementation of the rule of law, writ large (legal reach). We use event history and fixed-effects panel regression models to examine a sample of 154 countries between 1995 and 2013 to answer these questions. Our findings suggest that aid does increase the likelihood of adopting several rule of law reforms, but its effect on increasing the depth or quality of rule of law over time within countries is much less substantial. These findings suggest that though aid may play a role in supporting the diffusion of models contributing to state isomorphism among countries, it is less effective at increasing the pervasiveness and quality of such model's implementation. This discrepancy between the effectiveness of bilateral aid in promoting law on the books versus law in action in aid recipient countries calls into question the current approach to rule of law reforms.

Andrew Dawson and Liam Swiss contributed equally and are listed in alphabetical order.

KEYWORDS
development, foreign aid, institutions, norms, rule of law, security sector reform

1 | INTRODUCTION

Why do states share common approaches to the rule of law and the security sector, despite diverse individual histories and contexts? World Society Theory explanations for this isomorphism argue that this reflects the influence of international organizations, networks of legal and security sector experts, and a common world cultural model for how a legitimate state should structure legal institutions and promote the rule of law throughout society.

Despite this, the rule of law has received less attention in the World Society research literature than many related but distinct issues like human rights. Apart from a few examinations of the diffusion of specific types of legislation for sex crimes (Frank, Camp, & Boutcher, 2010; Frank, Hardinge, & Wosick-Correa, 2009), abortion (Boyle, Kim, & Longhofer, 2015), and terrorism (Shor, 2011, 2017), legal reforms have seldom been examined through a World Society lens. Similarly, while there are a few cross-national studies examining the influence of foreign aid on the rule of law (Knack, 2001; Rajan & Subramanian, 2007; Young & Sheehan, 2014), none assess the effect of aid specifically earmarked for the rule of law.

In this paper, therefore, we take up Swiss's (2016c) call to look more closely at the role of foreign aid in the diffusion of world society norms/models on a sector-by-sector basis. In doing so, we ask whether foreign aid targeted at security sector reform and legal/judicial reform influences both: (a) the diffusion of common rule of law norms and institutions among countries; and (b) changes in the level of the rule of law within societies over time.

We examine these questions through a two-stage research methodology. First, we use event history analysis to examine the diffusion of constitutional and legal reforms in low- and middle-income aid-recipient countries. Second, we use instrumental variable two-way fixed-effects panel regression to explore the effects of aid on the changing degree of the rule of law within aid receiving countries over time. We examine a sample of 154 aid-recipient countries between 1995 and 2013.

Our findings suggest that aid, generally, is associated with the diffusion of and legal and constitutional reforms associated with the rule of law. More specifically, different categories of aid (from more general to more specific) have different effects, depending on the type of legal/constitutional reform analyzed. Moreover, our results show that while total aid has a negligible effect on the degree of the rule of law measured in a variety of ways, more targeted measures of aid—particularly security sector reform aid—show a beneficial, albeit minor, effect on select measures of the rule of law. We conclude, therefore, that aid's role in the spread and institutionalization of world society models of the rule of law appears more consequential to the diffusion process of state institutional structures than to its impact on rule of law outcomes. The discrepancy between the two points to limitations of the current approach to rule of law reforms.

1.1 | Conceptualizing the rule of law

While acknowledging that the rule of law is a contested concept (see Costa, Zolo, & Santoro, 2007; Tamanaha, 2004), consistent with a World Society approach, we analyze it along two dimensions—the formal legal apparatus and the reach of the law throughout society. The distinction between the two dimensions of the rule of law is roughly analogous to the classic distinction between "law on the books" and "law in action" (see Halliday & Carruthers, 2007).

First, the rule of law necessitates a legal system that enforces established rules of conduct (i.e., laws). This dimension of the rule of law therefore pertains to the legal apparatus at the state level, with a focus on constitutional

frameworks, legal institutions, and/or individual laws. As described below, we measure change in this dimension of the rule of law by the adoption of constitutional and legal reforms.

The second dimension of the rule of law refers to "the authority and influence of law in society, especially when viewed as a constraint on … behaviour" (as cited in Frenkel, 2017). That is, it is the capacity of the law to effectively permeate society and influence conduct or, in other words, the "infrastructural power" of the state's legal system (Mann, 1984). The focus of this dimension is therefore on the society-wide diffusion of the law. Notably, this focus excludes an analysis of the extent to which the government's power respects meaningful legal constraints. While limits on government power are a fundamental element of the rule of law, our interest here lies in the influence of the law beyond the state. This dimension of the rule of law therefore corresponds to the concept of "rule by law" (also known as "law and order")—that is, the ability of the law to serve the power of the state but not to limit it (Carothers, 1998). While more difficult to operationalize, this dimension of the rule of law can be measured by the degree of legal compliance among the population (see Weber, 1968) and/or widely held attitudes toward, or perceptions of, the legal order, including the level of popular confidence in the legal system and whether the law is considered to be impartially and uniformly applied.

2 | LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 | World society and the rule of law

The World Society perspective of sociological institutionalism aims to explain the striking isomorphism we see across states and societies (Boli & Thomas, 1999; Lechner & Boli, 2005; Meyer, 2007, 2009; Meyer, Boli, Thomas, & Ramirez, 1997). Centered on the work of John Meyer and his many students and collaborators, this perspective explains isomorphism as arising from the enactment of common models, norms, and policies by states and other organizations in an effort to achieve legitimacy (Meyer, Boli, et al., 1997). These models, policies, and norms make up a world culture that is promulgated and refined through the efforts of the "rationalized actors" of World Society: international organizations, networks, professionals, scientists, and so on.

Research in this perspective has most often focused on explaining, therefore, the diffusion of these models and the connection of states to the actors and networks of World Society. Research has shown the spread of world cultural models linked to issues including, but not limited to: human rights (Clark, 2010; Cole, 2005, 2012a, 2012b; Cole & Ramirez, 2013), education (Schofer & Meyer, 2005), environmental institutions (Frank, Hironaka, & Schofer, 2000; Frank, Longhofer, & Schofer, 2007; Longhofer & Schofer, 2010; Meyer, Frank, Hironaka, Schofer, & Tuma, 1997; Schofer & Hironaka, 2005), women's empowerment and gender equality (Berkovitch, 1999; Cole, 2013; Nugent & Shandra, 2009; Swiss, 2009; Wotipka & Ramirez, 2008; Yoo, 2011), corporate policy (Lim & Tsutsui, 2012), and legal reforms (Beck, Drori, & Meyer, 2012; Boyle et al., 2015; Frank et al., 2009, 2010). The general conclusion of much of this research has been that the more ties or connections a state has to the actors and networks that compose World Society, the more likely they are to adopt and enact various world cultural models and practices.

Research into the rule of law and World Society has been rather limited and primarily focused on the diffusion of certain types of liberalizing criminal legislation or constitutional reforms (see above), corporate bankruptcy laws (Halliday & Carruthers, 2007), the expansion of government structure (Kim, Jang, & Hwang, 2002) and relatively few studies of the diffusion of common security/policing institutions (Deflem, 2002; Eyre & Suchman, 1996; Hironaka, 2009; Jepperson, Wendt, & Katzenstein, 1996; Shor, 2017; Suchman & Eyre, 1992; Swiss, 2011). Like other World Society research, these studies generally support the idea that there are common models linked to security and the rule of law that have diffused across many country contexts and are expected institutional forms in legitimate states. Our research here examines this diffusion and the effects of aid on it.

2.2 | Aid and the world society

Foreign aid's role in funding the diffusion and institutionalization of world society norms has only recently become a focus of research (Fejerskov, 2015; Peterson, 2014; Swiss, 2016b, 2016c, 2017; Velasco, 2020). This research has shown that the more ties to bilateral aid donors that states have, the more likely a country is to adhere to world society human rights norms and join international organizations (Swiss, 2016b). For instance, Velasco (2020) shows that countries receiving aid from more donor countries, and those receiving more aid overall are predicted to offer more protections to LGBT rights. Likewise, bilateral aid donors are more likely to provide aid to countries which are already more embedded in international networks (Swiss, 2017) or with whom they share more common memberships in international organizations (Swiss & Longhofer, 2016). Other research has examined the dynamics of how aid donors are subject to and enact World Society norms and models (Brown & Swiss, 2013; Cold-Ravnkilde, Engberg-Pedersen, & Fejerskov, 2018; Engberg-Pedersen, 2016, 2018; Swiss, 2011, 2012, 2018).

Swiss (2016b) argues that aid's role in World Society is one of both diffusing models/norms and increasing the embeddedness of states in global networks which promote the same. By brokering connections between recipient-country governments and organizations, aid funds help pay for the transfer of expertise and ideas that takes place in development assistance initiatives and may also work toward narrowing or closing decoupling gaps. Still, little is known about the sectoral efficacy of this role for aid. Much of the existing research has examined aid's role at the macro level and there remains a gap in knowledge here about how aid focused on specific sectors influences World Society diffusion processes. As a result, our study looks at this sectoral focus using the rule of law as a case study.

2.3 | Aid and the rule of law

The rule of law is often subsumed under the banner of good governance and is considered to be one of its central components. Good governance in recipient countries has been shown to attract development aid from some donors (In'airat, 2014; Neumayer, 2003), but also to have limited influence on the aid allocation of others despite political conditionalities (Furuoka, 2005; Hout, 2002). While the rule of law is acknowledged as an important correlate of various facets of development (Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2001; Dam, 2006; Dawson, 2010; Diamond, 2008; Fukuyama, 2011; Kaufmann, Kraay, & Zoido-Lobatón, 1999; North, 1990; Rigobon & Rodrik, 2005; Tebaldi & Mohan, 2010), efforts to strengthen the rule of law in certain countries are also undertaken with donors' national security interests in mind. This has led to the securitization of aid in recent years, with rule of law development assistance becoming a key foreign aid priority (Brown & Grävingholt, 2016; Swiss, 2011, 2016a). Consequently, aid spending related to the rule of law has expanded significantly. As Figure 1 shows, since 2000, donors have dedicated over a billion dollars of official development assistance per year to conflict and security aid, and nearly as much to legal and judicial reform aid. Indeed, since 2004, the United States alone spends about US$1 billion each year on rule of law reform abroad (Kleinfeld, 2012).

The cross-national literature suggests that aid, generally, is ineffective at promoting the rule of law. Indeed, Knack (2001), Rajan and Subramanian (2007), and Young and Sheehan (2014) all find that aid flows have a significant negative association with various measures of the rule of law—that is, aid is counterproductive and its effect is deleterious. However, these studies limit their evaluations to total official development assistance, and do not take into consideration the amount allocated to specific categories of aid related to the rule of law, namely those in Figure 1—conflict and security (including security sector reform) and legal and judicial reform. This distinction is of the utmost importance in assessing the effectiveness of official development assistance in promoting the rule of law (in addition to its role in diffusing rule of law institutions) as, on average, most official development assistance is allocated to other sectors (e.g., infrastructure, health, education) that are not expected to have a significant effect on the rule of law. Therefore, no large-*N* cross-national research has empirically examined the effectiveness of aid specifically dedicated to the rule of law.



FIGURE 1 Total ODA to conflict and security and to legal and judicial reform by year, 1995–2013 [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

Case study research, moreover, has directly investigated the effect of official development assistance targeted at strengthening the rule of law. In line with World Society explanations of state isomorphism, Cravo (2016, pp. 108, 119) finds that rule of law reforms in Georgia and security sector reform in Guinea-Bissau were "informed and undergirded by a liberal ethos and a practice of expert knowledge," prioritizing "the transplantation of a western liberal legal framework." However, despite goals of broadly promoting the rule of law, she finds that in practice initial objectives were narrowed to a focus on legislative reform, ignoring its implementation—that is, the focus became one solely of "law on the books." Cravo (2016, p. 119) argues that this narrow focus has proved inadequate in promoting security, resulting in a "stark gap between these formal amendments and the lived reality of insecurity faced by citizens on the ground." Indeed, the EU had labeled their security sector reform intervention in Guinea–Bissau as a success after westernizing legislative reforms of the military, police, and justice sectors were passed, even though the security situation had worsened (and despite the coup attempt near the end of the EU's security sector reform mission in 2010, resulting in the Armed Forces Chief of Staff being illegally and unconstitutionally detained). While this research provides important insight, the question of whether these two cases are anomalous or apply more generally remains open. As such, this study conducts a large-scale cross-national test of the broader applicability of these findings.

To undertake a sectoral focus of the influence of aid on World Society diffusion processes, we assess the effects of official development assistance on two dimensions of the rule of law—the adoption of constitutional and legal reforms and changes in the level of the rule of law. We examine the consequences of aid targeted at reforming and managing legal institutions (provided under the rubric of Security Sector Reform and Legal/Judicial Reforms) as the main area of aid spending with a specific focus on the rule of law and therefore the most likely contributor to the diffusion of rule of law norms and institutions. According to the Development Assistance Committee Handbook of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Security Sector Reform refers to the reform of "a broad range of security and justice institutions" and the governance and oversight of these institutions (OECD, 2007, p. 5), while legal and judicial aid supports reforms to formal and informal aspects of the justice sector. While security sector reform and legal/judicial aid may not capture all rule of law reforms, they are the primary Development Assistance Committee foreign aid categories associated with these reforms.

Given this definition, it is evident that aid dedicated to security sector reform and legal/judicial reforms, along with most other forms of rule of law development assistance, primarily targets the first dimension of the rule of law in attempting to reform the legal system and to create or change laws and, in some cases, constitutions. Aid dedicated to rule of law reforms often does not explicitly or directly target the second dimension of the rule of law

(partly because it is more difficult). However, at least implicitly, state-level legal reforms are often not an end in themselves, but are pursued to promote order by affecting the authority and influence of the law within society. Indeed, an underlying assumption of these reform efforts is that the second dimension of the rule of law will be enhanced once the proper legal institutional framework is in place. As such, following Cravo (2016), it is important to not only assess whether aid that targets rule of law reform is successful in changing legal institutional frameworks at the state level, but also to examine the extent to which aid is related to changes in the society-wide reach and influence of the law.

2.4 | Hypotheses

Given this background on World Society, aid, and the diffusion of rule of law norms and institutions, we aim to test the influence of foreign aid in support of the rule of law. Our analysis below therefore tests the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1 *Security sector reform aid and legal/judicial reform aid increases the likelihood of the adoption of constitutional and legal reforms in recipient countries.*

Hypothesis 2 *Security sector reform aid and legal/judicial reform aid strengthen the rule of law at the societal level within recipient countries.*

Hypothesis 3 *Security sector reform aid and legal/judicial reform aid have a stronger effect on diffusion processes and rule of law measures than broader categories of aid more generally.*

3 | METHODOLOGY

3.1 | Approach

Our analysis proceeds in two stages. First, in analyzing the first dimension of the rule of law, we use event history analysis to model the effects of foreign aid on the adoption of three types of legal institutional reforms. Then, we model the effect of aid on four rule of law measures that capture the second dimension of the rule of law to assess the influence of development assistance on broad-based changes in the levels of the rule of law within countries over time.

In Stage 1, event history models predict aid's effect on the rate of occurrence of the institutional adoption or reforms we examine as representing an increased institutionalization of world society norms of rule of law. We estimate hazard ratios for each of our independent variables and controls using an exponential event history model (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 1997). This model assumes that the hazard rate for each of the event types is constant throughout the period. Countries enter the analysis risk-set in the first year of our sample period (1995) unless they became independent following that point, in which case they enter the risk-set in their year of independence. Because each of our events are repeatable, countries only exit the risk-set at the end of the period in 2013, and re-enter the risk-set following the occurrence of an event (Box-Steffensmeier & Zorn, 2002). The details of the event data are outlined below. This approach in Stage 1 of the research lets us assess aid's role in supporting the diffusion and spread of the adoption and institutionalization of specific rule of law institutions.

In Stage 2 we use an instrumental variable two-way fixed-effects panel regression approach to assess the effects of aid on several measures of the degree and quality of the rule of law within countries. This approach allows us to examine whether changes in aid levels to a country over time are associated with concomitant changes in the rule of law across society. Our panels are unbalanced and for the purposes of our analysis we lag the independent variable 2 years behind the outcome variable to allow time for aid to take effect. Thus, we

predict rule of law measures 2 years following the investment of aid. Following Dreher and Langlotz (2017), we address the endogeneity of our aid measures using an instrument based on an interaction between the government fractionalization of donor countries and the probability of each recipient country to receive data from a given donor over the period of study. Applying Dreher and Langlotz's approach, we first conduct a zero-order OLS regression of each aid measure on the fractionalization-probability interaction and then predict a fitted aid measure. This fitted aid measure is used as the excluded instrument to predict the first-stage results in our instrumental variable regression models, and in the second-stage two-way fixed effects models we use the aid measures predicted in the first stage regression to model our rule of law measures. The instrument is outlined in the data section below.

3.2 | Data

3.2.1 | Sample

Our population consists of the 161 countries listed in the AidData dataset (Research Release version 3.1) as having received aid at some point during the period of our study between 1995 and 2013. Owing to missing data on some covariates, our largest sample of countries in the event history analysis includes 154 of these countries, very closely approximating the population. In our panel regression analysis, the 154-country sample is reduced in several models owing to limited data availability on the dependent variable. Still, with nearly all aid receiving countries in this period represented, we contend that our parameter estimates can—at least in the samples of 154 countries—be held to be close to a population estimate, and therefore we can focus less on the tests of statistical significance and more on the magnitude of the estimates.

3.2.2 | Outcome variables

To analyze the first dimension of the rule of law, our event history models estimate the risk of three separate legal institutional reform events. The first is the adoption of a new constitution or reinstatement of an existing constitution. Beyond constitutional reform, the first dimension of the rule of law also entails the creation or modification of laws. While there is a paucity of available cross-national data on the passing of specific types of laws, we are nonetheless able to collect data pertaining to two significant categories of legislation: the occurrence of a reform to rape legislation (Frank et al., 2009, 2010); and the creation or amendment of counter-terror legislation (Shor, 2011, 2017). We consider an evaluation of both rape and counter-terror legislation as particularly instructive in assessing the influence of aid on World Society diffusion processes with respect to the rule of law, as they are proxies of three major donor priorities: gender equality, legal and judicial reform, and the securitization of aid (Brown & Grävingholt, 2016; Pickbourn & Ndikumana, 2016; Swiss, 2011, 2012).

To measure the second dimension of the rule of law, we use four different indicators. Among the two more general measures is the International Country Risk Guide's (ICRG) "Law and Order" indicator, which measures the popular observance of the law and the strength and impartiality of legal institutions based on expert assessments (PRS Group, 2014). It ranges from 0 (a weak rule of law) to 6 (a strong rule of law). Second, we use the Worldwide Governance Indicators' (WGI) aggregated "Rule of Law" index, which ranges from −2.5 (a weak rule of law) to 2.5 (a strong rule of law) (World Bank, 2018). The index is drawn from a variety of sources, including survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, international organizations, and private sector firms, and "captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence" (World Bank, 2018).

The other two indicators are complementary in that they measure specific, but different, aspects of the second dimension of the rule of law—one is a proxy for security of private property, while the other is a proxy for security of the person. The first, Contract-Intensive Money (CIM), measures the general confidence in the legal system's capacity to enforce contracts and protect private property. CIM is a measure of how people choose to hold their financial assets—either as currency (i.e., cash) or in financial institutions as bank deposits or other financial instruments (Clague, Keefer, Knack, & Olson, 1999). In countries with a strong rule of law and trust in legal institutions, one would expect the vast majority of liquid assets to be held in financial institutions, where they are considered safe and also accumulate interest or other types of returns. Conversely, in countries with a weak rule of law, one would expect to find a stronger preference for currency even if it means forgoing interest income, as there is less confidence that money deposited in financial institutions is secure. The measure ranges from 0 to 1, reflecting the proportion of the total money supply held in financial institutions (International Monetary Fund, 2016).

Lastly, we use each country's intentional homicide rate from the United Nations Office on Drug and Crime's International Homicide Statistics database as a measure of both violence and legal compliance. The control of violence is arguably one of the most fundamental functions of a state (North, Wallis, & Weingast, 2009). As homicide is among the most severe manifestations of violence, the homicide rate can be considered an important indicator of the influence of law in society (i.e., the second dimension of the rule of law). Moreover, the homicide rate is considered the most reliable cross-national measure of violence, as it is defined similarly across countries and it is more difficult to conceal relative to other types of violent crimes (Pinker, 2011).

Notably, the indicators of the first and second dimensions of the rule of law are not directly linked. That is, measures of constitutional or legislative change are independent from measures of the diffusion of the rule of law across society. As such, each of the two methodological stages result in separate, stand-alone findings. The objective is not to directly test whether specific legal reforms result in specific society-wide behavioral changes (which would be difficult due to current limitations of data availability). Rather, our interest lies in whether foreign aid has an influence on both the adoption of constitutional and legal reforms and on the overall strengthening of the rule of law. This strategy has the advantage of allowing a general assessment of the state of the rule of law in recipient countries.

3.2.3 | Explanatory variables: Foreign aid

Our focus in this study is to better understand the effects of foreign aid on the diffusion of rule of law institutions and norms. To assess these, we use three categories of aid flows in our analysis which measure aid at the aggregate level, narrow to a sectoral focus on conflict and security, and then to a specific focus on security sector reform and management. Our aid measures are derived from the AidData dataset Research Release version 3.1 (AidData, 2017; Tierney et al., 2011).

Total ODA measures official development assistance (ODA) received by a country from all sources in each year in millions of US dollars (USD). Median total aid in our largest sub-sample of observations is $448 million.

The AidData dataset uses modified coding of the OECD Development Assistance Committee's sectoral codes to classify aid spending. We use three of these sector codes to identify aid spending sub-categories of interest:

1. *Total ODA to Conflict and Security* is all official development assistance received by a country coded in the AidData dataset as falling under the sector code for conflict, peace and security (code 15200 and its sub-groups). Aid to conflict and security aid in our sample ranges from countries which receive no aid in a given year to a maximum of US$1.14 billion.
2. *Total ODA to Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Management* is a sub-category of (1) above (code 15210). As mentioned, much of the aid in this category specifically targets rule of law institutions and their governance. The Development Assistance Committee describes this category as follows:

Technical co-operation provided to parliament, government ministries, law enforcement agencies and the judiciary to assist review and reform of the security system to improve democratic governance and civilian control; technical co-operation provided to government to improve civilian oversight and democratic control of budgeting, management, accountability and auditing of security expenditure, including military budgets, as part of a public expenditure management programme; assistance to civil society to enhance its competence and capacity to scrutinise the security system so that it is managed in accordance with democratic norms and principles of accountability, transparency and good governance. (OECD, 2016)

With this narrower focus, we expect aid in this category to have a stronger association with the measures of rule of law we examine in this study than aid generally. The median amount of aid to security sector reform in our largest sample is zero, reflecting that more than 50% of our sample countries receive no aid in support of security sector reform.

3. *Total Aid to Legal and Judicial Reform* (code 15130): Like (2) above, this category has a narrower focus on legal and judicial reform programs. The Development Assistance Committee describes this grouping as:

Support to institutions, systems and procedures of the justice sector, both formal and informal; support to ministries of justice, the interior and home affairs; judges and courts; legal drafting services; bar and lawyers associations; professional legal education; maintenance of law and order and public safety; border management; law enforcement agencies, police, prisons and their supervision; ombudsmen; alternative dispute resolution, arbitration and mediation; legal aid and counsel; traditional, indigenous and paralegal practices that fall outside the formal legal system. Measures that support the improvement of legal frameworks, constitutions, laws and regulations; legislative and constitutional drafting and review; legal reform; integration of formal and informal systems of law. Public legal education; dissemination of information on entitlements and remedies for injustice; awareness campaigns. (OECD, 2016)

Like aid to security sector reform above, we expect this category of aid to have a larger effect on both the adoption of legal reforms and the subsequent measures of rule of law. In our sample, the median level of annual aid to legal and judicial reform received by a country is approximately $570,000. To account for skewness in our aid measures, we take the log (base 2) of each measure. This means that in our regression analyses we can interpret the estimates as equivalent to a doubling of the aid measure, allowing for a simple conceptualization of the relative marginal effects of our logged measures. The untransformed summary statistics for our aid variables are shown in Table 1.[1]

3.2.4 | Controls

As both methodological stages examine separate types of outcomes, each has a unique suite of control variables. Descriptive statistics for these measures are shown in Table 1.

For the event history models in Stage 1, we control for factors that may influence the adoption of legal or constitutional reforms. This includes *national income* in the form of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (logged for skewness), with a sample median of approximately $2,089 in constant 2005 USD (World Bank, 2018). To account for the effects of *democracy*, we use the Varieties of Democracy polyarchy index to measure changing levels of democracy in our sample countries over time (Coppedge et al., 2016). The polyarchy index ranges from 0 to 1, and our sample has a median of 0.23. We control for *state capacity* using the WGI Government Effectiveness measure (World Bank, 2018). Following the World Society literature (Tsutsui & Wotipka, 2004; Wotipka & Ramirez, 2008; Wotipka & Tsutsui, 2008), we also control for the influence of international non-governmental organizations

TABLE 1 Summary statistics

	Mean	Median	Min	Max	*SD*
Aid measures (millions USD)					
Total ODA	1,483.4	447.9	0	63,232.6	3,910.3
ODA to conflict, peace, and security	13.4	0.25	0	1,135.6	66.5
ODA to SSR and management	2.72	0	−5.06	624.6	20.3
ODA to legal and judicial reform	10.1	0.57	−12.1	1,036.3	51.7
Controls					
GDP per capita (USD)	4,220.1	2089.4	50.0	60,290.2	6,823.2
Population (millions)	35.7	6.26	0.0092	1,357.4	140.9
Electoral democracy index	0.32	0.23	0.012	0.92	0.28
Gini coefficient	0.41	0.41	0.22	0.62	0.073
Government effectiveness	−0.35	−0.44	−2.27	1.57	0.69
Excluded population	0.15	0.090	0	0.87	0.20
INGO memberships	860.9	634	35	3,967	711.8
Human rights treaty ratifications	7.33	7	0	18	3.45
Dependent variables					
Intentional homicides	11.7	7.20	0.40	139.1	14.7
WGI rule of law index	−0.37	−0.46	−2.23	1.45	0.75
Contract-intensive money	0.81	0.85	0.12	1.04	0.14
ICRG law and order index	3.42	3.50	0.50	6	1.13

(INGOs) and human rights treaties. Our *INGO* measure counts the number of organizations in which a country's citizens hold membership in a given year, compiled from the Yearbook of International Organizations (Union of International Associations, 2015). The median INGO memberships in our sample is 634. The *human rights treaty* measure counts the number of treaties a country has currently ratified in a given year, ranging from 0 to 18 in our sample (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2018). Both the *INGO* and *human rights treaty* measure are logged to account for skewness.[2] To account for country size, we include the log of the total *population* (World Bank, 2018). Countries in our largest sample range from a minimum population of 9,227 (Tuvalu in 1995) to nearly 1.36 billion (China in 2013). Finally, to ensure we are not simply picking up trends in rule of law institutions and measures over time, we include a *time trend* in our event history models.

In Stage 2, we include several control variables in our two-way fixed-effects analyses that have previously been shown to influence rule of law outcomes. Given that we examine several different measures of the dependent variable, we control for the primary factors identified in the literature as influencing the rule of law. However, we do not include all possible measure-specific controls. While this strategy may increase the risk of omitted variable bias, we mitigate this risk by running two-way fixed-effects models, which control for all country-specific time-invariant (or slow changing) factors, and the effects of trends over time.

Income inequality is included as a control, as measured by the Gini coefficient (Solt, 2019). Following the logic of relative deprivation theory, higher levels of inequality are predicted to result in lower levels of the rule of law (Merton, 1938). Given the close ties between economic development and rule of law demonstrated in prior research (Dam, 2006; Haggard, MacIntyre, & Tiede, 2008; North, 1990), we include a *GDP per capita* (log) control

as wealthier countries are expected to demonstrate higher levels of rule of law. As *democracy* is not a requisite of the rule of law as conceptualized here, we include it as a control. Past research suggests that democracy and the rule of law are mutually reinforcing (Rigobon & Rodrik, 2005); therefore, more democratic countries are expected to have a more effective rule of law.

As promoting the rule of law and maintaining the social order are core functions of the state (North et al., 2009), we control for *state capacity* using the *government effectiveness* measure cited above. State bureaucracies that are deemed low quality—that is, bureaucracies that lack institutional strength and political autonomy—are expected to be associated with comparatively lower levels of the rule of law.

Wimmer (2013) contends that *ethnic exclusion* from state power decreases the legitimacy of the state and the legal order and increases the propensity of ethnic conflict. In this vein, ethno-political exclusion may lead to decreased levels of the rule of law. We therefore include it as a control, drawing upon an indicator that measures the proportion of the population belonging to politically relevant ethnic groups excluded from state power relative to the total population (Ethnic Power Relations Dataset, 2018; Vogt et al., 2015). Lastly, as with the Stage 1 models, we include a *population* (log) variable to account for country size.

3.2.5 | Instrument

To account for the endogeneity of our aid measures and for the potential of reverse causality, we create an excluded instrument using an interaction of government fractionalization in donor countries (the chance that a random draw of two members of the donor government represent different political parties) (World Bank, 2018) and the probability of each recipient country to receive aid from each donor in the AidData dataset in a given year (Dreher & Langlotz, 2017). Dreher and Langlotz (2017) demonstrate this instrument as a strong predictor of aid flows unrelated to recipient country characteristics because it reflects likely increased aid budgets in donor countries with fractionalized governments as a means of appeasing coalition members. We calculate this interaction for each donor–recipient dyad pair in the AidData dataset, and then include the mean fractionalization-probability value for each recipient country as the predictor of our fitted aid measure in our instrumental variable regression models below.

4 | RESULTS

4.1 | Event history results

The results of our first stage of analysis (event history models of rule of law institutional adoption) are shown in Table 2. Each model shows the hazard ratio estimates for the adoption of our three legal institutional reforms predicted by each of the categories of aid (Stare & Maucort-Boulch, 2016).[3]

Models 1–4 in Table 2 show the predicted effect of our aid measures on the adoption of constitutional reforms. While none of the four aid measures attains a *p* value below .05, each estimate shows that a doubling of that aid type predicts between a 5.3% (legal/judicial aid) and 14.2% (security sector reform aid) increase in the risk of constitutional reforms. The controls affect the adoption of constitutional reforms differently: government effectiveness predicts a lower chance of constitutional reforms, while higher levels of democracy predict an increased chance of adoption. The chance of constitutional reforms declines with time, between 5.2% and 6.3% a year.

Like the constitutional reforms, the adoption of rape law reforms modeled in Models 5–8 in Table 2 show that all aid categories predict an increased risk of rape law reforms, and the estimates for both conflict aid and security sector reform aid attain *p* values below the typical .05 threshold. The magnitude of these significant effects varies

TABLE 2 Event history regression of rule of law institutions on foreign aid

	Constitutional reforms				Rape law reforms				Terror law reforms			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Aid measures												
Total aid	1.062				1.112				1.061*			
Conflict aid		1.062				1.210*				1.004		
SSR aid			1.142				1.421**				1.021	
Legal/judicial aid				1.053				1.178				1.079*
Controls												
Logged population	1.049	1.077	1.087	1.081	0.661*	0.692*	0.683*	0.706*	0.942	0.980	0.960	0.968
Logged GDP per capita	0.949	0.942	0.934	0.941	0.895	0.879	0.854	0.892	1.009	0.983	0.985	0.996
Electoral democracy index	2.614*	2.559*	2.747**	2.545*	2.207	2.145	2.235	2.041	1.319	1.256	1.298	1.271
Government effectiveness	0.555*	0.588*	0.589*	0.571*	1.287	1.378	1.370	1.358	1.339*	1.325*	1.365*	1.356*
Logged INGO memberships	0.864	0.882	0.853	0.871	1.858	2.006*	2.066*	1.829	1.272*	1.285*	1.347**	1.279*
Logged human rights treaties	1.187	1.194	1.200	1.210	1.268	1.237	1.195	1.355	1.122	1.184	1.142	1.151
Year	0.948*	0.942*	0.937*	0.944*	0.832***	0.810***	0.816***	0.817***	0.993	0.987	0.997	0.983
Country-years	2,800	2,800	2,726	2,798	2,800	2,800	2,726	2,798	2,800	2,800	2,726	2,798
Countries	154	154	154	154	154	154	154	154	154	154	154	154
Failures	78	78	77	78	37	37	37	37	322	322	318	322
Log likelihood	−198	−197	−194	−198	−117	−116	−114	−117	−274	−277	−266	−274
AIC	413	413	406	413	253	251	246	252	566	572	550	566

Note: Exponentiated coefficients (hazard ratios).

*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$.

from a 21% increase (Conflict aid) to a 42% increase (security sector reform aid) in the chance of rape law reform. The control variables reveal that more populous countries have a lower likelihood of reforming their rape laws, while countries with more INGO memberships appear to have in some cases more than double the chance of these reforms than countries less plugged into the global INGO network.

Finally, in Models 9–12 of Table 2, we report the results of the event history models of the effect of all four aid measures on terror law adoption. Here, total aid and legal/judicial aid is associated with the adoption of terror laws. In Model 9, a doubling of total aid predicts a more than 6% increase ($p < .05$) in the risk of terror law adoption, while Model 12 shows that a doubling of legal/judicial aid predicts an almost 8% increase ($p < .05$). The direction of the hazard ratios for conflict aid and security sector reform aid also suggest increased risk of reforms but to a lesser degree; we fail to reject the null hypothesis in both cases. When it comes to terror law adoption, our control variables show that states with more effective governments and a greater number of INGO membership ties are more likely to adopt terror law reforms.

Figure 2 compares hazard ratio estimates for each category of aid across each institutional reform event. In both the constitutional and rape law reform cases, security sector reform aid has a larger effect on the risk of an event than aid to conflict and security generally, and in two of the three cases is a stronger predictor of rule of law reforms than either total aid or legal and judicial aid. Yet, in the case of terror law reforms our results show that this pattern is reversed and both total aid and legal/judicial aid are much stronger predictors of adoption. These results show support for our first hypothesis and partial support for our third hypothesis on the stronger effects of security sector reform and legal/judicial aid.



FIGURE 2 Predicted effect of doubling of aid amounts on risk of rule of law institution event [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

4.2 | Instrumental variable two-way fixed effects results

Stage 2 of our analysis estimates the effects of our four categories of foreign aid on each of our four measures of rule of law (homicide rate, contract-intensive money, and the two rule of law indices). In Table 3, we show the results of our zero-order OLS regression of our aid measures on an interaction of donor government fractionalization and the joint probability of a recipient country to receive aid from all donors in a given year. The fitted aid measure predicted from these models for each country-year observation is used as the excluded instrument in the first stage of our instrumental variable models reported in Tables 4–7. The final instrumental variable results are reported in the second-stage portion of each table, and include test results for identification of weak instruments following Stock and Yogo (2005).

Predicted marginal effects of our aid measures in the analyses from Tables 4–7, are also shown in Figure 3. Because our aid measures are logged using Base 2, we can interpret the coefficients for each aid measure in these models as the marginal effect of a doubling of aid on the dependent variable.

Although aid generally shows a beneficial relationship to the rule of law in terms of direction of relationship with each of the aid measures, the magnitude and tests of statistical significance for many of these estimates suggests that this relationship is tenuous at best and modest in size. The association of aid to improved rule of law is clearest in the ICRG Law and Order Index. Still, even the 0.165 point increase on this index predicted by a doubling of legal/judicial aid is meager compared to a standard deviation for the ICRG Law and Order index of 1.13 in our sample. Thus, although our results indicate aid is in some cases associated at statistically significant levels with improved rule of law in terms of our various metrics, there is not robust and convincing support for our Hypothesis 2 in this respect, and security sector reform-related and legal/judicial-related aid do not appear to be consistently more beneficial to rule of law than either of the other categories of aid, except in the case of the ICRG Law and Order measure. Indeed, for the homicide measure, only total conflict aid is significantly associated with decreasing homicide rates, while for Contract-Intensive Money, only total aid predicts a significantly significant increase.

The instrumental variable regression results from Stage 2 of our analysis suggest that the ability of aid to promote the rule of law, beyond the diffusion of certain institutional forms or reforms, may be limited and points to potential decoupling of rule of law institutional reforms and practices that aid cannot surmount and to which it may, in fact, contribute. We examine this decoupling in the next section of the paper.

TABLE 3 Zero-order regression results (OLS) for instrumental variable regressions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Total aid	**Conflict aid**	**SSR aid**	**Legal/judicial aid**
Lagged aid measures	0.760***	0.806***	0.611***	0.606***
Lagged donor fractionalization–recipient probability interaction	4.383***	1.523***	0.875***	2.562***
Constant	0.353***	−0.206**	−0.078	−0.318***
Observations	2,864	2,864	2,768	2,860
R^2	0.78	0.68	0.36	0.47
Country fixed effects	No	No	No	No
Year fixed effects	No	No	No	No

*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$.

TABLE 4 Fixed-effects instrumental variable regression of homicide rate on foreign aid

Second-stage regression results (two-way FE)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Total aid	Conflict aid	SSR aid	Legal/judicial aid
Aid measures				
Total aid	−0.406			
Conflict aid		−1.423**		
SSR aid			−2.799	
Legal/judicial aid				−1.152
Controls				
Logged population	6.916*	7.812*	9.885*	9.089*
Logged GDP per capita	−1.137	−1.179	−0.564	−0.307
Electoral democracy index	−0.689	−0.526	−0.731	−0.237
Gini coefficient	−3.731	2.467	−4.116	−6.464
Government effectiveness: Estimate	−5.319***	−4.929***	−4.065**	−4.844***
Excluded population	3.559	3.329	2.439	1.922
Observations	925	925	910	923
Countries	88	88	88	88
R^2	0.06	−0.00	−0.23	−0.05
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cragg–Donald weak identification	113.87	101.13	11.01	17.68
Anderson underidentification test	102.50	92.29	11.14	17.75
First-stage regression results (two-way FE)				
Fitted aid measures	0.498***	0.402***	0.192***	0.240***
Logged population	3.003***	1.260	1.581*	3.124***
Logged GDP per capita	0.436	0.038	0.242	0.846*
Electoral democracy index	−0.979*	−0.178	−0.170	−0.046
Gini coefficient	−2.099	3.018	0.534	−2.296
Government effectiveness: Estimate	−0.097	0.102	0.341	0.285
Excluded population	−0.511	−0.216	−0.557	−1.481
Observations	925	925	910	923
Countries	88	88	88	88
R^2	0.18	0.25	0.13	0.11
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.

5 | DISCUSSION

In this paper we make two primary contributions. First, we provide evidence of the relationship of aid to the diffusion of some common rule of law institutions. Second, we demonstrate that aid appears to play a larger role in

TABLE 5 Fixed-effects instrumental variable regression of rule of law index (WGI) on foreign aid

Second-stage regression results (two-way FE)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Total aid	**Conflict aid**	**SSR aid**	**Legal/judicial aid**
Aid measures				
Total aid	0.008			
Conflict aid		0.012		
SSR aid			0.083**	
Legal/judicial aid				0.026
Controls				
Logged population	0.042	0.059	−0.112	0.007
Logged GDP per capita	0.150***	0.157***	0.153***	0.140***
Electoral democracy index	−0.075	−0.081*	−0.121**	−0.079*
Gini coefficient	0.848*	0.806*	0.555	0.973**
Government effectiveness	0.406***	0.403***	0.383***	0.392***
Excluded population	−0.150**	−0.146**	−0.131*	−0.140**
Observations	1688	1688	1643	1686
Countries	135	135	133	135
R^2	0.23	0.22	0.04	0.21
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cragg–Donald weak identification	306.73	331.63	50.93	41.87
Anderson underidentification test	258.92	276.20	49.91	41.29
First-stage regression results (two-way FE)				
Fitted aid measures	0.540***	0.539***	0.299***	0.273***
Logged population	2.789***	0.793*	1.370***	2.277***
Logged GDP per capita	0.050	−0.320	−0.089	0.360
Electoral democracy index	−0.074	0.127	0.259	0.004
Gini coefficient	0.263	0.425	3.292	−4.852
Government effectiveness	−0.264	−0.061	0.117	0.376
Excluded population	−0.083	−0.479	−0.297	−0.428
Observations	1688	1688	1643	1686
Countries	135	135	133	135
R^2	0.24	0.33	0.14	0.14
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.

the isomorphism of state institutions than it does in strengthening states' performance of them (i.e., states' legal reach). Moreover, in analyzing both dimensions of the rule of law, our study addresses a gap in the World Society and law literature, which "mostly overlooks implementation … [and] attends almost entirely to law on the books" (Halliday & Carruthers, 2007, p. 1139).

TABLE 6 Fixed-effects instrumental variable regression of contract-intensive money on foreign aid

Second-stage regression results (two-way FE)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Total aid	Conflict aid	SSR aid	Legal/judicial aid
Aid measures				
Total aid	0.006*			
Conflict aid		−0.001		
SSR aid			0.011	
Legal/judicial aid				0.017
Controls				
Logged population	−0.025	0.001	0.012	−0.014
Logged GDP per capita	0.039***	0.039***	0.036***	0.038***
Electoral democracy index	0.010	0.009	0.005	0.015
Gini coefficient	0.041	0.045	0.157	0.066
Government effectiveness	0.046***	0.045***	0.045***	0.032*
Excluded population	−0.035*	−0.041**	−0.036*	−0.037*
Observations	1,354	1,354	1,335	1,354
Countries	124	124	123	124
R^2	0.19	0.20	0.16	0.03
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cragg–Donald weak identification	193.29	206.52	23.19	8.40
Anderson underidentification test	169.67	179.58	23.17	8.49
First-stage regression results (two-way FE)				
Fitted aid measures	0.505***	0.475***	0.238***	0.140**
Logged population	3.280***	−0.371	−0.289	0.889
Logged GDP per capita	−0.081	−0.415	0.016	0.066
Electoral democracy index	−0.052	0.397	0.324	−0.367
Gini coefficient	0.276	1.024	−0.604	−1.297
Government effectiveness	−0.088	−0.079	0.146	0.725**
Excluded population	−0.510	−0.207	−0.314	−0.179
Observations	1,354	1,354	1,335	1,354
Countries	124	124	123	124
R^2	0.21	0.32	0.13	0.11
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.

The results suggest that aid is more strongly associated with the first dimension of the rule of law (i.e., legal institutional reforms) than with the second dimension (i.e., rule of law outcomes). These findings are both consistent with, and contribute to, the rule of law literature. The results suggest that Cravo's (2016) case study findings of the link between aid and legislative reforms is generalizable across a large number of countries. However, the findings

TABLE 7 Fixed-effects instrumental variable regression of law and order index (ICRG) on foreign aid

Second stage regression results (two-way FE)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Total aid	Conflict aid	SSR aid	legal/judicial aid
Aid measures				
Total aid	−0.000			
Conflict aid		0.076***		
SSR aid			0.106*	
Legal/judicial aid				0.165**
Controls				
Logged population	0.285	0.180	0.363*	−0.190
Logged GDP per capita	−0.140*	−0.099	−0.105	−0.208*
Electoral democracy index	−0.117	−0.140	−0.113	−0.079
Gini coefficient	3.056***	2.759**	2.460*	3.564***
Government effectiveness	0.256***	0.266***	0.203**	0.163
Excluded population	−0.182	−0.129	−0.152	−0.066
Observations	1,485	1,485	1,443	1,483
Countries	103	103	101	103
R^2	0.17	0.16	0.15	−0.03
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cragg–Donald weak identification	317.62	311.51	80.42	36.64
Anderson underidentification test	261.65	257.56	77.07	36.26
First-stage regression results (two-way FE)				
Fitted aid measures	0.591***	0.539***	0.397***	0.271***
Logged population	2.711***	0.872*	1.066**	2.459***
Logged GDP per capita	0.259	−0.375	−0.137	0.306
Electoral democracy index	−0.272	0.202	0.203	−0.203
Gini coefficient	−2.213	2.272	2.731	−3.535
Government effectiveness	−0.720**	−0.167	0.169	0.484
Excluded population	−0.263	−0.499	0.017	−0.568
Observations	1,485	1,485	1,443	1,483
Countries	103	103	101	103
R^2	0.28	0.35	0.17	0.14
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.

differ from the extant literature in suggesting that targeted aid—specifically security sector reform aid—does have a positive (even if small) impact on certain aspects of the rule of law. Moreover, total official development assistance is found to have virtually no effect on the rule of law, unlike previous studies that found a significant negative effect (Knack, 2001; Rajan & Subramanian, 2007; Young & Sheehan, 2014). Taken together, the analyses



FIGURE 3 Predicted effect of doubling of aid amounts on change in rule of law measures [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

of various categories of aid directly targeting the rule of law reveal that aid may be somewhat more effective—or less deleterious—in strengthening the rule of law than found in prior studies. As such, the results also reinforce the importance of disaggregating total official development assistance for a sectoral analysis of the effectiveness of rule of law aid.

As aid appears less harmful and more helpful to rule of law outcomes than originally thought, these results could be interpreted as supportive of the current approach to rule of law reforms. However, given aid's limited impact on the second dimension of the rule of law, in our view the results tend to lend support to critics of the current approach. These critics contend that a legal system cannot simply be transferred from one country to another, as the rule of law involves far more than getting a particular legal framework in place (Carothers, 2009; Erbeznik, 2018; Haggard et al., 2008). Rather, "[i]t is a transformative process that changes how power is both exercised and distributed in a society … [and] also involves basic changes in how citizens relate to state authority and also to one another" (Carothers, 2009, pp. 59, 60). In corroborating this perspective, our results imply that state-centric legal reforms are likely to have limited success, as they are insufficient in significantly influencing the second dimension of the rule of law. This premise has led to the proposal of "second generation" rule of law assistance to overcome these limitations (Kleinfeld, 2012). These rule of law reforms are meant to go beyond justice institutions and have a broader focus on state-society relations, local norms, and political culture, potentially increasing the effectiveness of aid on rule of law outcomes.

When considering aid's role in World Society more generally, our results support the idea that sector-focused foreign aid can influence the diffusion/adoption of common models by states. This is in keeping with our hypotheses, and with earlier research on aid from a World Society perspective which theorizes a diffusion role for aid (Swiss, 2016b, 2016c). Still, our evidence suggests that aid's influence on isomorphism may have its limits when it comes to supporting not only the spread of models, but their institutionalization and efficacy. Consequently, foreign aid may augment the discrepancy between the law on the books and the law in practice—a finding that corroborates Halliday and Carruthers' (2007) study of corporate bankruptcy laws. Though this may be a finding specific to rule of law, if replicated in other studies of sector-focused aid, it would point to a potential limitation of World Society processes in promoting development. Indeed, we may find evidence to suggest that aid's role in supporting diffusion far exceeds that of supporting implementation of common models and practices among states, with aid potentially contributing to—rather than lessening—the decoupling between state institutional structure and practice.

Future research should explore the aid–rule of law relationship more closely to understand the micro-level dynamics of how aid initiatives support the diffusion of these approaches, as well as to better understand the reasons why aid's influence appears to diminish when it comes to the promotion of the rule of law. Additional case studies of specific security sector reform and rule of law initiatives would be useful future research in this regard. Likewise, as only a single sector-focused study of the role aid plays in diffusing World Society models, researchers should look to investigate the role of aid in diffusion of other world cultural norms around environment, human rights, education, and more. Only by intensifying the examination of foreign aid's role in the diffusion and enactment processes described by World Society theory will we get a fuller sense of how aid shapes isomorphism among aid recipient states.

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DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

The data that support the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request.

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NOTES

[1] While many studies of the effects of foreign aid consider aid flows in terms of per capita aid received, or as a percentage of a country's annual GDP, we specify aid as the aggregate annual flow because there is no theoretical justification to do otherwise given the nature of the institutional adoption and institutionalization process we are modeling (see Uslaner, 1976). Aid directed at such reforms would neither be proportional to the size of a country's population nor its economy, and arguably could be relatively consistent in cost across different country contexts. Furthermore, bilateral aid donors seldom make aid allocations based on a per capita or percentage of GDP basis, focusing instead on funding specific projects which target specific recipient country or donor priorities.

[2] As with our aid measures, we add one to account for zeros and then take the log (base 2) of each logged control variable.

[3] Hazard ratios (HR) represent the risk of an event occurring at a given point in time given a one unit change in the variable. An HR above one represents an increased risk, while an HR below one indicates reduced risk (Stare & Maucort-Boulch, 2016).

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ORIGINAL ARTICLE

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Shame and ("managed") resentment: Emotion and entitlement among Israeli mothers living in poverty

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Abstract

Of the range of negative emotional states, shame is commonly found to characterize experiences of people living in poverty. However, relatively little attention has been directed toward exploring other emotions that accompany the shame. Not exploring other emotions, the possibility that working-class mothers go through a struggling emotional experience in relation to their experiences of how authorities validate their belonging, is left out of scope. Exploring the notion of resentment creates a conceptual space for considering this possibility, as it flags the importance of belonging and entitlement for mothers living in poverty. I analyze these issues here, by applying "translocational positionality" which stresses how people take up positions relating to experiences of (non-) belonging and entitlement which are informed by struggles over inclusion and resources. As such, it stresses the links between struggles of belonging and struggles for securing access to resources. It affords the opportunity to identify the emotional/affectual dimension of struggles that would otherwise be implicit at best. A Resentment focused analysis of structured interviews conducted with 90 mothers, from seven ethno-national categories, living in poverty in Israel enabled me to analyze

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issues of belonging and entitlement as part of a continuous struggle for resources, pitched against welfare practices which ostensibly support mothers and families in need, but in fact apply means-tested and other exclusionary principles to leave mothers without the assistance that would protect them from shame.

KEYWORDS
belonging, class relations, entitlement, resentment, shame, translocational positionality

1 | INTRODUCTION

Living in poverty has been associated, by several authors, with the experience of shame and stigma (Ali et al., 2018; Walker, 2014). Lister's notion of Othering, together with her emphasis on poverty as a mechanism of exclusion (2004) was subsequently developed by Jo's (2013) discussion of shame. More findings indicated experiences of shame triggered by shouldering responsibility for failure (Chase and Walker, 2013; Skeggs & Loveday, 2012), and the loss of self-worth for those trapped in poverty employment (Benjamin, Bernstein, & Motzafi-Haller, 2011). These findings align with the sociological concept of affect, and particularly Scheff's (2003) conceptualization of shame as a relational emotion.

While shame and stigma have received a fair amount of scholarly attention, emotions reflecting the relational dimensions of belonging rarely appear in poverty research. Such emotions are worth studying when belonging provides confidence for negotiating access to institutional and governmental family support and material resources. Directing attention to the emotions of working-class mothers who negotiate enhanced access, is consistent with the way Anthias (2008) conceptualized the salience of belonging to the relational dimension of the struggle for access to resources. Her analysis of belonging may enable a leap in understanding poverty-related emotions by clarifying how shame appears with other emotions. To examine this possibility, I seek to develop a class-focused perspective, following Barbalet's (2001) understanding of resentment as an emotion triggered by deprivation of deserved advantage interpreted as signs of non-belonging. I thus raise here the research question: How do mothers who provide in poverty feel, in their struggles to enhance their access to material resources?

To enable my consideration of the possibility that claims for belonging against welfare authorities' signification of non-belonging, trigger resentment, even if managed, I separate relations in which shame develops from relations in which resentment appears. I follow mothers' emotional experiences while struggling along different intersecting social locations and their views on how authorities validate their belonging. Thus, I apply the concept of "translocational positionality" (TP) (Anthias, 2009), that is, an approach to the complexity of social locations and their intersections (e.g., gender, ethno-nationality, and class).

Despite its theoretical strengths, the relevance of TP to research on mothers living in poverty remains largely unexplored. One possible explanation for this is that researchers have tended to focus on *intersectionality* as an effective theory of mutual constitution of gender, class, and ethno-nationality (Choo & Ferree, 2010), at the expense of the relational nature of positionality and resource distribution and contestation. The advantage of a TP-informed approach, Anthias (2009) argues, lies in its emphasis on the contextual relationship between intersecting social locations and struggles by actors. The struggle to enhance access to resources, she points out, often involves struggling to refute a given belonging, or struggling to make claims to a refused one.

Moreover, TP processes are active sense-makings of belonging; it occurs in the context of accepting—or distancing—oneself from the hegemonic gaze of the community—inter alia through the struggle for securing the entitlements and privileges of citizenship. TP has two dimensions. First, it encapsulates the individual's concern about the community's gaze when one desires the status of belonging and inclusion. This dimension can expose the individual to shame (Scheff, 2003) if individuals are made to feel that they do not satisfy the community's criteria for self-worth. Life in poverty, as Lister (2004) shows, connects concern about the community's gaze with shame; the shame of worthlessness or stigma implied, for example, by and during interactions with street-level bureaucrats (see also Jo, 2013; Walker, 2014).

The other dimension of TP can help us to focus on the process of distancing, away from the community gaze and thus liberating one's self from its value criteria. When claims to social rights are not met and one's social standing is violated, resentment can easily emerge. Here, the strength of TP becomes clear, through directing attention to the ensuing struggles—often energized by resentment (Barbalet, 2001). Not enough attention has been paid to this dimension in analyses of living in poverty. The expectation of such struggles has led both earlier (e.g., Barbalet, 2001) and recent (e.g., Turner, 2014) scholarship to focus on the emotion of *resentment*. The struggle to belong can be associated with this understanding of resentment. Indeed, Lister's collaboration with researchers on the topic of the citizenship of young people (Smith, Lister, Middleton, & Cox, 2005) elicited such an indication: resentment was the emotion most readily associated with the rejection of citizenship and its presumed entitlements.

The notion of entitlement, and its place in the lives of mothers living in poverty, is key to understanding the lived experiences of working-class mothers in relation to welfare support—its accessibility or not, the struggle to secure it in an era of increasingly restrictive means-tested assessments. TP facilitates an analysis of entitlement (and, thus, claims to resources) as a dynamic dimension of belonging associated primarily with stigmatized ethno-national categories and the forms of exclusion that they experience. Applying a TP perspective to poverty directs attention to the relationships and relational experiences within which shame and resentment emerge.

In what follows, I unfold my approach to the study of the duality between shame and resentment, and their co-existence in the experiences of mothers seeking institutional welfare support. I begin by explicating my understanding of the notion of affect, and then proceed to linking TP with the emotions of shame and resentment.

1.1 | Affect within class sociology

As early as the 1970s, Sennett and Cobb (1972) interpreted class as an emotional matter. The diminution of personal dignity due to limited access to employment-based social respectability was, they suggested, of particularly negative emotional significance, Later, Sennett (1998) recognized similar manifestations of emotional pain in the failure of individuals to adapt to the expectations of the new economy. Similarly, in the lives of people living in poverty, diminished dignity tends to be experienced as shame (Lister, 2004); lack of success supposedly reflecting personal failures, regardless of the structural hurdles commonly elided in such assessments of personal worth (Chase & Walker, 2013). Even where studies do report anger (Ali et al., 2018), it is still interpreted as anger towards the self—embracing the institutional negating gaze. Introducing a sociological perspective on affect, Hochschild (1979, 1983) questioned such essential generalizations, emphasizing instead the "conscious and deliberate effort to shape feeling" (1979, p. 559) to manage them. For her, a class position can only be associated with an emotional experience if attention is directed to the question of "inappropriate affect"—specifically, asking how emotion work transformed a particular feeling. Others underline affect as a primarily bodily and relational experience (Burkitt, 2014) and Barbalet (2001), added a class perspective focusing on "reflex emotions" or "moral emotions," terms coined by Jasper (2018). The former refers to automatic responses to events, and the latter to (dis)approval of our

own or others' actions based on immediate moral intuitions or principles. Ahmed's (2014) politics of emotions, indicating emotions of dominant social categories towards the "Other," makes it possible to engage with both Hochschild's (1983) and Barbalet's (2001) scholarship: to conceptualize affect as a gender/class/ethno-national political phenomenon, reflecting power relations between discursive and institutional expectations (Benjamin, 2003). Emotion here is not reduced to the feeling experienced by the subject, but rather is understood as the interaction in which the feeling arises, and through which it is transformed as the interaction itself unfolds (Barbalet, 2001, p. 67). In my view, it is possible to see affect as representing a combination of emotions reflecting the various relationships we inhabit: a mother in poverty may feel proud of her child, ashamed of her dependency on her family of origin, resentful towards authorities who refuse to respond to her needs, and so on. One emotion isn't transformed by the others but, rather, experienced according to the relational awareness. A similar relational notion of affect was presented by Burkitt (2014) but my perspective links affectual responses, such as resentment, to wider struggles, and contributes to a political analysis of class relations and how these distinctions manifest at the intersectional and individual level.

1.2 | Affect and belonging within TP

Anthias (2016) suggests that *belonging*—or rather, the politics of belonging, and articulations of non-belonging—are salient to understanding claims of entitlement to resources, within the framework of TP. Here, I apply it in the analysis of poverty as experienced by mothers caught in the intersections of gender/class/ethno-national identity. One central feature of this intersectional approach is not merely demonstrating how belonging is tied to access to resources, but also the relational and contradictory social locations (or translocations) people find themselves in. The dependency of belonging on relational validation directs attention to the ambiguities or contradictions of belonging—for instance, where formal citizenship does not suffice for access to resources. Anthias's concept offers a class relations perspective that focuses on the struggle to strengthen access to resources through claims to belonging—and therefore to rights. With class understood as the unequal distribution of material resources and power inequalities, being primarily based on unequal material conditions, a class relations framework, Anthias proposes, must ask how belonging (e.g., citizenship) is relevant to access to resources. Poverty is created when belonging as a citizen does not suffice for formal eligibility for institutional welfare support; poverty increases, belonging failing to provide the leverage for family or community support when welfare authorities deny one's claims.

However, from a TP perspective, the gender and ethno-national dimensions of a mother's struggle to enhance access to resources without compromising one's dignity sheds important light on her relationships with others. When mothers belong to stigmatized ethno-national categories, they are conscious of the possibility that those around them—particularly those in power positions—signify their non-belonging by devaluing them as sources of danger, deviance, deficit, and disgust (Anthias, 2016). How do they feel when they encounter repeated degradation? Likewise, affect is present in the gendered worrying about fulfilling caring obligations aiming at protecting children from being Othered in their own circles of belonging.

To apply Anthias's perspective in the struggle for value, between welfare bureaucrats and individuals living in conditions of intensified devaluation (Skeggs & Loveday, 2012), I focus on emotions infused in notions of belonging or non-belonging and Othering. Belonging provides the context of the inner interpretation of affect and its appropriateness: for those struggling to maintain membership of one's ethnic community or family as sources of instrumental support, shame likely predominates once the failure to provide becomes visible (Walker, 2014) within these circles. For those who encounter institutional refusal to recognize their belonging to an imagined collective of citizens entitled for welfare support, the bureaucratic act may not be respected; shame, in such circumstances, may seem an "inappropriate affect" (Hochschild, 1979). This does not mean that it won't be experienced; rather, it indicates that other emotions, such as resentment, will be generated.

1.3 | Shame and poverty

A recent account of shame and poverty suggests that shame is a powerful institutional outcome of a political policy discourse guided by policy makers' attempts to attack citizens' sense of entitlement (Jo, 2013). Several mechanisms are deployed to this end, such as holding such groups responsible for their impoverished circumstances, or suggesting that they are endangering equality by demanding more than their fair share (Krumer-Nevo & Benjamin, 2010). In other words, shame and embarrassment reflect class relations where welfare bureaucrats constitute personhood as contingent on self-reliance and employment (Skeggs, 2011). Nevertheless, assuming shame as outcome is not necessarily consistent with the third of Lister's (2004) four types of resistance typology: subversion of the norms emerges in dealings with welfare authorities that may involve the rejection of negative labelling. Such rejection, particularly when belonging is not a given but must be struggled for, can protect welfare applicants from the shame of stigma (Walker, 2014). Thus, it could be the case that at intersecting gender/class/ethno-national specific social locations, shame will not arise when turning for welfare support. An over-emphasis on shame frames recipients of welfare support as sharing the hegemonic definition of their inferiority and undeservedness, believing in their shameful worthlessness (Loveday, 2016). So, what are the emotional responses generated when shaming is attempted by authorities—but those living in poverty do not share the value system, and interpret refusal for support as undermining an entitlement anchored by belonging?

1.4 | Turning to resentment

Barbalet's (2001) macro-sociological account of emotions emerges from a class relations perspective. It emphasizes the role of emotions in instigating class action, in the form of a collective endeavor to assert the right to the resources perceived as one's entitlement. Barbalet's interpretation of Marshall's (1973) theory of citizenship suggests that once someone is deprived of a right, denial of this presumed entitlement cultivates resentment and action. Barbalet further argues that resentment has the potential to ignite social change, due to the strong connection between it and the (preceding) confident assertion of one's entitlement to some social or economic benefit. Such confidence is embedded in the framework of social relations; but it is also contingent on the recognition of one's entitlement by others within the community (Honneth, 1996). Entitlement, in this sense, is related to the feeling or understanding of what one deserves by virtue of the status of citizen; resentment, for its part, emerges when this presumed entitlement is undermined. The regime of means-tested benefits underpins this transitional nature of entitlement and is reflected in the evolution of welfare policies. This evolving paradigm confirms Sayer's (2005) view that emotions are shaped, inter alia, by state ideology. Frequent changes to eligibility criteria, placing hitherto "deserving" as "undeserving," incubates a transient and unstable notion of entitlement. Resentment, thus, can be expected to be triggered by the changing face of the welfare state, and by the growing awareness of the state's role in creating poverty.

While resentment manifests an active denunciation of a social bond with a person or a body that failed to act appropriately and respect the entitlement of oneself, shame is a sense of loss over a valued social bond (Scheff, 2003). For its part, shame reflects moments when the negating social gaze is contained, rather than refuted. Interestingly, Scheff's (2003) theory of shame, which presents shame as a master emotion incorporating humiliation and other forms of disgrace, connects shame to rage—not unlike Barbalet's (2001) discussion of resentment. This similarity becomes particularly apparent in Ray's (2014) consideration of shame in inter-class and inter-racial relations through an analysis of protest violence. Away from collective protest, Scheff's (2003) earlier suggestions, linking shame and confrontational emotions, hints at the demand for a specific form of emotional management when applied to resentment. Indeed, Turner (2014) recently suggested that resentment has changed its display rules—a response to the risk of possible loss. Apparently, resentment should be "muted," in the sense of being *managed*, and is thus excluded from direct communication.

1.5 | Conceptual framework

Because TP articulates a constant struggle against exclusionary social processes, it connects to classed studies of emotions (Sayer, 2005; Turner, 2014; Weyher, 2012). Even if the struggles of those living in poverty, dependency, insecurity, and vulnerability, are not expected to take collective forms, the emotions of struggling individually against the shaming efforts of those who question their entitlement, practically hollowing their citizenship (Jamal, 2007), are central. One possible form of implicit struggle may be the refusal to be shamed; rather, resent welfare bureaucrats. Focusing on this form of individual struggle may reveal a duality of shame and resentment. Embracing the negative gaze of the community, positioning oneself as belonging in terms of accepting the dominant criteria, gives shame a way in; rejecting the negative gaze of authorities who refuse to validate belonging connects to resentment. The concurrent experience of shame and resentment is consistent with Pedwell's work on affect (2014), and her focus on ambivalence or the "ambivalent grammar of emotion and affect" (p. 14). The co-existence of shame and resentment illustrate the intimate co-dependence of structural, material, affective, and discursive dimensions in mothers' lives.

In the Israeli case discussed below, long-standing ethno-national hierarchies mean that processes of exclusion occur in the context of overarching ethno-national hierarchies implying non-belonging. Against the backdrop of such exclusion, the individual's sense of entitlement for support emerges from three sources: the realization of formal and legal rights and the stated commitment to ethno-national equality; the historical functioning of the welfare state during the pre-neoliberal era; and finally, ongoing comparisons against other individuals deemed eligible for support—who, in other words, have confirmed their entitlement. These three sources of entitlement suggest that shame and resentment may be experienced when one's eligibility—in the present case, for welfare support from the state—is denied.

1.6 | Ethno-national hierarchies in Israel

Class, ethnicity and gender inequalities, as they manifest in the Israeli context, intersect in the sense that while they are mutually constituted, each nevertheless has a distinct place in institutional policy development. Recent accounts of inequality in Israel demonstrate the systematic and persistent nature of inequality in Israel, dating back to the establishment of the state in 1948 (Cohen & Gordon, 2018). These include polarizing gender and class inequalities with regards to housing, education, quality employment, healthcare, and pension provision. Of the eight ethno-national categories in Israel, Jews of European descent (Ashkenazi Jews) sit at the top of the hierarchy. Poverty rates are lowest in this group, and generally relate to older members of the category. Much higher rates of poverty characterize the other categories: Jews from Middle Eastern and North African countries (Mizrahi Jews); immigrants from the former Soviet Union (FSU); immigrants from Ethiopia; Christian Palestinians; the Druze; Muslim Palestinians; and Bedouins. Many scholars have presented evidence for this hierarchy, arguing that the Israeli context cultivates a "hollow" citizenship for Bedouin, Druze, and Muslim Palestinians (Jamal, 2007). Nevertheless, these ethno-national inequalities are not directly reflected in eligibility to welfare support. They are cultivated instead via institutional allocation of budgeting towards regional (non)development, employment opportunities and differential commitment to social rights, primarily housing, education, and health services. Thus, discrimination is more subtle and complex than what manifests at the level of street-level bureaucracy—at times members of the same ethno-national categories.

2 | METHODOLOGY

The research team conducted structured interviews with 90 Israeli mothers, formally recognized as "living in poverty" and in receipt of at least one allowance during 2016–2017. All the mothers had been living in poverty

for lengthy periods of time; very few had experiences from earlier periods in their lives when they didn't need welfare support, and thus can be grouped as belonging to the lower echelon of the working class. The focus of TP on access to material resources as reflecting a struggle over belonging led to a focus on ethno-national categories: Muslim-Palestinians, Bedouin, Druze, members of the Jewish Ethiopian community, ultra-Orthodox Jews, immigrants from the former Soviet Union, and Israeli-born Jews (all but one of whom were of Mizrahi origin). A purposive sampling technique was used to ensure the comparability of categories, as well as comparability of the municipal authorities in which participants reside. Participants were selected according to the following criteria: they identified with one (or more) of three types of low-income household compositions (single mothers, families with more than four children, and families including a child with special needs); and received at least one form of state allowance, including unemployment benefit, income support, disability allowance and/or rent support. The ages of the participants ranged from 23 to 55, with most in their 30s and 40s; 19 were in full-time employment; 28 in part-time employment; 10 were unemployed; and 33 were not active in the labor market.

Participants were recruited through three different methods. First, social workers from social welfare departments in municipal authorities classified as low socio-economic clusters introduced the study to potential respondents. Second, notices were posted in these departments, inviting mothers to participate in the study. Third, a snowball recruitment technique was used where respondents were asked to refer other potential participants to the research team. Those who matched the selection criteria were contacted by phone, setting a meeting place and time for the interview. Participants were given a gift card, to the value of two hours' employment at minimum wage, as compensation for their time. For ethical reasons, the participants were told the truth about the purpose of the study—an investigation of barriers and resources in the alleviation of poverty—and were promised full anonymity. Thus, all the names used in the analysis are pseudonyms.

Interviews were conducted in the interviewee's first language. Interviewers used a structured interview guide, which included open questions on several topics: demographics; perceptions of lack and scarcity in everyday life; employment history and attempts to secure paid employment; encounters with welfare bureaucrats; the receipt of welfare benefits; and service actualization. Interviews lasted between 45 and 90 min, and were mostly audiotaped and fully transcribed for analysis. The interviews began with the assurance that the anonymity of the participants would be protected. Rapport between interviewer and interviewee was established through a short and open introductory discussion about the neighborhood or area in which the interviewee resided.

Charmaz's (2006) guidelines for grounded theory analysis provides a practical approach to interpreting complex social phenomena and developing theoretical analysis. Accordingly, I incorporated repeated readings and systematic theme extraction. Shame emerged as an inductive theme: almost all the interviewees referred to instances of scarcity and lack, experienced either by themselves or their children, where this vulnerability was visible to other members of their communities and/or ground-level bureaucrats and welfare administrators. However, shame did not feel as though it covered the full emotional complexity of the interview material, and the encounter with interviewees describing calls for single mothers to stand up for their rights, so I turned to Barbalet's suggestion, thereafter applying the emotion of resentment deductively by explicitly asking what the interviewees resented.

2.1 | Findings

In the struggle to enhance access to resources crucial for caring for their children, mothers often encountered an intimidating apathy, rather than the empathy they expected. Such encounters can become reflexive moments in which shame/humiliation/insecurity could be expected. But participants didn't usually describe such experiences. Similarly, ethnicity wasn't mentioned in the interviews. The three sections below unpack the duality of shame and resentment, presenting three TP processes and describing the ways through which belonging—namely, validated respectability—is negotiated.

2.2 | Shame as closeness—resentment as distancing

In Barbalet's discussion, shame is described as experienced in diverse conditions, three of which could be relevant here: (a) shame as a response to the belief that we fail to stand the expectations of members of our circle of belonging; (b) shame as a response to being publicly exposed as wrong in our expectations, understanding, conduct—this type of shame was associated by Scheff with triggering rage, as a way of rehabilitating our harmed social value; and (c) shame as a reaction to excess status, namely, worth attributed by others in ways that are not experienced as relevant. In their attempts to minimize the impact of the community's gaze, and the risk of failing to meet the community's value criteria, mothers emphasized the exceptionality of shame referring only to Barblet's second type:

> *I remember a moment… [when] I didn't have any money. I had to give the children something to eat… They had to eat, I had to knock on my neighbor's door, and she gave me 50 shekels to go get something. I won't forget that moment, I felt so bad. I'm never going to do that again… I mean… it's because I never … (Barkia, Jewish Ethiopian community, 5 children)*

In moments of urgent lack, the possibility of relying on ethnic circles of belonging presented a possible solution; but this ethnic closeness also created a trigger for shame. Because poverty is regularly mediated by welfare payments, shame comes to characterize experiences when support has been interrupted or halted; specific circumstances prevent application of the formally stated policy, impinging the understanding that underlines both eligibility and belonging. Shame seems to be a response to the explicitness of their dependency, with mothers embracing the belief that dependency, either on family members or on welfare authorities, is wrong. Shame is triggered by bureaucratic decisions of non-eligibility; but it is experienced when belonging is challenged by the gaze of family members turned to for support.

Other mothers interviewed described similar experiences in terms of occasions of dual risk—material risk, and the risk of impairing one's sense of self-worth. In the case described below, the issue was not one of interrupted support, but rather the consequences of the gap between support offered and the family's needs:

> *It was a Thursday, the tenth of the month. I had to buy some groceries because the girls take food to school every day. The boys have meals at school, but I needed food for the girls and I didn't have even one shekel. My brother gets his paycheck on the tenth of the month…. I was really ashamed to ask him, because I know how difficult it is for him too, and that he doesn't have enough for his own kids. But I had to call him. I couldn't leave my daughters with no lunch. So I called and explained, and he was OK; he said: "No problem, come". He knew how difficult it was for me to ask [him]. (Fatma, Bedouin, 3 children)*

Here, we can see at play two standards of value threatening the self-worth of the mother living in poverty: the standard of the reliable parent, one whose children can depend upon her; and the standard of not shaming one's brother, given that he too may be living in scarcity and lack.

An additional standard of value emerged in an interview with another Bedouin mother, Basma (mother of 4), when she referred to her own mother: "My mother always asks me: 'you have your allowance, why can't you manage?'" This is revealing with regard to the expected standard for the normative citizen—competent and capable of managing one's affairs independently with minimal support or intervention from the welfare bureaucracy.

In the context of harsh material scarcity, resentment took the shape of criticism of the perceived (or experienced) indifference of the agents of the state:

> *I live [in a tin hut with no windows] for five years now. They came once to see my situation, promised whatever, but never did a thing. They don't respond. I'll say it in front of everybody: they promised me [a home visit] but never did anything. And you know what, so many people work there, stay in the offices for so many hours, I don't want to be impolite, but really, they sit there for hours, they count their hours,*

they let their time pass… or I don't know what they're doing there, but they don't behave properly, or they don't do. In short, they just won't help people. (Fatma, Bedouin, 3 children)

Whatever it is that the bureaucrats do in the welfare office, the mother asserts, it does not satisfy a professional obligation to work with the community. The bureaucrats are uninterested in their living conditions, and do not offer relevant assistance. Instead, as Fatma suggests, they are preoccupied with their own positions, leaving those in need without an appropriate response to their requests for support. The agents of the welfare bureaucracy, in short, are abusing their positions of responsibility.

In a separate interview, another mother voiced resentful assessment of the welfare bureaucracy:

Once, they gave me 1,000 shekels, but how far can the thousand shekels take me? The truth is… all I can say is that there are so many people who need help, and you don't help them because you feel that sometimes they cheat you. I hope you'll come out of your offices and see how and where they live and then, you'll make your decision. (Nuria, Bedouin, 10 children)

One source of resentment is the perception that welfare bureaucrats are indifferent to the circumstances of people seeking support. This gives them the distance required to play the game of the suspicious stranger: one who frames requests for help as an attempt to cheat the system. The form of speech deployed here by the mother is of knowledge and understanding, coupled with the reasonable demand that welfare bureaucrats actually engage with the community—visit the community and see how people live, rather than assuming that they want to cheat the system. It seems that the discourse used to define the "rational" is Nuria's, rather than an understanding appropriated from the authorities. Despite her experience of exclusion, she does not question her sense of belonging, or her ability to use a "rational" value criterion in resenting the state and its representatives. The emotional politics evoked by refuting the shame maintains the separation of shame and resentment, even though their propinquity is clear. Resentment allows interviewees to devalue the status of the welfare bureaucrats because they focus on their power position, whilst remaining indifferent to the needs that they ought to respond to.

To sum up. The first TP process is that through which non-belonging is colored by a process of Othering. The shame experienced here exposes a situation in which mothers living in poverty are left without the necessary resources for themselves and their children, and are obliged to turn to the private support of the family and the community. The resentment manifested in such circumstances is organized around the indifference of the welfare bureaucrats—the very people mandated to address their social needs. Othering forces mothers to experience the shame of a conditional belonging to families and communities—their ultimate sources of support—while resenting the institutional acts of non-belonging that leave them unsupported. This positionality process emerged in interviews with the mothers whose belonging is scarcely acknowledged in the treatment received from welfare bureaucrats. This emerging TP process was repeated in the analysis of interviews with Bedouin mothers and mothers from the Jewish Ethiopian community. These mothers tended to encounter high levels of neglect, consistent with social Othering; they are the ones who resent the signifiers of Othering, which push them into explicit dependency on the extended family and community.

2.3 | Exposing the daily routines of disentitlement

One particularly painful encounter with authorities is that of disentitlement. Disentitlement was the experience of mothers who knew that others had confirmed their entitlement to some form of support, but could not make the bureaucracy acknowledge their own entitlement—at times due to what scholars have called "administrative exclusion" (Brodkin & Malay-Majmund, 2010). Entitlement was not always formally negated; however, structural and administrative mishaps blocked opportunities to access the support they were entitled to. In other circumstances,

their presumption to entitlement is rejected. In the description below, rejection is experienced by a mother seeking help with dental treatment:

> *I only went once to the welfare office to ask for help with my teeth but then she [the social worker] almost shouted that she can't help me and… I could tell that other people heard and I felt… how can I tell you… I didn't go there again because of the shame… (Samar, Muslim-Palestinian, 2 children)*

A hierarchical differentiation between the mother in need and the social worker is performed, producing shame and fear. The social worker, representing the institutional context of non-Jewish municipalities (i.e., lack of resources), conveys the message of non-belonging, regardless of citizenship and formal entitlement. The shame limits opportunities for future participation in activities that may require one's entitlement and belonging—whether in the form of repeated applications for material support, or in her capacity to fulfil the threshold of maternal commitment while suffering from toothache. Shame is further triggered by the visible deterioration of her children, living in scarcity:

> *Once my son stole a 10 NIS coin that he saw on the teacher's table, and they [phoned] me from school. I was so ashamed that day and I cried a river of tears, I cried because of our condition and because I want so much that my children will be the best in the world, and instead they deteriorate to places that are… not good. (Ganan, Druze, 3 children)*

Mothers struggling against acts that negate their entitlement, imposing the understanding of non-belonging, reach a particularly low point when they feel that their children are hurt by the exclusion. They report the experience of this shame as closely associated to that of the display of their failure to their community. Ganan's speech is revealing: A whole school inflicts its negating gaze on her because she failed to manage and fulfil her children's needs. Shame becomes a vehicle for constituting belonging and performing one's acceptance of the community values—even if situationally, it is impossible to abide by them.

Shame, then, reveals the dynamics at play between striving to belong on the one hand, and being exposed as incapable of converting belonging into access to resources on the other. The consequence is the public exposure of non-belonging and incomplete (hollow) citizenship. The interruption of one's participation in the communal sphere is embedded, emotionally, in a one-directional process of devaluation; those who control resources are left uncriticized. For others, however, the realization that the experienced scarcity constitutes an institutional attempt to shame them is clearer, and gives rise to resentment.

Moreover, because social actors experience resentment when an external agency denies them opportunities or valued resources (including status) otherwise available to them (Barbalet, 2001, p. 68), resentment also allows for the expression of a demand for social justice (Jasper, 2018). Resentment presents a position that embodies the notion of struggle and resistance. Indeed, mothers resented the acts of direct deprivation that followed denial of their eligibility. Deprived entitlement triggers resentment:

> *And then they told me I've got a debt of 7,000 shekels. I asked how come, and they said I was employed… and I'm not allowed to work when they [welfare authorities] pay me [allowances], and still I don't understand how that can be. And then they reduced the monthly allowance, and I begged to explain that this must be a mistake, but I had no one to talk to. And then they took an additional 900 shekels from me, and I was so frustrated. And to this day, I haven't got my money back. (Samira, Muslim-Palestinian, 2 children)*

Prior acknowledgement of membership in a "deserving" category continues to validate one's sense of entitled citizenship, and perceptions of the inequity of an abusive system. From a position of entitlement, the direct experience of a deprivation created through an administrative "mistake"—such as the imposition of an unfair financial penalty for working, or the creation of an inexplicable debt—is experienced as a deliberate act by the state to thrust a family into

poverty. Samira framed this experience within a narrative of blame when describing her managed resentment ("frustrated"), a reflection of her reluctance to accept the logic of deprivation; also, reflection of her need to maintain the image of the "rational actor," competent and able to control negative emotions. In implying that the welfare authorities created her poverty, she does not need to elaborate on her actual feelings. Asserting that there is "no one to talk to" is a powerful enough indication of how she felt. Another mother presented an additional blaming narrative:

> *Before I began work, we used to get income support, as my husband's income was really low, and we had no money. The month I began to work, they took it from us. I don't want to hear of this National Insurance Institute. They see that we're a large family, and [yet] they take the allowance away from us. (Naila, Muslim-Palestinian, 5 children)*

Like Samira, Naila's resentment of the act of direct deprivation that she experienced is expressed in similar terms, tucked away in the phrase "I don't want to hear of…": a phrase that implies the betrayal of all the accepted rules of engagement and communication, and the end of trust. Resentment is expressed, but it is managed in the sense that the negative emotions will be excised from communications between her and the bureaucrats who made the decision. The allowance—or, to be precise, its withdrawal—is experienced as the active creation of material scarcity: "They see we're a large family." Nothing else needs to be added; the statement is enough to assert that depriving a large family of an allowance has obvious ramifications.

To sum up, the second TP process splits the experience of belonging into two: the need for the community's approving gaze, and the need for formal eligibility to be translated into actual meaningful support. This split of belonging creates a juxtaposition of negative values: visible shame, the shame associated with the failure to meet community values, associated with the "NO" answers to requests for the forms of support that family circles are unable to offer; and resentment, which is created when an established right of entitlement (to support) is not recognized. TP here means that mothers must work very hard to sustain the respectability that underpins their belonging, against their awareness of an institutional context depriving them of their entitlements. That this positionality process emerged from my analysis of the interviews with Muslim and Druze mothers can be interpreted as articulating the racism which members of these social categories encounter, through being denied the status of eligibility. Their entitlement is clear; but it is often ignored and remains unfulfilled.

2.4 | The ambivalent road to respectable belonging

The struggle for appropriate motherhood serves to signify belonging and non-belonging by the mothers who felt relatively safer, because their struggles against the bureaucracy ultimately yielded them the rights that accrued from their status of eligibility. However, the success of the struggle didn't save them from moments of shame during attempts to negotiate and assert their respectability through the status of their belonging within communities.

> *I never let [my daughter] feel she is missing out on anything. I always worked two jobs. She had everything she needed, never any brand names, though… she just had to wait for me to get there, so yes, it had to be at my own pace…. She had everything, just that it wasn't at the moment she wanted it.*
>
> *Q: So there wasn't anything that you couldn't eventually get?*
>
> *A: There was one thing… There was the school trip to Poland, that I couldn't afford. That was a crisis for me, and I will never forgive myself for that. There were no options for postponing it. And, you know, I never ever went abroad myself. I don't even have a passport. (Riki, Israeli-born Mizrahi, 1 child)*

A prominent local value standard for Israeli Jewish families, the high-school trip to the Nazi concentration camps of Auschwitz has over time become an integral aspect of securing a child's sense of belonging. This is from a nationalistic perspective, it should be noted; nevertheless, it is very difficult to negotiate away. Riki interprets her inability to fund the trip in terms of her failure to achieve the standard of the good mother and citizen, understanding that no amount of emotional support will suffice to protect her daughter from the shame of exclusion. Riki is, generally, willing to make all the necessary efforts to secure her (and her daughter's) sense of communal belonging; but she lacks the resources needed for her daughter's participation in an expensive but pivotal activity. Her shame can be seen as emerging in response to the mixture of belonging and non-belonging that mothers living with poverty must contend with. As members of the Jewish collective, their children qualify for a place in the collective imagination, and can participate in collective activities; but the level of expense required exposes the contingent nature of their membership of the collective.

For these relatively "safer" mothers, resentment was triggered by the inability to see and acknowledge the assessment of their eligibility (or not) for support as rational. Resentment repeatedly manifested in the self-presentation of the interviewees, as experts on the discursive requirements of the state. Intensified resentment was triggered by the formal "disregard" policy of the National Insurance Institute, who cut welfare allowances after the smallest increase in personal income:

> *The allowance is for the children, but what about me? Am I not a person? Don't I have the right to live? Why can't I take a job and cover my own expenses? Why do they tell me: "If you go out to work, we will reduce your child support allowance"? How am I expected to live and provide for them? Out of 2,000 shekels, that must be a joke! It must be a joke. (Bina, ultra-Orthodox, 5 children)*

Bina expresses her resentment by suggesting that the current policy is a cruel joke, which makes it impossible for mothers to protect their children from the shame of poverty, regardless of state support. The poverty that exists within the framework of the formal legal right that should offer some form of protection creates a clear sense of entitlement to a more rational policy; in turn, this conceptualization allows Bina to present a clear rationale for the form that welfare policy ought to take—respecting her right to work, to provide for her children, to assert her belonging through meeting the threshold for community respectability.

Leah expressed a similar sense of resentment when unpacking the irrational logic of the rigid formal policy of child support payments received in lieu of absent and non-supporting fathers—a support mechanism that ceases at 18. On losing this support, mothers must provide for their children, who are not yet independent or in the workforce:

> *For instance, you're eligible for child support, from what I understand, it ends at the age of 18. A child can sue his father [for additional support] when in the army. It's assumed the child can chase after his father, but everybody knows this can't really work. And on top of that, when they are 19, it's assumed they can renew their lawsuit against their father, for not paying. But not all children know that, and go tell your child to do that at age 19. The father, at that point, may be someone the child barely knows but still is hoping… (Leah, Israeli-born, Mizrahi, 2 children)*

Leah's resentment can be seen in her thorough dissection of the known given. By not supporting mothers in providing for their children after 18, relying on the excuse that they can turn to absent fathers, the state consciously condemns the family to even harsher poverty. The resentful welfare recipient has nowhere to go with her need, because her sense of entitlement on behalf of her deserving children—serving the country through military conscription—is not recognized.

Lack of recognition also creates resentment for Ella, who undertook tedious bureaucratic work, trying to fight the means-tested policy:

> *I'm not into screwing the system, but I want the system to give me what I'm eligible for, what my daughter is eligible for. For God's sake! Everybody comes and announces: "a computer for every child", but the small print says that anyone who had a computer is ineligible… Well, … I had a computer ten years ago … so my daughter doesn't get a computer… (Ella, Israeli-born, 3 children)*

Identifying the cracks in one's purported eligibility as a member of a social category creates a sense of deprived entitlement; mothers living in poverty counter this by insisting that the system lacks a rational basis. Knowing better defeats the shaming impact of welfare assistance, which gives rise to resentment.

In summary, the third TP process is that in which the road to respectable belonging is ambivalent. Ambivalence creates the shame of the invitation to participate, which cannot be accepted due to the lack of the necessary funding. Indeed, belonging is ideologically validated, but participation is not ensured. The resentment here exposes the ambivalence, by indicating the lack of rationality inherent in ambiguous support policies, exposing mothers to the holes in a supposedly universal safety net. The third TP process, grounded in the routinized recognition of eligibility and actual support, emerged in my analysis of interviews with Mizrahi, ultra-orthodox and immigrant from the FSU. This may be because mothers aligned with these ethno-national positions struggle against welfare bureaucrats from a power position, where acts of non-belonging are experienced next to the strong rhetoric of nationalistic belonging.

3 | DISCUSSION

Previous research on shame and poverty (Chase & Walker, 2013) emphasized the destructive nature of shame for the individual, for the likelihood of seeking support and for social solidarity. Apparently, those shamed by discursive constructions of their inferiority tend to engage in shaming the "Other"—who, in other circumstances, may have been allies in shared struggle. When it is utilized in a country with strong support for mothers' entitlement (Regev-Masalem, 2014), primarily in the past where motherhood was constructed as a civic contribution (Berkovitch, 1999), shame almost never leads to the undermining of entitlement. Instead, my findings show that shame appears in gender/class situations when mothers were unable to provide for their children and protect them from being shamed at school. Thus, formal refusal to support mothers exposes the gendered outcomes of the refusal to recognize their belonging: a pressure on mothers to become even more dependent on informal support. Nevertheless, their sense of entitlement, as mothers who deserve support, meant that their shame was accompanied by an insistence on blaming the authorities. This confidence gave rise to resentment, creating a duality: shame was not transformed into rage, as in the cycle between shame and rage (Ray, 2014; Scheff, 2003), but rather was delineated to situations in which the gaze of other community members was present.

TP, a perspective that looks at the links between intersecting social locations and how they play out situationally along power hierarchies within experiential and institutional domains (Anthias, 2009) can help us relate belonging to the struggle for enhanced access to resources. This analytically informed my ability to elicit the three processes of emotional duality, highlighting the political dimensions of emotions and intersecting class/gendered/ethno-national relations. Further, the emerging differences in TP processes related in complicated ways to the emotional responses of shame and resentment which evolved, specifically around the material need, and sense of entitlement, for support. When applied to the area of emotions, Anthias's focus on the centrality of TP in relation to the struggling actor is consistent with Aptheker's (1989) notion of women's resistance. While primarily individual, it implies a readiness for a struggle for social change once mobilization of resources would occur. Furthermore, TP validates Barbalet's (2001) contribution on resentment—as an emotion associated with struggles for advantages believed to be one's entitlement, but which one has been deprived of. Indeed, shame among the working-class mothers in my study was not rejected or transformed. It was accompanied with the emotion of

resentment in different relational situations. Thus, my study develops existing knowledge on shame and social class by specifying how it is accompanied by additional emotions such as resentment.

I present a complex, ambivalent, and primarily struggling emotional experience of working-class mothers along different intersecting social locations and belongings and in relation to different experiences of how authorities validate their belonging: (a) when belonging is scarcely acknowledged, mothers manage their resentment of the dubious recognition; (b) when belonging is acknowledged but not translated into sufficient formal support, mothers managed their resentment of their deprivation; (c) when belonging is acknowledged and formal support given but participation is not ensured, mothers manage their resentment of their irrational treatment. I found that shame is the experience of TP processes where belonging is mutually validated. A mother wants to belong to her family and community and is positively responded to; resentment is experienced when belonging is longed for as a vehicle for access to support and resources, but is not validated; instead, mothers encounter barriers to support despite their confidence in their entitlement. The TP process becomes important in emphasizing emotions as relationship: it is only when the individual experiences the gaze of the other as valuable, that a "threat" to the social bond (Scheff, 2003), is relevant.

The main limitation of this study lies in the absence of direct interview questions exploring the ethno-national aspects of poverty. Future research should examine the possibilities raised here regarding the way belonging enables a position-specific duality of shame and resentment, and indeed characterize specific ethno-national/class/gender struggles. Future research should also examine the possibility that resentment has the power to shield mothers in poverty from the shamed position, the endpoint of the negating gaze of bureaucrats that (deliberately or not) seeks to criminalize and stigmatize them. This possibility is consistent with Carolyn Pedwell's work on affect (2014) and her focus on ambivalence or "ambivalent grammar of emotion and affect" (p. 14). Engaging with such ambivalence as responding to governance and regulation, allow to disentangle the confusion of diverse feelings. The co-existence of shame and resentment, as two different experiences illustrate the intimate co-dependence of structural, material, affective, and discursive dimensions in mothers' lives. Moreover, if shame is theorized without underlining resentment, critical attention to the political implications of particular mobilization of resentment is impaired.

DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

Interview data in Hebrew is available. Please approach the author.

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ORIGINAL ARTICLE

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Max Weber's antinomies of the Fall: Paradisiacal ethics and the populist *Zeitgeist*

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Abstract

This article points out that the way the biblical myth of the Fall has been interpreted in the Judeo-Christian tradition is a crucial heuristic in the works of Max Weber, an assessment that hitherto largely remained unnoticed. Nevertheless, Weber's understanding of everyday action is closely related to the various religious interpretations of what deprivations were suffered by humanity as a consequence of Adam's original sin and the paradisiacal yearning for salvation it engenders. Moreover, Weber's interpretation of the Fall is characteristic for his tragic sociology in the sense that it guarantees the freedom to subjectively create self-conscious meaning that is, however, no longer embedded in a context of common knowledge. His solution to this epistemological problem involves a Nietzschean heroic existentialism whereby individuals give personality to one's character by freely choosing their own values. Yet, he also realizes that many will not be able to choose by themselves and, therefore, will be attracted by charismatic leaders that can invoke a paradisiacal community of choice. Weber's modern antinomical interpretation of the Fall is still relevant today because it provides insight in the epistemological underpinnings of the contemporary populist Zeitgeist.

KEYWORDS

existentialism, the Fall, paradisiacal yearning, populism, Weber

> When in the Yahwistic story of paradise the snake advises the woman to eat from the tree of knowledge. It holds out the promise that "your eyes shall be opened and ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil." It told no lie, for Yahweh, after cursing man and the snake, added "man is become as one of us," hence godlike through knowledge, and he chased man out of the garden, "lest he put forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life, and eat, and live forever."
>
> (Weber, 1952, p. 219)

1 | INTRODUCTION

This article proceeds from the observation that the biblical myth of the Fall is a valuable heuristic tool in Max Weber's work, which has received hardly any systematic attention. Despite the fact that it is explicitly mentioned in, for example, *Ancient Judaism*, *Protestant Ethic*, *Intermediate Reflections*, *Economy and Society*, and several of his methodological essays,[1] neither *The Cambridge Companion to Weber* (Turner, 2000) nor *The Max Weber Dictionary* (Swedberg & Agevall, 2016) contains a single reference. Moreover, while an eminent commentator such as Schluchter (1981/1979) has pointed out that the developmental history of the idea of salvation in the Judeo-Christian tradition is crucial for Weber's theory of ethics, even in his work no attention is given to the various interpretations of the mythical Fall that created distinct needs for salvation. Whereas this omission may be in line with Weber's anti-utopianism[2] (Derman, 2012), Weber's interpretations of the biblical myth of the Fall nevertheless provide valuable insights in his theses on social differentiation, disenchantment, rationalization, and the vocation of politics. Weber's understanding of everyday action, even in the contemporary world, is closely related to various religious interpretations of what deprivations were suffered by the human race as a consequence of Adam's original infraction and the yearning for salvation and paradisiacal experiences it engenders. In this respect Weber foreshadows literature that recently makes similar claims with respect to the importance of the myth of the Fall for the human condition (Kahn, 2006), scientific knowledge (Harrison, 2008), and human responsibility (Greenblatt, 2017).

We will show that the way Weber interpreted the myth of the Fall himself is important to understand his preference for heroic existentialism whereby individuals give personality to their character by making a decisive choice of certain, ultimate values. Weber's attention for the Fall is doubly "negative" in the sense that he rejects utopianism as well as the negative appraisal of the Fall of the Judeo-Christian salvation religions. *To hell with paradise*. But as Turner aptly noticed "it is perhaps easier to identify solutions and positions that Weber rejected rather than those he embraced" (2002, p. 601). Similarly, Tenbruck (1980, p. 345) states that according to Weber, man creates his reality "through the counterpart (*Gegenbild*) of his rationalized image of the world." We will indeed show that the myth of the Fall is a valuable heuristic to understand Weber's tragic awareness that the "common people" will be overwhelmed by the freedom of choice and, therefore, will be attracted by charismatic leaders that can invoke a return to a paradisiacal community free of choice. *Back to Eden*.

While these kinds of tragic antagonisms (Honigsheim, 2001), antinomical structures (Mommsen, 1989), and dialectical reasoning (Alexander, 2006/1987) in Weber's oeuvre have received considerable attention, no one has pointed out that they often are inspired by the specific cultural significance of the biblical myth of the Fall. This is a lacuna because it led to a one-sided attention for the emancipatory "fortunate Fall" aspect of his rationalization thesis, while the complementary paradisiacal thesis has remained under the radar. Yet, an interesting exception in this respect is Carl Schmitt, who turns Weber's thesis of the Protestant Ethic on its head by positing a paradisiacal "Catholic" value rational counterpoint to the fortunate Fall "Protestant" instrumental rationality of Weber (Schmitt, 1996/1923, p. 11). According to Schmitt, Weber overlooks the fact that the advancing "economical instrumental rationality" creates "political value rationality." Especially in a world where "material interests" rule, there is a need for representatives that embody the unitary will of the people and stand for a particular "political

form" or a paradisiacal legal order, because "the juridical regulation of human relations existed before evil and sin, and was not its result" (Schmitt, 1996/1917, p. 56).[3]

However, based on Weber's antinomies of the Fall, we can see that Schmitt's apolitical portrayal of Weber is inappropriate (see also Kalyvas, 2008). Weber is perfectly aware that "the inescapable fruit of the tree of knowledge is distasteful to the complacent" (MVF, p. 18). Accordingly, he knows the common people will be susceptible to the temptations of politicians that seek "the salvation of one's soul and that of others" (PV, p. 90). In all his *Sachlichkeit*, Weber realizes that politics "is certainly not made with the head alone" (PV, p. 91). Ultimately, he is, therefore, convinced that there is nothing wrong with political "salvation" seekers as long as they show personality and responsibility in their vocation. They should make deliberate value choices and feel responsibility for the consequences of these choices. They should choose to order choices, just as the followers choose to follow their lead.

Weber nevertheless realizes that such genuine "choice directing" charismatic leaders must get the necessary elbow room in order to be able to compete with the "group embodying" charismatics of the "divine external order" (SCA, p. 250) and of "natural communal experience." After all, these paradisiacal contenders "direct the gaze of the masses towards paradise on earth" (SCDR, pp. 70–71) by only focusing on "the *form* of existence, without setting new, tangible, substantial goals" (Weber, 1975, p. 319). They evoke a return of a unitary context that is free of choice and full of objective meaning. Consequently, their primary task is to protect this precious context against the hostile fallen surroundings by erecting walls against foreign invaders. After all, the word "paradise" etymologically stems from the old-Persian *paradeisa*, which means *enclosed* garden.

In sum, while the liberal Weber obviously favored a "Fortunate Fall" viewpoint, he is aware of the attractions of the paradisiacal counterpoint. His paradisiacal characterization is clearly akin to the contemporary populist *Zeitgeist* (Mudde, 2004). However, although current conceptualizations of "populism" usually stress its Schmittean political form—the political embodiment of the people—(e.g., Abts & Rummens, 2007), they often fail to acknowledge its Weberian paradisiacal epistemology: the eagerness of the masses to be liberated from choice stress, subjective meanings, and differentiation. In sum, Weber's counter concept of "paradisiacal ethics" can provide valuable insights in the antiliberal regressive revolt we are witnessing today (e.g., Critchley, 2012; Holmes, 1993).

2 | WEBER'S DIALECTICS OF THE FALL

It is well known that the self-proclaimed religiously unmusical Weber already at a very young age "was more at home with the bible than many a theologian," (Radkau, 2009, p. 430) and was convinced that we all behave "involuntarily" in accordance with Christian doctrines (Radkau, 2009, p. 533; Weber, 1975, p. 337). He referred to them as "switchmen, that determine the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamic of interest" (SPWR, p. 280). Interestingly, this famous passage was a later addition to an already existing text (Schluchter, 1981/1979, p. 25) and inserted just before the following sentence: "'From what' and 'for what' one wished to be redeemed and, let us not forget, 'could be' redeemed, depended upon one's image of the world." Hence, it is no surprise that Weber insisted that "the myth of the Fall of man is basic to our present conception" (AJ, p. 227).

Interestingly, this assertion is symbolized by the fact that the cycle of Klinger's etchings on the biblical myth of the Fall, titled "Eve and the Future" was prominently displayed in Weber's Freiberg and Heidelberg homes (Chalcraft, 1999, p. 212). While Max and Marianne Weber owned at least 118 of Klinger's etchings, the etching portraying Adam and Eve's expulsion from the walled paradise hung beside their wedding photo (Radkau, 2009, p. 121). Another etching of the same Eve and the Future-cycle hung on the wall opposite Weber's desk. It shows a colossal sphynx-like tiger sitting up straight at the end of a canyon, which according to Klinger symbolizes "life barred by the passions of the flesh" (Baumgarten, 1964, p. 474) and also "the inevitability of death waiting at the end of life's path (Kirk, Vanedoe, & Streicher, 1977).

Whatever, more important is that Weber as a scholar of comparative religion gave extensive attention to the way the biblical myth has been variously interpreted in the Judeo-Christian tradition.[4] While the basic narrative

TABLE 1 Weber's developmental history of the biblical myth of the Fall

	Comparison 1		Comparison 2		Comparison 3	
	Magical traditions	Judaic tradition	Christianity		Disenchanted modernity	
	A. Zoroasterism	B. Jahewist	C. Catholicism	D. Puritanism	E. "Populist" experientialism	F. Heroic existentialism
	Paradisiacal	Fortunate Fall	Paradisiacal	Fortunate Fall	Paradisiacal	Fortunate Fall
	Magic ethic	Legal ethic	Conviction ethic	Conviction ethic	Conviction ethic	Responsibility ethic
Prelapsarian existence	Individuals are impure and wise (AJ, p. 228)	Individuals are innocent pure fools (AJ, p. 228)	Individuals are innocent perfect (PE, p. 46)	Individuals whose state of infinite nonbeing is suboptimal (PE, p. 47)	Individuals are part of an esthetic whole	Individuals live a boring inactive existence (PE, p. 32)
Postlapsarian sinful existence	Impure, wise but no longer immortal	Foolish by nature Obedient to an almighty God eschatological hopes for the chosen pariah people (PE, pp. 59, 109)	Guilt-stricken, suffering from the burden of the fall of men, passively accepting the dependence on God's grace	Inner lonely, ascetic worker who focuses on rational and specialized labor in a calling (PE, p. 107)	Would-be hermaphrodites longing for orgiastic experiences (Letter to Jellinek)	Modern individual that has eaten from the tree of rational knowledge is a meaning creating perspectivist (OK, p. 104)
Postlapsarian redemptive existence	Rudimentary idea of compensation in the hereafter in Zoroasterism (AJ, p. 145)	A special promise of salvation of Israel was connected to obedience in the here and now	Redemption is within the reach of the baptized who can again become an innocent child (ES, p. 632)	Salvation hinges on predestination; the elected work for confirmation in the here and now	Quasi-religious redemption in the sense of a sectarian union with a charismatic leader	There is no salvation, one should heroically embrace one's tragic fate (SV, p. 24)
Dialectic 1 domination/ freedom	Liberated from the dominance of certain gods	Free as legal but mortal subject	Liberated from sin by Jesus Christ and the church	Free to work for the confirmation of one's own	Liberated from individual "choice stress"	Free to seize the "wheel of history"
Dialectic 2 Objective/ subjective meaning	Experience oriented meaning through magical rites	Subjective quest for objective meaning of the suffering "pariah-people"	Objective meaning of individual suffering—vessel of God's grace	Subjective creating meaning—tool of God's will	Collective experiencing of the truth	Subjective meaning detached from common knowledge

(Continues)

TABLE 1 (Continued)

	Comparison 1		Comparison 2		Comparison 3	
	Magical traditions	Judaic tradition	Christianity		Disenchanted modernity	
	A. Zoroasterism	B. Jahewist	C. Catholicism	D. Puritanism	E. "Populist" experientialism	F. Heroic existentialism
Dialectic 3 Unity/ differentiation	From numerous abstractions, a purely constructed figure assumes the role of savior	The one God and the law unites the different tribes of the "chosen people"	Promise of divine salvation unites all believers	The individual conviction of salvation connects all the Calvinist's undertakings	A "choice embodying" leader personifies group unity in a polytheistic world	Individual responsible value choice brings unity the absolute diversity of the polytheistic world

stays the same, each religious epoch adopts a particular perspective on the biblical myth. By explaining the specific cultural significance of different interpretations of the biblical myth Weber provides insight in three antinomies: (1) the ability to act and control our lives versus the objectifying consequences of action; (2) the objectivity of truth versus the relativism of knowledge, and (3) the commitment to values and beliefs versus the instrumental responsibility to the consequences of one's actions (Whimster & Scott, 1987, p. 5). Moreover, because the different interpretations of the Fall in the Judeo-Christian tradition typically imply a succession of three distinctive phases—a prelapsarian thesis, a postlapsarian-sinful antithesis and a postlapsarian-redemptive synthesis—we will argue that it is even more appropriate to speak of three dialectics: (1) a dialectic of freedom and domination; (2) a dialectic of objective and subjective meaning; and (3) a dialectic of unity and differentiation.

In the following sections we will systematically elaborate these three dialectics and show how they are related to the various interpretations of the Fall in the Judeo-Christian tradition. Each of these dialectics unfolds in a succession of three pairwise historical comparisons which contrast specific ethical views. Inspired by Schluchter (1981/1979, p. 49) we can say that Weber's Judeo-Christian "developmental history" is characterized by three successive swings of a pendulum connecting magical ethics and Judaic law ethics, Catholic universal ethics of conviction and Calvinist particular ethics of conviction and finally the last "major swing" connecting secular ethics of conviction and secular ethics of responsibility (see Table 1). Yet, while Schluchter (1981/1979) aptly recognized the growing rationalization of the "salvation" beliefs as the "carrier" of the historical process, he somehow neglected what Tenbruck (1980) called the counterparts (*Gegenbild*) of this rationalization process. If one takes into account the alternative interpretations of the biblical myth of the Fall that Weber links with the particular salvation ethics, it is nevertheless possible to discern a subtle sequence of swings with a fortunate Fall character and swings characterized by paradisiacal yearning.

3 | THE DIALECTIC OF DOMINATION AND FREEDOM

Traditionally, many authors claim that the system of meaning of the myth of the Fall centers on the transition from freedom to domination (Kurtz, 1979). According to Weber this interpretation is mainly initiated by the Jewish prophets who stressed that humanity was free of social and physical constraints in paradise, but after Adam and Eve's consumption of the forbidden fruit of the Tree of Knowledge human freedom is constrained by physical toil and compulsory subjection to the authority of God. The magical creation myths of ancient Babylonia and Sumer were hereby disenchanted and transformed in a rational "paradigm" propagating law abidance (Table 1, columns A-B). The sin of the Jewish people was much more explicitly linked to violations of Israel's peculiar social institutions. "Sturdy chains bind the Jews firmly to their pariah position" (SR, p. 623). Yet, the Fall as conceived in ancient Judaism was only a minuscule infraction compared to the all-pervasive original sin of Augustinian[5] Christianity. Hence, Weber stated that "throughout the Old Testament the Fall became no soteriological event decisive for Yahweh's attitude to Israel or to man" (AJ, p. 227).

Only in early Christianity did the Fall become so fundamental that the prospect of salvation in afterlife became all important and an alibi for a life dominated by suffering. Although Jesus' message was rather aristocratic in the sense that "few are chosen to pass through the narrow gate, to repent and to believe in Jesus" (SR, p. 632) it did not a priori exclude certain groups. Moreover, in contrast with Israel's salvation, which is located in the unforeseeable future, the Catholic salvation is at hand for those that are baptized. The only condition is an absolute indifference to worldly concerns, and a preference for the innocent creatures that inhabited Eden before the Fall (ES, p. 632). In this respect the Catholic interpretation of the Fall clearly departed from the rational-legalistic interpretation of Judaism (Table 1, columns B-C). Notably, in the writings of Paul "we can feel the overpowering joy at having emerged from the hopeless 'slave law' [Talmudic law] into freedom, through the blood of the Messiah" (ES, p. 623).

However, it is only in the irreversible Fall of Calvinism and puritan Protestantism that Weber sees the traces of individual freedom (Table 1, columns C-D). In this sense, Weber fully agrees with his colleague, the theologian

Ernst Troeltsch, who stated that in Protestant theory "the Fall means the removal of Nature that leaves no room for compromise, adaptation, transitional processes, or evolution as in Catholic dogma" (Troeltsch, 1960/1911, p. 475). Paradoxically, the Puritan individual freedom originates from the doctrine of predestination which denies human beings any free will in the individual pursuit of salvation. "Man, by his fall into a state of sin, hath wholly lost all ability of will to any spiritual good accompanying salvation" (Westminster confession cited in PE, p. 57). Consequently, the only thing Puritans can rely on is their own self-confidence in finding inner-worldly confirmation for their conviction of salvation (*certitudo salutis*) (SR, p. 620). "The Puritan directing the gaze of the masses not to the paradise beyond performed very credible services on behalf of 'freedom' in this world" (SCDR, pp. 70–71). This positive libertarian appraisal of the Puritan interpretation is clearly neo-Kantian. In the "Conjectural beginning of human history" Kant satirized Herder's romantic idealization of Eden and argued that eating from the Tree of Knowledge was not an infringement of a divine moral voice but an act of reason's liberation of nature (2007/1786, p. 165). Weber subscribes to this view because he also sees rationalization as a liberating force instigated by Protestant Calvinism but even more than Kant he realizes that this liberation comes at a price. Weber puts the "freedom" in this world in quotation marks.

Paradoxically, the individual freedom of Puritanism leads to a universalization of the quest for self-fulfillment in their professional calling, which in turn creates a cosmos of capitalist and bureaucratic institutions (PE, p. 123). In the end, this iron cage will prove to be more persistent than its religious underpinnings but nevertheless the idea of duty in one's calling which is imposed upon us by the Fall "prowls about in our lives like the ghost of dead religious beliefs" (PE, pp. 124, 233). Hence, in Weber's case it is more appropriate to speak of a dialectic of domination and individuation because in modern disenchanted times the Fall is perceived as a fortunate flaw (*felix culpa*) that makes real individual freedom possible but at the same time tragically produces a new force of dominion: bureaucratic impersonal rules (Alexander, 2006/1987). Weber, not coincidently, speaks in this context of a "shell as hard as steel" (*stahlhartes Gehäuse*). Contrary to the walls of paradise which protect the Edenites from the inhospitable outside world, the iron walls of the rational cage control them from within. In this respect, it is understandable that the "masses" are again longing for the protective paradisiacal walls of social closure against outsiders (ES, pp. 43–47) and some leaders are eager to satisfy this need and protect the paradisiacal essences.

Yet, in a purely Puritan way, Weber's personal resistance to this refractory domination presupposes the self-confidence to face the bureaucratic tiger (Table 1, columns D-F). Post-paradisiacal humans are individually accountable for the consequences of their deeds. Without Adam and Eve, the snake would have been powerless. I must choose my own values, and this is not a rational choice, but a matter of mature conviction. Such a courage of despair is also typical for the existentialist revolt and in this sense Jaspers aptly identified Weber as the "existential philosopher incarnate" (op cit. in Löwith, 2003/1993, p. 47). Also for Weber the Fall once and for all closes off a prehistorical mythological cosmos from a modern rational cosmology.[6] In this respect he agrees with Elias who stresses the illusionary character of a zero-point in the civilizing process or a knowledge-less Eden (Elias, 1987, p. 230).

4 | THE DIALECTIC OF OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE MEANING

Weber also presents a second system of meaning, a modern epistemological interpretation of the myth of the Fall, namely the transition from objective meaning to subjective meaning, with common knowledge as an important go-between. In order to clarify this, we start off from a passage in *The objectivity of knowledge*:

> The fate of a cultural epoch that has eaten from the tree of knowledge is that it must realize that we cannot read off the *meaning* of events in this world from the results,—however complete they may be—of our scrutiny of those events, but that we ourselves must be able to create that meaning. (OK, p. 104).

Hence, according to Taylor, Weber constructs a "subtraction theory," which explains modernity "by human beings having lost, or sloughed off, or liberated themselves from certain earlier, confining horizons, or illusions, or *limitations of knowledge* (2007, p. 22; italics ours). Conversely this means the prelapsarian Adam and Eve can perfectly read off the meaning of events because they experience the true essence or the "objectivity" of Edenite existence. In Eden, they are symbolically "made of the same flesh" (Genesis 2.23). There is no individuality and no individual character (OK, p. 119). Hence, when speaking, they legitimately use the *majestatis pluralis*. "We know, because we are. We are, because we know." If social scientific knowledge is defined as insight into the reasons why people differ on a given variable, those in paradise know nothing, as there are no distinct subjects, there are no distinct value spheres, there is no history, there is no future, and thus no variation. It is unlikely that subjective meaning—"adequacy on the level of meaning"—in order to live in a self-conscious manner (*sinnhafte Adäquanz*) (ES, p. 17) will be found in paradise. In Paradise, meaning is collective and uncontested, such that there is actually only *kausale Adäquanz*. The first truly self-conscious meaningful social action (*Handeln*) taken by Adam and Eve is to cover their genitals because in doing that they are purposively oriented toward each other's action. Although there was obviously behavior before the Fall, even speech, they involved only relating to someone else (*Verhalten*).

This fortunate Fall-interpretation Weber again links up with the Puritan tradition (Table 1, columns D-F). In *The Protestant Ethic*, Weber includes two passages from Milton's *Paradise Lost*, a work that he describes as "A Divine Comedy of Puritanism" (cited in PE, p. 46). It is no coincidence that he chooses the passage in which the angel Gabriel impresses upon Adam that, after the Fall, he must above all else obey God, but that he must also attend to the well-being of his fellow humans. "*Only add. Deeds to thy knowledge answerable*; add faith; add virtue, patience, temperance; add love, by name to come called Charity, the soul. Of all the rest: *then wilt thou not be loath to leave this Paradise, but shall possess a Paradise within thee, happier far*" (PE, p. 47; italics ours). It is thus possible to individualize and transcend the original experience of paradise by explicitly basing one's actions on subjective self-conscious knowledge. In contrast with the objective meaning of the suffering for the pariah-people in Judaism and for the faithful baptized Catholics,[7] Puritans explicitly have to rely on subjective meaning (PE, p. 113). Instead of the "very human Catholic cycle of sin, repentance, atonement, release, followed by renewed sin" (PE, p. 71), in the Puritan world of predestination the faithful have but two elements to which they can cling: self-confidence and untiring ascetic labor (PE, p. 67). The message is thus that one should not doubt one's own subjective knowledge regarding the divine election, as doubt concerning whether one is among the elect is in itself a warning sign. In order to live an authentic life one should embrace one's own death. One should work, not because professional success is a means of being worthy of election, but purely because it allays the fear of the contrary (PE, p. 69). Interestingly, the Puritan quest for subjective meaning only makes sense if they are aware that all their fellow believers also lack objective meaning. All Puritans are naked before an invisible but nevertheless almighty God and they know they all know this. In sum, Puritan subjective meaning is embedded in common knowledge. I know that you know, that I know … that only some of us "are predestinated unto everlasting life" (PE, p. 57). Hence, it is not a coincidence that Weber's interpretive social science focuses on social behavior that is meaningfully oriented to the actions of others involved with each other (ES, p. 23).

> The transcendental precondition of every social science is … that we are cultural beings endowed with the capacity and the will to … to bestow meaning upon the world, … which will become the basis on which we are, in our life, led to judge certain phenomena of human existence in *common* and to adopt a position with respect to them because we regard them as significant.
>
> (OK, p. 119, italics ours)

While Schütz (1967, p. 234) was right that Weber often does not specify whether the subjective meaning (*gemeinter Sinn*) is attributed by the acting individual(s) or by the sociological observer, he is nevertheless very clear that the interpretative method presupposes an extensive overlap between the perspective of the actor and the observer in terms of a context of common knowledge of "average habits of thought and feeling." However, due to processes of

rationalization, specialization and (subjective) social differentiation, subjective meaning is increasingly detached from such a context of common knowledge. We can potentially know everything (SV, p. 12), but we no longer have much knowledge of what the other knows and feels, because of the lack of common cultural value ideas with which we approach reality (OK, p. 118). Consequently, "it becomes less likely that 'culture' can have any inner-worldly meaning for the individual" (RR, p. 356). In the absence of a common cultural context one can only cling to an important constant in modern life: instrumental-rationality. However, this is only a glimmer of hope:

> The rationalization of community action will most certainly not result in a universalization of the knowledge about its conditionalities and interrelations, but mostly in the exact opposite. The "savage" knows infinitely more about the economic and social conditions of his own existence than "civilized man."
>
> (IS, p. 301)

Modern individual knowledge is bounded by the inability to assimilate the exponential growth of collective knowledge.

> Thus the growing process of intellectualization and rationalization does *not* imply a growing understanding of the conditions under which we live. It means something quite different. It is the knowledge or the conviction that if *only we wished* to understand them we *could* do so at any time.
>
> (SV, p. 12)

Interestingly, in the foregoing quotation Weber is referring to both a decrease in self-conscious subjective knowledge and an increase in collective knowledge ("we as a collective"). Paradoxically, this means modern individuals are increasingly confronted with a gap between all-pervasive collective knowledge and futile individual knowledge. When speaking we again use the paradisiacal *majestatis pluralis*, but this time we are painfully aware of this. What I know is that "we can," but this knowledge is often completely detached from one's own individual experience. Weber realizes that objective scientific truth is only that which claims validity for those who seek it, like himself, but for the masses it is just generally accepted correctness. In this respect, it is comforting for them when political leaders affirmatively say: "Yes, we can." It is the fate of the modern individual that after the Fall one has the capacity to create subjective meaning but giving the meaninglessness of the world it is a challenge to live up to this capacity. In this sense, Weber explicitly takes into account that modern subjective meaning might be a tough nut to crack for many of his contemporaries.

5 | THE DIALECTIC OF UNITY AND DIFFERENTIATION

Whereas in Paradise, Adam and Eve had been "free to eat from every tree of the garden, except the tree of the knowledge of good and evil" (Genesis 2.15–17), out of Eden they have to provide for their own needs. Hence, already in Judaism "Adam's and Eve's fall is an etiological myth for … the toil of labor" (AJ, p. 227). The necessity of labor gives rise to a chasm in the holistic cosmos. Adam and Eve experience that there is not one world outside paradise, but multiple worlds, different spheres governed by specific values and ethics (e.g., the world of labor and brotherly love and the world of erotic attraction). The historical roots of social differentiation (*Eigengesetzlichkeit*) of the spheres of values thus can be located in very early interpretations of the Fall.

> For the rationalization and the conscious sublimation of man's relations to the various spheres of values, external and internal, as well as religious and secular, have then pressed toward making

> conscious the internal and lawful autonomy of the individual spheres; thereby letting them drift into those tensions which remain hidden to the originally naive relation with the external world.
>
> (RR, p.328)

All evidence seems to indicate that, with the "originally naive relation with the external world," Weber is referring to the magical myths in which the Fall is only a *fait divers* that underscores the supremacy of the Gods. Borrowing from Nietzsche, Weber uses the chemical term "sublimation" to refer to the rationalization as well as the fragmentation of the various orientations and spheres of values. This sublimation is conscious to the extent that individuals become subjects through individual choice, understanding the world differently and pursuing different goals and "surrogate religions" depending upon the value spheres in which they are located (SV, p. 30). Conscious sublimation is actually specialization, and this specialization is unavoidable and even desirable (OK, p. 108). According to Weber, those who do not see this are naively unconscious (SV, p. 7).

This conscious sublimation manifests itself already in Puritan asceticism, because there "primal, naturalist, and *un*sublimated sexuality," is integrated in the sphere of marriage, whereby "all elements of passion are considered as residues of the Fall" (RR, p. 349). It is no coincidence that, after the Fall, Adam and Eve cover their genitals with fig leaves. After all, these body parts embody the differences between them and that make them different and attractive to one another. The act of covering them with fig leafs makes the man and the woman. Adam knows that Eve, like himself, knows that they are not alike. An implicit meaning of Christian interpretations of the Fall is that individuals feel guilty about their own state of difference and about their concupiscence, as it is equivalent to betrayal with regard to the magical paradisiacal wholeness. I see that you are different from me, but I also know that you see this as well. Hence, for Max Weber "sexual polarity" is an archetypical form of social differentiation (Radkau, 2009, p. 53). Yet, at the same time he is perfectly aware of the human urge to overcome such polarities. When one speaks of the Fall in the Judeo-Christian tradition, Weber antinomically realizes, one is referring to disobedience to the Divine, as well as to betrayal to the fundamental paradisiacal unity of the godly community of the walled Eden (SR, p. 558). God created humans "in our own image, after our *likeness*" (Genesis 1.26; italics ours).

According to Weber this disobedience and betrayal are inevitable nevertheless. This is the tragedy of human existence. Humans do not rise up until after the Fall. It is no coincidence that, according to Aristophanes in Plato's *Symposium*, the first humans were spherical, with four arms, four legs, and two sets of genitals (Hunter, 2004, pp. 62–63). It was not until the panic-stricken Zeus split them in two that humans as we now know them emerged: erect, split beings desperately searching for a suitable other half. In this respect inner-worldly Weber's heroic existentialism rejects outer-worldly orgiastic experiences which envision "the possibility of a communion which is felt as complete unification, as a fading of the *thou*" (RR, p. 347; Weber's italics).[8] Yet, Weber realizes that living in a rational differentiated world is far from easy. For one, it puts "brotherliness" under stress. As a result, that which distinguishes us from each other is covered or concealed. It is no coincidence that, in the Christian faith, sexual attraction is increasingly suppressed, with celibacy and even castration being a virtuoso ideal. After all, by renouncing the concupiscence of carnal desire Christians can position themselves somewhat above the original sin (ES, p. 606). In the creation narrative, the Fall thus also constitutes a legitimation for the systematic spiritualization of the Christian religions (RR, p. 349).[9] Interestingly, the poet Stefan George, one of Weber's contemporaries, blames Weber of the same kind of spiritual heroism: "You want to keep turning everything into spirit and thereby you destroy the body" (quoted in Marianne Weber, 1975, p. 463).

The unitary holistic relation with the external world not only comes to an end "spatially" but also "temporarily." Self-consciousness ensures that we become conscious of inner and outer differentiation, but also of our own mortality (AJ, p. 227). In this regard, Weber adds to the quote and cites Yahweh's indictment against the sinful human:

> [F]or Yahweh, after cursing man and the snake, added "man is become as one of us," hence godlike through knowledge, and he chased man out of the garden, "lest he put forth his hand, and take also

> of the tree of life, and eat, and live forever." Hence, one becomes a god by possessing two things: immortality and knowledge.
>
> (AJ, p. 219)

Here Weber refers to the Divine connection between mortality and moral knowledge. In contrast to the primary paradisiacal group that continues to exist as long as there are members of that group, the earthly existence of unique, self-conscious individuals ends upon their death. In the religions of salvation, the terrifying idea of the irrevocable end of earthly existence is mitigated by the salvation of the hereafter. For example, in the Christian tradition, death is not a dreadful end point—quite the contrary, as it brings an end to suffering. Paradise is literally projected into the future for those that have faith. Yet, this projection is beyond human control in predestinated Puritanism. Even more explicitly than Yahweh, the Puritan God is distant and intangible. Whereas, in the Garden of Eden, Yahweh personally went in search of Adam and Eve, who had hidden themselves after they had eaten of the fruit (AJ, p. 211), the Calvinist God is an invisible and distant Creator, who does not condescend to come to humans. The individual believer is, therefore, disembedded and thrown back on himself. Me, myself, and a omniscient God. Whereas in a mythical world, the individual is surrounded by collective rituals, in a disenchanted world, the human is naked before an invisible but nevertheless almighty God. The Puritan lives within a divine panopticon. Because humans are ever conscious of their nakedness, all fig leaves aside, the chasm between them and the Paradise of Eden is never deeper and the disenchantment is never more pressing than it is in Puritanism. Within a context in which only one end counts, divine election, instrumental rational action (*zweckrationales Handeln*) becomes a self-evident mode of action. Given that the righteously ascetic are certainly not allowed to enjoy the fruits of their own work, each action is merely a means and never an end. Unlike Catholics counting their rosary beads, Calvinists have recourse only to themselves. In sum, a righteous Puritan should act as if death is only a *fait divers*, while it is vitally important.

Also in the modern world, mortality tend to become a vitally important *fait divers* for fallen humans. "Because death is meaningless, civilized life as such is meaningless; by its very 'progressiveness' it gives death the imprint of meaningless" (SV, p. 13). In the Western world, mortality is paradoxically the most tangible characteristic that self-conscious individuals share with each other. "People are 'equal' before death" (SDG, p. 105). The primary concern here is a fear of spiritual mortality and, only in the second order, a fear of the end of corporality. Hence, procreation is often considered the most appropriate survival strategy. Procreation alone is nonetheless insufficient. After all, it is one of the most important assignments in Paradise (dispensation of innocence). In post-paradisiacal existence, one should fight against the Tolstoian meaninglessness of life (SV, p. 13). Even though the struggle against earthly mortality is lost in advance, Weber expects individuals to engage all resources in the struggle. To the extent that one regularly employs rational means in order to reach earthly ends, one will eventually wonder about the utility of allowing oneself to be led by heavenly ends, particularly as the ritual ties existing between heaven and earth continue to decrease. "[W]e need no longer have recourse to magic in order to control the spirits or pray to them. Instead, technology and calculation achieve our ends."

(SV, p. 13).

With the differentiation of the value spheres also comes a new proliferation of meaninglessness. One can no longer be satiated by life because there is an infinite number of "cultural values one can amass and there is no guarantee that this selection has reached an end that would be meaningful to him precisely at the 'accidental' time of his death" (RR, p. 356). However, just as universal monotheism brought meaning in life because action could be oriented toward God willed salvation, individual value choice makes "sense." If "one finds the demon who holds the fibers of life" (SV, p. 156), one creates unity in diversity. By creating this conscious dichotomy between the chosen and the not-chosen one can somehow transcend the differentiation of the polytomous rationalized world. One dialectically brings back the abysmal gulf between the paradisiacal garden and its harsh surroundings. In this sense it is no wonder that Weber frames this individual choice in religious terms. "The individual has to decide which one is the devil and which the God *for him*" (SV, p. 23). If one decides to follow the political demon Weber points out that the most important economy of worth will be power. This means you will have to "resist

evil, otherwise you will bear some of the responsibility for its victory" and cannot abide by the religious dictum "resist not him that is evil" (SV, p. 23). As such there is a "mutual strangeness of religion and politics" (RR, p. 335). However, in this particular case the strangeness also takes the form of a competition around a similar economy of worth: the meaning of death and suffering. Both in the religious and in the political warlike sphere "the individual can believe that he knows he is dying 'for' something" (RR, p. 335). But also in a more mundane sense the political sphere is for Weber the arena where the demons are to be found and value struggles are being fought (MVF, p. 333; Kalyvas, 2008). In this respect it is the best location to see his struggle between Fortunate Fall ethics and Paradisiacal Ethics and the interconnections (*Sinnzusammenhang*) of the three aforementioned dialectics, as we will demonstrate in the next section.

6 | THE MODERN POLITICAL STRUGGLE BETWEEN PARADISIACAL AND FORTUNATE FALL ETHICS

We start off from an interesting quotation, because here Weber sets the stage for the politics of the Fall:

> "Correct" Social Democracy is drilling the masses in intellectual parade-marching, directing their gaze, not to the paradise beyond, but towards paradise on earth, and turning this into a kind of vaccination against those with vested interests in the prevailing order. … It accustoms its followers, in other words, to a "hysterical enjoyment of emotion" which displaces, and replaces, economic and political thought and action. … Yet time presses, and we "must work while it is still day". An "inalienable" sphere of freedom and personality must be won now for the individual who belongs to the great masses and who is thrown entirely on his own resources. (SCDR, pp. 70–71)

This quotation nicely illustrates (1) Weber's personal aversion of the estheticization of politics that accompanies paradisiacal "romantic experientialism" because it leads to "intellectual stultification;" (2) the fact that some leaders will nevertheless be prepared to drag the masses in this direction; and (3) the need for charismatic personalities that can counter this trend by heroically facing the contingent modern world by linking the inevitable instrumental rationality to a passionate and decisive value choice.

Weber is fully aware that the *inner* and *outer dissolution* of unity in the postlapsarian situation makes "everyday life hard and lonely." Moreover, he is also sceptical about experiences of happiness in the post-paradisiacal state: "It is the stigma of our human dignity that the peace of our souls cannot be as great as the peace of one who dreams of such a paradise" (Weber op cit. in Roth and Schluchter, 1981, p. XXIII). Hence, although Weber does not have much respect for those who are unable to look the "fate of the age full in the face" (SV, p. 24), he takes into account that "the world is filled with those who have not the self-discipline to hold upon themselves the world in all its chaos" (introduction of Owen and Strong in Weber, 2004, p. lxii). This is certainly true for Weimar politics that suffer from bureaucratic overregulation, ambiguity, and fractionalization. Weber, therefore, acknowledges the temptation to estheticize politics, for instance by idealizing history. Yet, this is a precarious undertaking because "it accustoms the masses to a 'hysterical enjoyment of emotion' which displaces, and replaces, economic and political thought and action" (SCDR, p. 70). In other words, it diverts the attention from real life political issues and tends to negate them (PGG, p. 215).

Certainly near the end of his life he nevertheless realizes that his own preferred heroic existentialism might be too demanding for the masses. What the weak really need are shining examples, charismatic individuals and their aristocratic apostles that show personality in a calling and are not afraid to challenge the authorities. Yet, there is some sense of urgency. "An 'inalienable' sphere of freedom and personality *must be won now for the individual who belongs to the great masses*" (SCDR, pp. 70–71). It is hard not to see the analogy with the biblical prophet that fights for the salvation and the spiritual control of the masses.

Although modern man will be strongly driven by material interests concerning happiness, there is no reason that "the need for salvation," which is closely linked to a search for meaning, will disappear. In *Politics as a Vocation* Weber explicitly takes into account that some politicians will seek "the salvation of one's soul and that of others" (PV, p. 90). Yet, he is convinced that such an ethic of conviction (*Gesinnungsethik*), whereby one's actions are primarily led by a decisive subjective value choice and thus moral intentions, will often do more damage "because conviction politicians take no responsibility for the consequences of their actions" (PV, p. 91). Because they embody the value they represent, they cannot be without value. Weber is, therefore, fully aware that political "representatives" of such convictional ethics are often striving for power as "an object purely of self-intoxication instead of something that enters exclusively into the service of a 'cause'" (PV, p. 77). Often they are just "windbags who do not genuinely feel what they are taking on themselves but who are making themselves drunk on romantic sensations" (PV, p. 92). Accordingly, Weber prefers politicians conforming to an ethic of responsibility (*Verantwortungsethik*) and thereby strive for inner-worldly solutions to compensate for the "ethical irrationality of the world" (PV, p. 85).

In a way, it is tempting to see Weber's assessment of paradisiacal ethics of conviction as a backlash of the losers of rationalization, who are "unable to endure the fate of the age like a man" (SV, p. 30). However, in reality Weber realized that "ethics of conviction and ethics of responsibility are mutually complementary (PV, p. 92). He was, for example, aware of the authentic appeal of those representing the democratic ethos of brotherliness, as a unique countervailing force "against the unavoidable 'status' character of bureaucracy" (SCA, p. 242). After all, democracy will also rationalize to the extent that it will be dominated by parties that primarily want to advance their own material interests (ES, p. 983). Accordingly, there will always be a tension between the democratic demos of the rule by the common people anchored in "equality before the law" and the redemptive democratic ethos of brotherliness that stresses a common mission (ES, pp. 979–980). In this respect, he seems to realize that his own preferred matter-of-factness (*Sachlichkeit*) needs a passionate embedding. While democratic laws change individuals "from without," charismatic leaders embodying the democratic ethos can potentially change individuals "from within" (ES, p. 1,116). In this respect charismatic politicians are price worthy.

Mommsen (1989, p. 141) and Schluchter (1981/1979, p. 37) have, therefore, rightly pointed out that in Weber's later work charisma is no longer an ideal-typical scheme for the legitimation of authority extraordinary contexts; instead it becomes a universal category. Indeed, each of the interpretations of the Fall highlighted by Weber, even the modern ones, can be linked to influential leader(s) or prophet(s). Yet, Weber distinguishes two forms of charisma. In the first case the personal gift of group leadership is important. Because the charismatic leader embodies the group all those that want to belong to the group have the "duty to recognize its genuineness and act accordingly" (ES, p. 223). In three ethical traditions (columns A, C, and E in Table 1), the followers are more pervasively imbued by this type of "group embodying" charisma that tends to be anti-rational, anti-intellectualist, and organic. This is true for Zoroasterism and Catholicism but also for the modern artistic circle around the poet Stefan George. George's charisma is characteristically described as "directed at the *form* of existence, …, without setting new, tangible, substantial goals" (Weber, 1975, p. 319). In the second case the value choices of the leader are crucial. "Here I stand, I can do no other" (PV, p. 92). Yet, even more important is the fact that those choices are recognized by the followers. "The mere fact of recognizing the personal mission of a charismatic master establishes his power" (ES, p. 1115). In three ethical traditions (columns B, D, and F in Table 1), the followers are more pervasively imbued by this type of "choice directing" charisma which tends to be more rational and doctrinarian in nature. This is true in ancient Judaism, Puritanism and Weber's own heroic existentialism. In all these traditions there is not much respect for the powers-that-be. Illustrative in this respect is that for puritans "the conduct of an office appeared as a business like all others, the ruler and his officials as sinners like everyone else" (ES, p. 1140). It is clear that this "choice directing" charisma is the type Weber preferred because it represents "the root of the idea of a calling in its highest expression" (PV, pp. 34–35). Genuine charismatic democratic leaders should help the masses, by exemplifying responsible decision-making. Hence, this type of charisma is a "choice in itself" (Smith, 1998, p. 34). Genuine charismatic leaders choose to order choices to the extent that their followers choose to follow their lead.

Moreover, this type of charisma creates common knowledge, in the sense that all its followers know from each other that they endorse and construct the same authoritative value choice (Joosse, 2014). Yet, such a charismatic "community of choice" will always be more vulnerable because it is based on public recognition that can easily be reclaimed. If a "choice directing" leader claims "Wir schaffen das" it is fairly easy to verify whether this is really the case. In this respect, "group embodying charisma" is generally more robust. If a "group embodying" charismatic leader says "We will make our nation great again" it is much more difficult to verify this.

After all, he/she can always revert to blaming the out-group. According to Weber the universalization of solidarity that accompanied the conviction ethics of salvation religions would "succumb in the end to the world dominion of unbrotherliness" (RR, p. 357). As a matter of fact Weber realizes that "the corruption of the world through original sin should have made it relatively simple to integrate violence into ethics as a way of punishing sin and the heretics who placed human souls in jeopardy" (PV, p. 88). In this respect he predicted that modern ethics of conviction will either fall back on the dualism of in-group and out-group morality or on the reciprocity of in-group morality (RR, p. 329).

It is no coincidence that the demarcation of friends and foes as well as the "group embodying" forms of representation became quintessential principles of politics for Carl Schmitt, whose work received a lot of attention in recent years, both form the left (e.g., Mouffe, 1999) and the right (e.g., De Benoist, 2013). Hennis (1988, p. 194) was certainly right to state that in the absence of Weber's "Politics as a vocation" Schmitt's political ideas would be barely thinkable. One can even say that Schmitt found the prototype of his authoritarian antitype in Weber's writings (Ulmen op cit. in Schmitt, 1996, p. xx). Reminiscent of Weber, Schmitt claims that "All significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts" (1985/1922, p. 37). Yet, while Schmitt was not opposed to Weber's diagnosis of the elective affinity between capitalism and protestant ethic, he nevertheless thought that the elective affinity between political form and catholic ethic would ultimately be more crucial. According to Schmitt, eventually, secularized protestants would "return in Romantic flight to the Catholic Church seeking salvation from the soullessness of a rationalistic and mechanistic age" (Schmitt, 1996/1923, p. 11). Especially in a capitalist world where "material interests" rule, there is a need for representatives that embody the unitary will of the people and give it "political form." This observation was somehow visionary because it foreshadows some contemporary descriptions of the populist *Zeitgeist* (Mudde, 2004). Interestingly, Schmitt also embeds his populist political form in the biblical myth of the Fall:

> Whoever recognizes how deep is the sin of man is compelled by the incarnation of God to believe that man and the world are "by nature good", because God can will no evil. Whoever has an eye for identities sees that the doctrine of paradise, of the original goodness of man "by nature"—transformed into the philosophy of nature—is the doctrine of the priority of life over death. … The lawfulness of the visible world in the Christian conception is thus by nature good. The juridical regulation of human relations existed before evil and sin, and was not its result.
>
> (Schmitt, 1996/1923, p. 56)

With the paradisiacal identities Schmitt refers to the classical Augustinian insight that just as Adam and Even were in their paradisiacal innocence married to each other, a mystical union exists between the Church and Christ and between the people and the ruler. This idealization of the paradisiacal roots of a genuine political form is also in line with Schmitt's conviction that after the Fall human nature is essentially defective and needs to be corrected by church or state authorities (Schmitt, 1985/1922, pp. 57–58). In a legitimate political order, politicians should, therefore, show the way back to an Edenite *Schicksalgemeinschaft* and this is what many populists do.

Schmitt would undeniably agree that his aphorism "Everyone is as great as what he negates" also applies to Weber (Schmitt, 1996/1923, p. 54). Yet, while Weber certainly would have rejected paradisiacal politics, notably in its Schmittean populist political form, Weber's antinomies of the Fall are interesting in themselves for contemporary populism research. While "populist research" typically stresses the Schmittean political form in the sense that

the will of the pure people is pitted against self-interested and corrupt elitist outsiders (Mudde, 2004), inspired by Weber, we can additionally see an interesting electoral affinity between paradisiacal ethic and populist form. The paradisiacal ethic responds to the redemptive yearning of the people and promises that they will again get in touch with long-lost paradisiacal essences: secured freedom, truth and unity. The *essentialization* is realized both by the explicit linkage with the myth of the Fall and by negatively estheticizing freedom restrictions, fake truths and the cosmopolitanism of the liberal enemies. While it goes beyond the scope of this contribution to systematically look for empirical proof in contemporary populist rhetoric, it is illustrative that all three paradisiacal essences can be found in Arlie Hochschild's ethnographic descriptions of the appeal of Donald Trump:

> Like other leaders promising rescue, Trump evokes a moral consciousness. But what he gives participants, emotionally speaking, is an ecstatic high. … One way of reinforcing this "high" of a *united brother- and sisterhood* of believers is to revile and expel members of out groups. … He was throwing off not only a set of "politically correct" attitudes, but a set of feeling rules—that is, a set of ideas about the right way to feel … First, they felt the *deep story was true*. Second, they felt that liberals were saying it was not true, and that they themselves were not feeling the right feelings. … So it was with joyous relief that many heard a Donald Trump who seemed to be wildly, omnipotently, *magically free* of all PC [political correctness] constraint. (Hochschild, 2016, pp. 226–227; italics ours)

The Weberian perspective on populism, therefore, is both etiological and political. By making proposals to return to a paradisiacal situation a "populist leader" can "outflank" the traditionalist elites for whom the *essentialization* will be dangerously purist or utopian (Joosse, 2018). Moreover, the opposition between the paradisiacal and fortunate Fall ethics can function as an axes along which new political value conflicts are fought. Especially in post-COVID-19 times we can expect intense struggle between paradisiacal "welfare chauvinists" according to whom social and healthcare protection should be reserved exclusively for those who belong to the objective in-group and fortunate Fall "cosmopolitans" who oppose the strengthening of group-based welfare fortresses but instead advocate empathy with different others across borders (e.g., Thijssen, 2012; Thijssen & Verheyen, 2020; Lesch, 2019).

Yet, Weber's reasoning is not only characterized by oppositions but also by historicized antinomies and dialectics. While Weber stated that modern individuals should decide "which one is the Devil, and which one God" (SV, p. 23) he is not blind to the difficulties that this entails in everyday life. After all, even Weber himself, a high priest of a rational anti-utopian tradition, felt a strange attraction to the charismatic George and his circle (Radkau, 2009). "Pursuing the idea of 'disenchantment' through the progressive formal rationalization of all spheres of social interaction, he came close to rediscovering myth as a source of individual lifestyles at variance with everyday life" (Mommsen, 1989, p. ix). Yet, he personally remained committed to his Fortunate Fall heroic existentialism that keeps a distance with dogmatic belief in paradisiacal essences but also with the vain self (Turner, 1992). The political actor with a vocation for politics embraces passion, a sense of responsibility, and a sense of proportion (PV, p. 76).

7 | AFTERWORD

In the beginning of this article we already mentioned that several etches of Klinger's "Eve and the Future"-cycle were prominently displayed in the home of the Webers. While as far as we know there are no reliable reports on Weber's own interpretation of the etchings, it is tempting to speculate about them, based on the foregoing analysis of the way he treated the biblical myth of the Fall in his work.

A first etching hanging on the wall opposite his desk could reveal that the enclosed canyon-like walk of life of modern individuals is necessarily lonely and separate because it is determined by distinctive value choices. These value choices are perfectly symbolized by the sphynx-like tiger looking them full in the face at the end of

the canyon. This is a terrifying image because according to Weber there is no meaningful way back. One must move forward as is symbolized by that other Klinger etching hanging next to Weber's wedding picture in which a Hercules-like Adam is leaving Eden carrying Eve in his arms.

These two etchings of Klinger's "Eve and the Future"-cycle nicely illustrate Weber's heroic existentialism because he is perfectly aware of the fact that only a small number of heroic Adams can bear the gaze of the sphynx-like tiger. As a consequence, flights from the world taking the form of re-divinization of the world and a commitment to paradisiacal experientialism will be very common. In line with Nietzsche, Weber does not have much sympathy for those people who cannot face being alone in a socially differentiated polytheistic world. Obviously, they can easily "return to the welcoming and merciful embrace of the old churches" (SV, p. 30) or follow political leaders that direct their gaze toward paradise on earth (SCDR, p. 70). But Weber really hopes that they will be enchanted by charismatic leaders that heroically give personality to one's character by a constant and intrinsic choice for certain ultimate values and meanings.

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ENDNOTES

[1] We use the following abbreviations for references to English translations of Weber's work: AJ = Ancient Judaism (1958); ES = Economy and Society (1949); PE = *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (2001). For references to SR = *Sociology of Religion;* RR: *Religious Rejections of the World and Their Directions (Intermediate Reflections/ Zwischenbetrachtung)*, MVF = *The Meaning of Value Freedom in the Sociological and the Economic Sciences*, and SCA = *Sociology of Charismatic Authority* we use the classic collection of *Essays in Sociology* by Gerth and Wright Mills (1946). For the methodological paper OK = *The Objectivity of Knowledge in the Social Sciences and Social Policy* and IS = *On some categories of interpretive sociology* (Logos essay) we use the recent collection by Weber (2012). For references to SCDR = *On the Situation of Constitutional Democracy in Russia* and PGG = *Parliament and Government in Germany under a New Political Order* we use the collection by Peter Lassman and Ronald Speirs (Weber, 1994). Finally, for the *Vocation Lectures* (*SV = Science as a Vocation* and PV = *Politics as a Vocation*), we use the collection by Owen and Strong (2004).

[2] Derman distinguished cold, temperate, and hot interpretations of Weber's anti-utopianism. Yet, in the end he clearly favored the latter which describe Weber's personal vision of life as an active heroic commitment to the possibilities of the modern rationalized world, rather than a passive enduring its shortcomings (2012, p. 137).

[3] We refer here to the essay "The Visibility of the Church: A Scholastic Consideration" which was published in an appendix to "Roman Catholicism and Political Form" (Schmitt, 1996).

[4] Weber also gave some attention to analogous myths in Islam but clearly the meaning of sin, especially original sin, is far less important here. On the implications hereof, see Turner (1992).

[5] The importance of the Augustinian interpretation of the myth of the Fall is somewhat underexposed in Weber's work.

[6] But obviously on other points there were fundamental differences between Weber and Troeltsch (see Radkau, 2009, pp. 201–203).

[7] Also when Weber refers to the traditionalistic tendencies in Lutheranism (PE, p. 45) he implies that they were still automatically and unthinkingly reacting (ES, p. 25).

[8] It is exactly on this point that Weber sees a fundamental difference between Lutheranism and Calvinism. The former still contains outer-worldly tendencies which are completely absent in the latter.

[9] Like the sword of Zeus and the bitten fruit of the Tree of Knowledge, the severed umbilical cord simultaneously symbolizes the unfolding self-consciousness and the disintegration of the organic whole.

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BOOK REVIEW

WILEY

A Historical Sociology of Disability. Human Validity and Invalidity from Antiquity to Early Modernity

B. Hughes

Routledge, 2020. 364 pp. £29.99 (paperback).

A Historical Sociology of Disability. Human Validity and Invalidity from Antiquity to Early Modernity, by Bill Hughes explores how the cultural lens of ableism has shaped disability as a category of "what not to be" in different epochs in Western history. This insightful book is based on an extensive review of previous research in disability history as well as the analysis of original sources, such as paintings and historical texts. The aim of investigating ableism from Antiquity to Early Modernity—a period of more than 2500 years—would have been overly ambitious had it not been guided by a clear theoretical framework.

Providing detailed historical evidence, Hughes' book is, first and foremost, a sociological enterprise seeking to make sense of the processes through which people have been categorized into "disabled" and "non-disabled." Rather than merely shedding light upon the living conditions of an excluded group in society (disabled people), Hughes draws attention to the moral economy happening around different bodies and ways of being in the world by examining the unequal distribution of recognition of human worth and dignity.

The book is divided into two parts, each consisting of three chapters. Part 1 presents the methods and theory used in the study. Chapters 1 and 2 situate the book within the fields of disability history and disability studies and outline the approach adopted in the book: a historical sociology of disability. Disability research is described as consisting of two waves: the first wave, based on the social model of disability, focuses on exposing the barriers hindering disabled people from participation in society, ranging from material obstacles to the negative attitudes of nondisabled people; and the second wave, critical disability studies, aims at interrogating the idea of normality and deconstructing the dichotomy disabled/nondisabled. Hughes draws on both strands to develop his own approach. He retains the disabled/nondisabled dichotomy and sets out to understand how certain (ableist) ideals inform our perception of what it is to be fully human and the consequences that these have had throughout history, for people who have been deemed to fall outside the realm of human validity. Chapter 3 offers a number of original concepts. "Invalidation," refers to the process through which a person becomes categorized as disabled. "Strategies of invalidation" are the two main ways through which disabled people have been treated from Antiquity to Early Modernity, that is, as *good to mistreat* and/or *good to be good to*. "Propriety" is the recognition of human worth and dignity, which is distributed through the moral economy of a society. "Ableism" refers to the cultural beliefs of nondisabled people based on the ideals of beauty, truth, reason, order, and justice, which serve to secure their superiority and devalue those who are deemed not to correspond to these ideals.

Part 2 provides empirical evidence of the processes described above. Its three chapters (Chapters 4–6) examine the processes of validation and invalidation in ancient Greece and Rome, the Christian Middle Ages, and Renaissance and Reformation, respectively. In Chapter 4, we learn that the ideals of beauty, truth, reason, order, and justice elaborated by some thinkers in Antiquity justified the treatment of disabled people as *good to mistreat* and, in some cases, good to kill. This is the era that coined the phrase *mens sana in corpore sano* (a healthy mind in a healthy body) and developed the pseudoscience of physiognomy, sparking the long-lasting view that the body reflects a person's intrinsic qualities and moral dispositions. Importantly, Hughes shows how the processes of invalidation not only target people with impairment and bodily variation, but also apply to a wide range of individuals deemed inferior, such as women, slaves and "barbarians." As such, the book shows how invalidation intersects with misogyny and racism, for example, by shedding light upon Aristotle's dichotomy between perfect and imperfect bodies and his idea that education comes through the ear, leading to the view that women are "deformed men" and that loss of hearing equals loss of intelligence, respectively. Or the example of Pliny, who mapped out different "races," creating a dichotomy between the phenotypes of the population of Romans and "others," including people with a different skin color, but also imaginary creatures and monsters that lived supposedly at the edge of the Roman Empire.

In Chapter 5, Hughes traces how some ideas developed in ancient Greece and Rome persisted and mixed with the Christian ideology of sin and charity during the Middle Ages, resulting in an ambiguous conception of disabled people as *good to mistreat* and *good to be good to*. The chapter argues that impairment and human variation were seen, on the one hand, as signs of sin and the work of the devil and, on the other hand, as a means through which nondisabled people could perform charity and secure their place in paradise. Disabled people were viewed as embodying *dis/grace* and Hughes claims that they were, therefore, in constant danger of being harmed or "saved" in the name of Christ. Pointing at the continuity of ideas developed in ancient Greece and Rome, the chapter shows, for example, that Aristotle's connection between education and hearing, led to the exclusion of deaf people from the Church, on the grounds that they were not able to take part of the Christian teachings. Bringing in gender and race into the analysis, the chapter also highlights how women and people living outside Christian territories were invalidated as lesser humans and dangerous beings as they were identified as sinners and monsters to be combatted.

Chapter 6 focuses on the period between the late Middle Ages and Early Modernity, characterized by the Renaissance and Reformation. Here, Hughes calls attention to the processes of validation and invalidation at the heart of the renewed celebration of Antiquity, Protestant Reformation, and Imperialism. The chapter shows how disabled people continued to be seen as *good to mistreat* and *good to be good to*, albeit in slightly modified ways. Those whose bodies and minds failed to conform to the ideals of beauty, truth, reason, order, and justice, as exemplified by Leonardo da Vinci's demonstration of bodily proportions, were *good to mistreat*. This is the period of witch-hunts, during which many women with intellectual and mental variation were subjected to torture and horrible death penalties, ordered by male inquisitors. This is also the period during which idleness and vagrancy were severely condemned and a number of disabled people were placed in institutions. Hughes demonstrates how the promotion of the ethics of work after the Reformation narrowed the practice of charity to include only the "deserving poor." Faking disability to receive assistance became a crime to be severely punished and a new literary genre flourished, written by nondisabled people, depicting the alleged lives of the "scroungers." From the view that some people obtained assistance undeservingly, it followed that all impaired people were under suspicion to be "undeserving poor," which, Hughes argues, forms the roots of the stigmatization of welfare claimants in current neoliberal society. The ideals promoted during the Renaissance and Reformation also justified the invalidation of non-Europeans as ableism intersects with racism, among others, by "monsterising race" and "racialialising monstruosity."

This book is an eye-opener: it brings a new perspective on Western history. However, I found it at times a strenuous read because of the many repetitions, long sentences, and the use of specialist vocabulary. Further, the "big brush" analysis presented in this book has inevitable downsides. To avoid the risk of unjustified generalizations, it

could have done a better job in outlining the scope of the study. In particular, the book does not provide a complete history of "Western civilisation" but is centered, first on ancient Greece and Rome, and then, on England and Scotland. One key insight of the book is that invalidation is intertwined with misogyny and racism. Here, it would have been desirable to include also other dimensions connected with processes of recognition of human worth and dignity, such as class, sexual orientation and identity, and age.

A Historical Sociology of Disability offers an important contribution to sociology by theorizing processes of invalidation and placing disability at the core of society's moral economy. It is a crucial read not only for disability scholars but also for any scholar interested in understanding the mechanisms behind the (re)production of social inequality, exclusion, and discrimination. This book opens new fields of research; it is an invitation to explore further how the category of disability has been used to justify the discrimination of certain groups in society and how it intersects with other processes of devaluation, such as sexism, racism, classism, and ageism.

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BOOK REVIEW

WILEY

Does sociology need a theory of mind?

COGNITIVE SCIENCE AND THE SOCIAL: A PRIMER.

Stephen P. Turner

New York and London: Routledge, 2018. pp. 226.

"Notes on the Art of Walking" is an article that was required reading when I taught a first semester basic social science course (Ryave & Schenkein, 1974). It's a classic in the genre of ethnomethodology and it literally opened the eyes of students to the social interaction processes at work in a seemingly mundane activity like walking down a crowded street. Social cues, facial expressions, movements of body, the attire of clothing, conventions on personal space—all these explain why people don't continually collide with one another on a pavement. Stephen Turner notes: "Even the simplest social interaction involves capacities, from facial recognition and memory to mind-reading and responsiveness to embodied action, signalling, and so forth" (p. 44). By "even" Turner is referring to the complex array of cognitive theories that are in play. The issue for sociologists is that one or more of these cognitive theories is capable of explaining everyday social interaction without recourse to ethnomethodology problematizing the issue. Which, if any, of these cognitive theories should sociologists be engaging with?

Turner has written *Cognitive Science and the Social: A Primer* to get us up to speed. He says it's a Primer—originally a prayer book used to teach children how to read. The difficulties in learning to read cognitive theories should not be underestimated. Cognitive science is not a unified field. It is inhabited by evolutionary psychologists, ethologists, experimental psychologists, neuroscientists, medical researchers, information theorists, and philosophers of language. The subject has exploded over the last three decades, in part because of techniques able to scan and image brain activity and collect experimental data. For instance, Paul Allen (co-founder of Microsoft) put US$100 million into a research institute to map the brain. Just a glimpse at its website (https://portal.brain-map.org/) shows how much detailed information is now available about the brain. The brain of a mouse has been digitally mapped in three dimensions down to the level of neurons. Experimental researchers can track stimulus and response in real time, so to speak, and they can turn on and off specific parts of the brain that control various bodily and mental functions. Likewise, human brains can be scanned by a growing number of technologies which allow visualization of brain activity as well as the chemical tracking of synaptic spikes of activity. The European Union is funding a vast project to model and simulate the human brain using supercomputers. Publications in the general field of neuroscience now number thousands per year. While behaviorism treated the mind as a "black box," it seems we have now taken the lid off.

How does the mind work? Immanuel Kant said it possessed inherent (logical) categories like space, time, contiguity, color, causation, and so on through which the complexity of experience could be interpreted and made sense of. David Hume wrote, earlier in 1738, "we ought not to receive as reasoning any of the observations we may make concerning *identity* [is a perceived object always the same?] and the *relations* of *time* and *place*; since in none of them can the mind go beyond what is immediately present to the sense, either to discover the real existence

or the relations of objects" (Hume, 1927, p. 77). The world comes across as ordered in various ways because we assume causation—the psychological belief that one event follows another. But causation itself is not to be known, said Hume.

Cognitive theorists have no such inhibitions. They want to get into the mind and explain how we reason, perceive, interact, and much more. Hume's strictures remain the "Room 101" default position—if a theory is not built on experience, crank the handle and dispatch it to the lower depths. We know what we experience, not how the mind processes experience. The mind is not open to introspection. Turner puts this point as follows: "How any of this works in the brain is unknown, and indeed there is a substantial explanatory gap between what we would like to explain (thought, actual speech, consciousness, and the qualities of human experience) and the neuroscience mechanisms we have an understanding of" (p. 49). Despite the new experimental evidence, "There is a concern that neuroscience explanations are more readily granted credence than other equally valid explanations of other kinds…" (p. 28).

Turner is especially well equipped to survey the field since he is both a seasoned philosopher of science and social theorist. The issues raised in those fields apply equally to cognitive theories of mind. Turner's aim is to debate critically the possibilities of integration between our notions of the social and the cognitivists. This is the thrust of Chapter 1, which is quite difficult to follow if you have not mastered the basic theories and their labels. Like many chapters in this book, it has to be returned to. Turner has a terrier-like ability to interrogate the multitude of cognitive theories and the truly voluminous literature (which, to note, appears to be accessibly written). He frequently refers to the work of Jerry Fodor assuming the reader is already acquainted with this important philosopher. For this review I supply a brief exposition in the next two paragraphs, since for many sociologists Fodor will be an accessible way into the field.

The formidable Jerry Fodor was the first to dive into the cerebral fluid of the mind. Looking back on his pioneering *The Language of Thought* (1975) he wrote: "I was writing an exposition of what I took to be an emerging, interdisciplinary consensus about how the mind works, the theory that was then just beginning to be called 'cognitive science'" (Fodor, 2008, pp. 3, 4). He continues: "Surely, I thought, it's been clear since Aristotle that explaining actions by attributing beliefs and desires to their agent is the very paradigm of how a mentalistic psychology does its thing" (Fodor, 2008, p. 5). This, in the main, is what social scientists do—sociologists attribute actions of people to their beliefs and desires, and economists, to their preferences. Fodor is our sort of guy—explaining social action involves understanding how someone else might think, feel, and act. On the basis of self-understanding and empathy, we can work out what someone else's motives for acting are. But, while sociology brings forward a depressingly large number of its own theories—Simmelian forms, phenomenology, social interactionism, symbolic interactionism as well as ethnomethodolgy—Fodor roots everything in the mind.

Defying Hume, Fodor proposes a representational theory of the mind, which "is a claim about the metaphysics of cognitive mental states" (Fodor, 2008, p. 5). Sensory inputs—what we see, hear, feel—are transformed by perception into representations. Representations enable us to be social—they concern our beliefs and whether they are true or false, and they represent desires. Having a desire and a reason to act demands computing what to do. The mind possesses a syntactical computing engine which is universal and not tied to local content or cultural semantics. The standard cognitive model—and it is a model and not an empiricist account of neurons synapsing—asserts and assumes this computational faculty. This draws on and is inspired by Alan Turing's conceptualization of the brain's power of logical reasoning. Turing reduced this to a formal logic that was independent of content and semantics and as such it provided the basis for a universal thinking machine. Turing subsequently created a physical version of this machine on the workbench. Content is rendered into a universal language of symbols interspersed with instructions. Turing *only* created his machine in order to find out which mathematical problems could be solved. He abstracted the mathematician's competence.

Mathematics, reduced to formal logic, is a defined domain. Fodor's domain is how the mind processes the social. Despite trying (it's a massive debate in cognitive science), I don't understand how representations mesh with the syntactic code. However, help is on hand and Turner supplies a quote from Noam Chomsky, himself, in a 2016

interview where he discusses the "Basic Property" of human language. "The language faculty provides the means to construct a digitally infinite array of structured expressions, each of which has a semantic interpretation expressing a thought, and each of which can be externalized by means of some sensory modality. The infinite set of semantically interpreted objects constitutes what has sometimes been called a 'language of thought'…" Chomsky continues, stunningly, "By far, the major use of language is internal—thinking in language" (quoted Turner, p. 70). So "language is a means of externalizing internal thought, which is then used for communication and social interaction", comments Turner. This then aligns with Fodor who has an elaborate account of how semantic representations are rendered into basic concepts that then become components of a syntactical language he calls mentalese. Chomsky's language faculty is Fodor's mentalese.

And, if we extend this, we presumably arrive at "sociologese" [my usage here]. Everything sociologists grapple with in the external world has an internal explanatory mechanism. Universal traits of sociality—like rationality, empathy, altruism, hierarchy, fairness—each have a neural basis within the language of thought. One of sociology's key concepts, norms, is accounted for by a neural base for norm-detection and one for adherence to norms.

Stephen Turner reflects in the face of this: "Much of this argumentation involves 'have to' claims: if there is computability in the brain, there must be a code. If there is a code, it must be innate. If it is innate, it must be universal. If it must be physically realized in the brain, it is physically realized in the brain" (p. 60). So do the computationalists have all the best arguments and is sociology wasting its time trying to explain the social? Not so, says Turner. Outcomes are all different even if there is an underlying mental code. Your DNA does not predict your height because of post-birth nutrition and so on, and likewise a code does not determine the semantic outcomes.

Anomalies and exceptions can always be found to universal statements. Also, to take morality, it has first to be conceptualized *as* universal (Kantian, utilitarian etc.), whereas any reading of Mary Douglas or the opening chapters of Weber's *Sociology of Religion* shows that morality was particular to, and a transaction with, nature. Animism, sacrifice, the heteropraxis of religions all have their own neural base? This gives Turner his opening: "For much of cognitive science, the social *is* the leftover nuisance" (p. 74). And dialogue with the cognitive sciences should proceed via the issue of human agency.

Before coming to that, the second major approach in the cognitive sciences is evolutionary psychology. It is ubiquitous throughout the book and has an "in-the-last-instance" status. It makes the seemingly unanswerable argument that animal species have evolved various competences following their millennial interaction with the environment. Ants can do dead reckoning and the Western scrub jay is able to cache food and systematically recover it. How do they do this? It's a trait and competence of the mind which has evolved. We share this with animal species and if we make the same argument at the level of information—how information is processed—we share as humans common features with plant life. It's a relentless argument that only stops when everything is explained. Humans have evolved an informational structure of DNA that allows them to reproduce in the climatic environment of late Earth. But you and I are phenotypes, underdetermined outcomes from DNA fusion at conception. It's the variability of individuals in their nurturing surround, and the variability of societies and culture that keeps sociology in the game. We are the anomalies that countermand the universal code of mind language, despite the latter's claim that the multiplicity of languages and cultures "must" have an underlying progenitor.

Evolutionary psychology does, however, offer more nuanced and sociological ways forward, and in some versions it escapes the standard computational model. This line of argument relies on an activist account of perception. In terms of philosophy of science there is a switch from realist to instrumentalist accounts: this is what happens, and the how of it we ignore. Human perception is Bayesian in form, argue some experimental psychologists. Our accumulated knowledge of the world leads us to assume prior likelihoods of events and we don't waste energy continuously reviewing what we already know. When something new occurs, we adjust our understanding of the world accordingly. The uptake of this in behavioral economics and decision-making has been considerable, because it delivers definite improvements in rational choice. Bayesian rules are not intuitive and statisticians have to be taught anew and weaned off their Gaussian view of populations. However, to return to the example of the Western scrub jay, how does this bird know how to unearth his caches and in what order? In a warm winter he

may ignore some of the deeply hidden supplies and go for the easily accessible caches. It's a decision tree problem and the jay follows a rule, which appears to be Bayesian in form. Perception works in close conjunction with the environment and is inferential.

Animal intelligence is closely attuned to the environment and this leads to the argument that cognitive competences are shaped by the environment. In addressing our environment, we enact our perception and, to the extent we live in our environment, our mind is embodied by it. Taking another step, the mind is embedded, extended, and enactive—the so-called "4Es." Cognition is minimalist. What we come into contact with fires up the neurons and, as is said, what is fired becomes wired. This suggests that minds are more pliable yet shaped by our interaction with nature; that civilizations, and in particular, types or even stages of civilization, constitute a group mind creating and building the "affordances" of social environment. These lines of inquiry, I think, offer considerable explanatory scope, not least for understanding final stage humanity and the post-human. Though, at the same time, these cognitive theories are colonizing or excavating the cultural. Arguments over where and how to draw the boundary between the cultural and the cognitive will, or should, reinvigorate social science. For a Weberian, the rationalization of the world by the sciences of knowledge, here cognitive and informational, has to be confronted by a moral sense of meaning which then becomes actuated as an agency of control.

While Turner is quite happy to turn cognitive theories against themselves as they trip over the social, he is not willing to condone the considerable lapses in scientific rigor in the social "sciences." He lays into the theory of social action, which in North America is patronized as GOFAT—Good Old-Fashioned Action Theory. (*Pace* John Rex, Alan Dawe, and Tony Giddens, British sociology never quite got its head around social action theory; the syllabus is Dilthey to Luhmann.) The cognitive sciences have a legitimate claim in explaining the social and, in ignoring these findings, sociologists have over-explained the social—and probably not to the layperson's satisfaction. Norms, beliefs, meanings, motives, preferences, intentions are ubiquitously described and are blithely offered up as explanations in themselves. But causality demands more. Following on from Thomas Hobbes, rationality is assumed as an intentional disposition of the person. Game theory explanations rely on this assumption. Likewise, Adam Smith's unsubstantiated claim that the profit motive drives market activity, subsumes most of economic science. From the stance of evolutionary psychology, goal-directedness is innate, and it may turn out to be as sophisticated as Bayes' rule. Rationality theorists are misattributing motives that are causally redundant or unverifiable. This matters because those same motives are used to justify, scientifically, market society and naturalistic accounts of income and wealth distribution. We might just as well consign Misean economics to a social theodicy. Turner quotes approvingly Paul Slovic: "it is now generally recognized among psychologists that utility maximization provides only limited insight into the processes by which decisions are made… 'People are not logical,' psychologists are fond of saying, 'they are *psycho*logical'" (p. 32). For Talcott Parsons social order is a normative order which exists, as Turner comments, as a *deus ex machina*. Norms are important but what is required is a theory of normative bonding. Neuroscience provides this with its account of mirror neurons as norm-detectors.

We might think that intention and belief and our ability to empathize and intuit other people's actions are crucial for the functioning of normal everyday life. Phenomenology seeks to unpack these processes and reach a sociological explanation. For theorists of the mind, this whole approach is labeled pejoratively as "folk psychology." Turner allows folk psychology as a component of social life, but only as "good bad theory." From a cognitive point of view, just what is belief or intuition as a mental object? Turner suggests that in concentrating on a person's beliefs and intention in the search for explanation, what the mind is actually doing is placing hypothesized intentions within a frame or situation where stored tacit knowledge is drawn upon. The cognitive correlate is pattern recognition—"the brain is essentially a pattern recognition machine" (quoted p. 118). In adopting this cognitive option, consciousness is being effectively downgraded in favor of non-conscious "Background." This gives rise to two levels of thinking—akin to Daniel Kahneman's fast and slow; that what we imagine is a willed conscious action or decision is also buffered by inferential engines (as in Bayesian information updating). With tacit knowledge acting as a determinant of action, in part, this means that social environment leaks into behavior. Where inner city violence is pervasive, "studies on the developing child clearly demonstrate the neurological mechanism whereby

the culture of violence is reproduced. Growing up in the presence of violence tends to make one violent," writes Orlando Patterson (quoted p. 143). The theory of "affordance" has wide applicability. There is a symbiotic relation between what the environment affords and the structuring of perception of inhabitants. Full-on sociological determinism, fond as we are of it as a discipline, has to co-habit with the cognitive.

Agency comes back in at this endpoint. On the cognitive side tacit knowledge is akin to stored routines or algorithms; on the social side complexity is created by agency. It is sociological diversity that produces the anomalies that cognitive science cannot cope with. An understanding sociology, a *verstehende Soziologie*, which Turner likens to a bubble within which we mind-read each other's intentions, generates reasons for actions and reciprocations. But the cognitive police reckon these to be illusory, having no mental status as objects and are merely comforting narratives we tell ourselves. Yet, argues Turner, it is within the bubble that "the action" takes place, and we could say without this explanandum there would be no science.

In the last pages of the book Turner puts forward a kind of Simmelian dyadic form, arguing that in our encounters we generate joint actions that can be built upwards into complex institutional forms like markets. The attraction of this for Turner is that it does not involve intentionality and that there are, as always, neuroscientific correlates. Sociologists are indebted to Stephen Turner's brilliant tour de force of cognitive theories and the numerous bridges he proposes for a beleaguered sociology to renew itself.

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