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Against a descriptive turn

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Abstract

While description is a valuable aspect of meaningful sociological work, this paper takes issue with Mike Savage's argument that the social sciences, and sociology in particular, should seek to prioritize description over practices of explanation and analysis, and attention to questions of causality. The aim of this paper is not to take issue with descriptive forms of sociology in themselves, but to argue that the answer to the problems identified by Savage and Burrows in their landmark paper "The Coming Crisis of Empirical Sociology" is not to follow commercial forms of research by prioritizing practices of description and classification at the cost of asking fundamental questions about the "why?" and the "how?" of social life and politics. Rather, this paper argues that it is imperative that sociology does not simply describe inequalities of different types, but questions, explains, and analyses the structures and mechanisms through which they are created, reproduced, and sustained. The argument will be developed in three stages. First, this paper will restate the main points of Savage's call for descriptive sociology; second, it will address his critique of "epochalist thinking" and subsequent opposition to the idea of neoliberalism; and third, it will respond to his use of Thomas Piketty's work as a model for developing sociological descriptions of class and inequality.

KEYWORDS

class, crisis, inequality, neoliberalism, power

1 | INTRODUCTION

Over the past decade there has been a call to reconsider the value of descriptive work within the discipline of sociology and across the social sciences more generally. While concern for the status of description within sociology is nothing new, this recent development can be traced to Mike Savage and Roger Burrows' 2007 article "The

Coming Crisis of Empirical Sociology," which set the terms of contemporary debate by arguing that qualitative and quantitative forms of sociological description need to be rethought in the face of new forms of methodological expertise and "big" data that have emerged outside the academy. This argument, subsequently, has been developed into a more explicit call for a descriptive turn by Mike Savage, who in a series of following papers has addressed the power of the "descriptive assemblage" (2009a) and the limits of "epochalist thinking" (2009b), and has made a case for learning from the descriptive work of other disciplines, in particular from the type of historical economics pioneered by Thomas Piketty (Savage, 2014). While there has been extensive debate over the core argument of Savage and Burrows' article on the crisis of empirical sociology, less attention has been paid to Savage's critique of epochal thinking and to his reading of Piketty, which, this article will argue, is problematic in its simplistic dismissal of concepts such as "neoliberalism" and in its uncritical use of Piketty's book *Capital* to address the question of social class. In response, this paper will argue that while description is a valuable part of all meaningful sociological work, Savage is mistaken in seeking to prioritize description over explanation, analysis, and attention to questions of causality. To be clear: the aim of this paper is not to take issue with descriptive forms of sociology in themselves, of which there are many, but to argue that the answer to the problems identified by Savage and Burrows in the "Coming Crisis" is not to follow commercial forms of research by prioritizing practices of description and classification at the cost of asking fundamental questions about the "why?" and the "how?" of social life and politics. For, given the extreme class polarizations that have emerged in the wake of the recent financial crisis, it is imperative that sociology does not simply describe inequalities of different types, but questions, explains, and analyses the structures and mechanisms through which such inequalities are created, reproduced, and sustained. This argument will be developed in three stages. First, this paper will restate the main points of Savage's call for a descriptive sociology; second, it will address his critique of "epochalist thinking" and subsequent opposition to the idea of neoliberalism; and third, it will respond to his use of Thomas Piketty's work as a model from which sociological descriptions of class and inequality can learn; a development that, to date, has received little critical attention as it has largely been eclipsed by engagement with the Great British Class Survey (which has been subjected to such extensive scrutiny (see, for example, Skeggs, 2015 and the articles that follow in the same volume) that it will not be addressed in detail through the course of the current paper).

2 | THE ARGUMENT FOR A DESCRIPTIVE TURN

In 2007, Mike Savage and Roger Burrows published their article "The Coming Crisis of Empirical Sociology," the core argument of which has since been widely cited and debated (see Crompton, 2008; Gane, 2011; McKie & Ryan, 2016; Webber, 2009; for Savage and Burrows' response to their critics, see 2009; for a further reflection on their initial position that focuses on the question of "big data," see Burrows & Savage, 2014): that commercial agencies now have access to "big" datasets, processing power and pools of methodological expertise that cannot be rivalled by the existing "apparatus" of empirical social science within the academy. This problem, they argue, presents a fundamental challenge to the quantitative and qualitative branches of the discipline. In terms of the former, they observe that "the apparatus of contemporary capitalist organizations now simply don't need the empirical expertise of quantitative social scientists as they go about their business" as they have "more effective research tools than sample surveys" and can "draw on the digital data generated routinely as a by-product of their own transactions: sales data, mailing lists, subscription data, and so forth" (2007, p. 891). And in terms of qualitative research, they declare that traditional methods such as the in-depth interview have lost their academic status as not only have they become part and parcel of popular culture, but also have been displaced by new transactional research technologies that are "able to produce nuanced representations of the lifeworlds of quite specific populations" (2007, p. 894; on the power of geodemographic technologies and classifications, for example, see Burrows & Gane, 2006). In the face of these challenges, Savage and Burrows call for a rethinking of the

repertoires of empirical sociology, and make two suggestions for how to start this process. First, there should be a renewed concern for the "politics of method," which means that sociologists should think again about research methods "not simply as particular techniques, but as themselves an intrinsic feature of contemporary capitalist organization" (Savage & Burrows, 2007, p. 895). Second, and more importantly for the purposes of the present paper, there should be a descriptive turn, for if "we see the power of contemporary social knowledge as lying in its abilities to conduct minute description," then "we should abandon a sole focus on causality (which we are very bad at) and analysis and embrace instead an interest in *description and classification*" (Savage & Burrows, 2007, p. 896, emphasis original).

This call for a sociology that prioritizes practices of description and classification over questions of causality has been restated and rearticulated by Mike Savage in a number of publications since "The Coming Crisis." The first of these is his 2009 article, "Contemporary Sociology and the Challenge of Descriptive Assemblage," in which he draws on the work of Andrew Abbott, John Goldthorpe, and Bruno Latour in order to revisit the relation of social science to natural science and the humanities with the purpose of questioning sociology's fundamental concern for "analysis, explanation and causality" (2009a, p. 156). Savage's argument in this article is threefold: first, that descriptive sociology can learn from the commercial world, in which "causal concerns are not necessarily discarded but can be bracketed out" (2009a, p. 156); second, that sociology can produce better descriptions through the use of innovative visual methods (for a further reflection on the role of visualization in reconfiguring sociological practices of description, see Burrows, 2011); and third, that we should think critically about descriptions that are "routinely produced," presumably both within and outside the academy (see Savage, 2009a, p. 171).

These three points are complemented and extended by the argument of a second paper published in the same year—"Against Epochalism"—in which Savage questions the ways in which sociology has championed the study of that which is "new" and/or "modern" in order to assert its intellectual legitimacy over other disciplines in the social sciences and humanities. Savage extends the earlier argument of the "Coming Crisis" by returning to two key methods considered previously: the sample survey and the interview. One of the problems of both, he argues, is that they have an underlying preoccupation with the analysis of social change, and so have provided the grounds on which "epochalist sociologists" (those who construct grand narratives such as postmodernism, post-Fordism, globalization, and risk society) have operated (see 2009b, p. 232). By way of response, Savage draws on figures such as Nikolas Rose and Donald MacKenzie to reassert the importance of fine-grained descriptive work. Against epochal claims of grand theory, Savage argues that we can learn from the likes of Rose and MacKenzie by paying attention instead to the ways in which the social sciences "imprint themselves, through their mundane devices and methods, rather than through their grandiloquent theorizing, into a range of social practices" (2009b, p. 228). For if the discipline of sociology remains tied to the study of grand forms of social change, then, he argues, it will remain stuck in the past along with other forms of social science that subsume attention to empirical detail under a constant search for "the new." Indeed, Savage makes the bold claim (which is never in turn substantiated) that: "For all the claims to intellectual novelty associated with epochalism, British sociology remains set hard in a time warp originally set in place nearly 50 years ago" (2009b, p. 233).

These arguments about the value of descriptive methods and the limitations of epochalist thinking underpin Savage's more explicit call for a descriptive turn in his 2014 article "Piketty's Challenge for Sociology." This article draws on Thomas Piketty's book, *Capital in the Twenty-First Century* (2014), in order to develop a model of the type of descriptive work that, for Savage, should be central to the discipline:

> *Rather than play to specialist academic communities, mired in their own paradigms and technical toolkits, Piketty has been bold enough to play to a bigger audience. He does not do this through the kind of grandiose theorizing that sociologists are familiar with, but instead through the careful empirical unravelling of the long-term patterns of demographic and economic change across numerous nations over the past two hundred years... I argue that his work should not be seen simply as a specialist study in economics—though it is surely this—but is also of profound significance for sociology. (2014, p. 591)*

What, exactly, should sociologists learn from this work of historical economics? Savage suggests three main things. First, he celebrates Piketty's use of descriptive methods, in particular his use of documentary sources such as tax data and national accounts, as well as devices such as figures and graphs that are used to visualize these data. Savage argues that such methods are important as they do not let historical facts speak for themselves, and equally they stand against "the typical social scientific insistence on causality as the holy grail" (2014, p. 593). More than this, Savage argues that Piketty is right to study capital and wealth over a relatively long time period (roughly 200 years), for in so doing he advances a model for reading the relationship between past and present that insists on the importance of the *longue durée*, and with this provides "a powerful demolition of the kind of 'presentist' sociology that abounds" (2014, p. 596). Second, following on from this point, Savage embraces Piketty's work on the grounds that it offers a corrective to the kind of epochalist thinking that is, he argues, commonplace in the social sciences and "especially sociology" (see 2014, p. 596). Whereas his previous article on this subject, "Against Epochalism," takes issue with grand narratives of the (post-)modern, global, and more generally the "new," now his target is the "neoliberal." He observes that the term neoliberal is never used once by Piketty in *Capital* (something which, for Savage, is "striking," see 2014, p. 605), and, more than this, states that this book "debunks the neo-liberal mantra that the economic role of the state has changed profoundly" (2014, p. 599). This is an important point that we will return to in detail below. Third, and finally, he lauds Piketty's contribution to sociological understandings of social class and privilege on the grounds that his work on such questions proceeds through description rather than a focus on causality, and does so by identifying "accumulation rather than exploitation as the central dynamic of capitalism" (Savage, 2014, p. 600). Savage argues, moreover, that Piketty makes an important contribution to existing sociological knowledge because he connects class both to the study of wealth and inheritance and to the study of households and family life—connections, he argues, that have previously been neglected within the discipline.

3 | EPOCHALIST THINKING

The above section provides a summary of the main points of Savage's call for a descriptive turn in sociology. The detail of this argument will now be considered by addressing his critique of "epochalist thinking" and his privileging of description over causality, particularly in relation to the sociological study of inequality and class. In terms of the former, the key point made by Savage is that the discipline should move away from its tendency to use grand narratival concepts to capture the essential features of an age or "epoch," and to separate past from present in the constant pursuit of that which is deemed "new." In his paper on Piketty, Savage declares: "Such thinking saturates debates about social change and incites an almost constant agitation for detecting new kinds of epochal change and transformation which makes our contemporary times different from anything that comes before" (2014, p. 597). It is hard to argue against the underlying sentiment of this statement, as periodizations of social change that dominated social theory in the 1980s and 1990s—in particular modernization, postmodernization, globalization—now look ill-equipped for the analysis of a present that is defined, among other things, by recurrent forms of political and economic "crisis"; by a political landscape in which the "anything goes" of the postmodern has become the mantra of the libertarian Right; and the emergence of virulent forms of nationalism which frame themselves in opposition to ideas of economic and political "globalization." But Savage's argument is more than this, as it stands not just against these "-izations," but against "the glib temptations of 'presentism'" more generally. What is needed, as a remedy, is what he calls "careful historical study" (see 2014, p. 597). Again, Savage is right on this point, which has been stated in different guises many times before. At the outset of the discipline, for example, neo-Kantian thinkers such as Max Weber refused to use epochal thinking to deal with the complexities of the empirical world, and in response advanced a historical approach to the analysis of social and cultural change that was underpinned methodologically by the development of analytical concepts known as "ideal-types" (for further reflection on the role of concepts in social science, see Gane, 2009).

Savage's aversion to social science that constantly pursues the "new" is also nothing new in itself. Many sociologists have questioned, for example, the newness of supposedly "new" cultural forms such as media technologies that, especially through the late-1990s, were predicted to give rise to radically different forms of society and even life. In response, they insisted on the need to think historically about media, and paid close attention to the breaks and continuities between past and present. Savage's critique of sociological presentism, while not in any way ground-breaking, is well founded, for the danger of being dazzled by the "new" is that it risks divorcing the study of the present from a concern for the many ways in which it is embedded within longer historical trajectories and processes that demand close and detailed study. While Savage is right to draw attention to this point, the problem, however, is not simply that epochal thinking has supplanted nuanced historical work, but that, too often, meta-concepts such as the global, modern and postmodern have been used in a blanket way in an attempt to capture complex societal and cultural changes across time and in different places. This is important because epochal thinking is not the problem per se, but rather the use of what C. Wright Mills called conceptual "sponge-words" (see 1962, p. 53); words that suck the life-blood out of the empirical world and block serious historical study.

Savage is divided on the value of the work of Mills, for on one hand he stands against celebrating Mills' life as a public intellectual on the grounds that "it is unhelpful to attempt to recover a heroic sociology that never actually was and look for a 'golden age'" (2016a, p. 190), while on the other he uses Mills as a point of departure for developing new biographical methods (see Savage, 2013). The work of Mills, however, potentially offers much more than either of these things, particularly in its attempt to reflect on the "uses of history" within the sociological imagination (see Mills, 1962, pp. 143–164). While Mills' commitment to the value of history to sociological analysis might seem, initially, to chime with Savage's argument against presentism, in fact Mills advances quite a different position: that epochal history can be used as a form of typological analysis that provides a useful starting point for the analysis of social change, not least because it provides a means for addressing "pivotal events in the development of social structures" (1962, p. 160).

The Power Elite is a good example of what Mills means by this practice. In this work, Mills analyses the shifting basis of the institutional structure of power in US society across five epochs: first, from the American Revolution through to the early 1820s; a period in which there was little differentiation between social, economic, political and military institutions; second, during the mid-19th century, the economic order became more significant as individual property owners grew in status, but to a large extent there remained a balance between the economic, political and military orders; third, from 1866 economic power became ascendant and, following a Supreme Court ruling of 1886 the "centre of initiative shifted from government to corporation" (1959, p. 271); fourth, the New Deal created new, competing centres of power both in the political arena and the corporate world; and in the fifth epoch, Mills argues that post-1945 the deep involvement of business and government "reached a new point of explicitness" (1959, p. 274). This work on power elites in the US is important as it shows that epochal history need not be chained either to a meta-concept of social change (the modern, postmodern, the neoliberal) or to a concern simply for the "knife-edge" moments of change from one epoch to another. Rather, epochal history can fire the sociological imagination by helping to address what Mills calls "dynamic changes in a contemporary social structure," and doing so by understanding their "longer run developments" and thus "the mechanics by which these trends have occurred" (1962, p. 168). Mills argues that the analysis of social change can, in fact, be either short-term or epochal in basis depending on the research problem but that the latter is important for combatting sociological presentism: "Longer-term trends are usually needed if only to overcome historical provincialism: the assumption that the present is a sort of autonomous creation" (1962, p. 168). Here, Mills and Savage agree that presentism is a problem, but, for Mills, epochal history, used properly as a starting point rather than as an end in itself, is a potential cure rather than one of its causes.

The key point that can be taken from Mills is that epochal thinking is not necessarily a problem in itself just as long as epochs are used as heuristic devices rather than pursued as ends in themselves (on this point, see Weber, 1949) and/or tied to a meta-conceptual narrative of historical change (as in narratives of the "modern" and "postmodern"). The importance of Mills' work here is that it prompts us to pay close attention both to the role of history

and of concepts in sociological thought. Savage is more concerned with the former than the latter, but, in his article on Piketty, he takes particular issue with one meta-concept—the "neo-liberal"—which, like previous ideas of the global, postmodern, informationalized, and cosmopolitan, he says is tied to an epochal conception of a new world order (see 2014, p. 596, 597). Savage is right to draw attention to this problem, as there has indeed been a tendency to use the term neoliberal in a uniform way to capture grand changes in the governance and make-up of Western societies from the early 1980s onwards. But, again, the problem is not simply one of epochal history, but rather the use of a concept and an associated process (-ization) that too often is divorced from close historical analysis and, as a consequence, is used without sufficient attention to the complexities of the social and political structures and dynamics in question.

It is important to note, however, that not all sociological work on neoliberalism takes this form. For while "the neoliberal" was for many years used as a signifier for all that is bad about free market capitalism, since the financial crisis of 2007- a body of scholarship has emerged that has addressed the conceptual, historical, and political basis of neoliberalism in painstaking detail. Much of this work has been inspired by Michel Foucault's (2008) lectures on biopolitics, which, as is well known, map out different national trajectories of neoliberal reason that emerged from the 1930s onwards. Are these lectures informed by "epochal thinking" of the type contested by Savage? Yes and no. There is a sense in which Foucault constructs a crude model of classical liberalism (the state watches over the market and only intervenes in the last instance), the structure of which is then said to be reversed by emergent forms of neoliberal governance (within which the market not only watches over but infiltrates the state and all things "social"). But this model is part of a much richer genealogical history of neoliberal reason, which, while not without problems (see Gane, 2014), is not driven purely by presentist concerns. This history is important. For one danger in dismissing concepts such as "the neoliberal" out of hand is that such concepts, including their institutional and practical effects, are then not subjected to analytical and critical scrutiny. This would mean, in the case of the neoliberal, that attempts from the 1920s onwards to redefine the liberal cause and the subsequent attempt to mobilize pro-market ideas through organizations such as think-tanks (see Stedman Jones, 2012) would slip from view. In sum, Savage is right to question the elevation of concepts such as the neoliberal to the status of a master narrative, but the outright rejection of such concepts on these grounds is not the answer, as concepts can be mobilized in different ways by different social and political groups throughout their life-course. This means that close analysis of the conditions of emergence and subsequent historical trajectories of concepts such as neoliberalism is required, both in terms of their operation within political discourse and their lived effects and consequences on the ground.

Savage gives a further reason, however, for abandoning the concept of the neoliberal, namely that there is not sufficient empirical evidence to support its use. This argument is not concerned with the political history of the term neoliberal, which originated in the early part of the 20th century within right-wing circles as part of an attempt to move beyond the laissez-faire commitments of classical liberalism (on this history, see Gane, 2016), but rather whether the term itself can be used to describe accurately the changing role of the state and patterns of wealth distribution across time. Savage argues that one of the attractions of Thomas Piketty's work is that its close attention to historical detail means that one can dispense with static, all-encompassing ideas of the "neoliberal." Savage writes:

> Piketty's work ... debunks the neo-liberal mantra that the economic role of the state has changed profoundly. In fact, with remarkable regularity, the ratio between private and public wealth is in the order of 6:1. This changes very little, if at all, despite changes in the politics associated with state intervention, the shift to marketization, neo-liberalism and so forth. This point is so important because of the obsession of the social sciences towards studying the state. (2014, p. 599)

At least two initial responses might be made to this position. First, concepts such as the neoliberal that have complex political and organizational histories themselves demand close historical study alongside the empirical effects that

they may (or may not) have produced. Second, it is not clear that the social sciences have been or continue to be "obsessed" with studying the state. Indeed, post-crisis there has been a renewed interest in many things that are not simply reducible to "state"-centred analysis: money (see, for example, Pettifor, 2017), debt (Adkins, 2017; Lazzarato, 2015), finance (Konings, 2017), and the family (Cooper, 2017), to name just a few.

The basic point of Savage's argument is that where we might be looking for social change, structurally, there may be none at all. The danger of this position, however, is that in rejecting the neoliberal as a grand narrative of change, a grand narrative of stasis is introduced, perhaps inadvertently, in its place. Savage's reading of Piketty's analysis of the relation of public to private wealth across time here deserves closer attention. In *Capital*, Piketty observes that net public wealth in both Britain and France, when viewed across the past 200 years, is "close to zero" as the tendency (with some historical variation through, for example times of war) has been for the assets and liabilities of the state to cancel each other out (see, 2014, p. 124). Private wealth (or what Piketty calls capital), however, in both countries remained fairly constant at 700% of national income until 1910 when it began to fall to a low of around 300% in 1950 before recovering to 500% in 2010 (see Piketty, 2014, p. 128). There have, then, been significant fluctuations in the ratio of private to public wealth, and the 6:1 ratio of private to public wealth is not a constant, as Savage suggests. Importantly, Piketty draws attention to the tendency, for roughly the past 30 years, for public debt to rise (to the point that, in some cases public capital is in deficit), alongside what he calls the "prosperity of privately owned wealth" (see Piketty, 2017). This, in turn, raises a series of important questions that demand closer sociological study; questions that concepts such as the neoliberal may (or not) help us answer. For example, are public assets (which Piketty defines rather narrowly as "public buildings," see 2014, p. 124) or the state the same things in 1700, 1900 or in 2010? How has the value and quality of such assets changed as they have been privatized? Who has benefitted not only from this process but also from the exponential rise in public debt since 1980? And which social groups, as Piketty himself has asked, have profited most from the accumulation of private capital, particularly from 1950 onwards? A simple assertion of historical continuity over the past 200 years and an accompanying dismissal of the continued importance of sociological analyses of the changing role of the state (alongside the market) effectively means that, in Savage's account, such questions are neither raised nor addressed.

4 | INEQUALITY AND CLASS

It is precisely because Piketty's work can be used to raise these types of questions that it is of sociological interest, not because it "debunks the neo-liberal mantra" and offers descriptive methods for producing potential answers. Savage, however, finds a different point of appeal in Piketty's *Capital*: that his work contains data that can be useful for the sociological study of inequality and class. This is a little surprising, for while, in *Capital*, Piketty offers a wealth of data on inequality within and across different societies over a long time-span, he has very little to say, explicitly, about social class. The only mention of class in this book comes in a series of tables on inequality of labour income, inequality of capital ownership, and inequality of total income (all across time and space), in which Piketty splits the share of different groups in total capital three ways: the top 10% is the "upper class" (the top 1% of which is the "dominant class"); the middle 40% is the "middle class"; and the bottom 50% the "lower class" (see 2014, pp. 247–249). In the pages that follow, however, Piketty states that these divisions and also their class "designations" are largely *arbitrary* as they are introduced "purely for illustrative purposes" and "play no role" in his analysis. He writes: "I might as well have called them "Class A," "Class B," and "Class C" (see 2014, pp. 250, 251). In other words, the notion of class and the related practice of social classification is, for Piketty, largely meaningless.

This position is not at odds with Piketty's broad aim of documenting historical patterns of wealth and income equality across Europe. What is surprising, however, is that Piketty observes that there is an underlying politics to the production of class schemas, which are "generally far from innocent." He writes: "The way the population is divided up usually reflects an implicit or explicit position concerning the justice and legitimacy of the amount

of income or wealth claimed by a particular group" (2014, p. 251). Given this acknowledgement, why does Piketty not reflect on the effects or consequences of the class schema he himself constructs, even if these are designed for "illustrative purposes"? Instead, he absolves himself from such concerns by turning away from the concept of class and back to questions of inequality, stating that while class designations are "open to challenge" there is "no need for me to take a position on this delicate issue" (2014, p. 215).

Such a statement could not be further removed from the work of another thinker who is pivotal to Savage's work on social class elsewhere: Pierre Bourdieu (see, for example, Bennett et al., 2009, although it is worth noting that Bourdieu's book *Language and Symbolic Power* (1991), which informs many of the arguments below, is not mentioned in this reappraisal of Bourdieu's theory of cultural capital, see Bennett et al., 2009, pp. 9–23). Bourdieu argues, quite rightly, that every form of sociological description necessitates close attention to the terms and concepts at stake, including "class," which, contra Piketty, can never be used in an arbitrary or purely illustrative way. For Bourdieu, while concepts such as class are essential tools for the analysis of inequalities of different types, it is crucial that we remain alert to the symbolic powers of such concepts when they are used as descriptors. He makes this point in his brilliant work on the symbolic power of naming (see Bourdieu, 1991; Burrows & Gane, 2006, pp. 806, 807), and its significance here is that to classify a population, in Piketty's terms (see above), as "wealthy," "dominant," or a member of the "lower classes" is a generative practice that can have powerful and often unforeseen consequences for those being classified. For this reason, Bourdieu argues that the social sciences should do more than describe through the use of classification; at the same time, they should be concerned with the politics of classification and, by necessity, pay close attention to ongoing struggles over the power to classify, on one hand, and subjection through classification on the other (see 1991, p. 241, 242). In this view, it is not enough simply to measure, describe and classify inequalities of different types; what also matters are the generative effects, both symbolic and material, that these very processes have for the lived experiences of different social groups on the ground.

This argument is developed in a different way by Imogen Tyler in her landmark book *Revolting Subjects*, which draws on the work of Jacques Rancière and Bev Skeggs rather than Bourdieu in order to consider class as a "struggle over names" (see Tyler, 2013, p. 154). Tyler refuses simply to describe or measure inequalities of different types, and instead asks the fundamental question of *why* a vocabulary of inequality rather than of class has become so prevalent in contemporary sociology and political discourse. Tyler traces this development in the UK to the 1990s, and to the attempt not only by New Labour to decouple economic inequality from the political language of class, but by elites more generally to rid politics of all forms of class-based struggle (see 2013, pp. 153, 154; interestingly this is a development not considered by Savage in his analysis of the fall and rise of class analysis in British sociology, see 2016b, or in his reflections on the politics of method in the conclusion to his book *Identities and Social Change in Britain Since 1940*, see 2010, pp. 237–249; but it is acknowledged briefly in his work with Tony Bennett et al., see 2009, p. 2). Sociology and the social sciences more generally, Tyler argues, have not been immune from this development, but in many cases have helped support it. Reflecting, in turn, on the work of Jan Pakulski and Malcolm Waters (1996) and then Anthony Giddens, she writes that from the late-1990s onwards class analysis was seen to be "providing rapidly diminishing intellectual returns. Class no longer sold academic books or made academic careers. Class was a block to the marketization of academic knowledge. Class had become an embarrassing and even shameful topic" (2013, p. 158). It might be noted that this displacement of class by the study of inequality is something that continues today (see, for example, Dorling, 2014), and for this reason still demands critical sociological reflection.

Against this backdrop, Piketty's brief gesture towards the construction of a class schema but accompanying refusal to consider the symbolic and material politics of such classificatory work, and subsequent return to the measurement and documentation of economic inequalities, is not something that can be dismissed lightly but is part of a wider problem that itself needs to be addressed. Tyler (2013, p. 177) rightly argues that the task in hand for sociology is not to develop better descriptive techniques (by drawing, for example, from thinkers such as Piketty), but to ask how and why class has become a "revolting subject" within the social sciences and mainstream

leftist politics. To confront this situation, she argues, it is necessary to analyse neoliberalism as a class project and, beyond this, understand class politics in terms of an ongoing struggle against different forms of classification (for further articulation of this project, see Tyler, 2015). This is because classification is not something that is value-neutral or arbitrary (as in Piketty, see above), but rather is a practice that is fundamentally political in basis as, to use the words of Bev Skeggs, it creates "standards of value" that are "expressions of power" (2015, p. 214). Tyler and Skeggs observe that Savage's work is not exempt from this problem as such standards of valuation are at work within the new taxonomies of class developed out of Great British Class Survey (see Savage et al., 2015). For while class might be presented as something that is taxonomic or descriptive in form, taxonomies and their associated descriptions, in practice, are never divorced from politics and power, not least because they have real generative and performative effects on the populations they are used to classify.

These sorts of considerations are bypassed by Savage in his appeal to a descriptive sociology that is inspired by the work of figures such as Piketty. For rather than engage with the problems of Piketty's position on class and classification in *Capital*, he embraces the fact that "Piketty's book is fundamentally descriptive" (2014, p. 593), and, more than this, argues that there are attractive features of Piketty's analysis that can inform sociological work on class and inequality. First, Savage welcomes Piketty's attempt at shifting attention away from a concern for exploitation and towards the study of processes of accumulation; something which, for Savage, helps move debate about inequality away from the labour theory of value and towards more "empirically nuanced perspectives" (2014, p. 600; for a robust response to this move see Toscano & Woodcock, 2015). Second, by moving away from a theory of exploitation, Savage argues that it becomes possible to separate class from class consciousness: "It allows us to see how fundamental inequalities can be generated by agents who are completely oblivious to class and who are not necessarily collectively organised" (2014, p. 601). Third, Piketty's work is said to offer an alternative to Marxist and Weberian conceptions of class as it analyses wealth and inheritance and not simply the labour market as the site where class divisions are created. Fourth, as an extension of this point, class can be understood as being "bound up" with households and family life; something that, for Savage, is particularly important as "By re-introducing household wealth into the study of class, it becomes possible to link family dynamics to class in a way which might recognize the significance of non-employed household members and provide a richer and more wide ranging perspective on class" (2014, p. 602). Finally, Savage argues that we can learn from the findings of Piketty's extensive study, and, in particular, pay greater attention to the "very wealthy" and to the ways through which they are "crystallizing as a class" (2014, p. 603)—something that has now started to happen (see, for example, Burrows, Webber, & Atkinson, 2016; Webber & Burrows, 2016).

On a number of these points, Savage is right, as clearly it is important to develop contemporary understandings of class that address historical processes and strategies of accumulation, and that pay closer attention to the structural dynamics of (family) wealth and inheritance. Equally, it is important that social scientists study the super-rich, just as long as this shift in gaze does not displace attention to the analysis of social marginalization, abjection, and poverty. But the question still remains: is a descriptive sociology the means to address such concerns? Is description of inequalities enough in itself or is there a need for a sociology that analyses the *causes* of inequality and explains these by developing a more political conception of social class that centers instead on structural and relational forms of power? There is a choice to be made here: should we follow Savage in pursuing a "taxonomic" sociology of class, or instead focus our attention on the "antagonistic politics of class formation" (Toscano & Woodcock, 2015) and with this material and symbolic processes of "exploitation, domination, dispossession and devaluation" (Skeggs, 2015)—processes that can still be understood in important ways through practices of description?

This question is by no means new and, in many ways, reframes an age-old debate about whether class should be analyzed in terms of its relations (in a Marxist sense) or be concerned instead with the taxonomic study of stratification (a view that is commonly but mistakenly attributed to Weber, see Gane, 2005). In his previous work, especially that with Tony Bennett et al. (2009), Savage uses Bourdieu as a starting point for moving beyond Marx and Weber by developing a relational theory of the social that is tied to a theory of cultural capital that is

said to be "multi-dimensional" in basis (i.e. one that is not anchored solely in the study of class). In this approach, relationality is less a theoretical or critical concern but something that can be captured and described through a methodological technique: multiple correspondence analysis (see Bennett et al., 2009, pp. 45–48). For Savage, the attraction of Piketty's work is that it can be used to extend this position as its study of economic capital can be used as "a crucial counterpart to Bourdieu's dissection of cultural capital" (2014, p. 601). Aside from a brief remark from Savage that Piketty and Bourdieu "share a common focus around accumulation and inheritance" (2014, p. 601), it is not clear, however, exactly how or why they should be treated as counterparts, and how cultural capital and economic capital, as read through these two authors, can lend to new understandings of social class. Instead, Savage turns to Piketty in large part because of his methodological approach. In particular, Savage is keen to move away from an overriding concern for causation (something, he argues, the discipline is "very bad at," see Savage & Burrows, 2007, p. 896) and instead use data from Piketty to produce better historical and comparative descriptions of inequalities between different groups that are primarily economic in basis. Here, a strong conceptual and theoretical account of the economic and cultural basis of class is displaced by a different concern: that we should oppose the "strong condescension to the descriptive" that can be found within the discipline of sociology, and that we should do so by questioning the "core tenet" or "article of faith" of social science: that it should be "fundamentally concerned with analysis, explanation and causality" (Savage, 2009a, p. 157).

But what, exactly, are the merits of shifting towards a descriptive sociology and away from a commitment to sociological explanation and analysis, along with an underlying concern for causality? This question is fundamental as it concerns the aims, scope, and promise of what sociology as a discipline can and should be. For the purposes of the present paper, three main points will be raised and addressed in turn through reference to Savage's turn to Piketty: first, the proposed elevation of description over causality as the focal point for sociological work; second, the continuing role of critique within a descriptive turn; and third, the quality of description that can be offered by academic sociology in relation to its commercial counterpart.

First, while Savage might be right that Piketty's work is a rich source of historical data that is potentially useful for sociological purposes (with the acknowledgement of some problems, for example, a lack of interest in the question of gender, see Savage, 2014, p. 605), a major limitation of this work is that it stops short of providing a detailed conceptual and explanatory account of the different inequalities under study. While Savage views this limitation as a positive aspect of Piketty's work, he stops short of saying exactly why, and what is to be gained by adopting the descriptive methods that are central to this approach. This point has not gone unnoticed. John Holmwood, for example, is critical of Piketty on the grounds that *Capital* provides us with data but only a "limited account of the mechanisms that produce the distributional effect he observes" (2014, p. 609). Surely Holmwood is right? For an enduring quality of the sociological imagination is its ability to cast light on the structures and relations of *power* that are the drivers and causes of inequality across time and place. To give an example: the events of the 2007- financial crisis have been well documented, but sociology can make a difference not simply by describing these events, but by explaining and analyzing the causes of the crisis, and asking how and why different social groups benefitted disproportionately from the government initiatives that emerged in response. Rather than retreat from questions of causality on the grounds that sociology "does them badly," the challenge is rather to move beyond description, which in the case of the crisis has often been provided by good journalism, to address fundamental questions of "how" and "why" by connecting the crisis to broader analytical and structural concerns about the underlying dynamics and trajectories of forms of financialized capitalism, and to the inequalities this type of capitalism creates as a matter of routine (this is the attraction, for example, of the work of thinkers such as Wolfgang Streeck (2016)). Such a sociology—one that transcends description by having strong analytical, explanatory and critical intent—will not only be politically engaged but is also more likely to be of genuine public interest.

This is exactly the point made by Aditya Chakrabortty, the senior economics correspondent for *The Guardian* newspaper, who in 2012 questioned the failure of sociology to address the events of the financial crisis. His explanation for this failure was as follows: "Sociologists are reliably good at analysing the fallout from crises: the recessions, the cuts, the dispossessed, the repossessed. I'd expect them to be in for a busy few years. But on the

upstream stuff, the causes of this crisis, they are practically silent." For Charkrabortty, this was an opportunity missed, as the failure to tackle the political and economic drivers of financial crisis meant that the discipline had lost a chance to challenge the hegemony of economic concepts and ideas within the public sphere, and, with this, shape and perhaps recast public understandings of crisis as well as possible routes out of it. It is hard to disagree with the sentiment of Chakrabortty's (2012) attack on the discipline: that sociology should do more than document and describe the consequences of events such as the crisis; it should instead swim "upstream" to identify and explain their root causes. Savage, for his own part, instead defends a commitment to a descriptive approach by arguing, "in the spirit of C. Wright Mills," that "descriptive modes can be energized by the sociological imagination" (2009a, p. 170). But the important point for Mills is a different one: that attention to the craft of description *and* to questions of causality lie at the very heart of the sociological imagination. His argument is that the formation of sociological problems "should include explicit attention to a range of public issues and of personal troubles; and they should open up for inquiry the *causal connections* between milieux and social structure" (1962, p. 145, emphasis mine). Indeed, for Mills this is the very promise and task of sociology: to make otherwise unforeseen connections between individual troubles and structural issues, between biography and history; connections cannot be made without explicit attention to questions of causality.

Second, there is the question of what happens to critique in a sociology that prioritizes description over other concerns. John Holmwood, again, is sensitive to this point, and argues that one danger of following Piketty's approach is that "sociologists respond by feeling confirmed, rather than challenged: that Piketty tells us what we already know and that there is no need to re-think our own categories and approaches" (2014, p. 609). This is a serious point because a purely descriptive sociology that documents inequalities of different types risks leaving intact views that are currently in the political ascendency, most notably, in the current environment, libertarian and neoliberal beliefs that inequality is not only a fact of nature but also something that is desirable. Such a view, which was popularized by figures such as Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek through the course of the 20th century, rest on a number of serious philosophical and political propositions: that human beings are by nature quite different in their abilities and so any attempt to promote equality between them is destined to fail; that in spite of this capitalism has been successful in raising the general prosperity of all to a degree never seen before throughout history; and that inequality promotes competition, which is a spontaneous force of integration that works for the social good. It is tempting to dismiss such views out of hand, but this would be a mistake as they continue to influence the direction of populist right-wing politics. Indeed, Boris Johnson, the current UK Prime Minister, openly expresses such views. In his Margaret Thatcher Lecture at the Centre for Policy Studies in November 2013, he states, for example, that "Whatever you may think of the value of IQ tests, it is surely relevant to a conversation about equality that as many as 16 per cent of our species have an IQ below 85, while about 2 per cent have an IQ above 130. The harder you shake the pack, the easier it will be for some cornflakes to get to the top" (see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DzIgrnr1ZB0). For Johnson, in keeping with libertarian and neoliberal principles, inequality is "essential for the spirit of envy," and any attempt by a government to "stamp it out" would not only be mistaken but ultimately "futile." Such views demand a serious sociological response. It is not clear, however, that a descriptive sociology of inequality can engage with such political positions, meaning, as a consequence, that they are left to operate without sociological critique or opposition. Given the contemporary power of such ideas, this, I would argue, is a dangerous strategy, for the further privileging of description over a renewed concern for questions of causality is only likely to exacerbate the problem by failing to engage with political discourses and practices that see inequality as both necessary and desirable.

Third, even if one ignores the above and accepts the merits of descriptive sociology of the type advocated by Savage, then there is a further question: what makes for good sociological description? Although Savage does not answer this question directly, he suggests that innovative forms of visualization can help us produce better sociological descriptions of complex forms of data (on this point, see also Burrows, 2011). Indeed, he argues that one of the successes of Piketty's work is that it "mobilizes a powerful set of visual inscription devices and uses these to great effect" (2014, p. 594). This may indeed be the case, but as Burrows rightly observes, "visual prowess" is not

in itself enough (2014, p. 580). For in spite of the visual successes of Piketty's work, which no doubt has helped it appeal to a mass readership, without a strong accompanying conceptual and analytical framework it is unable to produce better accounts or taxonomies of social class than those that exist already within the discipline of sociology. Indeed, regardless of figures, tables, and charts that decorate the pages of *Capital* and which illustrate shifts in inequality over time, Piketty's conception of social class is so thin that the class schema he develops as a consequence is of little if any value to the discipline. John Holmwood shares this view: "the presentation of his [Piketty's] data on distribution in terms of "deciles" seems crude" compared with existing sociological theories and measures of social class" (2014, p. 609). The point here is that neither description nor visualization are necessarily good things in themselves; what matters more is how they are used in relation to the analytical and/or critical task in hand.

This raises a further concern about Savage's use of Piketty to elevate the value of description over that of causal analysis: that quite often these two things accompany each other rather than compete with one another within sociological work. This is the position taken, rightly, by Emma Uprichard (2012) and David Byrne (2016), who argue, albeit in different ways, that good description is precisely that which opens up questions of causality. In the words of Uprichard: "Description provides the soil from where causal modes of inquiry can germinate and grow" (2016, p. 101). Halford and Savage, in a later article on big data (2017), revisit this question briefly and insist that Piketty is in fact interested in causality and that this is addressed through "the elaboration and explication of multiple examples" (Halford & Savage, 2017, p. 1137). While it is not clear that Piketty does indeed address causality by piling up "repeated examples" of the concentration of wealth in different national settings, the paucity of his conceptual and theoretical framework severely limits his account as a form of sociological "explication." Concepts (such as class) play a key role in sociological analysis as they bridge description of the raw data of the empirical world with causal and critical analysis of such data (see Gane, 2009), or, put simply, they are the devices that make meaningful sociological description possible, while at the same time empowering the sociological imagination to be concerned with more than simply description. Halford and Savage (2017) suggest that a "symphonic social science" that centers on the relationship between "data, method and theory" is the way forward, but for this to be the case the role of concepts needs to be taken seriously, and an approach is required that does not focus on data and method at the expense of theory (as tends to be the case in Piketty's *Capital* and in Savage's appropriation of this work).

Savage's argument for new forms of descriptive work is, in large part, methodological in basis, and addresses questions, many of which are important, about the challenges of doing empirical sociology in a world of increasingly "big" data (see Burrows & Savage, 2014). One of the key issues here is whether sociological forms of description can and should learn not just from other disciplines (such as economics in the case of Piketty) but from research produced outside the academy by commercial agencies of different types. There is some sense in this argument (see Burrows & Gane, 2006), but given that commercial agencies now have unrivalled datasets, processing power and methodological expertise (as stated in the original "Coming Crisis" article), should social science now take a descriptive turn? For could it not be the case that sociological work that prioritizes description runs a greater risk of being displaced by its non-academic others that can do this job better: for example, by good journalism or by research of commercial agencies that are capable of ever-more powerful and finer-grained forms of measurement and classification?

It could well be the case that sociology can learn from its non-academic counterparts in order to improve its own descriptive practices (and bring them up to some kind of commercial standard), but this is not the only possibility. Another argument is that sociology as discipline continues to be valuable precisely because it can offer description of a different kind; one that need not be chained to a commercial imperative. And given the powers of description that now exist in the commercial world, the value of sociological work perhaps now lies elsewhere, namely in its ability to ask difficult questions about the instrumental logic of certain forms of knowledge and knowledge production outside the academy. Holmwood expresses this point more boldly: "the question is not simply one of how to practice sociology in the context of commercial interest in, and access to, data that was previously mainly of interest

to social scientists and policy-makers, but also of sociology's purposes; that is, the question of sociology's jurisdiction is not simply knowledge *of what*, but knowledge *for* what, or more precisely, *for whom*?" (2014, p. 610). Indeed, given the descriptive powers of contemporary forms of commercial research that takes place outside the academy, a key challenge for the discipline is to question the underlying politics of these descriptions and the classifications and/or decisions they are used to inform. It is not clear, however, that a sociology that prioritizes description at the cost of causal explanation and/or critical analysis is best-positioned to perform this task.

5 | CONCLUDING REMARKS

The aim of this paper is not to argue against the value of sociological description in itself, but to resist the elevation of description over a concern for explanation, analysis and questions of causality, which together lie at the heart of what C. Wright Mills called the sociological imagination. If sociology is bad at addressing questions of causality (and it is not clear that this is indeed the case), then one answer is to think again about causality in an age of "big" and often misleading data rather than call for work that privileges description in its place. For without attention to what Mills calls "causal connections," it is not possible to locate individual lives within wider social and political structures, and to understand the powers that lend shape to history. Again, the financial crisis is a case in point. A descriptive approach to this crisis does have value: it documents, among other things, events (for example, dramatic movements in market prices and the resulting responses of governments and institutions such as central banks), a range of socio-technical processes and devices (credit default swaps, collateralized debt obligations, leveraged forms of derivatives trading, and so on), and resultant inequalities of different types. But surely sociological work can do more than this? It can question the structural causes of the crisis, the group powers and interests involved, as well as the symbolic and material effects of the very idea of "crisis." The writings of C. Wright Mills are again instructive. In the final pages of *The Power Elite*, Mills analyses what he calls "the higher immorality," and writes that "'Crisis' is a bankrupted term, because so many men [*sic*] in high places have evoked it in order to cover up their extraordinary policies and deeds..." (1959, p. 345). Mills' suggestion is that crisis is connected to the operation of elite power; an insight that continues to be relevant to the present (on this question, see Davis & Williams, 2017). Given this, rather than simply describe inequalities generated by the policies and deeds of this recent crisis (an exercise that requires no particular sociological training or affiliation), a more critical approach is one that explains the causes and accentuation of these inequalities by analysing, among other things, the processes of financialization that led to the crisis in the first place; governmental responses to the crisis in form of austerity programmes (see Blyth, 2013) and quantitative easing (see Gane, 2015); and new forms of usury that further marginalized the poor in the immediate post-crisis period (see Gane, 2019). For such developments not only require description but also, and more importantly, close attention to their underlying causes. It is the argument of the present paper that at a time when class has become a dirty word within mainstream party politics and perhaps also, as Tyler suggests, within sociological analyses of inequality, it is a mistake for the discipline to take a descriptive turn at the cost of deeper concerns for causality, politics, and power. For if, as Savage states, "Class analysis is fundamentally about politics" (2015, p. 224), then the grounds and operation of such politics should be a point of central sociological concern.

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COMMENTARY

WILEY

What makes for a successful sociology? A response to "Against a descriptive turn"

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Abstract

This paper responds to Nick Gane's "Against a descriptive turn". I argue that descriptive research strategies are more open and inclusive than those which purport to be causal where explanatory adequacy is assessed by expert insiders. I also show how open descriptive strategies can assist a wider explanatory purpose when these are conceived in non-positivist ways. I argue that epochalist sociology lacks an adequate temporal ontology because it collapses descriptive specificity back into overarching epoch descriptions. Finally, I argue that if the entire range of publications associated with the Great British Class Survey are considered, that it has demonstrated a productive way of recognising the significance of class which has facilitated major research advances in its wake.

KEYWORDS
class, description, epochalism

When the BBC catapulted the Great British Class Survey (GBCS) so effectively into public debate in 2013, no-one, myself most definitely included, anticipated the remarkable intensity of the confrontations which ensued. We normally write for specialized academic audiences, usually within our own discipline, and for the sociological debate on class to get such remarkable coverage was eye-opening. This has had the effect of making the GBCS such an object of attention that it can distract attention from related research issues, and leads to ongoing scrutiny and debate with the original GBCS paper (Savage et al., 2013). This is one of the reasons why I am grateful to Nick Gane for this thoughtful and generous engagement with my recent work because he places his reflections on the GBCS within a much broader intellectual hinterland which links it to my arguments about the "coming crisis of empirical sociology" (Savage & Burrows, 2007, 2009), the descriptive turn (Savage, 2009a), the problems of epochal sociology (Savage, 2009b), and my interest in Piketty's *Capital in the 21st century* (Savage, 2014). I think this more expansive perspective is illuminating in drawing out the wider intellectual stakes around the GBCS by

linking it more broadly to the question of how sociologists can most effectively intervene in current debates. It is therefore very helpful for him to place the question of the optimal strategies by which sociology can demonstrate its importance, and my response is written with this fundamental issue in mind. Accordingly, I will turn to consider my claims about the descriptive turn, epochalism, and the broader project of class analysis.

1 | THE DESCRIPTIVE TURN

One of my major themes in *Identities and social change* (Savage, 2010) was the remarkable way that the "social science assemblage" became such a powerful force in the decades after the Second World War, and how its claims to jurisdiction were dependent on specific historical conditions which are now fading. In this context, I wanted to unsettle a kind of disciplinary complacency that sociology as a coherent professional discipline is a natural and necessary intellectual formation. One form that this unsettling takes is to dispute the hold of internal devices which secure sociological authority through appealing to professional insiders who are seen to assess the protocols for judging sociological adequacy. It is in this context that "explanatory" claims are often made—as means by which disciplinary insiders decide that some ways of thinking pass muster, and others don't (for instance, because they are "merely descriptive").

In place of this appeal to insider authority, I argued that descriptive work can be highly productive. It can open up new areas of inquiry, provoke questions, and allow analytical, and indeed explanatory work to be furthered by presenting descriptive puzzles which need to be unravelled. In making this point, I built on Andrew Abbott's (2001) point that—like it or not—descriptive exercises have huge traction across vast swathes of contemporary life. This is not only true in the commercial world of credit scoring, security screening, social media scanning and the like. It is also true in academic research. Piketty's *Capital in the 21st century*, a profoundly descriptive account of trends in income and wealth inequality, has—like it or not—had more influence on recharging the analysis of inequality than have more theoretical or analytical tomes. My argument was therefore not pitched against explanation or causation as worthy goals as a matter of principle, but was rather to urge sociologists to loosen up their own thinking so that our own research could take more of a puzzle-solving form and open form.

It follows that my emphasis on the power of the descriptive turn is not couched as a critique of explanation as if these are zero-sum terms (e.g., the more descriptive an account is, the less explanatory it necessarily is). This point is now fairly familiar, for instance in the way that John Goldthorpe (2000, 2001) sets it out. Especially at the end of his paper Gane also recognizes that description need not be at the expense of explanation, but he does not make it clear—other than through some references to C. Wright Mills—how he actually conceives explanation. Here it is useful to reflect on the significance of three types of explanatory strategies.

Firstly, and most conventionally, explanation can be seen in positivist style as based on the operation of general covering laws, that is, principles that are bound to apply when specific conditions are satisfied. It is this framing which lies at the heart of the separation of nomothetic, generalizing social science against idiographic and particularizing humanities oriented disciplines which was installed during the later 19th century Methodenstreit and which has persisted through the institutionalization of boundaries between quantitative and qualitative methods. Here, explanation is the delineation of "law like" principles. The problem is that the underlying theoretical basis of covering law perspectives has been discredited a long time ago. One, powerful, humanist response (which I suspect Gane would endorse) is to object that it attributes causal powers to abstract forces—laws—which are inattentive to context: and more specifically the meanings and values which sentient humans attribute to their actions. Another, more quantitative response, most famously made by Karl Popper, is that however much a law-like pattern can be observed in the social sciences, it only takes one case—which may lie in the future—to refute it. Therefore, one can only ever disprove "laws" and we can never actually establish non-trivial or tautological causality in the social sciences.

However, although discredited theoretically, covering law approaches have an afterlife because of the way that they can be pragmatically deployed in quantitative analysis, in which particular "variables" are seen to have causal effects. Goldthorpe (2001) valuably dissects the different causal strategies which quantitative researchers deploy—before going on to endorse the need for the descriptive elaboration of regularities as a sine qua non. It is in the debates on "variable" versus "case" centered research strategies that a second approach to causality has been elaborated, most memorably by Stanley Lieberson (1987) in his brilliant *Making it count*. He argues against the idea that explanation can be conflated with the analysis of variance in any dependent variable in standard positivist style (what Abbott refers to as the general linear model). Lieberson sees causality as a constant force, such as in the case of gravity. Therefore, if we want to understand contingent outcomes, such as why a feather falls to the ground slower than a lead weight, we cannot appeal to the central causal force—gravity—but instead appeal to more contingent factors, in this case that a feather's filaments act as a drag. Lieberson leads us to the paradoxical conclusion that even though causality is fundamental, it does not help us to explain specific outcomes because it operates as an overarching force which thereby can't be used to explain particular outcomes. Lieberson's account echoes with the argument of critical realists (e.g., Sayer, 1992) that it is necessary to delineate the "causal powers" of particular entities, while paying attention to the differing contexts which may affect if these causal powers can be released. These arguments are persuasive, and indeed I largely subscribe to them, but with one fundamental caveat. In attributing causality in such general terms, it follows that causality often has little role to play in explaining the kinds of specific and variegated outcomes which are normally of interest to social scientists. Causality retreats to being an overarching background principle which can shed little life on actual "real world" situations. In fact, it is precisely for these reasons that Piketty has been criticized because his "fundamental laws of capitalism" do not explain why inequality varies across different nations and over time (e.g., Atkinson, 2015).

Here, a third approach to explanation comes to the rescue, which I think both Gane and I actually share. This is closer to the historian's emphasis on winnowing out the reasons why particular events and outcomes happen (rather than other possible events and outcomes). This ultimately boils down to reflecting on the nature of specific cases, and the particular sets of circumstances which provide the context, paying due attention to key turning points, decisive moments, and so forth. It is in this spirit that Gane states that "a more critical approach (compared to Piketty's) is to explain the causes and accentuation of these inequalities by analysing, for example, the processes of financialization that led to the crisis in the first place; governmental responses to the crisis in form of austerity programmes.... and quantitative easing." This is a kind of contextual causality which does not appeal to covering laws or causal powers. It is consistent with Goldthorpe's (2001) support for delineating "causal process". However, because this approach to explanation focuses on illuminating the specificities of cases through also establishing how they fit within a wider pattern of regularities, it is completely consistent with descriptive strategies which can provide rich detail on a wide range of contexts to allow the specific circumstances to best be delineated. This is why Goldthorpe (2000, 2001) insists that until regularities are established—which can only be done descriptively—then no causal analysis is possible.[1] To explain why a particular patient gets cancer, for instance, there is absolutely no conflict with having a wide battery of descriptive information about that patient, his or her medical history, extensive scans and tests of other organs or of numerous experiences, and such like: indeed such descriptive information assists in making the most likely explanation.

It is in this creative spirit that I see the "descriptive turn" as more productive and energizing than appealing to causality as some kind of occult which tried and trusted insiders can adjudicate about. Let me give an example of how this kind of descriptive strategy can be very powerful. Because the GBCS had such a large sample size, we were able to descriptively compare pay rates at a very fine-grained level, and controlling for the usual socio-demographic factors. It was in this way that Friedman, Laurison, and Miles (2015) noted that among many elite professional and managerial occupations, those who happened to come from professional and managerial backgrounds tended to get paid more than those who were upwardly mobile. From this purely descriptive puzzle, they were then able to conduct pioneering research which allowed them to tease out different explanations for why this "class ceiling" effect might exist (Friedman & Laurison, 2019; Laurison & Friedman, 2016). This research

spanned out into elaborated qualitative case studies and has ended up as an outstanding much lauded, mixed methods piece of social mobility research. My point is that this important study did not begin through some kind of theoretical reflection about the causes of social mobility and immobility—it got its initial bearings from delineating a descriptive puzzle which needed to be unravelled.

In a similar light, the GBCS became influential not because of any theoretical innovation, but because of the richness of its descriptive data. The sociological debate on class, which I have engaged with for many years, indeed became preoccupied by analytical definitions of class, and of the processes which generates class relationships. The debates between Marxist, Weberian, and hybrid class schemas which have been fought out since the 1980s (with me as an occasional protagonist) have certainly been energetic, but they largely became, to adapt Bourdieu's term, "scholastic debates"—that it is to say, between groups of academic experts with their own internal criteria for assessing theoretical and analytical adequacy. For those outside this internal expert community, the debates had little or no interest. They ultimately failed to address the changing social landscape of the 21st century—which is precisely where the descriptive social science of Piketty or Wilkinson and Pickett scored very highly. This also explains why the GBCS had the appeal that it did to much wider audiences who were also able to engage with the descriptive puzzles it threw out.

2 | EPOCHALISM

I do accept, as with my discussion of description, that my account of epochalism cuts many corners. The concept of epoch is wedded to a periodizing approach which itself is embedded in a certain way of conceptualizing time as a set of periods. I acknowledge that the philosophical issues raised here are deep and fundamental and need much more consideration than I have given them so far. I am attempting to address the analysis of time in my current writing, and I hope that my forthcoming book, *The challenge of inequality: Social change and the weight of the past*, will offer a more elaborated statement of my views on these issues, so what follows is only a preliminary response.

My 2009 paper on epochalism was also linked to a similar sentiment to that which animated my advocacy of the descriptive turn.[2] I wanted to unsettle the kind of sociological complacency which I think has led sociologists to appeal to certain broad epochal ideas as if this amounted to some kind of analysis. The basic point here is the way that appealing to certain "epoch terms" could become a lazy way of "explaining" a phenomenon to other insiders like yourself who were steeped in a similar conceptual vocabulary. Here, my sentiments are actually rather similar to Gane's concern about how epoch terms can become "sponge words" which suck analytical life out of issues which are often attributed to them.

It is, however, in the details where I would contest Gane's account. His laudatory reference to C. Wright Mills is confusing because I don't see Mills as an epochal sociologist, indeed as Gane rightly emphasizes, he has an unusually historically focused approach to understanding the social structure which is consistent with my position. Indeed, it is Mills' skill in relating social change to longer standing processes which is striking in his work. In Savage (2009b) I emphasized that epochal thinking only really gathered pace from the 1970s, and that it is British sociology which took it especially to its heart. I was not attempting a blanket caricature here.

I suspect that one of the issues at stake is the value of the "neo-liberal" concept as an analytical tool. Gane understandably objects to my irreverent remarks about its use, and in retrospect I agree that I took some cheap pot-shots. I completely accept that there is an important and productive theoretical lineage of this concept in the work of Foucault and his followers which has proven powerful in distilling important features of contemporary capitalism. It is on those occasions where it slips into being more loosely used that I was taking issue with. In any event, my advocacy for Piketty's work is because he unravesl a key feature of contemporary capitalism regarding the accumulation of capital which did not seem to be brought out adequately by reflections on neo-liberalism— namely the accumulation of wealth as a central force of historical importance.

Piketty's work was important because it provided powerful empirical evidence which allowed me to extend my critique of epochalism. This originally came from observations (Savage, 2010) about how sociology carved out a niche of intellectual jurisdiction in Britain during the 1960s by proclaiming its expertise to unravel the new and emergent. Sociology gained stature by siding with the modern, counter-cultural trends of the time, which led it to be a discipline attracted to embracing the new and emergent. Here Piketty's provocation that the return of capital also means the reassertion of older historical forms is a very powerful insight which I have found very analytically rich. I have become increasingly aware of this power of the past across huge swathes of contemporary claim making: around the writing of historical wrongs; the debate about removing historical monuments of racism (such as 'Rhodes must fal'l or American confederate memorials); the pertinence of historical crimes whether this be sex abuse or war crimes. In these cases, and many others, the past is coming to have huge power over the present and future: it has not been wiped clean in the way that heady postmodernists once thought. This is a theme I am trying to elaborate at length in my forthcoming work.

3 | CLASS

I finally want to return to the Great British Class Survey. Readers will no doubt have already formed their views about it, and there is an extensive critical literature which can guide them in their evaluations. My main reflection on the points that Gane brings to the table is that the GBCS needs to be taken as a whole, and not simply directed at the "seven classes" which were laid out in Savage et al. (2013), and it may be useful to provide some context here.

The GBCS arose not from a strategic decision by myself, Fiona Devine or the larger academic team who later worked on it to go out and commission a digital survey, but through serendipity. In 2009 the BBC approached me to advise them on a project of their own devising and which they wanted academic advice on. I did not feel particularly that it was within my comfort zone as I had no grounding in conducting web surveys, but I simply felt, given the arguments of Savage and Burrows (2007) that I had no choice but to assist. Given that I had emphasized how sociologists should be open to new digital research repertoires, how could I possibly refuse the opportunity which the BBC presented when they knocked on my door? It is important to emphasize, however, that the work on the GBCS leading up to the publication of our paper in 2013 was always something of a side project, a piece of curiosity-driven research as we looked for meaningful patterns in a large and very skewed dataset. Given all our concerns about the contemporary "neo-liberal" (to coin a phrase which is dear to Nick Gane's heart) academy, it is a remarkable testimony to the continued possibility of academic collegiality that a passionate group of enthusiasts—including Niall Cunningham, Sam Friedman, Johs Hjellbrekke, Brigitte Le Roux, Yaojun Li, Andrew Miles, Helene Snee, Mark Taylor, Paul Wakeling, none of whom were resourced to work on the project (the BBC paid no research funds for the project)—were so keen to join myself and Fiona Devine to try to make it work.[3] When we hit on the idea of using latent class analysis to cluster the small national sample survey to provide some "descriptive" class groups, this was not done in the spirit of "here is a new model of class which will blow everything previously written on the subject out of the water," but rather a sense of relief that we had finally found some kind of plausible way of extracting patterns which might lead to a publishable article. I am not trying to claim some false modesty here, but only to make the point that it was only in the aftermath of the remarkable public interest in our original article, that we realized that there was the possibility of a major project on class. We wanted to take ethnographic advantage of the way that the project was so widely discussed in order to build the public reception into a broader and more empirically robust project. It was for these reasons that Sam Friedman and Helene Snee led the collection of an additional 100 qualitative interviews, that Lisa McKenzie conducted additional ethnographic research among the "precariat," that Daniel Laurison was inspired to code occupations from the GBCS, that Paul Wakeling coded up information on university attendance, and that Fiona Devine promoted the project

so actively in the media and public forums. It was only after the publication of the 2013 paper—which remains the attention of so much of the critical reflection—that the GBCS became a major research project on class. However, it is strange that our clutch of research papers (Cunningham & Savage, 2015; Friedman, Laurison, & Miles, 2015; Savage, 2015; Wakeling and Savage, 2015) and especially the 2015 book *Social class in the 21st century* are largely neglected in much of the subsequent discussion which continues to fixate on Savage et al. (2013). Thus, it feels somewhat strange to be told about Bourdieu's recognition of the symbolic violence of class classifications, Imogen Tyler's important arguments about the power of stigma, and so forth, when these very points are central to the account we set out in *Social class in the 21st century* (as well as fully discussed in earlier work, notably Bennett et al., 2009). For instance, an entire chapter of *Social class in the 21st century* examines how the forces of classification and stigmatization play out among the precariat whom Lisa McKenzie interviewed, and our entire book reflects on the performative power of class classifications—including our own.

Gane goes up a strange alley way in his comments with respect to Piketty and class analysis. He takes Piketty to task for not recognizing that class is a classificatory act, when as his own quotation shows, he clearly does recognize this. Most importantly, Piketty has no interest in developing a class schema, and only, very briefly, uses the language of class, on two pages of his book, where he makes it clear that his use of class terminology is "arbitrary." Piketty clearly attaches far more significance to terms drawing on "income shares," and especially that of the "1%." In my view, with his emphasis on top earners, Piketty has served a signal service to social science and critical thinking more generally. He has allowed the fortunes of those who have done extraordinarily well in recent decades to be bought under his analytical as well as descriptive spotlight. Given the extent to which the 1% has become the subject of widespread opprobrium, and has allowed a critical focus on top earners ranging from University Vice Chancellors to chief executives, it seems to me he has done a signal service to critical social science which should be applauded. More than nearly any other social scientist we might care to think of, he has elaborated a way of analysing and classifying income distributions which can be used to turn the telescope on to the very rich.

Let me return to the GBCS. Now that the dust has settled, I would also add that the interpretation of class relations on which we elaborated does not appear so much at odds with other accounts of class as might have appeared at the time. In identifying an "elite" and a "precariat" class, our account is consistent with Marxist and neo-Marxist perspectives on capitalist dynamics. As I have argued elsewhere (Savage, 2015), in pulling out the significance of elites it was also consistent with research using the more orthodox NS-Sec (National Statistics Socio-Economic Classification) which has also shown how NS-Sec 1, senior professionals and managers, have become increasingly socially privileged. And, in invoking the concept of the precariat, we were deliberately taking aim at the problematic concept of the underclass which has been used in racialized ways to stigmatize those in the most marginal positions in the class structure and seeking to understand marginality in other, less stigmatizing terms.

The most useful question to ask at this point, several years after the publications from the GBCS appeared, is whether the project been productive? Has it allowed the development of new bodies of research and insight which has aided an effective sociological analysis of our current challenges? Given that Gane is motivated by reflecting on how best to enhance sociological analysis, this is a crucial test of the value of the GBCS. Here, I think the answer is a very definite and resounding "yes!" In only a few years after the publication of the GBCS, I can think of at least four areas in which the interventions of the GBCS have allowed the rapid elaboration of new repertoires of research. Firstly, the study of social mobility has been recharged by the concern with linking social mobility to occupations which the GBCS permitted, and which has now been conducted on other data sets. Friedman and Laurison's work has been of particular importance in bringing out the significance of class as a major force structuring not only entry to elite jobs, but also wider career progress. There are also influential studies of social mobility into other elite groupings which draw on this framing (O'Brien, Laurison, Miles, & Friedman, 2016; Friedman et al., 2017). More broadly, the GBCS also facilitated the support of Bourdieusian perspectives which have proven themselves to be more sensitive to subjectivity and temporality (see, e.g., Friedman, 2014; Friedman & Savage, 2017).

A second area where the GBCS has been productive has been in recharging the sociology of elites, which had become a largely dormant area of research in recent decades (see in general, Korsnes et al., 2017). Precisely because of the sample skew of the GBCS towards more elite groups, we were able to develop unusually granular accounts of elite geography (Cunningham & Savage, 2015); elitism with respect to the role of specific universities (Wakeling & Savage, 2015); and elites as top earners (Savage et al., 2017). This work has helped to inspire other innovative studies of elite formation and recruitment (see for instance Reeves & Friedman, 2019).

Thirdly, the GBCS allowed sociology to move away from its typical and unproductive antagonism with economics. This opposition between sociology and economics is of long standing, and has recently been restated by Erikson and Goldthorpe (2010) who continue to deny the value of economists' research on social mobility because it does not use their preferred social class categories. This opposition has become highly unproductive for sociology, especially when it is the work of economists which is driving recent discussions—for instance through the contributions of Jo Blanden, Steve Machin, Raj Chetty, and Miles Corak. Because we collected data on both economic inequality as well as social and cultural capital we were able to link both economic and sociological perspectives in a way which offers prospects for further collaboration. Once again, Friedman and Laurison played a key role here because they are concerned with accounting for income inequality, rather than seeing this as an issue with limited sociological relevance.

Fourthly, again because of the power of granular GBCS data, we have made significant strides in linking geography to social class—not only ethnographically, as is now familiar, but through more sustained mapping (Cunningham, 2019; Cunningham and Savage, 2017). This work has allowed us to develop arguments about the increasingly urban basis of cultural capital (Hanquinet & Savage, 2018) and provide much more nuanced accounts of spatial inequality.

For all these reasons, therefore, the GBCS has been highly productive of the staking out of new sociological repertoires in sociology which allow us to rise to the challenges of better understanding 21st-century capitalism. If "the proof of the pudding is in the eating," the GBCS has turned out to offer very hearty fare, with all the crispness of its descriptive recipe, and its care to avoid the MSG of epochalist sauce.

LINKED CONTENT

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NOTES

[1] Goldthorpe's pithy critique of "causal" analysis in statistics is worth citing: "the whole statistical technology that has underpinned the idea of causation as robust dependence, from Lazarfeldian elaboration through to causal path analysis, should be radically re-evaluated. That is to say, instead of being regarded as a means of inferring causation directly from data, its primary use should rather be seen as descriptive, involving the analysis of joint and conditional distributions in order to determine no more than patterns of association (or correlation)" (Goldthorpe, 2001, p. 11).

[2] A passing comment here is that the papers which are focused on by Gane (Savage, 2009a, 2009b; Savage & Burrows, 2007) were never intended as major research contributions. They are not deeply thought-through interventions but were intended, in the best sense of the word, as provocations (in which they have been pretty effective, especially Savage and Burrows, 2007). My most important research during this period was three major empirical research projects which I am very proud of and which I hope make enduring contributions: (i) my work with Tony Bennett, Elizabeth Silva, Alan Warde, David Wright and Modesto Gayo on cultural capital in Britain, which led to *Culture, class, distinction* (Bennett et al., 2009); (ii) my historically oriented reworking of sociological archives to provide a new interpretation of social change in Britain, which led to *Identities and social change in Britain since 1940* (Savage, 2010), I am not referring to these projects to talk up my CV but to note that Gane largely ignores these sustained research interventions where

much of the reasoning for my thinking is embedded, and instead focuses on a set of papers which were written when I was "coming up for air," and wanted to draw out, speculatively and provocatively, some wider implications. To put this another way, the sustained pieces of research which contain my "workings" are largely omitted from his account. Please note, this does not mean I am going to distance myself from my arguments in them!

[3] Daniel Laurison and Lisa McKenzie later joined the team after I had been awarded an ESRC Professorial Fellowship which allowed the recruitment of two Research Officers.

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ORIGINAL ARTICLE

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How does cultural capital affect educational performance: Signals or skills?

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Abstract

In this paper, we test two mechanisms through which cultural capital might affect educational performance: (a) teachers misinterpreting cultural capital as signals of academic brilliance and (b) cultural capital fostering skills in children that enhance educational performance. We analyse data from the ECLS-K and ECLS-K:2011 from the United States and focus on three aspects of children's cultural capital: participation in performing arts, reading interest and participation in athletics and clubs. We find that (1) none of the three aspects of cultural capital that we consider affects teachers' evaluations of children's academic skills; (2) reading interest has a direct positive effect on educational performance; and (3) the direct effect of reading interest on educational performance does not depend on schooling context. Our results provide little support for the hypothesis that cultural capital operates via signals about academic brilliance. Instead, they suggest that cultural capital fosters skills in children that enhance educational performance. We discuss the theoretical implications of our findings.

KEYWORDS

cultural capital, educational success, teacher bias, schooling context, non-cognitive skills

1 | INTRODUCTION

Social stratification research documents persisting inequalities in educational success across countries and over time. French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu famously argued that these inequalities arise in part from individuals' and families' differential possession of cultural capital, that is, familiarity with high-status culture and the ability to express this familiarity effortlessly (Bourdieu, 2006; Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977). Two interpretations of how cultural capital operates exist. The first interpretation, emphasized by Bourdieu, is that cultural capital sends signals of academic brilliance to teachers, which in turn lead to favoritism, preferential treatment, and to educational success. In this interpretation, children's cultural capital does not reflect their actual academic ability but needs a catalyst, the teacher, to be converted into educational success (DiMaggio, 1982; Jæger & Breen, 2016; Kalmijn & Kraaykamp, 1996; Roscigno & Ainsworth-Darnell, 1999; Wildhagen, 2009). The second interpretation, which can be inferred from Bourdieu, and which has been developed in recent research, is that cultural capital fosters skills in children, for example analytical competence and creativity, that directly enhance educational success (Kaufman & Gabler, 2004; Kisida, Greene, & Bowen, 2014; Lareau, 2011, Sullivan, 2007). In this interpretation, cultural capital affects educational success directly and does not need a catalyst to operate.

In this paper, we empirically test the two interpretations that cultural capital affects educational success by (a) sending signals of academic brilliance to teachers, and (b) fostering skills in children. We focus on three aspects of cultural capital—familiarity with legitimate culture, reading interest, and communicative and social skills—and build on an existing literature that finds positive correlations between these aspects of children's cultural capital and different measures of educational success, for example test scores, grades, and final educational attainment (e.g., Bodovski, 2010; Bodovski & Farkas, 2008; Cheadle, 2008, 2009; Covay & Carbonaro, 2010; DiMaggio, 1982; Gaddis, 2013; Sullivan, 2001). While this literature shows that cultural capital has a positive direct effect on educational success, it does not distinguish the two mechanisms outlined above through which cultural capital might operate. Some research has demonstrated that a positive association exists between children's cultural capital and teachers' evaluations of children's academic skills and behaviors (Bodovski & Farkas, 2008; Dumais, 2006a, 2006b; Farkas, 2018; Farkas, Sheehan, Grobe, & Shuan, 1990; Kozlowski, 2015; Takei, Johnson, & Clark, 1998). Consistent with Bourdieu, this research suggests that cultural capital sends signals of academic brilliance to teachers, who in turn form upwardly biased perceptions of children. However, with the exception of two studies (Roscigno & Ainsworth-Darnell, 1999; Wildhagen, 2009), this literature has not linked teacher evaluations to children's actual educational success. In this paper, we test the two proposed mechanisms through which cultural capital might affect educational success within a joint framework. In addition, we extend existing research in two ways by employing a particularly robust research design and by exploring if different schooling contexts shape the extent to which cultural capital is converted into educational success.

First, we use a research design that enables us to draw stronger conclusions about causal relationships than previous research (Roscigno & Ainsworth-Darnell, 1999; Wildhagen, 2009). Specifically, we estimate fixed effects models that control for the fact that children's cultural capital is likely to be correlated with unobserved characteristics that also affect their skills and educational performance (for example, baseline academic ability and motivation). In doing so, we take into account that children who possess more cultural capital send stronger signals of academic brilliance and do better in school for reasons that are substantively different from, but empirically correlated with, their cultural capital (Gaddis, 2013; Jæger & Breen, 2016). In our empirical analysis, we use panel data from the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study—Kindergarten cohort 1998 (ECLS-K; National Center for Educational Statistics, 2009) and the recently released Kindergarten Class of 2010–2011 (ECLS-K:2011; National Center for Educational Statistics, 2017). These studies, which were carried out in the United States, include longitudinal information on (a) teachers' evaluations of children's academic skills (a proxy for teachers' potentially biased perceptions of children), (b) different aspects of children's cultural capital (participation in performing arts, reading interests and participation in athletics and clubs), and (c) children's educational performance (standardized test scores in reading and math). This means that, in addition to offering a more robust methodological framework

than previous research, we are able to replicate all analyses using two separate datasets, thereby increasing the external validity of our results (Bloome, 2015; Freedman, 1991).

Second, we analyse if the two mechanisms through which cultural capital might affect educational success (signals vs. skills) work differently in different schooling contexts. Previous research suggests that schooling contexts differ in the extent to which they enable children to convert their cultural capital into educational success (DiMaggio, 1982; Lareau, 2011; Roscigno & Aisnworth-Darnell, 1999). Building on this research, we hypothesize that if cultural capital operates via signals, schooling contexts in which teachers and students have high socioeconomic status (SES) are more likely to recognize and reward cultural capital compared to schooling contexts in which teachers and students have low SES. Alternatively, we hypothesize that if cultural capital operates mainly via skills, children in low-SES schooling contexts benefit more from their cultural capital than those in high-SES contexts because the skills associated with cultural capital, which might be less prevalent in low-SES contexts, stand out. Empirically, we use information on teachers (e.g., on their education and family background), classrooms (e.g., the proportion of children labeled as gifted) and schools (e.g., their overall socioeconomic composition) to analyze if the effect of cultural capital on educational performance differs across high- and low-SES schooling contexts.

We report three key findings. The first is that, in both datasets, children's reading interests, a key dimension of their cultural capital (de Graaf, de Graaf, & Kraaykamp, 2000; Sullivan, 2007), has a direct positive effect on educational performance. Two other dimensions of cultural capital—participation in performing arts and participation in athletics and clubs—do not have any effect. The second finding is that none of our indicators of cultural capital has any effect on teachers' evaluation of children's English and math skills. This result is in contrast with the interpretation that cultural capital operates via teachers' biased perceptions of children's academic ability. The third finding is that the direct effect of cultural capital on educational performance is remarkably homogenous across schooling contexts characterized by different teacher, classroom, and school characteristics. Overall, our empirical results challenge the interpretation that cultural capital operates via signals of academic brilliance. Instead, they suggest that cultural capital fosters skills in children that enhance educational performance, and furthermore that this mechanism operates in a similar way across otherwise different schooling contexts.

2 | THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In this section, we present our theoretical framework. Drawing on Bourdieu and on a recent literature on cultural capital, we describe the concept of cultural capital and different mechanisms through which it has been argued to shape educational success. We then address different ways in which the effect of cultural capital on educational success might vary across schooling contexts and present a set of empirical hypotheses.

2.1 | The concept of cultural capital

Although there is controversy regarding the definition of cultural capital (Davies & Rizk, 2017; Lamont & Lareau, 1988), Bourdieu saw cultural capital as familiarity with the cultural codes, manners, and behaviors that dominate in a particular society (Bourdieu, 1984, 1996; Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977, 2006). He regarded cultural capital as a valuable resource on par with *economic capital* (income, wealth, etc.) and *social capital* (gainful social connections and networks). Similar to economic and social capital, cultural capital can be converted into other forms of capital through exchanges in material and symbolic markets. Bourdieu used the term "cultural capital" in different ways to emphasize its embodied, material, and relational aspects. This means that there is little consensus in the literature on the exact definition of cultural capital. In this paper, we draw on an influential definition of cultural capital, which defines it as "... institutionalized, i.e. widely shared, high-status cultural signals (attitudes, preferences, formal knowledge, behaviours, goals, and credentials) used for social and cultural exclusion" (Lamont & Lareau, 1988,

p. 156). We rely on this definition because, similarly with Bourdieu's approach, it emphasizes that cultural capital pertains to signals, skills, and behaviors that can be used to obtain more or other forms of capital. Moreover, this definition does not restrict cultural capital to familiarity with "highbrow" forms of culture and emphasizes that it must be used to yield a return.

2.2 | Cultural capital and educational success

According to Bourdieu, the educational system is a subfield within society in which cultural capital carries particular weight (Bourdieu, 2006; Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977). Although he did not offer a clear account of how cultural capital shapes educational success, subsequent literature building on Bourdieu highlights two mechanisms through which cultural capital might operate.

The first mechanism, emphasized by Bourdieu in several of his writings (e.g., Bourdieu, 1996, 2006; Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977), is that cultural capital sends signals of academic brilliance (DiMaggio, 1982; Jæger & Breen, 2016; Kahn, 2012; Kalmijn & Kraaykamp, 1996; Roscigno & Ainsworth-Darnell, 1999; Wildhagen, 2009). Cultural capital, as it manifests in children's attitudes, behaviors, and modes of self-presentation, acts as a signaling device that teachers and other institutional gatekeepers misinterpret as academic brilliance. The consequence of this "misrecognition" is that teachers come to favor and give preferential treatment to children who possess cultural capital, which in turn enhances these children's educational success. A key assumption in this interpretation of cultural capital is that cultural capital is fundamentally unproductive because it does not reflect any actual academic skills. This is the case because, as Bourdieu argues, what counts as high-status culture is arbitrary in the sense of not capturing any objective "truth" but rather the idiosyncratic tastes of those who hold power (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977, pp. 11–31). It is for this reason that cultural capital needs a "catalyst," the teacher, to be converted into something concrete that promotes educational success, for example favoritism and preferential treatment. In this interpretation, cultural capital affects educational inequality because children from privileged backgrounds tend to possess more cultural capital than those from less privileged backgrounds, which gives them an unfair advantage in the educational system.

The second mechanism is that cultural capital affects educational success by equipping children with skills that help them do well in school. Bourdieu did not articulate this mechanism clearly, but it may be inferred from his writings. For example, in *Reproduction* he writes that:

> through all the skill-learning processes of everyday life, and particularly through the acquisition of the mother tongue ... logical dispositions are mastered in their practical state. These dispositions ... predispose children unequally towards symbolic mastery of the operations implied as much in a mathematical demonstration as in decoding a work of art. (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977, p. 43)

Furthermore, in *The State Nobility* he writes that "a person's relationship to culture and language" is "associated with very real differences in both content and form" (Bourdieu, 1996, p. 22). Both statements would suggest that cultural capital also includes actual skills—for example, knowledge, vocabulary, and verbal proficiency—that enhance educational success. Building on Bourdieu, a recent literature has argued that cultural capital includes a set of skills that promotes educational success. For example, this literature argues that cultural activities such as going to arts and music classes may increase children's analytical skills (Kisida et al., 2014), while extracurricular activities might enhance their intellectual creativity (Kaufman & Gabler, 2004) and socio-emotional, communicative, and social skills (Lareau, 2011). In addition, it suggests that reading for enjoyment, also an important aspect of cultural capital, might develop academic skills like linguistic fluency and broad cultural knowledge (Sullivan, 2007). In conclusion, this interpretation of cultural capital suggests that, in addition to operating via signals, cultural capital may also enhance educational success via actual skills. Below, we present a research design that enables us to distinguish each mechanism within a joint framework.

2.3 | Schooling contexts

In addition to affecting educational success via the two different mechanisms presented above, in this paper we argue that the effect of cultural capital may depend on the schooling context in which it is applied. Bourdieu did not explicitly address contextual heterogeneity in the effect of cultural capital, but a later literature has argued that SES characteristics of schooling contexts are important for converting cultural capital into educational success (DiMaggio, 1982; Leopold & Shavit, 2013). We draw on this literature to analyze how the effect of cultural capital on educational success, operating via either signals or skills, might differ across schooling contexts.

First, if cultural capital operates mainly via *signals*, it may yield a higher return in high-SES schooling contexts than in low-SES ones because, in the former, teachers and peers possess more cultural capital and are more likely to appreciate and reward embodied signals of familiarity with high-status culture (Andersen & Jæger, 2015; Leopold & Shavit, 2013). In this context, actual skills associated with cultural capital, for example analytical and creative skills, might matter less because children in high-SES schooling contexts on average possess more skills than those in low-SES contexts. This line of reasoning is consistent with, but adds context to, Bourdieu's argument that cultural capital acts as an "inequality multiplier" that mainly benefits high-SES children.

Second, if cultural capital operates mainly via *skills*, its effect may be stronger in low-SES schooling contexts than in high-SES ones because, in the former, teachers and peers on average possess less cultural capital and are less inclined to recognize signals of familiarity with high-status culture. Instead, teachers and peers may more easily recognize and reward actual analytical and creative skills associated with cultural capital, which in turn promote educational success. This argument is different from Bourdieu's ideas but are in line with DiMaggio's (1982) *cultural mobility model*, which argues that cultural capital does not mainly benefit high-SES children but, if possessed, benefits everyone.

2.4 | Hypotheses

Based on Bourdieu's theoretical arguments and on research that has extended these arguments, we now present a set of empirical hypotheses.

Our first two hypotheses arise from Bourdieu's argument that teachers misinterpret cultural capital as academic brilliance and reward it as such. Specifically, wehypothesize that *children's cultural capital has a positive effect on teacher evaluations* (H1a, i.e., signals affect teacher perceptions) and *teacher evaluations have a positive effect on children's educational performance* (H1b, i.e., signals lead to actions by teachers such as favoritism and preferential treatment). Both hypotheses are necessary for cultural capital to promote educational success via signals. Our empirical test of hypothesis H1a and H1b builds on the assumptions that (1) children use their cultural capital in school and (2) teacher evaluations lead to manifest actions such a favoritism and preferential treatment.

Our second hypothesis is that *cultural capital has a direct positive effect on educational performance* (H2). This hypothesis, which we base on our reading of Bourdieu and on a recent literature that makes this argument, captures that children who possess more cultural capital possess more analytical, creative, and social skills than children who possess less cultural capital. Our empirical test of this hypothesis builds on the assumption that our indicators of cultural capital capture variation in children's skills that affect educational performance.

Finally, we propose two hypotheses pertaining to contextual heterogeneity in the effect of cultural capital on educational performance. Our first contextual hypothesis is that *the positive effect of cultural capital on teacher evaluations, and the positive effect of teacher evaluations on educational performance, is higher in high-SES schooling contexts than in low-SES ones* (defined as contexts with, among other things, fewer poor students, better educated teachers and more gifted students; we present empirical indicators below). We label this hypothesis H3, and it captures the possibility that cultural capital—operating via signals rather than via skills—is an "inequality multiplier" that mainly benefits children in high-SES schooling contexts. Our second contextual hypothesis is that

the direct positive effect of cultural capital—operating via skills rather than via signals—is higher in low-SES schooling contexts than in high-SES ones. We label this hypothesis H4, and it captures that the actual skills associated with cultural capital are in shorter supply in low-SES schooling contexts and, if possessed are more easily recognized and yield a higher return.

3 | DATA

We use data from two studies from the Early Childhood Longitudinal Program: the Kindergarten Class of 2010–2011 (ECLS-K:2011) and the Kindergarten Class of 1998–1999 (ECLS-K) (Tourangeau, Nord, Lê, Sorongon, & Najarian, 2009; Tourangeau et al., 2017). We use these two datasets because, for nationally representative samples from the United States, each includes information on: (a) different aspects of children's cultural capital; (b) teacher evaluations of children's academic skills; (c) standardized test scores; (d) children's socioeconomic background; and (e) teacher, classroom, and school characteristics. The ECLS-K:2011 follows a sample of children from kindergarten to the second grade, while the ECLS-K follows another sample of children from kindergarten to the eighth grade. In this paper, we only use data from waves with repeated information on the dimensions listed above, which restricts the analysis to kindergarten and first grade in the ECLS-K:2011 and to first, third, and fifth grade in the ECLS-K.

ECLS-K initially sampled 21,409 children, but due to panel attrition and missing data on the specific variables that we use, we rely on a sample of 6,471 children who participated when they were in the first, third, and fifth grade. This sample is somewhat selective in that, compared to the full sample, respondents have higher SES, more children live in families with two biological parents, and there is a lower share of black, Hispanic, and Asian children (see online Appendix Table A1). However, substantive differences between samples are not large. In the fifth grade, the ECLS-K randomly assigned half of the participating children to have their mathematics skills evaluated by a teacher. This decision reduces the sample size to 3,005 for this variable, but since assignment was random, it does not induce sample selection. The ECLS-K includes an indicator of literacy skills for all children, which yields a sample size of 6,471 children for this variable. We use the sample weight provided with the ECLS-K to account for panel attrition and the complex survey design.

ECLS-K:2011 sampled 18,170 children in kindergarten. We restrict the analysis sample to children with valid responses on all key variables, which yields a sample of 6,149 children. As in the case of ECLS-K, the analysis sample has somewhat higher SES than the overall sample, more children live in families with two biological parents, and there are fewer minority students (see online Appendix Table A1). In this dataset we also use the sample weight provided with ECLS-K:2011.

Table 1 summarizes descriptive statistics for all variables included in the analysis, including the intra-class (i.e. within-child) correlation for all variables that vary over time.

3.1 | Children's cultural capital

Although it is difficult to measure a rich construct like cultural capital (Kingston, 2001; Lamont & Lareau, 1988; Swidler, 1986; van de Werfhorst, 2010), in this paper we focus on three aspects of cultural capital that have been identified in previous research and that we can reasonably measure in the ECLS-K and the ECLS-K:2011. Specifically, we construct three summary scales that capture: (1) children's participation in performing arts classes; (2) their reading interest; and (3) their participation in athletics and clubs. Others have used the ECLS-K and ECLS-K:2011 to measure cultural capital in similar fashion (Bodovski, 2010; Bodovski & Farkas, 2008; Cheadle, 2008, 2009; Covay & Carbonaro, 2010; Dumais, 2006a, 2006b; Potter, Mashburn, & Grissmer, 2013). We include

TABLE 1 Mean, standard deviation, and intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC)

	ECLS-K			ECLS-K:2011		
	Mean	**Std. Dev.**	**ICC**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**ICC**
Educational performance						
Reading test score	0	1	.74	0	1	.79
Math test score	0	1	.79	0	1	.81
Cultural capital						
Performing arts	0	1	.46	0	1	.47
Reading interest	0	1	.47	0	1	.57
Athletics and clubs	0	1	.48	0	1	.54
Teacher evaluation:						
Evaluation of English skills	0	1	.55	0	1	.60
Evaluation of math skills	0	1	.44	0	1	.43
Controls						
Socioeconomic status	0	1	.94	0	1	.96
Number of siblings	1.50	1.08	.90	1.52	1.09	.96
Two biological parents	.72	.45	.88	.75	.43	.93
Female	.50	.50		.49	.50	
White	.69	.46		.59	.49	
Black	.09	.28		.09	.29	
Hispanic	.13	.33		.20	.40	
Asian	.04	.21		.06	.24	
Other ethnicity	.05	.22		.06	.23	
N (children × *t*)	19,413			12,298		
Teacher characteristics						
Teacher has a Master's degree	.18/.18	.38/.38	.20/.20	.47	.50	.26
Teacher's parents have a						
Master's degree				.19	.39	.03
Classroom characteristics						
Class size	21.6/21.5	4.87/4.65	.41/.44	20.55	4.10	.51
Gifted child in class	.40/.38	.49/.48	.17/.13	.15	.35	.19
Proportion of gifted children in class	.05/.05	.10/.09	.20/.10	.02	.06	.22
Prop. of children reading below average				.19	.14	.20
Prop. of children doing math below average			.15	.11	.21	
Prop. of children being tardy				.07	.06	.35
Prop. of children being absent	.04/.04	.05/.05	.09/.08	.04	.04	.19
Class behavior	3.62/3.60	.87/.87	.11/.14	3.48	.86	.13
School characteristics						
School district poverty				18.63	11.03	.97

(Continues)

TABLE 1 (Continued)

	ECLS-K			ECLS-K:2011		
	Mean	**Std. Dev.**	**ICC**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**ICC**
Private school	.24	.43	.96	.13	.34	.93
Free lunch eligible	31.55	25.99	.80	38.03	30.68	.83
N (children × t)	19,413			12,298		

Note: The sample size differs for teacher, classroom, and school characteristics for reasons described in the data section. The cells with two numbers first provide the number for the English teacher and second the number for the mathematics teacher.

three different aspects of cultural capital because there is consensus that cultural capital pertains to more than familiarity with legitimate or "highbrow" culture (Lareau & Weininger, 2003).

First, we use indictors of *participation in performing arts classes* to create a scale that captures familiarity with legitimate culture (see, e.g., DiMaggio, 1982; Downey, 1995; Dumais, 2006b; Roscigno & Ainsworth-Darnell, 1999; Sullivan, 2001; Wildhagen, 2009). Our scale is a sum score of participation in: (1) dance lessons (only available in ECLS-K); (2) music lessons; (3) art classes; (4) organized performing arts programmes; and (5) drama classes (only available in ECLS-K:2011).

Second, we use two indicators of *reading interest* to create a scale that captures the literary climate in the home and how well the child has internalized this climate (de Graaf et al., 2000; Cheung & Andersen, 2003; Sullivan, 2001). Our scale is a sum score based on: (1) how often the child reads outside of school; and (2) how many children's books the child has. Davis-Kean (2005) combines these two items in similar fashion.

Third, we use indicators of *participation in clubs and athletics* to create a scale that captures the child's skills in managing interactions in diverse institutional settings, including the ability to perform in public in front of adults and other social skills. As explained earlier, Lareau (2011) suggested that children learn skills from organized leisure activities, which subsequently affect their educational performance (Covay & Carbonaro, 2010; Dumais, 2006a). Our scale is a sum score based on participation in: (1) organized clubs or recreational programs; and (2) organized athletics.

We construct each scale by adding the relevant items into a sum score and standardizing the sum score for each scale to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one within each grade. This means that for each grade level our indicators of cultural capital measure children's relative position within the distribution of cultural capital. The online Appendix Table A2 summarizes measures of reliability and correlations for the items used in the three scales. The table shows that statistical reliability is not particularly high for each scale; however, we use these scales because they are similar to how previous research has measured these aspects of cultural capital.

3.2 | Teacher evaluations

We use two empirical indicators from the ECLS-K and the ECLS-K:2011 to capture teachers' perceptions of children's academic ability. Our first indicator is the teacher's rating of the child's skills in oral and written expression, while our second indicator is the teacher's rating of the child's skills in math (mathematical problem solving and demonstration of mathematical reasoning). In kindergarten and first grade, the general classroom teacher rated both English and math skills. In third and fifth grade, the English and math teacher rated the child's skills in their respective subjects. This means that different teachers could have rated the child in the different grades. The ECLS-K provided teachers with examples to help them establish the level of difficulty of a particular item and for each grade level. In ECLS-K, teachers were asked to rate the child's skill, knowledge, or behavior using the following scale: 1 = "Poor," 2 = "Fair," 3 = "Good," 4 = "Very good," or 5 = "Outstanding." In the ECLS-K:2011, the scale was changed to: 1 = "Not yet," 2 = "Beginning," 3 = "Progress," 4 = "Intermediate," and 5 = "Proficient." The overall

rating for each subject is the mean of the items pertaining to that subject. This mean rating is then standardized for each grade level to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one.

3.3 | Educational performance

We use children's test scores in reading and math as empirical indicators of their educational performance. We measure performance in reading and math using standardized tests administrated by the National Center for Educational Statistics. We use the standardized test scores available in the ECLS-K and ECLS-K:2011 and rescale them within each grade level to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. This means that for each grade level our dependent variables measure children's relative position within the distribution of educational performance.

3.4 | Schooling contexts

The ECLS-K and ECLS-K:2011 contain information on the SES characteristics of schools, teachers, and classrooms. Conditioning on valid responses for all contextual variables would reduce our sample size dramatically. For this reason, we use the valid responses within the analysis samples defined above. The online Appendix Table A3 reports relevant sample sizes.

Teachers: We use two variables as proxies for teachers' SES. Both the ECLS-K and ECLS-K:2011 include information on teachers' educational qualifications. We use a binary variable to capture whether the teacher has a Master's degree (or higher qualifications). In addition, the ECLS-K:2011 contains information on the educational attainment of the teacher's parents. We use this variable as a proxy for the teacher's SES background and include an indicator of whether any parent has graduate education (Master's Degree and beyond = 1, less than Master's Degree = 0).

Classrooms: We are unable to measure SES at the classroom level directly. Instead, we use indicators of the academic and social environment in the class that is likely to reflect overall SES. To capture the academic environment in the classroom, we include indicators of: (1) class size; (2) whether there are any children classified as talented and gifted; (3) the proportion of children in the class classified as gifted and talented; (4) the proportion of children with reading skills below grade level (only available in ECLS-K:2011); and (5) the proportion of children with math skills below grade level (only available in ECLS-K:2011). To capture the social environment, we include indicators of: (1) the proportion of children being tardy on a typical week (only available in ECLS-K:2011); (2) the proportion of children being absent on a typical week; and (3) the teacher's rating of how well-behaved the children in the class are.

Schools: We use three indicators to capture school-level SES. The first indicator is a dummy variable indicating if the school is private or public (private = 1; public = 0). The second indicator measures the percentage of students in the school that is eligible for free lunch (a proxy for the share of low-income students in the context of the United States). The third indicator is the percentage of children aged 5–17 in the school district living in poverty (using the U.S. Census Bureau's definition of poverty). This variable is only available in the ECLS-K:2011.

3.5 | Socioeconomic controls

We also include a set of socioeconomic control variables. First, we include a summary indicator of family SES provided in the ECLS-K and the ECLS-K:2011. This continuous variable, which was constructed by the ECLS-K team and not by us, is derived from information on parents' occupational prestige (ranked according to the 1989

General Social Survey prestige score), education and household income at the time of interview (Tourangeau et al., 2009, 2017). We standardize this variable within each grade level to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. Second, we include a binary variable indicating whether the child lives with both biological parents. Third, we include an indicator of number of siblings living in the household. Fourth, we include indicators of the child's sex (female = 1; male = 0) and race (black = 1; Hispanic = 1; Asian = 1; other = 1; white = 0). Table 1 shows means and standard deviations for the control variables.

4 | EMPIRICAL DESIGN

In the empirical analysis, we wish to test five hypotheses concerning the effect of cultural capital on teacher evaluations (H1a); the effect of teacher evaluations on educational performance (H1b); the direct effect of cultural capital on educational performance (H2); and whether the effect of cultural capital varies across schooling contexts, as measured by different school, teacher and classroom characteristics (H3 and H4). We write a panel regression model for children's educational performance:

$$y_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta_1 E_{i,t} + \beta_2 \mathbf{C}_{i,t} + \beta_2 \mathbf{X}_{i,t} + u_i + \varepsilon_{i,t}, \tag{1}$$

where i denotes child ($i = 1,..., n$) and t denotes time period (i.e., grade). In this model y is the child's test score in reading or math, E is the teacher's evaluation of the child's English or math skills at time t, $\mathbf{C}$ is a vector that includes the three scales measuring different aspects of cultural capital, and $\mathbf{X}$ is a vector of control variables. Moreover, α is an overall constant, u is a child-specific effect, and ε is a random error term. The β's are regression coefficients. We exploit the panel data to estimate the model as a linear fixed effects (FE) model. The FE model uses within-child variation in all time-varying variables to difference out the child-specific fixed effect u_i, thereby controlling for all time-invariant, omitted characteristics that affect children's educational performance, cultural capital, and teacher evaluations. Stated differently, this model controls for omitted variables that are correlated with, but substantively different from, cultural capital (for example, children's baseline academic ability) whose omission would lead to biased estimates of the effect of cultural capital on educational performance (Gaddis, 2013; Jæger & Breen, 2016).

We write a similar panel regression model for teacher evaluations:

$$E_{i,t} = \phi + \gamma_1 y_{i,t-1} + \gamma_2 \mathbf{C}_{i,t} + \gamma_3 \mathbf{X}_{i,t} + u_i + \xi_{i,t}, \tag{2}$$

where E is the teacher's evaluation of the child's English or math skills in grade t, y_{t-1} is the child's educational performance lagged one period, $\mathbf{C}$ and $\mathbf{X}$ are as described above, u_i is a child-specific effect and ξ is a random error term. As before, we use the panel data to estimate the model as an FE model. Our main objective is to isolate the signaling effect of cultural capital on teacher evaluations: that is, the effect of cultural capital that is unrelated to children's actual academic ability. To do this, in Equation 2 we control for the child's baseline academic ability (via the fixed effect) and her past educational performance in English or math (via y_{t-1}). We include past educational performance to take into account that, when evaluating a child's skills in the present, teachers possess information on the child's mastery of the curriculum in the past (Jæger & Breen, 2016).

If cultural capital operates via signals, H1a entails that γ_2 should be positive and statistically significant (cultural capital has a positive effect on teacher evaluations) and H1b entails that β_1 should be positive and statistically significant (teacher evaluations have a positive effect on educational achievement). If cultural capital operates via skills, H2 entails that β_2 should be positive and statistically significant (cultural capital has a direct effect on educational performance arising from skills associated with cultural capital). To test H3 and H4, we augment the FE models in Equations 1 and 2 by including the teacher, classroom, and school variables and by testing for

interaction effects between these variables and the cultural capital variables. We test each interaction term individually to avoid conditioning on potential mediators or colliders. H3 implies that the positive effect of cultural capital on teacher evaluations (γ_2), and the effect of teacher evaluations on educational performance (β_1), should be stronger in high-SES schooling contexts (i.e., in schools with fewer poor students, better-educated teachers, more gifted students, and so on). H4 implies that the direct effect of cultural capital on educational performance (β_2) should be stronger in low-SES schooling contexts.

5 | RESULTS

We present the main findings in three sections. First, we present results from FE regressions of children's educational performance on teacher evaluations and children's cultural capital. Second, we present results from FE regressions of teacher evaluations on children's cultural capital. These two sets of results enable us to assess if the effect of cultural capital on educational performance operates via teacher evaluations (H1a and H1b) and/or if the effect is direct (H2). Third, we present results on whether the effect of cultural capital varies systematically with school, teacher, and classroom characteristics, as hypothesized in H3 and H4.

5.1 | Cultural capital and educational performance

Table 2 summarizes key results from regressions of children's standardized reading and math test scores on the cultural capital indicators, English and math teacher evaluations, and the control variables (see online Appendix Table A4 and A5 for full regression tables). For both datasets, we also present results from Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions to compare our results with those found in previous research (most of which uses OLS regression). Finally, we run models with and without teacher evaluations to assess the extent to which teacher evaluations mediate any direct effect of the cultural capital indicators on educational performance.

OLS regression models that do not include teacher evaluations (Models 1 and 5) show that all three aspects of cultural capital—participation in performing arts, reading interest, and participation in athletics and clubs—are positively associated with educational performance. These baseline results are in line with previous research (e.g., Bodovski, 2010; Bodovski & Farkas, 2008; DiMaggio, 1982; Sullivan, 2001). When we add English and math teacher evaluations to the models (cf. Models 2 and 6), we find that teacher evaluations mediate some of the associations between the cultural capital indicators and educational performance.

When we rerun the models as FE models, and thereby control for omitted child characteristics that are correlated with cultural capital and educational performance, we get different results. In the FE model for children's reading test scores, and for both datasets, we find that, both before (Model 3) and after (Model 4) controlling for teacher evaluations, reading interest is the only cultural capital indicator that has a positive direct effect on reading test scores. In Model 4, we estimate that increasing reading interest by one standard deviation increases reading test scores by .046 standard deviations in the ECLS-K:2011 and .061 standard deviations in the ECLS-K (both $p < .001$). Results are similar in the FE models for math, in which we find that reading interest is the only cultural capital indicator that affects test scores in the ECLS-K (models 7 and 8), but not in the ECLS-K:2011.[1,2] An explanation for these different results may be that the skills associated with reading interest are less important for math performance in the early school years (kindergarten and first grade) than in the middle school years (third and fifth grade).[3]

Our conclusion from the first step of the analysis is that one aspect of cultural capital, reading interest, has a direct positive effect on educational performance. Given that our models control for baseline academic ability and other omitted child characteristics, we interpret this result as consistent with H2 stating that cultural capital fosters skills in children, for example analytical and creative skills, that help them master the curriculum (as

TABLE 2 Results from regressions of reading and math test scores

Outcome	Reading test score				Math test score			
Model	OLS (1)	OLS (2)	FE (3)	FE (4)	OLS (5)	OLS (6)	FE (7)	FE (8)
ECLS-K 2011								
Performing arts	.046*** (.012)	.037*** (.009)	.013 (.009)	.013 (.009)	.034** (.011)	.028** (.009)	.005 (.009)	.005 (.009)
Reading interest	.194*** (.012)	.118*** (.009)	.048*** (.010)	.046*** (.010)	.121*** (.012)	.074*** (.010)	−.006 (.010)	−.006 (.010)
Athletics and clubs	.046*** (.012)	.015 (.009)	.013 (.010)	.011 (.010)	.081*** (.012)	.059*** (.010)	.014 (.009)	.013 (.009)
Evaluation of English		.567*** (.009)		.128*** (.011)				
Evaluation of math						.442*** (.011)		.037*** (.009)
N	12,298	12,298	12,298	12,298	12,298	12,298	12,298	12,298
ECLS-K								
Performing arts	.042** (.016)	.014 (.012)	.001 (.011)	−.002 (.010)	.035 (.020)	.017 (.015)	.003 (.014)	.002 (.014)
Reading interest	.174*** (.015)	.094*** (.010)	.070*** (.013)	.061*** (.012)	.119*** (.018)	.074*** (.014)	.043** (.015)	.041** (.014)
Athletics and clubs	.032* (.016)	.006 (.012)	−.012 (.011)	−.013 (.011)	.116*** (.021)	.076*** (.017)	.016 (.014)	.014 (.014)
Evaluation of English		.569*** (.013)		.152*** (.012)				
Evaluation of math						.485*** (.018)		.059*** (.013)
N	19,413	19,413	19,413	19,413	9,015	9,015	9,015	9,015

Note: Weights used. OLS standard errors are corrected for clustering of observations within children. All models include control variables.

***$p < .001$. **$p < .01$. *$p < .05$ (two-tailed tests).

witnessed in higher reading and math test scores). As noted earlier, this interpretation rests on the assumption that our reading interest scale is a proxy for skills associated with cultural capital. Although we cannot test this assumption, previous research applies a similar interpretation of the positive association between reading and educational performance (e.g., de Graaf et al., 2000; Sullivan, 2007). Moreover, in both datasets we find that teacher evaluations consistently have a positive effect on reading and math test scores. These results support H1b claiming that teacher evaluations affect educational performance. As we have argued above, empirical support for H1b is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the hypothesis that cultural capital operates via signals to hold. The second condition that must also hold is that cultural capital affects teacher evaluations; that is, H1a. We now address this question.

5.2 | Cultural capital and teacher evaluations

Table 3 summarizes results from OLS and FE regressions of teacher evaluations of children's English and math skills on children's cultural capital, past educational performance and controls (see online Appendix Table A6 and A7 for full regression results). The hypothesis that we wish to test is that cultural capital has a positive effect on teacher evaluations because teachers misinterpret cultural capital as academic brilliance (H1a).

The OLS models for teacher evaluations of English skills (Models 9 and 10) show that, even after we control for past educational performance, several of our indicators of cultural capital are positively associated with teachers' evaluations of children's English skills. In the OLS models for teacher evaluations of math skills, reading interest is the only indicator of cultural capital that remains statistically significant after we control for past performance.

Results from the FE models provide little support for H1a. Before controlling for children's past educational performance (Models 11 and 15), we find that only one indicator of cultural capital, reading interest, has a statistically significant and positive effect on teacher evaluation of children's English skills in the ECLS-K (but not in the ECLS-K:2011). After we control for children's past educational performance, none of the cultural capital variables are significant.[4] Our substantive interpretation of these results is that, at least in the context of the United States, the three aspects of cultural capital that we study do not appear to operate via signals of academic brilliance. Below, we analyse if a signaling effect of cultural capital might still exist in high- and low-SES schooling contexts, respectively.

5.3 | Schooling contexts

Our empirical analysis shows that one of our three indicators of cultural capital, reading interest, has a direct positive effect on educational performance (H2) but does not appear to have any indirect effect operating via teacher evaluations (H1a, H1b). However, this average effect could mask important contextual differences if cultural capital converts more easily into favorable teacher evaluations or recognizable skills in some SES schooling contexts than in others. We use the rich data on teachers, classrooms, and schools in the ECLS-K surveys to test H3 and H4. These hypotheses state that the effect of cultural capital on *teacher evaluations* is higher in high-SES schooling contexts than in low-SES ones (H3), and the direct effect of cultural capital on *educational performance* is higher in low-SES schooling contexts than in high-SES ones (H4). To test these hypotheses, we estimate FE regressions of teacher evaluations and educational performance that include main effects of the teacher, classroom, and school variables listed in Table 1 and interaction effects between these variables and the cultural capital variables. We summarize results in the online Appendix Table A8–A10.

To our surprise, we find no evidence that the effect of any of our cultural capital variables on teacher evaluations and on children's educational performance varies systematically across high- and low-SES schooling contexts. Of a total of 252 interaction terms tested in the FE models, none are statistically significant after we adjust

TABLE 3 Results from regressions of teacher evaluations of English and math skills

Outcome	Teacher evaluation of English skills				Teacher evaluation of math skills			
Model	OLS (9)	OLS (10)	FE (11)	FE (12)	OLS (13)	OLS (14)	FE (15)	FE (16)
ECLS-K 2011								
Performing arts	.016 (.012)	−.010 (.009)	.001 (.015)	.002 (.014)	.013 (.012)	−.008 (.010)	−.004 (.019)	−.003 (.019)
Reading interest	.134*** (.012)	.043*** (.010)	.015 (.015)	.017 (.015)	.106*** (.012)	.043*** (.010)	.011 (.019)	.011 (.019)
Athletics and clubs	.055*** (.013)	.032** (.011)	.015 (.014)	.015 (.014)	.051*** (.013)	.008 (.011)	.023 (.018)	.022 (.018)
Reading test score, t−1		.599*** (.011)		.095*** (.022)				
Math test score, t−1						.532*** (.011)		.060* (.029)
N	12,298	12,298	12,298	12,298	12,298	12,298	12,298	12,298
ECLS-K								
Performing arts	.050*** (.014)	.046*** (.013)	.016 (.015)	.028 (.021)	.036 (.021)	.014 (.020)	.025 (.025)	.041 (.034)
Reading interest	.140*** (.014)	.055*** (.013)	.061*** (.016)	.011 (.021)	.092*** (.022)	.037* (.018)	.022 (.029)	.009 (.035)
Athletics and clubs	.046** (.015)	.031* (.014)	.007 (.015)	.031 (.021)	.083*** (.021)	.018 (.022)	.038 (.023)	.057 (.038)
Reading test score, t−1		.518*** (.015)		.038 (.028)				
Math test score, t−1						.522*** (.019)		.014 (.048)
N	19,413	12,942	19,413	12,942	9,015	6,010	9,015	6,010

Note: Weights used. OLS standard errors are corrected for clustering of observations within children. All models include control variables.

***p < .001. **p < .01. *p < .05 (two-tailed tests).

for the false discovery rate associated with running a large number of tests (we use the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure to do this; McDonald, 2014). This result is surprising given the very large variation in SES and schooling contexts that exists in the United States (Hyman, 2017). We interpret this result to suggest that, at least in the United States and in the data that we analyse, there is no evidence that the link between the three aspects of cultural capital and teacher evaluations, and the link between these aspects of cultural capital and educational performance, depend on the SES of the schooling context. We note that our FE models provide a strict test of contextual heterogeneity because they rely exclusively on within-unit (teacher, classroom, school) variation in the contextual variables and thus disregard all cross-sectional variation.

6 | DISCUSSION

In this paper, we test two mechanisms through which cultural capital might affect educational success. We draw on Bourdieu and on other research on cultural capital to argue that cultural capital might affect educational success by: (a) sending signals of academic brilliance to teachers who in turn form upwardly biased perceptions of children's academic ability; and (b) fostering actual skills in children that directly enhance educational performance. Moreover, we hypothesize that the effect of cultural capital might vary across high- and low-SES schooling contexts due to differences in the ways in which cultural capital is recognized and rewarded.

We analyse rich panel data from the United States and use a robust fixed effects design to control for omitted characteristics that correlate with cultural capital and educational performance. Overall, our empirical results suggest that cultural capital operates via skills rather than via signals of academic ability. Specifically, we find that, net of omitted characteristics and actual mastery of the curriculum (as measured by past performance in reading and math), children's participation in performing arts, athletics and clubs, and their reading interest, have no effect on teachers' evaluations of their academic skills. Instead, our results indicate that one aspect of cultural capital, children's reading interest, has a direct positive effect on reading and math test scores. This result is consistent with the idea that the literary environment in the family cultivates skills in children—for example, a complex vocabulary, creativity, and cultural knowledge—that enhance educational performance (de Graaf et al., 2000; Kaufman & Gabler, 2004; Lareau & Weininger, 2003, Sullivan, 2007). The result is also consistent with previous findings that, among different dimensions of cultural capital, reading is the dimension that is most strongly correlated with educational performance (Gaddis, 2013). Finally, and to our surprise given the large variation in schooling contexts that exists in the United States, we find no evidence that the effect of the three aspects of cultural capital on teacher evaluations and educational performance differs across teacher, classroom, and school characteristics that capture high- and low-SES schooling contexts, respectively.

We conclude the paper by highlighting three limitations in our analysis and discussing some avenues for future research. First, when operationalizing cultural capital we draw on measures that previous studies have shown to be positively correlated with educational performance (e.g., Covay & Carbonaro, 2010; DiMaggio, 1982; Gaddis, 2013; de Graaf, 1986). However, it is unlikely that our indicators of cultural capital capture all relevant aspects of cultural capital and the ways in which cultural capital affects educational success. For example, qualitative research by Calarco (2011, 2014) shows that children's propensity to seek help from teachers varies by SES background, and furthermore that these socially stratified help-seeking strategies lead to differences in how teachers perceive and treat children. Unfortunately, we are unable to address these interactional aspects of cultural capital, and we are not aware of any existing datasets that would allow us to address them. Future quantitative data collections should include data on interactional aspects of cultural capital.

Second, Bourdieu and others argued that embodied cultural capital is the key mechanism through which cultural capital enhances educational success. This means that we should observe how students "do" their cultural capital, not only which cultural activities they participate in. We are limited by empirical indicators of cultural participation, which means that we assume that these indicators are proxies for physical manifestations of, or skills

associated with, cultural capital. This is not ideal. However, one redeeming feature of our analysis compared to other quantitative research is that we observe teachers' subjective assessments of students, which logically must depend on how students "do" their cultural capital in school.

Third, while our data include indicators of teachers' *perceptions* of children, they do not include indicators of the *actions* that teachers take based on these perceptions. This means that we assume that teachers favor and give preferential treatment to children whom they regard as more academically gifted. Although we find that teacher evaluations have a positive effect on educational performance (which suggest that teachers' perceptions lead them to act in ways that affects children's performance), we would much prefer to measure how teachers treat children. For example, we would like to measure the amount of time teachers directly interact with children or the length of written responses on assignments.

In addition to highlighting empirical limitations, we would also like to discuss the consequences of our findings for future research on cultural capital. Our main empirical result is that some aspects of cultural capital affects educational success, but that the mechanism through which cultural capital operates is via skills rather than via signals of academic brilliance. This result challenges the traditional interpretation of cultural capital as an essentially unproductive "con capital" whose purpose is to signal familiarity with arbitrarily defined high-status culture (Ganzeboom, 1982). Moreover, the finding that children are unable to convert their cultural capital into favorable teacher perceptions—even in high-SES schooling contexts in which teachers might be particularly receptive to high-status culture—support this argument. Altogether, our results are in line with a recent literature arguing that cultural capital, transmitted from parents to children and fostered via participation in diverse activities, is a set of skills that enhances children's educational performance (Kaufman & Gabler, 2004; Kisida et al., 2014; Sullivan, 2007). If true, this interpretation of cultural capital as a set of skills that apply in most settings might also explain why we find no contextual heterogeneity in the effect of cultural capital on educational performance and teacher perceptions. Still, more work is needed to unpack the different ways in which cultural capital enhances educational performance in different settings.

DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

The data that support the findings of this study are openly available from the National Center for Education Statistics, U.S. Department of Education, at https://nces.ed.gov/ecls/dataproducts.asp.

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NOTES

[1] It may be that children who do better in school find more pleasure in reading. In supplementary analyses, we have addressed potential reverse causality by using additional data from the ECLS-K:2011 in which we observe children's reading

test scores around 6 months after we observe their reading interest (instead of measuring both at time *t*). Results from FE models using these data are identical to the ones we report in Table II (results are available upon request).

[2] In supplementary analyses, we have split up the reading interest scale into its constituent components to assess if one item drives our results. Results show that the item capturing how often the child reads outside of school drives most of the positive effect of reading interest on educational performance (results are available upon request). However, in some cases, and in particular in the FE regressions of reading test scores in the ECLS-K, we find that the number of books also has an independent effect. Based on these results, we use the combined scale in the main analysis.

[3] Since the two ECLS-K surveys were collected 12 years apart (and the 2011 wave was collected in the aftermath of the financial crisis), we have analyzed if children's participation in performing arts, athletics and clubs, as well as the SES gradients in patterns of participation, are different in each wave. We find little evidence that this is the case (further results are available upon request).

[4] One might argue that our FE models, which also include the child's past educational performance, are too conservative. However, even in the FE models in which we do not control for past educational performance, only one cultural capital variable, reading interest, has a statistically significant and positive effect on teacher evaluation of literacy skills, and only in one dataset (model 11, ECLS-K). Thus, support for H1a is limited.

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SUPPORTING INFORMATION

Additional supporting information may be found online in the Supporting Information section.

ORIGINAL ARTICLE

WILEY

Are universities left-wing bastions? The political orientation of professors, professionals, and managers in Europe

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Abstract

Universities are accused of being left-wing bastions, unwel-
coming to conservative and right-wing professors. However,
we know little about the political orientation of professors
in comparison to other professionals, which would be the
right comparison group if we want to know whether univer-
sities are potentially hostile environments to conservatives.
Examining culturally and economically oriented political
orientations in Europe, it is demonstrated that professors
are more liberal and left-leaning than other professionals.
However, there is no greater homogeneity of political ori-
entations among the professoriate relative to other specific
professions, suggesting that there is a diversity of opinions
which is similar to what professionals would find in other oc-
cupations. One exception concerns attitudes towards immi-
gration, on which professors have more liberal orientations
and comparatively low residual variance around that more
liberal mean. Importantly, the difference between profes-
sors and other professionals is not so clear within graduates
from the social sciences, but emerges more clearly among
graduates with a medical, STEM, economics or law degree.
An important political cleavage exists between profession-
als and managers, a group of similar social standing.

1 | INTRODUCTION

In various societies debates have arisen on the lack of political diversity among academics in universities.[1] Critics have argued that one-sided political views in the university, particularly leaning to left-wing or liberal orientations, may prevent the teaching of a diverse set of opinions and worldviews, and may constrain academics who have unconventional views to express themselves and follow their own research interests. Recent scholarship suggests that academic social psychologists became increasingly liberal (Duarte et al., 2015), and conservatives find it less attractive to opt for an academic career (Gross & Fosse, 2012). But criticism does not only come from the political right: academic freedom has also been criticized by critical theorists as serving the interest of social elites (Williams, 2016). A non-diverse university may be threatening to academic freedom when researchers do not feel free to investigate following their own interest, while academic freedom is essential for scientific progress (Williams, 2016).

While evidence exists that academics, on average, have more left-leaning orientations than the general population (Gross & Fosse, 2012; Klein, Stern, & Western, 2005; Ladd & Lipset, 1975), the presumed *homogeneity* in political orientations among professors has not yet been properly investigated. Moreover, academics have not been compared to the most evident comparison group of (other) professionals, which is unfortunate because the social class of professionals is known to be more egalitarian and liberal than the social class of managers—a group of similar occupational standing in the standard sociological social class literature (Brint, 1984; Güveli, Need, & De Graaf, 2007; Kalmijn & Kraaykamp, 2007; Van de Werfhorst & De Graaf, 2004).

It is important to compare professors to other professionals, both in their average political orientation and within-group diversity in orientations, because universities are thought to be organizations hostile to conservative or right-wing scholars. If universities are left-wing bastions where people with divergent (non-liberal) orientations would feel unwelcome, we would not only expect that professors are more left-leaning than other professionals (with similar levels and fields of education), but also that there is a comparatively small dispersion around that more left-wing average orientation, leaving little room for diversity. If the selection process into the professoriate were biased against scholars with divergent opinions, a homogenizing process would have taken place beyond what one may expect from the self-selection into specific fields of study and the potential causal effect of field of study on political orientations. I consider this homogeneity-inducing process a central claim of the thought that universities are left-wing bastions intolerant to a diverse set of opinions. Previous scholarship has not been concerned with within-group homogeneity among professors and comparison groups, although low variability of values within a profession have been defended as resulting from scientific wisdom rather than bias (Fuller & Geide-Stevenson, 2014).

This paper studies the left-wing bastion hypothesis by examining political orientations of people in various occupational groups within the classes of professionals and managers, both in terms of the group averages and within-group homogeneity. Inspired by contemporary class theories and Bourdieusian field theory, I argue that occupational groups and educational background structure political orientations, causally and through processes of selection. This is likely not only the case for professors, but also for other occupational groups. Occupations are examined that are typically seen as rich in cultural capital (professors, artists), rich in economic capital (e.g., CEOs of large private enterprises), and occupations in which there is no clear dominance of one type of capital over the other (engineers).

Using large-scale representative survey data of the European Social Survey I compare the political orientation of professors with that of other professionals, managers, and other groups of workers in Europe. Using four indicators of political orientation, I cover both the economic and cultural dimensions of political cleavages (Van der Brug & Van Spanje, 2009). While the general question on self-placement is informative about general political tendencies, the underlying cultural and economic dimensions of political orientation can reveal more specifically on which issues professors potentially deviate from other occupational groups.

1.1 | Occupations and political orientation

Back in the 1970s it was already established that American professors were more strongly connected to the Democratic Party than to the Republican Party (Ladd & Lipset, 1975). Moreover, the proportion of supporters of the Democrats is larger than in the American population as a whole, suggesting that there is a mis-representation of political ideologies in college campuses (Gross, 2013). However, the criticism to universities as left-wing bastions does not only concern the distribution of ideologies, but also the closure of the occupational group towards outsiders having different viewpoints. This can be assumed to have led to a homogenization process among the professoriate, leading to low dispersions around a left-wing/liberal orientation. Sociological theory may help us to examine whether and why professors are an exceptional occupational group with regard to political and cultural orientations.

New class theory highlights an important change in the class structure with the rise of post-industrial society, with a new class of knowledge workers that differ from the traditional "ruling" class of proprietors (Brint, 1984). While the influential Erikson-Goldthorpe class schema sees the service class as one class that includes managers and professionals, alternative class schemas have separated them—for example, "experts" in the work of Wright (1997) or the modern and traditional professionals in the approach by Savage et al. (2013). More refined approaches distinguished knowledge workers or socio-cultural specialists as a particular group of professionals that would have strongly different political views (Brint, 1984; Güveli et al., 2007; Van de Werfhorst & De Graaf, 2004). From this literature it becomes evident that, in order to judge whether professors are exceptionally left-leaning, one would need to compare them to other professionals rather than to the population as a whole. If professors have political orientations similar to other professional groups, it is not likely that universities as organizations are hostile to people with divergent attitudes.

Further disaggregations of social class are proposed by recent developments in class theory that posit that many of the processes that manifest classes take place at the occupational ("micro-class") level rather than at the "big class" level (Grusky & Sørensen, 1998; Weeden & Grusky, 2005). Inspired by the relevance that Durkheim attached to occupational organizations as intermediaries between the individual and society, occupational class theory proposes a number of homogenization mechanisms happening at the level of occupations: the *allocation* of people into positions, the *social conditioning* of workers (e.g., through training, closure, and interest formation), and the *institutionalization of conditions* such as structuring and rewarding work (Weeden & Grusky, 2005). Given the relevance of occupational groups as evidenced in this approach (not just of professors), it is likely that such homogenizing processes happen in other occupational groups as well, certainly when members of an occupational group are well integrated into formal (professional) associations, like judges, architects, and accountants. The disaggregated approach has proven relevant for many outcomes, including lifestyles, political orientations, and social mobility (Weeden & Grusky, 2005; Van de Werfhorst & Luijkx, 2010).

The disaggregated approach to class resonates with social field theory. Professions can be seen as working in a field that structures the orientations towards the world. Regularities in individual action (such as the coherent preference for a particular political ideology within a professional group) can, according to field theory, be understood "in recourse to position vis-à-vis others" (Martin, 2003, p. 1). An important classification scheme in field theory is in the types of capital that are associated to the social location of occupations, in particular economic

and cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1984). Depending on the dominance of a particular type of capital, some occupational groups are richer in cultural capital, while others are richer in economic capital (Bourdieu, 1984; De Graaf & Kalmijn, 2001). Academics—together with, for example, artists and journalists—are typically seen as part of the cultural elite. CEOs of large organizations are, by contrast, part of the economic elite in which the dominant form of capital is of the economic type.

The structuring character of elite formation is already exemplified in the selection of the *grandes écoles*; the elite institutions in the French system of higher education (Bourdieu, 1998). Social classes differ in their preference for the separate schools that exist for, for instance, public administrators, business elites, and social and humanistic sciences. Enrolment into a particular institution does not only structure labour market opportunities, but also the political and cultural orientations of graduates. Elite institutions are thus part and parcel of the professional field in which graduates integrate (Van Zanten, 2009).

While field theory would thus assume that each profession has its own processes of identification and orientation, in which the position of one's own profession is delineated in relation to others, there is also a special position of professors according to Bourdieu (1988). Professors share with artists a dominance of cultural over economic capital, and can in this respect be positioned against managers of large corporations. However, they have a more stable employment relationship, with regular incomes and more traditional life orientations than artists. However, there are clear differences between faculties. Professors in the fields strongly connected to scientific honor (reflected in national academic board memberships and indicators of academic prestige) are strongly connected to cultural capital (the arts, humanities, but also physics and mathematics), and have corresponding, liberal orientations. Professors in more powerful fields of medicine and law have more traditional orientations.

The question is, however, whether these differences reflect variations in the fields of study people have been educated in, or whether there is a true "battle" between faculties as organizations with their own interests, as Bourdieu (1988) would argue. Differences across graduates from different fields of study (independent of their profession) have often been demonstrated. Fields of study are not only correlated to career progression (Jacob & Klein, 2019), but also to wider political and cultural values (Van de Werfhorst & Kraaykamp, 2001). While professors in the social sciences and humanities are often found to be particularly left-wing compared to professors in other fields (Gross, 2013; Klein et al., 2005), it is unclear whether this is true when these professors are compared with other professionals who took a social science or humanities degree. If the left-wing bastion hypothesis would be true, faculties of social and humanistic sciences would be particularly hostile to divergent (non-liberal) opinions of potential faculty members. Under such a regime, it is likely that conservatives would find it less and less attractive to opt for an academic career (Gross & Fosse, 2012). If, on the other hand, political orientations are correlated to the field of study people enrolled in, independent of whether they became professors or found jobs outside the university, then this could be explained by selection effects into these fields or causal effects of the fields on political orientations. There would, in that case, be little to worry about the presumed social closure of the professoriate whose interest it would be to exclude conservative or right-wing scholars.

Inspired by these literatures, the current paper studies political orientations of a range of occupational groups that differ in the amount of economic and cultural capital. Professors are compared to other professionals and managers, as the main categories of elites that vary in the type of capital (economic or cultural) that is dominant for their location in the social space. This is done for graduates within the same field of study. A crucial test of the left-wing bastion hypothesis as I see it, is whether professors do not only differ with regard to the *average* political orientation, but also in its *dispersion*. Variations within occupational and educational groups have been highlighted before. One example is the variability in values among economists inside and outside academia (Block & Walker, 1988; Van Dalen, 2019). Achievement-oriented economists with little involvement with the public interest are more supportive of income inequality and more critical to immigration than publicly concerned economists who score low on achievement-oriented values, although other values, such as opposition against tariffs, were widely shared among economists. Also, students obtaining a teaching qualification varied in their political cynicism

depending on their cohort, and varied in what they considered good citizenship (Wilkins, 1999). Furthermore, the political orientation of CEOs is associated to the existing pay differences within the management team in their organizations (Chin & Semadeni, 2017).

> **Hypothesis**: *According to the left-wing bastion hypothesis, we would expect a more homogeneous, and more left-leaning orientation among professors relative to other professional occupations (such as lawyers, architects, computer programmers, accountants, engineers, and medical doctors), who have similar educational histories but different career paths after leaving education. Following Bourdieu's metaphor of a battle between faculties, one would furthermore expect that professors in the humanities and social sciences stand out as particularly (homogeneously) left-wing, compared to other professors, also in relation to the non-professors with similar educational backgrounds. Also, important differences are to be expected between professionals and managers or large corporations, as groups that vary in the dominance of cultural and economic capital.*

If, however, professors differ little from other professionals or CEOs with similar educational histories, the professoriate would not stand out as a closed bastion intolerant to divergent opinions. Such structuration patterns by occupational groups are interesting from the perspective of social class theory as it has been argued that class formation and identification increasingly take place at the occupational level rather than at the level of broad social classes (Weeden & Grusky, 2005). But such cleavages would be less worrying in relation to the concern that universities are closed organizations hostile to employees with atypical political orientations.

2 | RESEARCH DESIGN

2.1 | Data

Similar to the study by Gross and Fosse (2012), I use general population surveys to identify professors and comparison groups. I make use of the European Social Surveys (ESS). The ESS data have been collected biannually since 2002 (as a repeated cross-sectional study), and is part of the core European Research Infrastructure funded by the European Commission. We use rounds 1–8 for this analysis (the Cumulative File rounds 1–7 edition 1 to which the round 8 Integrated File edition 2.0 has been added), and selected respondents aged 25–65 with a valid occupation code (ESS, 2016, 2018). This gives us an analytical sample of $N = 234,306$ (with slightly fewer observations in the regression models depending on the valid N on the dependent variables).

There are several advantages of using the ESS. First, thanks to rigorous sampling procedures and efforts, the response rates are comparatively high (the ESS works with a target response rate of 70%; most countries have response rates between 50 and 70%). Second, the ESS takes great effort in collecting high-quality socio-demographic information including educational attainment and respondent's occupation. Third, the ESS is primarily aimed at measuring social and political attitudes, which enables us to study an important set of political attitudes of occupational groups. Fourth, the ESS Core Team has developed extensive weighting procedures of which we make use (ESS, 2014). We weight the data using the design weight *DWEIGHT* (correcting for differential probabilities of individuals of being sampled due to each country's specific sampling design) and the population size weight *PWEIGHT* (so we can generalize to the overall European population across the countries in our database). For within-country descriptions (Table 2) we only used the *DWEIGHT* variable. The data we use includes 31 countries (see Table 2 for a list of countries). There was one country without one single professor in the sample (Turkey), and we omitted that country from the data file for that reason. As the educational field of study of respondents is only known in ESS rounds 2–4, we restricted the analyses by field only to these rounds ($N = 80,179$).

2.2 | Background variables

Occupational group is identified on the basis of the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) version 1988 (ESS waves 1–5) and version 2008 (ESS waves 6–8), referring to the respondent's current occupation, or the last occupation if the respondent is currently not employed. The first digit of this four-digit classification distinguishes managers (first digit 1), professionals (2), and "other occupations" (3–9). Within the class of professionals, university professors are identified by code 2310 ("College, university and higher education teaching professionals"). Excluded therefore are university researchers without a teaching responsibility and non-academic personnel, and included is everybody whose main job involves teaching in higher education (including tenured professors of all ranks, and lecturers with temporary and/or part-time contracts such as adjunct professors and teaching assistants). As our interest is in the comparison of professors to other professionals and managers, the group of "other occupations" (i.e., non-professionals and non-managers) is not further disaggregated but serves as overall comparison to our groups of interest. Additional analyses make a distinction in various professional occupational groups. Table 1 gives the detailed occupational codes to identify all occupational groups that were investigated. As said, the identified occupations represent different locations in the social space of occupations as presented in Bourdieu's work (Bourdieu, 1984). Besides professors, teachers and artists are also identified as high-cultural capital occupations. Other professional groups are stronger on economic capital, such as accountants, while still others score reasonably high on both kinds of capital without any clear dominance of either (medical

TABLE 1 Occupational codes to identify occupational groups

	ISCO 1988	ISCO 2008	Weighted frequency
Managers	1	1	18,773
Of which			
Legislators and senior officials of special interest groups	1000–1133	1100–1114	449
Managers of large organizations, CEOs	1200–1239	1000, 1120–1349	11,493
Managers in small and medium enterprises (SMEs)	1300–1319	14	6,831
Professionals	2	2	41,077
Of which			
Professors	2310	2310	1,306
Teachers and teacher associates	232–235, 33	232–235, 5312	13,894
Engineers	2143, 2144	215	4,176
Medical doctors	2221	221	1,579
Computer programmers	213	25	2,338
Accountants	2411	2411	1,865
Architects, town and traffic planners	2141	2161, 2162, 2164	1,060
Lawyers and judges	242	261	1,211
Artists	245	264, 265	1,577
Other professionals			12,071
Armed forces	100	0, 100, 110, 210, 300, 310	882
Other occupations	3–9	3–9	173,574

Note: The ISCO codes identify occupations at the four digit level. The number of digits in the table determines at which level of detail the occupational groups were identified. Higher-order digits can be filled. For example: 1 indicates all occupational codes starting with a 1, 213 indicates all occupations starting with 213. The provided codes are the ones seen in the ESS data.

TABLE 2 The proportion of professors in each country and ESS round

| Country | ESS round | | | | | | | |
	1 (2002)[a]	2 (2004)	3 (2006)	4 (2008)	5 (2010)	6 (2012)	7 (2014)	8 (2016)
Austria	0.003	0.002	0.002				0.009	0.002
Belgium	0.002	0.000	0.010	0.008	0.004	0.008	0.006	0.003
Britain	0.011	0.005	0.013	0.013	0.008	0.007	0.003	0.006
Bulgaria			0.002	0.001	0.002	0.002		
Croatia				0.005	0.005			
Cyprus			0.000	0.004	0.003	0.000		
Czech Republic	0.001	0.001		0.002	0.001	0.003	0.003	0.002
Denmark	0.005	0.006	0.010	0.005	0.009	0.016	0.010	
Estonia		0.002	0.005	0.003	0.005	0.005	0.006	0.003
Finland	0.006	0.004	0.006	0.003	0.003	0.004	0.009	0.005
France	0.007	0.010	0.004	0.010	0.017	0.002	0.006	0.007
Germany	0.002	0.004	0.001	0.003	0.003	0.004	0.003	0.005
Greece	0.000	0.001		0.001	0.001			
Hungary	0.003	0.010	0.002	0.001	0.003	0.000	0.001	0.000
Iceland		0.000				0.002		0.009
Ireland	0.007	0.007	0.012	0.010	0.007	0.004	0.002	0.005
Israel	0.008			0.016	0.008	0.008	0.010	0.009
Italy	0.005	0.003				0.011		0.004
Lithuania					0.007	0.004	0.004	0.004
Luxembourg	0.006	0.006						
Netherlands	0.007	0.001	0.005	0.006	0.001	0.008	0.009	0.005
Norway	0.010	0.005	0.013	0.005	0.007	0.007	0.008	0.009
Poland	0.007	0.003	0.001	0.007	0.002	0.004	0.001	0.002
Portugal	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.005	0.001	0.007	0.003	0.006
Russia			0.005	0.008	0.003	0.002		0.004
Slovakia		0.005	0.004	0.007	0.001	0.002		
Slovenia	0.005	0.006	0.006	0.004	0.006	0.007	0.001	0.003
Spain	0.006	0.018	0.002	0.007	0.011	0.004	0.003	0.004
Sweden	0.007	0.005	0.004	0.008	0.007	0.009	0.006	0.015
Switzerland	0.003	0.002	0.005	0.002	0.005	0.008	0.003	0.002
Ukraine		0.004	0.005	0.007	0.007	0.005		

Notes: Weighted data (sampling design weight *DWEIGHT*). Empty cells indicate that the country did not take part in the respective ESS round.

[a]These are the modal survey years for each wave, although some countries have collected data in adjacent years.

doctors, engineers). Within the group of managers, relevant distinctions are between legislators, which would, in Bourdieu's depiction of senior civil servants, possess a dominance of cultural capital, and the CEOs of large organizations, which are typically seen as a group with a dominance of economic capital. It should be noted that the list of occupations is not exhaustive, but identifies clearly positioned occupational groups sufficiently large to use for the empirical analysis.

Table 2 presents the proportion of professors in each of the countries in each of the ESS rounds. It shows that, after applying weights, the surveys have a proportion of professors (or more precisely: anyone with a teaching function in higher education) between 0 and 1.8%. The overall weighted average across the 31 European countries is 0.53%, so roughly 1 in 188 individuals with a current or past occupation. As a check we examined the population distribution of the Netherlands in 2016, one of the included countries with reliable employment statistics through the *Vereniging van Samenwerkende Nederlandse Universiteiten* (VSNU) that represents the research universities, and the *Vereniging Hogescholen* (VH) that represents universities of applied science (which offer bachelor degrees). In total, 26,864 academics worked in Dutch universities as a PhD candidate, other scientific personnel, or as an assistant/associate/full professor,[2] and 30,995 employees in the category of "teaching and researching personnel" in the universities of applied science.[3] In total this is 57,819, which includes individuals counted twice because they work both at a research university and a university of applied science. Set off against the total labor force of 8,941,500,[4] this gives us a proportion of 0.006 (while it is 0.005, or 0.5%, in the ESS, Table 2). With the possibility of double counts and the inclusion of non-teaching researchers in the population data, the proportion of 0.5% professors does not seem unrealistic.

The field of study of the highest completed level of education is added to the model. In ESS rounds 2–4, field of study is asked as follows: In which one of these fields or subjects is your highest qualification? The ESS variable *EDUFLD* is more detailed than we examine here; it has 14 categories which were recoded into 6 broad fields. It includes a category "general/ no specific field", typically identifying primary and non-vocational secondary education. Table 3 shows how educational field of study was coded. Most fields are fairly unequivocally classified, including the humanities, the STEM (science, technology, engineering and mathematics) fields, the (para-) medical field, and the legal field. The social sciences are, importantly, separated from the category of economics and business. This represents the faculty ordering in many European countries, while economics would sometimes be seen as a social science in the American context. I classified the field of personal care services in the social sciences. While this field is a bit broad in coverage (and small in numbers under the college graduates), it includes studies like domestic science, and catering.[5]

TABLE 3 Classification of fields of study

Field of study	ESS category	Weighted frequency	%
Humanities/arts	Art, fine/applied	4,595	5.7
	Humanities		
STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics)	Technical and engineering	25,782	32.2
	Agriculture/forestry		
	Science/mathematics/computing etc.		
	Transport and telecommunications		
Social Sciences	Teacher training/education	13,436	16.8
	Social studies/administration/media/culture		
	Personal care services		
(Para-) Medical	Medical/health services/nursing etc.	5,853	7.3
Economics/Business	Economics/commerce/business administration	10,325	12.9
Legal	Law and legal services	2,213	2.8
	Public order and safety		
	[General/no specific field]	17,975	22.4
Total		80,179	100.0

Note: Field of study is only available in the ESS rounds 2, 3 and 4.

The models control for educational attainment, which is measured with a set of dummy variables (less than lower secondary, lower secondary, upper secondary, some post-secondary, college degree). We furthermore control for sex (male = 1, female = 0), age and age squared (to adjust for possible non-linear age correlations with political orientation).[6] We furthermore added fixed effects for country and ESS round, to filter out baseline differences in political orientations between societies and time periods. Note that we present marginal effects plots summarized for individuals with a college degree, and the mean value on other control variables (i.e., the mean between men and women, with mean age and mean age squared, of the average country and average ESS round). For the graphs by field of study we omitted the category of "general/no specific field", although that category is included in the model.

2.3 | Assessing political orientations

While political preferences are expressed most clearly in the voting booth, party choice is an incomplete measure of political bias among professors. There is a lot of variability in orientations among professors with similar party identifications in the U.S.A. (i.e., Democrat or Republican; Klein & Stern, 2008). Moreover, electoral systems differ widely between European societies. A more appropriate way for our purposes to analyze political preferences is to investigate political attitudes. In the political sciences two political axes are usually distinguished to identify political orientation: an economic dimension of left versus right (with the left identifying as pro-redistribution of incomes and a strong welfare state, and the right characterized by pro-market attitudes and preferences for low taxes), and a cultural "GAL-TAN" dimension (Green-Alternative-Libertarian vs. Traditional-Authoritarian-Nationalist, sometimes called the libertarian-authoritarian dimension, Bakker et al., 2015). Research has shown that, over time, the right-left political identification has increasingly been based on cultural (or GAL-TAN), rather than economic (or traditional left-right) issues (Baldassarri & Gelman, 2008; Vries, Hakhverdian, & Lancee, 2013). Moreover, this trend is partly due to cohort replacement as the political right-left orientation of younger cohorts is more strongly driven by cultural issues (Rekker, 2016). Also the link between political ideology and lifestyles is increasing (DellaPosta, Shi, & Macy, 2015).

There is some debate about the question whether political values are consistent across domains. Especially in the 1960s–1980s, political values were thought to be inconsistent across domains (Wuthnow, 2008). As Baldassarri and Gelman (2008) show, the connection between political ideology and values became stronger across time in the United States, while there is no trend towards stronger correlations across issue domains. Also British research showed that political values were in fact highly internally consistent, and can be conceptualized in the two dimensions that are conceptualized here (Evans, Heath, & Lalljee, 1996). The tolerance towards immigration and to further European integration can be seen as part of the GAL-TAN dimension (Hooghe, Marks, & Wilson, 2002), although both political views can of course also be driven by economic motivations. In any case, economic redistribution, immigration and further European integration are important issues in the contemporary political debates in Europe. I created *z*-scored variables on the analytical sample, across countries and waves.

A general *right-left self-placement* is examined using the survey question "In politics people sometimes talk of 'left' and 'right'. Using this card, where would you place yourself on this scale, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?" (The variable was recoded such that higher scores indicate a left-wing orientation.)

Second, the opinion on the role of the government in economic redistribution is asked by the survey question "The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels", where respondents could answer on a 1–5 scale with answer categories "Agree strongly", "Agree", "Neither agree nor disagree", "Disagree", "Strongly disagree" (the variable was recoded such that higher scores indicated a pro-redistribution attitude).

The third indicator is tolerance to immigration to one's own country of residence. This is assessed with the following questions: "Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]'s economy that people come to live here from other countries?" (11-point scale from 0 "Bad for the economy" to 10 "Good for the economy"); "Would

TABLE 4 Descriptive statistics

	Valid *N*	Mean	Standard deviation	Minimum value	Maximum value
Right-left self-placement	199,375	0	1	−2.382	2.134
Government should reduce income differences	231,316	0	1	−2.721	1.070
Tolerant to immigration	231,555	0	1	−2.475	2.477
Further European integration	150,616	0	1	−1.879	1.920
Education	234,306	3.463	1.272	1	5
Gender (male = 1, female = 0)	234,306	0.473	0.499	0	1
Age	234,306	45.248	11.489	25	65
ESS round	234,306	4.508	2.230	1	8

Note: Unweighted data.

you say that [country]'s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?" (11-point scale from 0 "Cultural life undermined" to 10 "Cultural life enriched"); and "Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?" (11-point scale from 0 "Worse place to live" to 10 "Better place to live"). Cronbach's alpha for this scale was 0.85, indicating a high reliability. The average was taken over the standardized items, in a way that a high score indicates tolerance to immigration.

The last indicator is people's support for further European integration. This is assessed with a single item: "Now thinking about the European Union, some say European unification should go further. Others say it has already gone too far. Using this card, what number on the scale best describes your position?" (11-point scale from 0 "Unification has already gone too far" to 10 "Unification go further"). This question was not asked in ESS rounds 1 and 5.

We *z*-standardized each of the outcome variables across the whole dataset, with mean 0 and standard deviation 1. Table 4 shows the descriptive statistics of the used variables, following listwise deletion with regard to independent variables occupation, education, gender and age (the variance function regression models do not allow us to use multiple imputation).

2.4 | Modeling strategy

Given our interest in the group means and the dispersions around the predicted group means, I make use of a joint set of equations predicting (1) the mean score on political outcomes, and (2) the variance in residuals of the mean equation. I follow the variance function regression approach proposed by Western and Bloome (2009). Fixed effects are added for country and ESS round. The residual variance informs us about the dispersion of attitudes around the predicted mean. The left-wing bastion hypothesis would assume that professors are more left-wing (higher average), and have lower dispersions (lower residual variance around the group mean) than other professionals.

If the variance of the residuals is a function of predictor variables (e.g., occupational group), there is heteroskedasticity. This violates the homoskedasticity assumption of ordinary least squares regression models, leading to biased estimates of the standard errors. The variance function regression model relaxes the homoskedasticity assumption.

A common solution for heteroskedasticity is reweighting the data by assigning lower weights for individuals with higher residuals. The Western and Bloome approach takes the following steps (following the notation of Western & Bloome, 2009, p. 301), with y_i standing for the individual score on the outcome variable (political orientation), x_i standing for the predictor variables of the linear regression model, and z_i for the predictor variables of the variance function regression:

1. First estimate a linear regression model of y_i on x_i, providing estimated coefficients $\hat{\beta}$ and residuals $\varepsilon_i = y_i - x'_i\hat{\beta}$.

2. Then fit a gamma regression with log link of ε_i^2 on z_i, yielding current estimates $\hat{\lambda}$. Then save the fitted values $\hat{\sigma}_i^2 = \exp(z'_i\hat{\lambda})$.

3. Fit a *weighted* linear regression model of y_i on x_i, with weights determined by the inverse of the individual squared residual $1/\hat{\sigma}_i^2$. After this model, update the saved residual $\hat{\varepsilon}_i$, and evaluate the log-likelihood.

4. Iterate steps 2 and 3 to convergence (i.e., no improvement of model fit in terms of log-likelihood), updating $\hat{\beta}$ and $\hat{\varepsilon}_i$ from the weighted linear regression, and $\hat{\lambda}$ and $\hat{\sigma}_i^2$ from the gamma regression.[7]

Heteroskedasticity can point to an incomplete specification of the basic linear regression model, for instance through omitted variables or functional form. For our purposes it is not very important whether heteroskedasticity (in our case: different levels of dispersion within occupational groups) results from omitted variables or not. If, for example, there would be larger homogeneity among professors than among other professionals because of a particular distribution of intelligence, there would still be a situation in which people with divergent opinions may find it hard to find their place in the university.

The model predicting the mean outcome has the following form, with $G + 1$ occupational groups, 5 educational levels, 32 countries, and 8 ESS rounds (for these nominal and ordinal variables one category was omitted):

$$y_i = \alpha + \beta_{1.1-1.G} \text{ occupational group} + \beta_2 \text{ male} + \beta_{3.1-3.4} \text{ educ} + \beta_4 \text{ age} + \beta_5 \text{ age}^2 + \beta_{6.1-6.31} \text{ country} + \beta_{7.1-7.7} \text{ ESS round} + \varepsilon_i.$$

(1)

The variance function regression model has the following form:

$$\varepsilon_i^2 = \alpha + \lambda_{1.1-1.G} \text{ occupational group} + \lambda_2 \text{ male} + \lambda_{3.1-3.4} \text{ educ} + \lambda_4 \text{ age} + \lambda_5 \text{ age}^2 + \lambda_{6.1-6.31} \text{ country} + \lambda_{7.1-7.7} \text{ ESS round} + \xi_i$$

(2)

The models by field of study (see Figure 2 later) also add the interaction term between fields of study and occupational group (including main effects).

3 | RESULTS

The tables with the estimates can be found in the Appendix. Marginal plots are used to display the most relevant results. Figure 1 shows that professors are more left-leaning than other professionals on all four indicators. On right-left self-identification, attitudes to immigration, and support for further European integration the difference with other professionals is around 0.2 standard deviations. Professors are also more egalitarian on the question whether governments should reduce income differences, with a difference of around 0.1 standard deviations. It should be noted that professors score around the mean score across the total distribution of economic redistribution attitudes (value 0), given that the effects are identified for people with college education, who are less egalitarian than people with lower levels of education.

With regard to the variance around the predicted occupational group mean, the evidence for the left-wing bastion hypothesis is mixed; the variance is (somewhat) lower among professors than among other professionals on right-left self-identification, and attitudes towards immigration, but the difference is not significant. With regard to income redistribution and further European integration there is no greater homogeneity among professors than among other professionals. Note that the group of other professionals is very diverse, and we examine more specific professional groups below.

An important political cleavage exists between professors and professionals on the one hand, and managers on the other. On all four indicators professors are more liberal than managers, and for professionals this holds for

FIGURE 1 Predicted mean and residual variance around the predicted mean by occupational group, all non-professoriate professionals in one group. Confidence intervals (95%) are displayed with the black vertical lines. Marginal means are shown for people with a college degree, average age, average ESS round and the average country

three of the four variables (except further European integration). The gap between professors and managers is between 0.2 and 0.4 standard deviations, which is sizeable. The residual variance is, however, rather high among managers.

FIGURE 2 Predicted mean and residual variance around the predicted mean for specific professions and other occupational groups. Confidence intervals (95%) are provided with the black vertical lines. Marginal means are shown for people with a college degree, average age, the average ESS round and the average country

I also estimated a model with a more detailed set of professional occupations. Besides professors, this set includes teachers, engineers, medical doctors, computer programmers, accountants, architects/town and traffic planners, lawyers and judges, and artists. Also the class of managers is disaggregated, in legislators/managers of

special interest groups, managers of large organizations/CEOs, and managers in small and medium enterprises. This is a particularly relevant exercise with regard to the variance, because a more fair comparison of dispersion of attitudes would compare professors with other specific occupational groups, rather than a general (possibly highly dispersed) occupational category.

As Figure 2 shows, professors are more left-leaning than all other professional groups except one (artists), on three of the four indicators (except further European integration, where, besides artists, also the architects and planners have similar attitudes as professors). The differences are quite sizable, often between 0.2 and 0.3 standard deviations. Also, teachers stand out as an occupational group with left-wing orientations, but only on traditional left-right issues (income redistribution, including a very low variance around the group mean). Professional occupational groups that appear to be comparatively the most conservative/right-wing are engineers and accountants, where the engineers also have a relatively low residual variance (i.e., little within-occupation dispersion). Also CEOs, SME managers, and people working in the armed forces are typically right-wing and conservative, although there is a lot of variance around their group means. These patterns correspond well to the classification of occupational groups by economic and cultural capital.

When we examine the residual variance, there is little indication that professors have an exceptionally low level of dispersion. There is little evidence for the claim that universities are left-wing bastions where there is no room for diversity of political orientation.

Figure 3 shows the results by the field of study in which people obtained their highest degree. This allows us to compare professors with other professionals who graduated from similar fields of study. In the humanities and arts, professors position themselves more to the political left than other professionals with a humanities degree, are more supportive of immigration, and are more in favor of further European integration. Among graduates with a qualification in the social sciences—the other field that is often considered a left-wing bastion—there are hardly any differences among professors and other professionals; only with regard to immigration social science professors are slightly more liberal than other social science graduates.

There is one political orientation indicator on which professors across all fields are more liberal than other professionals and managers within the same field of study: tolerance to immigration. This holds especially for the fields that are *not* typically considered left-wing bastions: the medical field, economics/business, the STEM fields, and law. For these fields the residual variance is also smaller among professors than among other professionals, in line with the left-wing bastion hypothesis. For the other outcome variables the residual variance among professors is sometimes lower, sometimes higher, without much systematic pattern. For instance, the residual variance on economic redistribution attitudes and European integration is relatively low among medical and law professors compared to other professionals with the same field of study. The exceptional position of immigration attitudes may speculatively be explained by the highly international character of academia.

4 | DISCUSSION

The evidence for the left-wing bastion hypothesis is mixed. Overall, when we examine the average positions of different occupational groups, we see a pattern that is in line with sociological theories positing a central role to occupations for the formation of life styles and political orientations. In particular, we find evidence for a relationship between the dominance of cultural and economic capital for the political orientation of occupational groups. Professors and artists stand out as having a more left-wing/liberal orientation than most other professions (as can be predicted from their dominance of cultural capital), and especially CEOs and small business managers stand out as more conservative and right-wing (fitting the dominance of economic capital in these occupational groups). Also in line with this idea is the average position taken by engineers and medical doctors, groups for which none of the two types of capital can be considered dominant according to Bourdieu (1984).

FIGURE 3 Predicted mean and residual variance around the predicted mean by occupational group and field of study in tertiary education. Confidence intervals (95%) are displayed with the black vertical lines. Marginal means are shown for people with a college degree, average age, the average country, and the average survey year. STEM stands for science, technology, engineering and mathematics

However, with regard to the residual variance, as a measure of homogeneity within occupational groups, the pattern is less clear. Professors do not stand out as having a low dispersion of orientations. If universities were exclusionary organizations where diversity of opinions is undesired and conservative scholars are excluded, one would expect this would have resulted in a high level of homogeneity of opinions. The fact that that seems not to be very clearly the case is reassuring for the contemporary debates on ideological diversity in higher education.

Also, when we split out the results by fields of study, professors with a humanities degree are more left-wing and liberal on most indicators, but this is not the case for professors with a social science degree. Importantly,

professors are more tolerant to immigration than other professional graduates of three fields that are usually not seen as left-wing bastions: the (para-) medical field, economics/business, the STEM fields, and law. This finding fits less well with the "conflict of the faculties" noticed by Bourdieu (1988); the professoriate is comparatively more liberal in the powerful fields (compared to non-professors). So, overall graduates from the humanities and social sciences may be more left-wing and liberal (professors or not), but this is not an organizational feature of the universities, as Bourdieu seems to have suggested.

A common explanation for the more liberal orientation of professionals (including professors) relative to managers concerns their attachment to education. While the evidence is mixed on the question whether education has a causal effect on political orientations (Cavaillé & Marshall, 2019; Hillygus, 2005; Lancee & Sarrasin, 2015) people with higher levels of education, and educated in the social sciences and humanities, identify typically more strongly as left-wing in the political sphere. The more left-leaning orientation of more educated individuals is consistent with several well-known explanations for the formation of political values. These include the theory that intelligence is an important driver of occupational group differences in political orientation (especially on cultural issues, Carl, 2015), the theory that education socializes values especially in the social and humanistic sciences (Stubager, 2008), and the theory that consensus in orientations results from scientific wisdom rather than bias (Fuller & Geide-Stevenson, 2014).

To further illustrate the relevance of education, it is worth emphasizing that we used model predictions of occupational group differences for respondents with a college degree, and almost all predicted outcomes are above zero (indicating above the overall average on the z-standardized variables), except for the support for economic redistribution. Also managers and workers in other social classes with a college degree have above-average scores on a liberal and left-wing political orientation.

While we cannot test the theory that conservatives are reluctant to take up an academic career because of their atypical political orientations, the results point to the possibility that universities form an unwelcoming environment to conservatives (Gross, 2013; Rothman, Lichter, & Nevitte, 2005). Even if there is the same level of variability within the universities as elsewhere, the mean difference implies that societies' intellectuals responsible for teaching the next generation have a more left-leaning orientation than the rest of society. Whether this is worrying from an educational perspective is yet another question—there is no evidence that professors bring their political orientation into the classroom.

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NOTES

[1] For instance, in the Netherlands the Royal Dutch Academy of Sciences published a report commissioned by parliament that investigates academic freedom after concerns were raised about the lack of diversity in universities (KNAW 2018).

[2] Source: https://www.vsnu.nl/f_c_verhouding_vast_tijdelijk.html, last accessed August 30, 2018.

[3] Source: https://www.vereniginghogescholen.nl/kennisbank/feiten-en-cijfers/artikelen/zelf-selecties-maken, last accessed August 30, 2018.

[4] Source: Statistics Netherlands, www.cbs.nl, last accessed August 30, 2018.

[5] There are 773 college graduates with a degree in personal care services in the analytical sample, of which two are in the professor category. The three most common occupations for this category were hairdressers/beauticians (n = 68), cooks (n = 92) and market salespersons/demonstrators (n = 112).

[6] One may question whether a control for age and gender are appropriate, as the critique to universities as a left-wing bastion is independent of the demographics of the teaching corpus. I ran models without a control for age and gender and the results were very similar. It is preferable to control for demographics as we do not want the comparison to other occupational groups to be driven by structural change in the occupational distributions.

[7] Because of the weighting procedure, the weighted N can deviate from the weighted N based on sampling weights as seen in descriptive statistics.

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APPENDIX

TABLE A1 Estimates of regression models underlying Figure 1

	Right-left self-placement		Gov't should reduce income differences		Tolerant to immigration		Further European integration	
	Mean model	Variance function regression	Mean model	Variance function regression	Mean model	Variance function regression	Mean model	Variance function regression
Occupational group (base category: professors)								
Other professionals	−0.203***	0.074~	−0.086**	−0.059	−0.244***	0.067~	−0.191***	−0.066
	(0.027)	(0.045)	(0.029)	(0.044)	(0.023)	(0.040)	(0.034)	(0.041)
Managers	−0.427***	0.076~	−0.299***	0.069	−0.336***	0.164***	−0.198***	−0.038
	(0.028)	(0.045)	(0.030)	(0.044)	(0.024)	(0.041)	(0.034)	(0.042)
Other	−0.303***	0.056	−0.010	−0.123**	−0.461***	0.195***	−0.312***	−0.036
	(0.027)	(0.044)	(0.029)	(0.043)	(0.023)	(0.040)	(0.033)	(0.041)
Education (base category: less than lower secondary)								
Lower secondary	−0.022*	0.018	0.016~	−0.014	0.109***	−0.024~	−0.019	−0.052***
	(0.010)	(0.017)	(0.009)	(0.016)	(0.010)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.016)
Upper secondary	−0.005	0.035*	−0.043***	0.040**	0.286***	−0.113***	0.049***	−0.071***
	(0.009)	(0.015)	(0.008)	(0.014)	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.014)
Some post-secondary	0.049***	−0.001	−0.112***	0.097***	0.446***	−0.225***	0.116***	−0.074***
	(0.013)	(0.021)	(0.012)	(0.021)	(0.012)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.020)
Degree	0.047***	0.051**	−0.213***	0.192***	0.595***	−0.224***	0.215***	−0.047***
	(0.010)	(0.016)	(0.009)	(0.015)	(0.009)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.015)
Male (base category: female)	−0.045***	0.097***	−0.105***	0.136***	0.068***	0.075***	0.072***	0.181***
	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Age	0.004**	−0.009***	−0.001	0.008***	0.008***	0.007**	−0.007***	−0.001
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)

	Right-left self-placement		Gov't should reduce income differences		Tolerant to immigration		Further European integration	
	Mean model	Variance function regression	Mean model	Variance function regression	Mean model	Variance function regression	Mean model	Variance function regression
Age squared	-0.000^{***}	0.000^{***}	0.000^{***}	-0.000^{***}	-0.000^{***}	-0.000^{**}	0.000^{**}	0.000^{*}
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Country fixed effects (base category: Netherlands)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
ESS round (base category: first available ESS round)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	0.249^{***}	-0.231^{**}	-0.417^{***}	-0.156^{*}	0.052	-1.073^{***}	0.388^{***}	-0.349^{***}
	(0.045)	(0.075)	(0.045)	(0.072)	(0.040)	(0.067)	(0.055)	(0.068)
Observations	199,375	199,375	231,316	231,316	231,555	231,555	150,616	150,616

~$p < .10$, *$p < .05$, **$p < .01$, ***$p < .001$ (two-tailed). Standard errors in parentheses.

TABLE A2 Estimates of regression models underlying Figure 2

Occupational group (base category: professors)	Right-left self-placement		Gov't should reduce income differences		Tolerant to immigration		Further European integration	
	Mean model	Variance function regression	Mean model	Variance function regression	Mean model	Variance function regression	Mean model	Variance function regression
Teachers	−0.147***	0.052	0.036	−0.157***	−0.246***	0.061	−0.219***	−0.080~
	(0.028)	(0.046)	(0.030)	(0.045)	(0.024)	(0.042)	(0.034)	(0.042)
Engineers	−0.336***	−0.075	−0.222***	−0.070	−0.308***	0.030	−0.295***	−0.197**
	(0.042)	(0.072)	(0.048)	(0.071)	(0.039)	(0.066)	(0.054)	(0.068)
Medical doctors	−0.320***	0.153*	−0.234***	−0.002	−0.264***	0.066	−0.153***	−0.064
	(0.037)	(0.059)	(0.039)	(0.058)	(0.031)	(0.054)	(0.044)	(0.054)
Computer programmers	−0.253***	0.072	−0.234***	−0.024	−0.200***	0.002	−0.162***	−0.095~
	(0.033)	(0.054)	(0.036)	(0.054)	(0.028)	(0.050)	(0.040)	(0.050)
Accountants	−0.380***	−0.049	−0.227***	0.023	−0.417***	0.099~	−0.241***	0.002
	(0.034)	(0.058)	(0.037)	(0.056)	(0.030)	(0.052)	(0.043)	(0.052)
Architects and planners	−0.202***	0.068	−0.232***	0.003	−0.172***	0.121~	−0.004	−0.083
	(0.047)	(0.076)	(0.051)	(0.076)	(0.041)	(0.070)	(0.057)	(0.070)
Lawyers and judges	−0.285***	0.167**	−0.276***	0.098	−0.252***	0.006	−0.109*	−0.197***
	(0.040)	(0.063)	(0.042)	(0.062)	(0.033)	(0.058)	(0.045)	(0.057)
Artists	0.027	0.064	0.023	−0.064	0.008	0.062	−0.041	−0.064
	(0.036)	(0.059)	(0.038)	(0.058)	(0.031)	(0.054)	(0.043)	(0.054)
Other professionals	−0.224***	0.082~	−0.128***	−0.039	−0.253***	0.067	−0.195***	−0.050
	(0.028)	(0.046)	(0.030)	(0.045)	(0.024)	(0.041)	(0.034)	(0.042)
Legislators/managers special interest group	−0.420***	0.228**	−0.223***	−0.026	−0.125**	0.168*	−0.069	−0.047
	(0.056)	(0.085)	(0.056)	(0.085)	(0.048)	(0.079)	(0.067)	(0.081)

	Right-left self-placement		Gov't should reduce income differences		Tolerant to immigration		Further European integration	
	Mean model	Variance function regression	Mean model	Variance function regression	Mean model	Variance function regression	Mean model	Variance function regression
Managers of large organizations/CEOs	-0.402***	0.039	-0.327***	0.079~	-0.306***	0.135**	-0.173***	-0.046
	(0.028)	(0.046)	(0.031)	(0.045)	(0.024)	(0.042)	(0.035)	(0.043)
Managers SMEs	-0.475***	0.127**	-0.261***	0.059	-0.405***	0.202***	-0.256***	-0.028
	(0.029)	(0.048)	(0.032)	(0.047)	(0.025)	(0.044)	(0.036)	(0.044)
Armed forces	-0.522***	0.103	-0.194***	-0.045	-0.413***	0.159*	-0.317***	0.013
	(0.043)	(0.069)	(0.045)	(0.068)	(0.039)	(0.063)	(0.054)	(0.063)
Other occupations	-0.302***	0.057	-0.005	-0.125**	-0.464***	0.197***	-0.314***	-0.036
	(0.027)	(0.044)	(0.029)	(0.043)	(0.023)	(0.040)	(0.033)	(0.041)
Education (base category: less than lower secondary)								
Lower secondary	-0.023*	0.015	0.016~	-0.014	0.108***	-0.023	-0.020	-0.051**
	(0.010)	(0.017)	(0.009)	(0.016)	(0.010)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.016)
Upper secondary	-0.007	0.033*	-0.044***	0.042**	0.285***	-0.112***	0.049***	-0.070***
	(0.009)	(0.015)	(0.008)	(0.014)	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.014)
Some post-secondary	0.046***	-0.003	-0.116***	0.102***	0.444***	-0.221***	0.116***	-0.072***
	(0.013)	(0.021)	(0.012)	(0.021)	(0.012)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.020)
Degree	0.046***	0.050**	-0.209***	0.190***	0.591***	-0.221***	0.212***	-0.044***
	(0.010)	(0.016)	(0.009)	(0.015)	(0.009)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.015)
Male (base category: female)	-0.040***	0.094***	-0.095***	0.129***	0.066***	0.077***	0.069***	0.181***
	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Age	0.004*	-0.009***	-0.002	0.008***	0.008***	0.007*	-0.007***	-0.001
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)

	Right-left self-placement		Gov't should reduce income differences		Tolerant to immigration		Further European integration	
	Mean model	Variance function regression	Mean model	Variance function regression	Mean model	Variance function regression	Mean model	Variance function regression
Age squared	-0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000**	0.000**	0.000*
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Country fixed effects (base category: Netherlands)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
ESS round (base category: first available ESS round)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	0.255***	-0.231**	-0.414***	-0.158*	0.057	-1.073***	0.392***	-0.347***
	(0.045)	(0.075)	(0.045)	(0.072)	(0.040)	(0.067)	(0.055)	(0.068)
Observations	199,375	199,375	231,316	231,316	231,555	231,555	150,616	150,616

~$p < .10$, *$p < .05$, **$p < .01$, ***$p < .001$ (two-tailed). Standard errors in parentheses.

TABLE A3 Estimates of regression models underlying Figure 3

	Right-left self-placement		Gov't should reduce income differences		Tolerant to immigration		Further European integration	
	Mean model	Variance function regression	Mean model	Variance function regression	Mean model	Variance function regression	Mean model	Variance function regression
Occupational group (base category: professors)								
Other professionals	−0.653***	0.108	−0.834***	1.347***	−0.522**	0.279	−0.989***	0.200
	(0.191)	(0.328)	(0.130)	(0.373)	(0.192)	(0.321)	(0.208)	(0.263)
Managers	−0.938***	0.284	−1.013***	1.560***	−0.706***	0.321	−1.079***	0.204
	(0.190)	(0.325)	(0.128)	(0.371)	(0.190)	(0.319)	(0.206)	(0.260)
Other	−0.660***	0.197	−0.741***	1.293***	−0.740***	0.333	−1.023***	0.210
	(0.187)	(0.322)	(0.124)	(0.368)	(0.188)	(0.316)	(0.204)	(0.257)
Field of study (base category: General/ No specific field)								
Humanities/Arts	−0.187	0.296	−0.589***	1.662***	−0.225	0.358	−0.625**	0.161
	(0.206)	(0.348)	(0.155)	(0.388)	(0.203)	(0.337)	(0.219)	(0.276)
STEM	−0.423*	−0.064	−0.868***	1.616***	−0.343~	−0.264	−0.989***	0.097
	(0.202)	(0.353)	(0.159)	(0.391)	(0.198)	(0.341)	(0.220)	(0.279)
Social Sciences	−0.554**	0.272	−0.915***	1.443***	−0.342~	−0.172	−1.010***	−0.063
	(0.203)	(0.346)	(0.151)	(0.389)	(0.198)	(0.339)	(0.216)	(0.278)
(Para-) Medical	−0.727**	−0.181	−1.013***	0.822~	−0.089	−0.886~	−0.469*	−1.315***
	(0.244)	(0.460)	(0.205)	(0.497)	(0.217)	(0.453)	(0.224)	(0.369)
Economics/Business	−0.802**	0.889*	−1.327***	1.995***	−0.209	−0.222	−0.801**	−0.163
	(0.269)	(0.396)	(0.224)	(0.422)	(0.213)	(0.374)	(0.245)	(0.333)
Legal	−0.704~	0.337	−0.848***	0.379	0.008	−0.872	−0.076	−1.148*
	(0.359)	(0.555)	(0.219)	(0.579)	(0.237)	(0.536)	(0.259)	(0.456)

	Right-left self-placement		Gov't should reduce income differences		Tolerant to immigration		Further European integration	
	Mean model	Variance function regression	Mean model	Variance function regression	Mean model	Variance function regression	Mean model	Variance function regression
Occupational group × Field of study								
Other professionals # Humanities/Arts	0.444*	−0.210	0.685***	−1.692***	0.364~	−0.355	0.738***	−0.256
	(0.211)	(0.357)	(0.162)	(0.395)	(0.208)	(0.344)	(0.224)	(0.283)
Other professionals # STEM	0.412*	0.085	0.732***	−1.561***	0.241	0.165	1.048***	−0.163
	(0.206)	(0.360)	(0.165)	(0.397)	(0.202)	(0.348)	(0.225)	(0.284)
Other professionals # Social Sciences	0.647**	−0.150	0.997***	−1.446***	0.362~	−0.008	1.045***	−0.044
	(0.207)	(0.353)	(0.157)	(0.395)	(0.202)	(0.345)	(0.221)	(0.283)
Other professionals # (Para-) Medical	0.698**	0.397	0.866***	−0.690	0.058	0.760~	0.597**	1.197**
	(0.248)	(0.466)	(0.210)	(0.503)	(0.222)	(0.459)	(0.229)	(0.374)
Other professionals # Economics/Business	0.653*	−0.790~	1.102***	−1.872***	0.114	0.138	0.843***	0.177
	(0.273)	(0.404)	(0.229)	(0.429)	(0.217)	(0.381)	(0.250)	(0.338)
Other professionals # Legal	0.658~	−0.190	0.603**	−0.189	−0.021	0.821	0.220	1.113*
	(0.364)	(0.563)	(0.227)	(0.585)	(0.243)	(0.543)	(0.266)	(0.462)
Managers # Humanities/Arts	0.488*	−0.251	0.600***	−1.684***	0.477*	−0.397	0.771***	−0.236
	(0.213)	(0.360)	(0.166)	(0.397)	(0.210)	(0.347)	(0.226)	(0.285)
Managers # STEM	0.517*	−0.005	0.782***	−1.661***	0.377~	0.200	1.122***	−0.150
	(0.206)	(0.358)	(0.164)	(0.395)	(0.201)	(0.346)	(0.223)	(0.283)
Managers # Social Sciences	0.751***	−0.295	0.971***	−1.569***	0.515*	0.122	1.277***	0.021
	(0.208)	(0.353)	(0.158)	(0.395)	(0.202)	(0.345)	(0.221)	(0.284)
Managers # (Para-) Medical	1.042***	0.109	1.002***	−0.984~	0.290	0.752	0.593*	1.232**
	(0.252)	(0.472)	(0.216)	(0.508)	(0.226)	(0.464)	(0.233)	(0.379)

	Right-left self-placement		Gov't should reduce income differences		Tolerant to immigration		Further European integration	
	Mean model	Variance function regression	Mean model	Variance function regression	Mean model	Variance function regression	Mean model	Variance function regression
Managers # Economics/Business	0.795**	−0.913*	1.024***	−1.968***	0.276	0.276	0.958***	0.131
	(0.272)	(0.401)	(0.228)	(0.427)	(0.216)	(0.379)	(0.249)	(0.337)
Managers # Legal	0.545	−0.223	0.805***	−0.367	0.062	0.774	0.266	0.999*
	(0.368)	(0.566)	(0.232)	(0.589)	(0.246)	(0.546)	(0.269)	(0.465)
Other # Humanities/Arts	0.219	−0.162	0.578***	−1.542***	0.439*	−0.434	0.700**	−0.184
	(0.207)	(0.350)	(0.157)	(0.389)	(0.204)	(0.338)	(0.220)	(0.278)
Other # STEM	0.390~	0.024	0.863***	−1.576***	0.257	0.267	0.918***	−0.118
	(0.203)	(0.353)	(0.160)	(0.392)	(0.198)	(0.342)	(0.221)	(0.279)
Other # Social Sciences	0.540**	−0.298	0.927***	−1.410***	0.331~	0.153	0.978***	0.005
	(0.203)	(0.347)	(0.152)	(0.390)	(0.198)	(0.339)	(0.217)	(0.278)
Other # (Para-) Medical	0.708**	0.195	1.004***	−0.797	0.106	0.851~	0.440~	1.179**
	(0.244)	(0.461)	(0.205)	(0.498)	(0.218)	(0.454)	(0.224)	(0.370)
Other # Economics/Business	0.689*	−0.903*	1.230***	−1.882***	0.202	0.120	0.801**	0.077
	(0.270)	(0.397)	(0.224)	(0.423)	(0.213)	(0.375)	(0.246)	(0.333)
Other # Legal	0.552	−0.339	0.677**	−0.276	−0.087	0.773	0.039	1.067*
	(0.360)	(0.557)	(0.221)	(0.580)	(0.239)	(0.538)	(0.261)	(0.458)
Educational attainment (base category: less than lower secondary)								
Lower secondary	−0.049*	0.001	0.015	0.039	0.067***	0.017	0.083***	0.001
	(0.022)	(0.034)	(0.017)	(0.031)	(0.020)	(0.030)	(0.022)	(0.027)
Upper secondary	−0.033	0.083*	−0.028	0.054~	0.265***	−0.068*	0.160***	0.023
	(0.022)	(0.034)	(0.018)	(0.031)	(0.019)	(0.030)	(0.022)	(0.027)

	Right-left self-placement		Gov't should reduce income differences		Tolerant to immigration		Further European integration	
	Mean model	Variance function regression	Mean model	Variance function regression	Mean model	Variance function regression	Mean model	Variance function regression
Some post-secondary	0.049~	0.096*	−0.113***	0.150***	0.407***	−0.210***	0.218***	0.045
	(0.027)	(0.045)	(0.025)	(0.041)	(0.025)	(0.040)	(0.029)	(0.035)
College degree	0.027	0.077*	−0.186***	0.186***	0.541***	−0.146***	0.288***	0.024
	(0.023)	(0.036)	(0.019)	(0.033)	(0.021)	(0.032)	(0.023)	(0.029)
Male (base category: female)	−0.048***	0.146***	−0.096***	0.128***	0.101***	0.059***	0.102***	0.160***
	(0.008)	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.008)	(0.010)
Age	0.016***	−0.001	0.008**	0.003	0.016***	0.004	−0.006*	−0.001
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Age squared	−0.000***	0.000*	−0.000	−0.000	−0.000***	−0.000	0.000~	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Country fixed effects (base category: Netherlands)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
ESS round (base category: round 2)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	0.473*	−0.676*	0.177	−1.476***	0.154	−0.998**	1.019***	−0.650*
	(0.197)	(0.338)	(0.138)	(0.379)	(0.197)	(0.329)	(0.213)	(0.269)
Observations	69,597	69,597	80,553	80,553	80,623	80,623	71,387	71,387

~$p < .10$, *$p < .05$, **$p < .01$, ***$p < .001$ (two-tailed). Standard errors in parentheses.

RESEARCH NOTE

WILEY

Remainers are nostalgic too: An exploration of attitudes towards the past and Brexit preferences

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Abstract

Nostalgia had a prominent place in the Brexit Referendum campaign, epitomized by Nigel Farage carrying around with him an old-fashioned blue British passport on the campaign trail. In this paper, we seek to examine British attitudes towards the past through a new survey instrument administered online in July and August 2018 (N = 3,000). We empirically establish two dimensions of nostalgia that are differentially associated with political preferences. We conclude that it is the substance of the nostalgia that matters, not the looking towards the past per se.

KEYWORDS
Brexit, egalitarian nostalgia, social change, ethnic exclusion, traditional nostalgia

1 | INTRODUCTION

The nostalgia of the Brexit Referendum campaign can perhaps be epitomized by Nigel Farage carrying around with him an old-fashioned blue British passport on the campaign trail, described by Otto English in the Independent, "as a sort of weird 'Brexit carrot' to entice people to vote Leave."[1] Nostalgia for the past has also been a central feature of other political campaigns of far-right parties in Europe such as the AfD in Germany, the National Front in France, and the Sweden Democrats (Elgenius & Rydgren, 2018). And the nostalgia frame, of course, was central to Trump's "Let's Make America Great Again." In the politics of the radical right, nostalgia is offered as an antidote to a decaying present (Kenny, 2017); unlike anti-immigration sentiment or xenophobia, the nostalgic frame of ethnic nationalism is relatively free of stigma (Elgenius & Rydgren, 2018) thus making it a useful rhetorical tool (Kenny, 2017).

Beyond the political discourse, recent studies and commentaries have invited empathy with those who have been left feeling nostalgic. It is suggested that anti-immigration and Brexit preferences are natural and understandable consequences of feeling lost and left behind in the modern world (e.g., Gaston & Hilhorst, 2018; Gest, 2016;

Goodhart, 2017). Evidently then, nostalgia is intertwined with debates about the so-called "left behind," a term coined in the search to explain why so many Britons voted for the UK to leave the European Union in the 2016 referendum. The "left behind" is a descriptive term with the normative implication that the experienced loss from economic development and globalization, in relative terms, has been *unfair* (Jackson & Grusky, 2018). From the perspective of the liberal elite, "left behind" may conjure an image of British citizens who were not just economically marginalized but unable to keep up with social and cultural changes (Kenny, 2017). The cultural divide separates those who are more open to immigration with a cosmopolitan outlook (Bhambra, 2017; Inglehart & Norris, 2016), and those with more traditional and local (non-globalized) views (Goodhart, 2017). An alternative perspective can be sought in Pettigrew and Meertens' (1995) classic paper on subtle versus blatant prejudice which highlights that "the defence of traditional values" has a racialized nature, namely that "traditional values" might be in themselves a facet of subtle prejudice.

In this study, we set out to measure preferences for the past of fifty years' ago among a representative sample of British people. There are few quantitative sociological accounts of nostalgia, a gap we seek to fill with the analysis of newly developed measures designed to tap into dimensions of nostalgia.

2 | ABOUT THIS STUDY

From the Homeric Greek nostos (meaning *return home*) and algos (*pain*), *nostalgia* in its literal meaning is a yearning to return home. In Fred Davis' (1979) *Yearning for Yesterday: A Sociology of Nostalgia*, nostalgia was considered to be a constructed social memory which draws on the past but is unmistakably a product of the present. His account suggests that nostalgia is triggered by "fears, discontents, anxieties, or uncertainties" and as such could be construed as pessimism about social change (Turner, 1987). For Davis, "nostalgia" should be applied to lived experiences but in this study, we apply a wider definition of nostalgia that allows young people as well as old to be nostalgic for a past they have never known. In any case, memories are likely to be selective reconstructions of the past and rooted in affective reactions to the present. Thus, we treat nostalgia as a retrospective lens that distorts the past from the viewpoint of the present.

We choose to root our empirical approach in concrete social change, and avoid loaded terms such as *loss* or *nostalgia*. We use data from a single wave of a panel study fielded by Kantar Public in July/August 2018. Respondents were sampled from an access panel with considerable attention to representativeness and efforts made to pull in "hard to reach" sectors of society. Benchmarking shows that these data perform well on representativeness compared to face-to-face surveys. We asked the 3,000 respondents: "Do you think Britain was a better place to live 50 years ago?" The modal answer was "yes" at 45%, 31% of people said "no," and the remaining 24% "I don't know." More young people "didn't know" than older people, perhaps unsurprisingly since this group has fewer lifetime experiences on which to draw. Respondents were then asked: "Here are some of the things that have changed in the last 50 years. Do you think these aspects of modern life make life worse, or make life better?" Respondents indicated whether life was made better, made worse, made no difference, or "don't know" for 11 different aspects of social change. We selected social changes giving broad coverage (i.e., are not just about immigration and ethnicity) and also that are common knowledge and uncontroversial.[2] The wording of the 11 social change items can be seen in Figure 1.

3 | ANALYSIS

Figure 1 shows that the majority of British people report that higher levels of economic inequality and the lack of working-class politicians make life worse. New ways of communicating (Facebook and Instagram) are also unpopular with 41% saying these make life worse. The items that had the lowest numbers saying "make life worse" include greater opportunities to go to university, the increase in ethnic minority and female politicians, and more choice in TV and entertainment.

FIGURE 1 Aspects of modern life that make life better, make no difference, or make life worse (weighted percentages)

TABLE 1 Nostalgia factor analysis: Rotated factor loadings

	Traditional factor	Egalitarian factor
Worse: Technology	**.509**	.423
Worse: Diverse politicians	**.740**	−.080
Worse: Social media	.478	.459
Worse: TV/ entertainment	**.489**	.258
Worse: Education opportunities	**.506**	.145
Worse: Women working	**.609**	.135
Worse: Ethnic diversity	**.702**	.095
Worse: Church/secularization	**.419**	.154
Worse: Economic inequality	−.112	**.591**
Worse: Professionalization of politicians	−.014	**.622**
Worse: Same-sex couples	**.718**	−.026

Notes: Variables recoded to binary, with Don't Knows retained in denominator. Traditional factor eigenvalue 1.856; Egalitarian factor eigenvalue .600; Scree plot suggests two factors; *N* = 3,002; Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin = .75. The higher factor loading is shown in bold.

On some items, the proportion saying "makes no difference" is rather high, particularly for the level of church attendance and more open same-sex couples. This middle answer option perhaps ought not to be treated as indifference towards the social change but rather as modest acceptance (e.g., "I don't mind that fewer people go to church these days").

3.1 | Is there more than one underlying type of nostalgia?

To further explore the structure of nostalgic attitudes we use factor analysis. This reveals two underlying dimensions of nostalgia, shown in Table 1. The first we label "traditional nostalgia," which is characterized by high factor loadings on ethnic diversity, diversity among politicians, and open same-sex couples. The loadings are more moderate

TABLE 2 Socio-demographic profiles of the two nostalgias (linear regression coefficients)

	Traditional nostalgia			Egalitarian nostalgia		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
Female	-.118** [.030]	-.105** [.028]	-.071+ [.038]	.056* [.024]	.061* [.024]	.084** [.032]
Age	.010** [.001]	.007** [.001]	.008** [.001]	.010* [.001]	.008** [.001]	.010* [.001]
Education ref cat = degree						
Other higher education	.244** [.050]	.183** [.048]	.062 [.066]	.113** [.042]	.125** [.042]	.091+ [.055]
A level etc.	.089* [.043]	.049 [.041]	.016 [.055]	.047 [.036]	.047 [.036]	.079+ [.046]
GCSE etc.	.168** [0.044]	.079+ [.042]	.018 [.056]	-.039 [.036]	-.032 [.037]	-.033 [.047]
Other/none	.07 [.069]	-.026 [.066]	-.152+ [.088]	-.275** [.057]	-.261** [.058]	-.271** [.074]
White British	0.003 [0.047]	-.093* [.046]	-.063 [.063]	.05 [.039]	.004 [.040]	.031 [.053]
Class ref cat = Professional						
Intermediate occupations	-.105** [.038]	-.125** [.036]	-.102* [.048]	-.045 [.031]	-.045 [.031]	-.068+ [.040]
Semi-routine/routine	-.128* [.050]	-.175** [.047]	-.133* [.066]	-.006 [.042]	-.01 [.042]	-.058 [.055]
Other or never worked	-.076 [.058]	-.125* [.055]	-.048 [.078]	.024 [.048]	.013 [.048]	-.02 [.065]
Referendum vote ref cat = leave						
Remain		-.300** [.034]	-.393** [.044]		.031 [.030]	-.065+ [.036]
Did not vote		-.215** [.048]	-.191** [.067]		-.043 [.042]	-.144** [.056]
Immigration ref cat = should be reduced a lot						
Increased/stay the same		-.498** [.039]			-.145** [.034]	
Reduced a little		-.439** [.040]			-.005 [.035]	
Authoritarianism			.218** [.023]			-.050* [.019]
Right-wing economic preferences			.044* [.021]			-.187** [.018]

(Continues)

TABLE 2 (Continued)

	Traditional nostalgia			Egalitarian nostalgia		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
Constant	-.474** [.095]	.347** [.073]	-.014 [.093]	-.533** [.079]	-.352** [.064]	-.449** [.077]
Adj R-squared	.08	.19	.17	.07	.08	.12
N observations	3,000	2,933	1,710	3,000	2,933	1,710

Note: Region controlled but coefficients not reported. Authoritarianism and left-right preferences taken from Wave 4, hence lower N.

+$p < .1$. *$p < .05$. **$p < .01$.

for technology, educational opportunities, and women working. The second factor we label "egalitarian nostalgia," which is characterized by high factor loadings on economic inequality and the professionalization of the political class. Note that items with similar loadings on both these latent factors include technology and social media.[3]

3.2 | What kind of people are nostalgic?

In a multivariate analysis (Table 2), we find that age is associated with higher levels of both types of nostalgia.[4] Both types of nostalgia also have an education gradient, which is particularly marked in the case of egalitarian nostalgia. In Model 2, when immigration attitudes are controlled, the White British appear to have lower levels of traditional nostalgia, perhaps surprising given its ethnic component.[5] Both remain voting and abstention are associated with lower levels of traditional nostalgia, an association that holds even with attitudes to immigration controlled. Respondents preferring to increase or to keep immigration at its current level score substantially lower on traditional nostalgia than respondents wanting immigration to be reduced. Traditional nostalgia is higher among those with higher scores on the authoritarianism scale while egalitarian nostalgia is lower among those with preferences for right-wing economic policy.

4 | DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

In contrast to psychological approaches, our definition of nostalgia is attitudinal rather than affective. With this approach, we uncover two types of nostalgia among the British public, which are differentially associated with political preferences. It is the traditional type of nostalgia that is linked to preferences for Brexit whereas egalitarian nostalgia is associated with preferences to remain.

Our derived measure of traditional nostalgia is defined by its relationship to preferences for traditional family forms: for these respondents "more women working" and "more open same-sex couples" have made life worse. It therefore seems evident that those with high levels of traditional nostalgia are not fully at home in modern Britain. The world they wish for is ethnically homogeneous, with traditional family structures and gender roles, a world long gone and irretrievable. Egalitarian nostalgia is perhaps a more optimistic utopian type (May, 2017), being pro-social in its concern with political representation and better economic outcomes for the many.

Both types of nostalgia are associated with older age groups. Young people may have little knowledge of the economic distribution of the past (and no lived experience of lower inequality) and older people, for example with paid-off mortgages and economic stability, may not be experiencing the turmoil of the present; however, these results suggest that the older people with high levels of egalitarian nostalgia may be concerned for the experiences and opportunities of younger generations.

The patterns of clustering that define our nostalgia types are familiar patterns of attitudinal clusters; we do not wish to claim that the clusters are new but rather that we must look at the *content of the nostalgia* in order to understand its link to political preferences. It highlights the need to see nostalgia for what it really is—a social construction reflecting the sentiments that flourish in political discourse—not as a satisfactory justification or explanation of political preferences per se. The danger is, in the same way that "left behind" is used to legitimize or rationalize the Brexit vote, that nostalgic explanations can see ethnic, gender, and other inequalities discarded from the conversation (Bhambra, 2017). To use Bhambra's terms, we must make sure that nostalgia is not "a euphemism for a racialized identity politics" (p. S227). Nor indeed should we forget that Remainers are nostalgic too.

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NOTES

[1] https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/vince-cable-brexit-white-nigel-farage-nostalgia-lib-dem-ukip-immigration-racist-a8251966.html

[2] In fact, we based our choice of items largely on the basis of a recent book on social change by two of the authors (Heath, Garratt, Kashyap, Li, & Richards, 2018). The majority of the social change items are based on topics for which we have reviewed or compiled strong evidence.

[3] A third factor, when allowed, relates to technology/ media. It explains little variance (eigenvalue .29) thus is not pursued.

[4] We considered that this may be an artefact of including "Don't Know" in the denominator. However, we replicated models with number of "Don't Knows" controlled, and our findings hold firm.

[5] Bivariate analysis shows that all minority ethnic groups have lower traditional nostalgia than the White British. Only once other attitudes are controlled do statistically significant differences emerge in the other direction. A reviewer of this paper suggested that marginalized populations may differ in their understandings of nostalgia, and we agree. One avenue for future studies would be to disentangle the effects of religion, ethnicity, and experiences of discrimination.

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ORIGINAL ARTICLE

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The Hiroshima memory complex

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Abstract

The atomic bomb attack on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945 is one of the most powerful global memories. While the literature on global memories has greatly expanded in recent decades, Hiroshima remains surprisingly understudied. In addressing this lacuna, this paper develops a new theoretical prism for the study of global memories. It argues that the Hiroshima memory cannot be understood in isolation, but rather as the hub in a broader memory complex. This complex is the result of symbolic dialogues that connect Hiroshima with such different events, situations, and memories as Nanjing, Pearl Harbor, the Cold War, and so on. The paper demonstrates how these dialogues have been forged, often in the context of substantial controversy. While distinctly sociological in orientation, the paper takes its main theoretical inspiration from cultural, literary, and history scholars such as Jan and Aleida Assmann, Sebastian Conrad, Astrid Erll, Ann Rigney, Michael Rothberg, Aby Warburg and Mikhael Bakhtin.

KEYWORDS

9/11, anti-nuclear movements, global memories, Hiroshima, Korea, Nanjing, Pearl Harbor

It would take 71 years for a sitting American president to visit the site of the world's first atomic bomb attack in Hiroshima. In his speech, Barack Obama (2016) avoided controversy, calling instead for "a shared responsibility to look directly into the eye of history and ask what we must do differently to curb such suffering again." But if Obama tried to stabilize the Hiroshima memory around a vision of peace, the debates sparked by his visit demonstrated that it remains both restless and conflictive. In the United States, observers expressed disappointment that he did not issue an apology. Challenging the American mythology "that the bombs were necessary to end the war and avoid a U.S. invasion," Peter Kuznick (2016) described Hiroshima as "a war crime by any standards." In the

other camp, Donald Trump denied any need for apology and characteristically tweeted whether "President Obama [will] ever discuss the sneak attack on Pearl Harbor while he's in Japan?" Even outside the United States the visit generated controversy, with Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi (quoted in *The Straits Times*, 2016) acknowledging that "Hiroshima is worthy of attention," but insisting, in the same breath, that "Nanjing should not be forgotten."

The quotes teach us several things. While "memory is locally grounded almost by definition" (Sierp & Wüstenberg, 2015, p. 321), it is evident that Hiroshima is also a *global* memory. Not only in the banal sense that it is widely known outside of Japan, but, more interestingly, because it is negotiated and understood through other events and memories such as the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 and the so-called Rape of Nanjing perpetrated by Japanese troops in 1937. These connections were made early on and, as we just saw, continue to reverberate to this day.

During the Cold War, the a-bombs underwent a different kind of globalization, where "Hiroshima and Nagasaki became the symbols of the worldwide antinuclear movement" (Orr, 2001, p. 66). And closer to our own time, Osama bin Laden has pointed to the atomic bombing of Japan to condemn the historical and moral record of the United States and, hence, legitimate al Qaeda's own attack on 9/11 (Dower, 2010, p. 152). Hiroshima, it transpires, is a highly active global memory site, defined by the cross-pressures of symbolization and counter-symbolization efforts, and traversed by several interacting, and sometimes conflicting, memory appropriations: "a never-ending event" in Michael Shapiro's (2015, p. 41) apt formulation.

Whereas work on Hiroshima's place in Japanese collective memory is quite extensive (e.g., Buruma, 1995; Dower, 1999; Hashimoto, 2013; Igarashi, 2000; Orr, 2001; Saito, 2006; Tachibana, 1996; Yoneyama, 1999), a systematic focus on its global dimensions is surprisingly scant. In what is probably the most advanced study, Ran Zwigenberg (2014) outlines several points of entry into the global sphere, including attempts in the 1960s to connect the Hiroshima and Auschwitz experiences and American psychiatrist Robert Lifton's work, also in the 1960s, on survivor trauma. John Dower's life-long effort to analyse Japanese society in the post-war years also contains numerous insights on the global dimension. In *Cultures of War* (2010), in particular, he discusses Hiroshima as a "code" reactivated in numerous ways in relation to the 9/11 attacks and the invasion of Iraq.

Their insights are seminal and a major source of inspiration in the conception of the paper. They do not, however, in my view, go far enough in theorizing the connections between Hiroshima and events, situations, and experiences beyond Japan. I propose that we think of these connections as *symbolic dialogues* and that such dialogues, if systematic and persistent over time, lead to the formation of *global memory complexes*.

Viewing Hiroshima as part of a memory complex is to disrupt any assumed singularity and homogeneity about it; to bring into focus how the same event is involved in a constant negotiation over both memory ownership and meaning. When Hiroshima is remembered *through or with* Pearl Harbor, Nanjing, and so on, that inevitably affects the interpretation of the Hiroshima memory itself, as well as vice versa. This is not to say that memories have no core or factuality. Memory work must, in order to be credible and resonant, stay within the bounds of historicity and empirical facts. What the notions of dialogue and complex compel us to consider is rather how the same reality constantly absorbs new meanings from the events and memories that it is brought into symbolic contact with (Alexander, 2004).

Thinking about memory work in this way provides an effective theoretical-conceptual means to understand the restlessness of the past. The reinvention, re-actualization, and, hence, politicization of the past, is to no small degree a reflection of the symbolic energies and tensions that inhere in memory complexes and their actual and potential connections. When Hiroshima, and other memories, resurface in contemporary political debates, it is almost always *in relation* to other past or present events.

In the last couple of decades, it has become uncontroversial to speak of global or transnational memories within sociology, international relations (IR), communication, and cosmopolitanism studies (e.g., Alexander, 2002, 2004; Beck & Levy, 2013; Kyriakidou, 2017; Levy & Sznaider, 2006; Misztal, 2010; Olesen, 2015; Resende & Budryte, 2014; Volkmer, 2006; see Smith, 1990 for a skeptical view). In none of these approaches do we find more than passing reference to Hiroshima. While this is puzzling in itself, more limiting is the absence of a theoretical vocabulary for

addressing memory complexes in which several interpretive lineages and appropriations intersect and co-produce each other. I believe that such an approach has relevance beyond the case of Hiroshima. For example, we can understand 9/11 as a symbolic node within a global complex of memories (e.g., the Crusades, Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo Bay, etc.) that in different ways relate to the conflict between the United States and political Islam. Similarly, we can identify global memory complexes around events such as "the Holocaust", "Apartheid", "Bloody Sunday", and so on.

The most promising efforts to explore memories as dialogically constituted complexes are, in my view, found outside of sociology, IR, communication, and cosmopolitanism studies. Work on memories within literature, culture, and historical research generally display a much stronger sensitivity towards the dialogical aspect. In particular, authors such as Jan and Aleida Assmann, Sebastian Conrad, Astrid Erll, Ann Rigney, Michael Rothberg and, going deeper into intellectual history, Aby Warburg and Mikhail Bakhtin, offer powerful bridgeheads for this purpose. The paper proposes the concept of memory complexes as a way of systematizing and condensing these disparate insights into a distinct political sociological form.

In pursuing this goal, the paper has a pronounced theoretical and conceptual ambition. As a result, the choice of empirical material is selective and primarily oriented towards an illustrative application of key concepts. In reviewing the literature I have identified three nodes that seem to hold particularly central positions in the Hiroshima memory complex: Nanjing/Korea, Pearl Harbor/9/11, and the anti-nuclear movements of the Cold War and the present. Apart from the fact that these events, situations, and periods are significant in their own right, they also provide the analysis with a genuinely global outlook and allow for mapping the complex onto a wide historical canvass; from events in the early 20th century (the annexation of Korea in 1910) and 1930s and 1940s (Nanjing, Pearl Harbor, and the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima itself), through the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s (the anti-nuclear movement), and up until our own time (the nuclear ban movement and 9/11). I discuss each of these nodes in detail later but first turn towards an elaboration of the memory complex concept.

1 | MEMORY COMPLEXES

Rothberg's (2009) work on *Multidirectional Memory* offers perhaps the most powerful formulation of the dialogical nature of memories. Applying the idea of multidirectionality to the global level, he discusses how the Holocaust memory has influenced the way histories of slavery and colonization have been understood and, conversely, how these histories have also impacted the remembrance of the Holocaust itself. In a set of different yet congenial theorizations, Erll (2011), Assmann and Conrad (2010), and Rigney (2016) have pointed to the travelling character of memories; Rigney, for example, by showing how the 1972 Bloody Sunday in Northern Ireland has been symbolically linked with other events past and present, most recently, for example, the Maidan Square protests and killings in 2014 in Ukraine.

These authors take significant inspiration from the work of Warburg, Erll in particular from his famed *Mnemosyne Atlas*, which he began developing in the 1920s. Warburg wanted to show how the ideas and images of antiquity have kept reappearing throughout Western history, but in constantly changing interpretations (Gombrich, 1997). The Warburgian inspiration is also evident in Jan Assmann's (1998) effort to trace the mnemohistory of ancient Egypt in the West. For Assmann, the study of mnemohistory is less interested in "facts." The relevance of the past, he says (p. 10), comes not from its "factuality," but "from an ever-changing present in which these events are remembered as facts of importance" (see also Halbwachs, 1992/1925]; Schwartz, 2008). Understood this way, memories are "collective" in the sense outlined by Olick (1999). In fact, he says (1999, p. 343), "the clearest demonstration of the genuinely collective nature of remembering is the degree to which it takes place in and through language, narrative, and dialogue." Olick grounds this argument in Bakhtin's literary theory. In *The Dialogical Imagination* (1981), for example, Bakhtin insisted that literary works cannot be understood in isolation. Every novel is engaged in a dialogue with works that went before it, but not only that: these previous works also absorb something from the dialogue and are thus constantly "renewed" and in flux.

Olick's accentuation of "dialogue" via Bakhtin helps us understand memory complexes as meaning circuits that evolve through the establishment of connections that affect all the nodes involved in the exchange; as dynamic "symbolic families." I understand a memory complex as a cluster of several memories, events, and situations that are discursively and narratively connected to each other with some degree of recurrence and patterning. A *global* memory complex, in continuation, is one where these nodes and dialogues systematically traverse national boundaries. For Rothberg, the symbolic dialogue between memories is not a zero-sum game where memories deplete, eclipse, or outcompete each other, but where new layers of meaning are constantly added. To think of memory complexes, in other words, is an invitation to view remembering as "subject to ongoing negotiation, cross-referencing, and borrowing; as productive and not privative" (Rothberg, 2009, p. 3).

The focus on discourse and narrative suggests how memory complexes emerge through attempts to dialogically *bridge* (Alexander, 2004) certain memories, events, and situations. These bridging attempts become the ties that connect the various nodes of the complex. To speak about dialogues and bridging as *symbolic* is to underline how they revolve not only around facts, but, to a significant extent, around the social and political *meanings* imputed to these facts by various actors (Alexander, 2004; Rothberg, 2009; Schwartz, 2008).

We may distinguish between at least three types of bridging. The types are ideal-typical and not mutually exclusive. As will be shown in the empirical analysis below, several forms of bridging can be operative in the symbolic dialogue between events. For the purpose of illustrating the theoretical points and to avoid overcomplicating the already condensed analyses of Hiroshima dialogues in the coming sections, I focus on just one type of bridging for each of the three empirical nodes under discussion: Nanjing, Pearl Harbor, and the anti-nuclear and ban movements.

Analogical bridging (Alexander, 2004) occurs when one event is compared to another. During the Balkan Wars in the 1990s, the ethnic-political cleansing that occurred was often described as a "new Holocaust." Similarly, the concept of Apartheid is routinely employed to describe the situation between Israel and Palestine. It is a process, in other words, where events or situations borrow moral weight and significance from each other, or perhaps rather where new and/or contested events are provided with moral stature through a comparison with events and memories that hold a more or less undisputed status as wrong and evil (Alexander, 2002, 2004; Rothberg, 2011). *We see this process at play, for example, when Hiroshima is employed by anti-nuclear movements to amplify the political and moral credibility of their claims.*

This dynamic of analogical bridging, it should be noted, differs somewhat from the examples (Balkan, Apartheid) given above in that its concern is not an actual event, but a *potential* one: large-scale human and social devastation if nuclear armament is not stopped or regulated. Potentiality is, however, also a form of analogical bridging modelled on the template "if we don't do something about this it will become just as bad as…". It resembles the way calls for international intervention in the evolving Darfur humanitarian crisis around 2007 routinely evoked the memory of the Rwanda Genocide in 1994 to state that if we do not act now Darfur will become a *new* Rwanda (Olesen, 2015).

Bridging can also attain a *competitive* character where comparisons are made to highlight how one memory or event/situation overshadows others. Rothberg (2009), for example, discusses concerns among black rights activists over how the enormous resonance of the Jewish Holocaust has eclipsed other equally horrendous events, such as the century-long enslavement of millions of Africans. Remembering, in this perspective, consequently entails potential forgetting or even erasure (De Cesari & Rigney, 2014). The universe of memories is a marketplace where some events attain higher degrees of visibility and resonance than others, because of strategic political and cultural efforts or as a result of historical power configurations where some events are brought to the forefront and others ignored or even repressed. Competitive bridging is therefore often a way for collectives to challenge such configurations and memory monopolies. In doing so they redefine identities and injustice narratives with the intent to bolster new claims for recognition. *In the case of Hiroshima, competitive bridging is visible, for example, in attempts to bring the suffering inflicted by Japan on East Asia during World War II on a par with that of Hiroshima. These drives for recognition have come from both within and outside of Japan.*

Like the processes of analogical and competitive bridging, *causal bridging* is about connections. Unlike the former, however, causal bridging seeks to understand events as sequentially and historically linked. When al Qaeda, for example, explains the 9/11 and other attacks with reference to a crusader coalition's threat against Islam (e.g., Olesen, 2015), they locate them within a historically deep causal chain of events that lead all the way up to the present. Causal bridges constitute chains of injustice where events of suffering are discursively constructed as more or less direct responses to one another. Like both analogical bridging and competitive bridging, causal bridging is often a means to discursively create rooms of political possibility by legitimating or motivating certain lines of action. *In relation to Hiroshima, causal bridging, for example, occurs when the bombing of Hiroshima is portrayed as the direct result of Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor.*

It is evident from these observations that memory complexes (at least those revolving around acts of violence), are rarely "happy families." The bridging dynamics elucidated above involve pronounced moral and political dramas where villains and victims, good and evil, right and wrong, are contrasted and cast into recognizable plots and narratives (Alexander, 2006; Smith, 2005). The past, says Paul Ricoeur (2006, p. 15), thus often carries "a moral burden" that can be both "increased and lightened" when memories of it are actualized in the present. Bridging attempts therefore rarely go uncontested, but provoke *counter-symbolization* (Olesen, 2015).

This can be leveraged in several ways: by challenging the factual foundation of a bridging claim; denying causality; pointing to disproportionality and/or incomparability, Rothberg (2011), for example, analyses how attempts by some actors to compare (and, hence, analogically bridge) the Warsaw Ghetto with Israel's policies in Gaza was fiercely counter-symbolized on the grounds that the two events are both morally and factually *in*comparable.

These observations clearly demonstrate that symbolic dialogues are not just words. Establishing bridges are strategic acts that shift moral and political balances and affect relationships between actors (Alexander, 2002, 2004; Rothberg, 2009, 2011). The emphasis on strategy does not suggest that the facts of the past can be moulded into any shape. If facts are manipulated or exaggerated bridging efforts become vulnerable to resistance and counter-symbolization. On the contrary, facts are always read and interpreted through cultural and ideological lenses. This is a point of special relevance for a discussion of *global* memory complexes where culturally and ideologically diverse interpretation communities engage with each other. A causal bridging claim connecting, for example, Pearl Harbor and Hiroshima is likely to be most resonant and legitimate in the United States where interpretive packages (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989) supporting such a bridge are more firmly grounded and accepted.

The simultaneity of symbolization and counter-symbolization describes memory complexes as inherently fluid and historical phenomena that move, grow, or shrink in response to the success or failure of symbolization and counter-symbolization efforts. New memories, events, and situations can enter their gravitational field through "invitation," that is, when agents connect them to the complex. Similarly, nodes may become lethargic if they are no longer actively connected with others. Complexes in other words are *outcomes* of social and political action. At the same time, however, they also provide actors with symbolic and discursive *resources*. Already established dialogues and bridges can be reused, amplified, and reinterpreted to create leverage for new claims and aspirations.

2 | NANJING AND KOREA

The so-called Rape of Nanjing (then the capital of China) occurred over six weeks from late 1937 to early 1938 when Japanese troops were occupying the city. During the 1930s and 1940s, Japan led an aggressive colonial war in Asia. Nanjing has come to symbolize this period more than any other place or event. The extent of the atrocities has been fiercely debated over the years, with estimates ranging from 40,000 to up to 300,000 killed (Yang, 2001, p. 53). The widely used reference to the "rape" of Nanjing refers to the at least 20,000 women who were raped during the occupation (Chang, 1998). The Nanjing memory occupies very different roles and places in China and Japan. In Japan, notes Yang (2001, p. 51), "it has been the subject of intense disagreement...whereas the Chinese

have appeared to be speaking in unison." In China, the beginning of the Nanjing massacre on December 13, 1937 was thus recently officially declared a national day of remembrance, while in Japan it has incited controversies ever since it came to public awareness (Buruma, 1995). This is not least visible in the ongoing conflict surrounding the Yasukuni Shrine, which commemorates Japan's war dead (Lind, 2008, p. 74; Nelson, 2003; O'Dwyer, 2010).

The Nanjing and Hiroshima memories did not immediately enter into direct dialogue. As shown by Ran Zwigenberg (2014; but see also Dower, 1999 and Orr, 2001), the memory of Hiroshima in the post-war years was under strict control by US occupation authorities who strove to promote a vision of Hiroshima as a city of peace; a message to the world (and to the future) of the dangers of war and aggression (pp. 26–30). This was consistent with the rhetoric of the US government that "the bomb had ended World War II and brought peace to the world" (Schäfer, 2016, p. 361). This reading of Hiroshima was broadly accepted by local and national elites in Japan (Zwigenberg, 2014, p. 38) and is clearly inscribed on the memorial sites of present-day Hiroshima.

On the one hand, the positive peace brand was seen locally as a way of attracting resources through tourism (Schäfer, 2016, p. 360; Zwigenberg, 2014, p. 42). On the other, national elites could use Hiroshima to represent a kind of zero-hour and advocate "a radical departure from a stigmatized past" (Hashimoto, 2013, p. 28). Both visions aspired to include Japan in the new world order economically and politically; to provide a fresh start for a worn-down and reviled nation that would have been difficult with a more confrontational reading of Hiroshima. The Nanjing atrocities, and, as discussed below, Japan's aggressions in Asia in general, lurked powerfully, if not always explicitly, behind these interests. Zwigenberg (2014, pp. 139–140) even suggests that Japan's acceptance of Hiroshima as a peace city reflected a kind of unarticulated compromise. In return for the Japanese not portraying Hiroshima as a victim of war crimes and injustice (which, according to, for example, Rawls (1995) and Walzer (1977), there were strong reasons to do), the United States would not pursue direct condemnation of Japan's Asia policies.

The end of US occupation in 1952 saw an increasing, if uneasy and ambiguous, entry of the Nanjing massacre into the Japanese public sphere (Yoshida, 2006). Former soldiers in the imperial army came forward with eyewitness accounts, and films and books appeared that sought to provide more sober portrayals of the event (Buruma, 1995; Yang, 2001). During the 1980s and 1990s, the memorial site in Hiroshima itself was affected by this drive for recognition, and against forgetting and erasure (Yoshida, 2006, p. 135). After a decade of debate, in 1995, the Peace Memorial Museum thus introduced "an aggressor corner" where "For the first time, the museum examined the bombing beyond August 6, and within the context of the war as a whole, including Japanese … atrocities in Asia" (Zwigenberg, 2014, p. 293; see also Lind, 2008, pp. 74–75). This change, according to Conrad (2003, p. 96), was in large part motivated and made possible by the geopolitical rearrangements after the end of the Cold War, and by the renewed global focus on reconciliation and forgotten victims set in motion by these events (Wemmers, 1996).

The politicization of Hiroshima's memorial site has not least revolved around the growing, yet often contentious, recognition of Korean bomb victims (Tachibana, 1996). "Until 1990," writes Lisa Yoneyama (1995, p. 502), "the speeches of political elites at the annual municipal Peace Memorial Ceremony on August 6th never referred to the at least 20,000 to 30,000 Korean atom bomb victims." The majority of these Koreans were forced labourers who had come to Japan following the colonial takeover in 1910. The beginning of such efforts during the 1990s represented another significant move towards a more direct dialogue between Hiroshima and Japan's war atrocities.

These connections seem to have a non-expirable capacity for controversy. In 2013, the mayor of Osaka, Toru Hashimoto, took a revisionist stance towards one of the most contentious issues in the post-war relationship between Japan, China, and South Korea: the so-called comfort women (many of them Korean and Chinese) used as sex slaves for the Japanese army (Nozaki, 2005; Soh, 2008). Shortly after, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe posed for photographs in a Japanese fighter plane with the number 731. While innocent to the casual observer, this number carries significant symbolic weight in East Asia as it invokes memories of the so-called unit 731 where

Japanese army specialists carried out vivisections and other abhorrent medical experiments on war prisoners. In what was likely a response to these incidents, an editorial of one of South Korea's largest newspapers, the *JoongAng Ilbo*, shortly after offered a clear religious-political *causal bridge* between Hiroshima and Japan's war crimes when it stated how "The cries [of the unit's victims] reached heaven and the bombs were dropped on Tokyo and the atomic weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki" (quoted in *The Straits Times*, 2013). And as recently as November 2018 a scheduled show by the Korean K-pop group BTS on Japanese television was cancelled when it emerged that one of its members had worn a t-shirt linking Korea's liberation from Japan with the atomic bomb on Hiroshima (*Japan Times*, 2018).

Competitive bridging is also powerfully at play in these connections. As already indicated by the quote from Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi in the introduction, claims to victimhood and attention by the Japanese often motivate Chinese responses that juxtapose Hiroshima and Nanjing, or even, as noted by Miyamoto (2012, p. 48), seek "to delegitimize claims to victimhood on the part of Japanese citizens, particularly victimhood associated with the atomic bombings." While this type of symbolic competition over victimhood is generally met with resistance, there is also an acceptance on the part of many Japanese that these restless pasts must be connected and their victims equally remembered (Tachibana, 1996). During a 2017 exhibition in the city of Hiroshima, *Sealed Memories: No More Nanjing*, Toshio Tamamoto, the son of a Japanese war veteran, thus expressed that because "the Japanese troops … my father belonged to during the war also killed a massive group of people … it's particularly significant to tell the truth about the Nanjing Massacre in Hiroshima" (quoted in CNC, 2017). This dialogical recalibration of the Hiroshima memory against the forgetting and repression of Nanjing and Korea has obvious consequences. While individuals and institutions will inevitably draw different kinds of conclusions from it, the fact that Hiroshima is being "touched" in this way by the experiences of Nanjing, Korea, and so on, leaves an indelible mark on its memory; a mark that makes it inherently difficult to firmly fix its moral-political meanings and repercussions.

3 | PEARL HARBOR AND 9/11

The dialogical link between Pearl Harbor and Hiroshima was made just 16 hours after the atomic bomb attack when President Harry S. Truman announced it to the American public. In the speech he declared that "The Japanese began the war from the air at Pearl Harbor. They have been repaid many fold" (Truman, 1945). In a response to a telegram from the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America on August 9, urging Truman to not visit further devastation on Japan, he replied: "Nobody is more disturbed over the use of Atomic bombs than I am, but I was greatly disturbed over the unwarranted attack by the Japanese on Pearl Harbor and their murder of our prisoners of war." The atomic bombs, he goes on, are the "only language they seem to understand… When you deal with a beast you have to treat him as a beast" (cited in Alperovitz, 1995, p. 563). Two years after the war, Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War at the time of the bombings, and one of its masterminds, expounded on his reasoning in a *Harper's Magazine* article. Here, Stimson (1947, p. 106) remarked that even though Japan had been effectively beaten in 1945, it still commanded around 5,000,000 soldiers who, if the war had continued with conventional means, could have inflicted 1,000,000 casualties on the United States (Walker, 1996).

This argument to save lives by taking lives has been surrounded by considerable controversy (see Alperovitz, 1995) as any estimates of this nature are obviously counter-factual and open ethical debates about the valuation of some human lives over others (for discussions, see, e.g., Grayling, 2006; Lifton & Mitchell, 1995; Rawls, 1995; Walzer, 1977). These debates have erupted several times since 1945, but probably most fiercely around the proposed exhibition of the Enola Gay (the plane that flew and dropped the atomic bomb on Hiroshima) at the National Air and Space Museum (part of the Smithsonian Institution) in the mid-1990s (Hogan, 1996; Neiman, 2015; Yakel, 2000). When conservative politicians and veterans' groups learned about the script for the exhibition they reacted with indignation. In its initial plans, curators had included "the figure of 30,000–50,000 American lives potentially saved by the bomb, based on recently declassified documents" (Neiman, 2015, p. 16), if the war

had been ended with conventional means and a land invasion of the Japanese islands. This drastically undermined Truman and Stimson's early reasoning, and "veterans insisted on using the official estimates of half a million to a million" (Neiman, 2015, p. 16).

Critics also objected to initial ideas to include artefacts and graphic photographs from the aftermath of the attacks. While arguments ran along many different fault lines, they all seemed to come back to an effort at *causal bridging* in which Pearl Harbor stands as the original and action-demanding symbol and memory of Japanese evil. Hugh Dagley of the American Legion, a veterans' organization and one of the fiercest critics of the exhibition, thus said that the curators' script "was a misguided effort to morally balance the two sides by equating a sneak attack by the Japanese with regular contingency planning by the United States" (quoted in Lewis, 1994). In the end, the campaign to counter-symbolize the exhibition succeeded. The plans proceeded, but the final result was a much more watered down and uncontroversial version than originally envisioned (Neiman, 2015, p. 17; see also Lifton & Mitchell, 1995). Viewed from this perspective, the counter-symbolization of the exhibition sought to block the Hiroshima memory from morally interfering with the well-established causal bridging of Pearl Harbor and Hiroshima. Yet even if this effort was largely successful, it also amplified the symbolic dialogue between the two events in ways that inevitably tinged (and perhaps even to some extent unhinged) the meanings associated with both in the American public.

The line of criticism exemplified by the Enola Gay exhibition re-emerged, as noted in the introduction, during President Barack Obama's visit to Hiroshima in 2016. Apart from Trump's tweet attack, deeper debates raged over whether Obama should issue an apology during his visit. John Bolton, the former US Ambassador to the United Nations, was adamant that even if Obama did not in fact apologize during his visit, his admissions of the terrible consequences of the bombs came too close, without sufficiently acknowledging that "What we were doing was defending our country, which had been attacked in a completely unprovoked fashion" (cited in Hayward, 2016) and, invoking Truman and Stimson's arguments, that the bombs had been dropped "to save American lives." Others tried to obstruct the attempts at causal bridging by arguing that even if the attack on Pearl Harbor and the treatment of American POWs was indeed unjust and abhorrent, the killing of civilians to achieve a military goal can never be justified and therefore must be apologized for (e.g., Philpott, 2016). Extending the symbolic dialogue between Hiroshima and Pearl Harbor, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited Pearl Harbor alongside Barack Obama some six months after Obama's Hiroshima visit. Like Obama, Abe did not apologize for the attack, but offered "sincere and everlasting condolences" and a pledge that "we must never repeat the horrors of war again" (quoted in *The Guardian*, 2016).

In the wake of al-Qaeda's attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 the Pearl Harbor-Hiroshima dialogue was once again activated, albeit in more indirect and surprising ways. It is easy to understand analogies between 9/11 and Pearl Harbor (both were sudden and unexpected attacks from the air). The link between 9/11 and Hiroshima is less obvious. Hiroshima, sometimes directly and other times indirectly, was nonetheless powerfully present in the ensuing debates about the appropriate US response to 9/11. A connection was made in the immediate aftermath of the attack when media and politicians "baptized the ravaged site of the World Trade Center's twin towers 'Ground Zero'" (Dower, 2010, p. 152). At a deeper level, Hiroshima was connected to 9/11 *via* Pearl Harbor, so to speak. Both attacks on the United States were viewed as deeply unjust and cowardly. Just as Pearl Harbor became a symbolic core in the legitimation of the atomic bombs, 9/11 also inspired calls and justifications for swift and decisive military action in Afghanistan and, later, against Saddam Hussein and Iraq. The so-called "shock and awe" doctrine employed in the 2004 invasion of Iraq drew on a well-known refrain from 1945 and later: the necessity to launch pre-emptive strikes and achieve so-called "rapid dominance" (see Ullman & Wade, 1996 for the formulation of the doctrine) in order to halt or avoid severe threats against the United States (Dower, 2010, pp. 153–154).

One year after 9/11, in a rather peculiar exercise in moral acrobatics, these symbolic logics were reversed by the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, Osama bin Laden. In an attempt to shame the United States, bin Laden said: "You dropped a nuclear bomb on Japan, even though Japan was ready to negotiate an end to the war. How

many acts of oppression, tyranny, and injustice have you carried out, O callers to freedom" (cited in Dower, 2010, p. 152). Here, bin Laden, apparently well versed in the standard objections to the atomic bombings, sought to justify 9/11 with reference to memories of past injustices committed by the United States. 9/11, as these examples demonstrate, had immediately become a busy symbolic site where memories of the past, including Pearl Harbor and Hiroshima, were symbolized and counter-symbolized to give meaning to a new event.

4 | THE ANTI-NUCLEAR MOVEMENT AND THE NUCLEAR BAN EFFORT

As already discussed, Zwigenberg (2014) suggests a compromise between Japanese elites and the US occupation forces in the years after 1945. This alliance was an alliance on terms dictated by the war's victors and involved extensive censorship (Conrad, 2003; Dower, 1999; Marcón, 2011; Orr, 2001; Saito, 2006; Zwigenberg, 2014). The US government and occupation forces sought to organize the symbolization of Hiroshima in two ways: to avoid blame towards the United States as aggressor, and to make sure that nuclear power and nuclear energy were not problematized to the extent where the bombings would generate a public and political backlash. In early discourse, says Saito (2006, p. 362), "The atom bomb was conceived as an 'actor' in its own right and framed as possessing agency" by Japanese elites, thus neutralizing potential criticism around the victim-perpetrator binary. As part of this symbolizing exercise, both parties were at pains to steer clear of injustice interpretations of Hiroshima. As a result, the event was instead "transformed into a 'symbol of the world's hope for peace'" (Zwigenberg, 2014, p. 46; see also Schäfer, 2016).

The memory, in other words, was emptied of much of its conflictive potential, the bomb de-nationalized and turned into a "global event that transcended identification with any particular nation" (Orr, 2001, p. 37). This partly reflected the emerging exigencies of the new geopolitical Cold War reality (Igarashi, 2000, pp. 19–28). The combined threat from the Soviet Union and China forged a cooperative relationship between the United States and Japan that would rest strongly on nuclear deterrence (Zwigenberg, 2014, p. 46). It was paramount, therefore, that Hiroshima was balanced in a way where it demonstrated the will and capability of the United States to use its nuclear power, but without at the same time discrediting nuclear arms.

With the implementation of the Peace Treaty in 1952, Japanese sovereignty was re-established, opening a new phase in the remembering of Hiroshima: "The book market was flooded with testimonies and collections of short stories by and about atomic bomb survivors, and images showing the effects of the bombing also started to be widely published" (Marcón, 2011, p. 789). The memory of Hiroshima remained rather uncontentious and abstract until the mid-1950s. In March 1954 it emerged that a Japanese fishing crew on board Lucky Dragon 5 had been exposed to nuclear fallout following a US hydrogen bomb test in the Bikini Atoll on March 1, 1954. When one of the crew later died, it set in motion a wave of anti-nuclear protest across Japan (Orr, 2001, p. 47ff; Saito, 2006, p. 368), which gradually paved the way for a re-symbolization of Hiroshima as a "national trauma" and the people of Hiroshima as victims (Saito, 2006, p. 369; Tachibana, 1996). This interpretive "opening up" of Hiroshima was expanded during the 1960s and 1970s and the emerging awareness of the Cold War context. Part of this new dynamic was driven by Marxist activists and scholars in Japan who sought to link the bombs to an anti-imperialist agenda in which the United States was the main culprit (Zwigenberg, 2014, pp. 100–105).

During this period Japanese anti-nuclear activists started to engage with anti-nuclear and peace activists from Europe and the United States. The new Japanese focus on trauma, injustice, and victimhood became increasingly entangled with some of the major global events of the time, perhaps most notably the Vietnam War and civil rights (Orr, 2001). In 1966, for example, the Japanese Beheiren activist group invited Howard Zinn and Ralph Featherstone, both well-known civil rights and anti-war activists in the United States, to discuss the Vietnam War and other contemporary issues at a meeting in Hiroshima. The event was also a testament to the increasing politicization of the *hibakusha* (atomic bomb survivors), who were strongly present at the meeting. The *hibakusha*,

according to Sherif (2016, p. 173), not only talked about their own experiences, but "instead maintained a focus on the Vietnam War, foreign policy and the contemporary geopolitical contexts of the anti-nuclear movement."

The entry of the *hibakusha* into the wider debates on the Cold War and the nuclear threat was paved by the pioneering work of Robert Lifton, an American psychiatrist who came to Hiroshima in the early 1960s (Zwigenberg, 2014, pp. 144–175). Lifton was initially interested in the analysis of survivor trauma in Hiroshima and post-Holocaust Germany, but gradually expanded his agenda to Vietnam veterans and "started to employ his survivor analogies and insights in the service of the [anti-war] movement" (Zwigenberg, 2014, p. 169). Lifton's academic and political work facilitated the forging of symbolic connections and analogical bridges beyond Hiroshima and Japan and, not least, between Hiroshima and other instances of human suffering from war.

The connection between Hiroshima and the events and conditions of the Cold War was not only made in Japan. In Europe and the United States, peace and anti-nuclear movements employed the powerful imagery of the world's first atomic bombings. In his remarkable three-volume account of the anti-nuclear movements of the 20th and 21st centuries, Lawrence Wittner describes how during the 1960s the date of the Hiroshima bomb became a symbolic day of protest in countries all around the world. In a small country like Denmark, for example, anti-nuclear activists staged Hiroshima Day demonstrations in no less than "forty-five town squares around the country, with activists standing silently under anti-nuclear banners" (Wittner, 1997, p. 211).

As "the only instances of the use of nuclear weapons" (Orr, 2001, p. 66), Hiroshima and Nagasaki commanded enormous and unrivalled symbolic power on a global scale. The photographs of post-bomb devastation and mushroom clouds became staples in the visual vocabulary of anti-nuclear and peace activists. In *analogically bridging* Hiroshima and the Cold War nuclear threat, activists could strategically draw on these images and experiences of suffering as a powerful warning of what would lie ahead for humanity if the nuclear arms race continue unabated. By being symbolically tied in this way to events and concerns removed from it in both time and space, Hiroshima inevitably absorbed a new set of meanings that reflected its "travelling" character. Some of these were largely in line with the already established city-of-peace brand, while others, as suggested, imparted to it a more political reading in which Hiroshima came to symbolize the injustices and dangers of US world dominance and of the Cold War nuclear arms race.

While the symbolic dialogue between Hiroshima and the global concern with nuclear arms was perhaps at its strongest during the height of the Cold War, Hiroshima remains a politically powerful memory in contemporary efforts to abolish nuclear weapons. This movement is led by the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN). When ICAN received the Nobel Peace Prize in 2017, its director Beatrice Fihn sat beside a Hiroshima survivor, Setsuko Thurlow as she signed the Nobel protocol (*Japan Times*, 2017). Thurlow, herself a tireless campaigner against nuclear weapons for decades, was invited by ICAN to the Nobel Prize event to lend the still-resonant symbolic capital of the Hiroshima *hibakusha* to the event. In the preamble to the recent United Nations (2017, p. 2) draft treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons, the *hibakusha* also played a central role as the text referred to "the unacceptable suffering of and harm caused to the victims of the use of nuclear weapons (hibakusha)."

5 | CONCLUSION

This paper has pursued two ambitions: first, to provide a firmer place for Hiroshima in the context of global memory research, and, second, to develop a new theoretical concept: memory complexes. This concept seeks to bring attention to the way memories, events, and situations are linked to each other through symbolic dialogues. These dialogues involve attempts at bridging otherwise separate experiences, by referring to their comparability, their causal relations, their mutual struggles for recognition and against forgetting, and so on. Creating such bridges is political as it entails the placing of moral burdens on specific actors, nations, and institutions. As a result, symbolic dialogues are often contentious and involve significant counter-symbolization efforts.

Thinking about memory *complexes* sensitizes us to the way memories, events, and situations are never separate or fixed experiences. The meanings they contain and emit are shaped through dialogue. It follows from this observation that they are constantly evolving and "travelling" (Erll, 2011; Rigney, 2016) phenomena that absorb new meanings when they are brought into dialogue with other experiences. The Hiroshima bombing, for example, acquired a new set of meanings during the process of being linked to the anti-nuclear and peace movements of the 1960s and 1970s. Similarly, the recurring confrontations between Pearl Harbor and Hiroshima memories in US public debate creates a permanent state of unbalance where the moral burdens of both events are consciously or unconsciously weighed up against each other.

The nodes analysed in the paper are obviously not the only "members" of the complex. To mention just two examples, Hiroshima has been dialogically connected with perhaps the only comparable (in terms of destructive scale and public resonance) World War II memory: Auschwitz. This happened through a range of initiatives, most notably the so-called Hiroshima-Auschwitz Peace March in 1962–1963 (Zwigenberg, 2014, pp. 176–207). While causes, means, and outcomes differed in so many ways, symbolic bridges emphasized how both places represent unjust suffering at an unprecedented scale for not only the Jews and Japan, but for humanity as a whole. Finally, for many the tsunami and subsequent radiation disaster in Fukushima in 2011 revitalized atomic bomb memories in Japan and beyond (e.g., Harrell, 2011). Apart from broadening the range of nodes in the complex, future analyses must pursue more fine-grained resolutions of the symbolic connections. Each of the three nodes analysed in the paper thus merit studies of their own. In-depth studies would usefully trace over-time changes in the symbolic dialogues, as well as offer more detailed insights into the way the nodes have absorbed meanings from one another.

The paper's analyses have relied strongly on secondary literature. A promising and so far non-utilized approach to gather new data would be interviews with international visitors (more than 1.5 million per year) to the Hiroshima memorial museum. Such a strategy could uncover details and nuances not captured by the paper's more comprehensive analysis. In particular, it would allow research to probe national and regional differences in the meanings associated with Hiroshima and the extent to which such differences may be explained by and through the various vantage points in the Hiroshima memory complex: do American and Chinese visitors, for example, balance their experiences in Hiroshima vis-à-vis Nanjing and Pearl Harbor, respectively, and if they do, how does this affect the way they remember these events?

Memory complexes are inevitably also about absence and forgetting. Nagasaki is perhaps the most notable "absence" in the Hiroshima memory complex and largely seems to exist in the shadow of the Hiroshima memory (Diehl, 2014; Zwigenberg, 2014, pp. 3–4). This may be explained by sequence (the Nagasaki a-bomb was dropped on August 9, three days after Hiroshima), the number of deaths at Nagasaki (roughly half of Hiroshima), and by the more proactive efforts of Hiroshima authorities to promote the Hiroshima event (Zwigenberg, 2014). These explanations notwithstanding, it is nonetheless striking how the global memory of the a-bombs on Japan is almost exclusively organized around Hiroshima. Future research could explore this absence in more detail. One approach would conduct interview and survey analyses at the local level of Nagasaki to understand if the marginalization of Nagasaki is experienced as problematic by its citizens and, perhaps most interestingly, by its a-bomb survivors (*hibakusha*).

In general, a research agenda around global memory complexes must be sensitive to the interplay and tensions between global, national, and local memory planes. The paper's analysis has primarily drawn on global and national media and elite discourses. The analytical view of the Hiroshima memory complex offered here is thus very much one "from above." The understandings of *local* citizens and elites are likely to provide different and perhaps even contrasting understandings of the bridging and dialogical efforts of global and national elites. I consider these alternative analytical angles and data collection strategies to be central not only to expand our empirical understanding of the Hiroshima memory complex, but also to develop the theoretical concept of the memory complex itself.

The concept thus remains a work-in-progress with a need to both expand the range of bridging types (analogical, competitive, and causal) as well as to break these down in various subtypes. The idea of a memory complex has drawn much inspiration from works on memory in the humanities, but was ultimately conceived through an "open" reading of Hiroshima related material. I see such an abductive interplay between theory and data as pivotal in moving the theoretical agenda forward. This would also entail "testing" the concept beyond Hiroshima. While I am convinced that the concept can be meaningfully applied to a range of other cases (such as those mentioned in the introduction), it is equally evident that such exposure would also challenge, complicate, and, hopefully, refine it. A look at the Apartheid memory complex, for example, reveals the presence of cultural forms of bridging and dialogue not addressed in the more politically attuned analysis of the Hiroshima memory complex. While the Apartheid memory complex obviously includes such events as the Sharpeville massacre, the Soweto uprisings, the death of Steven Biko, and so on (Olesen, 2015), we also need to consider major global cultural events such as, for example, the Free Nelson Mandela Concert on Wembley in 1988 as elements of the complex. The Wembley concert was not simply a strategic cultural-political effort to put pressure on the Apartheid regime, but has become a global memory in its own right, one that transmits a sense of hope (Rigney, 2018) and popular solidarity across time.

Other types of cultural-political events or products may be found within the Holocaust (e.g., the diaries of Anne Frank; Alexander, 2004) and Black enslavement (e.g., the highly popular television series *Roots*; Eyerman, 2002) memory complexes, but also within the Hiroshima memory complex itself. Premiering in 1959, Alain Resnais and Marguerite Duras's romantic drama *Hiroshima mon amour*, for example, became a powerful entry point for the Hiroshima event into French and European cultural-political debates. The film came at a time when France was involved in a bloody and controversial colonial war in Algeria and its ruminations over war, violence, and power consequently entailed various potentials for bridging the Hiroshima memory with present events of perceived injustice (Sanos, 2016). Theorizing and analyzing such popular cultural products offers a particularly fruitful sociological avenue for the further development of the memory complex concept.

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ORIGINAL ARTICLE

WILEY

Irrational rationalities and governmentality-effected neglect in immigration practice: Legal migrants' entitlements to services and benefits in the United Kingdom

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Abstract

Governments' attempts to manage immigration increasingly restrict immigrants' eligibility to healthcare, education, and welfare benefits. This article examines the operation of these restrictions in the United Kingdom. It draws on qualitative research with civil servants and NGO expert advisors, and applies sociological theories on bureaucracy as a lens to interpret these data. Conceptually, the paper employs a generative synthesis of Ritzer's notion of "irrational rationality" and Foucault's perspective on "governmentality" to explain observed outcomes. Findings show that public service workers struggle with complex and opaque regulations, which grant different entitlements to different categories of migrants. The confusion results in mistakes, arbitrary decisions, and hypercorrection, but also a system-wide indifference to irrational outcomes, supported by human factors in contexts of austerity. I consider this a form of governmentality-effected neglect, where power operates as much through inaction as well as through intention, but which results in exclusions of legal migrants that are harsher in practice than in law.

KEYWORDS
bureaucracy, governmentality, immigration, rationality, rights, welfare

1 | INTRODUCTION

In Spring 2018, the Windrush scandal broke, exposing the failings of the United Kingdom's Home Office policies which ordered people to prove their rights to live, work, and access services and benefits. Those affected were immigrants from the Commonwealth who arrived in the UK from 1948 and were legally present, yet since 2002, had been detained or deported because they could not produce the correct paperwork (National Audit Office, 2018). This was not least because of the British government's poor record keeping, including the Home Office's destruction of their landing cards. Amidst the interrogations as to why such a situation had arisen, commentators were quick to point out this was a predictable consequence of the "hostile environment" package of policy measures. First referenced in 2012, the hostile environment marked an orientation to make life "tough" for undocumented immigrants. It manifested in legislation under the Immigration Act 2014 and 2016 to prohibit them from renting accommodation and acquiring driving licences and bank accounts, while implicating citizens in immigration enforcement (Jones et al., 2017; Yuval-Davis, Wemyss, & Cassidy, 2018).

The scandal was a candid reminder of the expanding frontiers of immigration policy affecting all migrants, including those whose presence within British territory is long-standing and legally granted. This article provides further original evidence of how this operates, by focusing on legally present migrants' access to healthcare, education, and welfare benefits in the United Kingdom. It provides a new sociologically informed qualitative analysis of the operation of regulations governing access to services and benefits, from the perspective of relevant actors in local and national government settings and NGOs. It exposes a picture of bureaucratic practices that result in forms of exclusion that go beyond those established in law. The malpractice is permitted to occur, I argue, amid a wider national culture of hostility towards immigrants, where there is little administrative motivation for corrective action.

The analysis sets out a sociological critique of the supposedly rule-governed access to services and benefits in immigration-related regulations, portraying it instead as a process that asserts new boundaries and creates new exclusions. The original contribution of the article is first a substantive one, demonstrating the importance of sociological investigation of bureaucratic processes and regulations to understand how exclusion works. Graeber (2012, pp. 123 and 108) suggests that bureaucracy is often seen as a "dead zone" by scholars, and considered "boring" and "devoid of any interpretive depth." Yet, as he points out, such a perspective misunderstands the potential of bureaucracy to wreak structural violence. This article gives new insights into that process.

Second, the article forges new ground conceptually by operationalizing two concepts from the sociology of bureaucracy within the same framework to show how exclusion is produced. I apply Ritzer's (1983, p. 100) concept of "irrational rationality" to show how perverse outcomes emerge from apparently rational bureaucratic processes. I show how rationality becomes irrational in the operation of the eligibility restrictions examined in the article, particularly through the sheer volume and bewildering mass of regulations in this field. Restrictions have mushroomed to a point that betray the logic and purpose they purport to serve. Rules on migrants' eligibility are unclear and confusing, and this leads to arbitrary decisions and hypercorrection in practice in hospitals, welfare-offices, and education institutions.

Employing Foucault's concept of governmentality in tandem with Ritzer's concept, however, illustrates how this dysfunction has deeply functional effects (Fassin, 2011). Governmentality exposes the "meticulous, often minute techniques" exercised through the procedures, calculations, and tactics of institutions through which the state's vision is advanced (Foucault, 1977/1991, p. 139; Foucault, 1978/2007). "Governmentality-effected neglect" is a term I deploy in this article to refer to how the mistakes of public servants are overlooked, because they emerge from human limitations: from ignorance in understanding rather than maleficence, and from working conditions under a regime of austerity that mean eligibility judgments cannot be made with the time and understanding they need. Where laws are complex, and contexts pressurized and weighted towards disbelief, institutional indifference to arbitrary and incorrect decisions often remains intact. This also, however, occurs precisely because such outcomes correspond with the State's wider vision on immigration.

The article begins by outlining sociological perspectives on migrants' access to services, before exploring concepts in the sociology of bureaucracy to show how Ritzer's irrational rationality and Foucault's governmentality can be intellectually generative for understanding the production of exclusion. It outlines the design and methods of the research project, before presenting empirical data on the regulations nationally, as well as on how these were implemented locally in two case study cities. In the penultimate section, I show how and why dysfunction remains unchallenged, arguing that governmentality promotes neglect and indifference. As such, the article demonstrates how the hostile environment does not just target those deemed illegitimate, in dramatic raids, arrests, and deportations. It extends too to legal migrants, through bureaucratic process, in banal (mis)understandings of guidance, forms, paperwork, and procedures, that nevertheless have devastating effects.

2 | THEORETICAL CONTEXT: CIVIC STRATIFICATION, IRRATIONAL RATIONALITY, AND GOVERNMENTALITY

One of the most powerful aspects affecting the experiences of legal migrants is their "partial citizenship," which limits access to services and keeps them at "arm's-length" from benefits routinely enjoyed by citizens (Bosniak, 2006). These processes have been traditionally overlooked in migration scholarship, with its greater preoccupation with "matters of entry and exclusion than on the general status of aliens who are already present" (Bosniak, 2006, p. 42). There is, however, growing recognition of the wider effects of immigration policy on legal migrants, including through increased policing of migrants' status and processes of everyday bordering (Anderson, 2013; Back, Shamser, & Bryan, 2012, Jones et al. 2017, Menjívar, 2014. Yuval-Davis, Wemyss, & Cassidy, 2018). Another means is through the growing phenomenon of restricting access to welfare. This originally applied to asylum seekers, as well as migrants from EU accession states, although the regulation of access to benefits and services extends now to many types of migrants from within and outside Europe (Dwyer & Scullion, 2014; Geddes, 2000; Lafleur & Mescoli, 2018; O'Brien, 2015).

Immigrants experience restricted access to services and benefits through a process of "civic stratification," identified by Morris (2003). Civic stratification refers to a "complex set of refinements and distinctions [which] variously shape the prospects of different categories of migrants" (Morris, 2003, p. 77). The concept captures the ways immigrants are stratified into different entry categories according to their origin and motivations for migration: as asylum seekers, workers, family members, EEA nationals, third country nationals (TCN) and so on. Those different immigration statuses bring differing levels of entitlements to benefits and services in education, the health service, and welfare provision, as well as access to the labour market (Sainsbury, 2012). The process of aligning access to public provisions and immigration rules also extends the need for increased vigilance by personnel, and increases opportunities to police immigrants (Morris, 1998).

However, eligibility regulations operate through a largely bureaucratic process, in which conditions of access to services and benefits are outlined in detailed legal stipulations. This provides a good example of how rationalizing principles of modern bureaucracies (originally identified by Weber [1922/1948]) have extended further into broader societal arenas (Ritzer, 1996). Rationalization aims to impart "efficiency, predictability, calculability, substitution of non-human for human technology and control over uncertainty" into various domains of social life (Ritzer, 1983, p. 100). This rather benign view of rationalization apparent in Weber's earlier work was, however, replaced later by acknowledgement of its more oppressive character. Indeed, Weber famously identified the potential for bureaucracies to get out of control and ensnare individuals within an "iron cage" of bureaucracy. His pessimistic vision is strongly borne out in Bauman's (1989, p. 26) analysis of the Holocaust, which shows how a bureaucratic culture acted as a "moral sleeping pill," where administrators evaded responsibilities and passed problems down the line. Bureaucracy enabled them to become remote and distanced from the horrific outcomes of the genocide of millions of Jews.

Of particular value in understanding the deviations of bureaucracy from its technical-rational aspirations is also the work of Ritzer. He coined the phrase the "irrationality of rationality" (1983, p. 100; 1996) to capture the counter-productive side-effects of rationalization processes. For him, rationalization can lead to unintended outcomes, which dehumanize and degrade both service-providers and their clients. Ritzer (1993) explains this through his well-known exploration of McDonaldization, exemplified by the principles and operation of the McDonald's restaurant chain. Though established by a logic to provide quick, easy, and consistent service, this rationality becomes irrational, as McDonald's is experienced as a dehumanizing place to work, where relationships between customers and staff are reduced to fleeting, anti-human encounters, and the experience of dining becomes fast and unsatisfying.

Ritzer's conception sees irrationality as a logical consequence of rationalization or a side-effect of bureaucracy. Embedding this notion in an additional concept, that of Foucault's governmentality (1978/2007) is instructive, however, to show further how even the most "irrational" malpractice can be quite "rational" when viewed in the broader contexts of its operation. Fassin (2011, p. 218) argues that a full understanding of the governmentality of immigration requires a closer study of immigration bureaucracy, to show the "discrepancies between the Weberian view of the fair and neutral state and its actual functioning." Darling (2014) provides a valuable example, showing how governmentality operates in immigration control through the apparently anachronistic mode of letter-writing by the Home Office, which powerfully inscribes the authority of the state. Here, governmentality is practiced, "through the production of paperwork, the filing of cases, and the posting of mail" (Darling, 2014, p. 485).

The perspective of governmentality advances a crucial point: that power does not operate only in a well-planned manner, but can do so through emergent and "cobbled together" practices (Walters, 2015). In this view, bureaucracy can act as a "veneer," masking the "everyday compromises, failings, and contingencies" of the State (Darling, 2014, p. 489, see also Gupta, 2013). Herzfeld's classic analysis of bureaucracy argues it is exactly its inefficient, messy, and unfair character, which proves vital for a collective "social production of indifference" (Herzfeld, 1993). Clients might complain, but so too do bureaucrats, blaming "the system," "excessively complicated laws" or senior managers. Yet in doing so, they confirm their place in the wider vessel of the nation state and reinforce indifference to its effects. Following these perspectives, it is vital then to consider the irrationalities of rationalities not only as accidental by-products, but understood by way of the "functionality of these apparent dysfunctions" for the nation-state (Fassin, 2011, p. 217).

In considering the pervasive, subtle, and complex ways in which processes of domination operate, including through irrational practices, governmentality is also instructive since it calls attention to how these processes are embedded and entwined with practices of self-government—in other words, how people behave. This, too, is vital for my analysis, because we see how the outcomes emerge because individuals tasked with administering regulations have absorbed certain values and look to behave in acceptable ways (Rose, 1999). When I argue in the following analysis that governmentality generates neglect, I argue not that individuals themselves are necessarily inactive. It is rather the opposite, as workers are quite cautious in making eligibility judgements. What I found was that exclusions are not (at least, in most cases) driven by maleficence, but rather by functionaries' ignorance and anxiety to apply the regulations correctly in stressful working contexts.

The problem occurs at a system-level, however, because fear drives accountability to the government, but the government is more concerned with policing incorrect authorization of access than refusals. There is only limited systematic attempt (apart from through the work of NGOs and limited private consultants) to provide training, which would equip workers with a richer understanding. Generally, however, in contexts of limited corrective oversight, there is little impetus for addressing mistakes. The responsibility falls to civil society, where NGOs play a vital role not only in correcting error, but also mobilizing and bringing legal cases which challenge aspects of the regulations and their application. And while institutional accountability exists, malpractice is exposed often much later than the events occur (for example, the Windrush scandal was eventually exposed to scrutiny by the National Audit Office). Meanwhile, the behemoth of unwieldy, ad hoc, and additive immigration-related regulation of access to services and benefits grows more irrational, increasing too the likelihood of governmentality-effected neglect of its outcomes.

3 | METHODS

The article draws on evidence from a large cross-national research project on entitlements for migrants relating to education, welfare benefits, employment, housing, healthcare, and voting rights and their impacts on the economic, social, cultural, and political integration of migrants in four EU member states in 2012–2014. The IMPACIM project was funded by the EU Fund for the Integration of Third Country Nationals, and involved mixed methods research with academic partners in the UK, Germany, Spain, and the Netherlands (see compas.ox.ac.uk/project/impact-of-admission-criteria-on-the-integration-of-migrants-impacim/). The countries were selected to consider how such practices varied across different welfare regimes, since this variation leads to different dynamics of migrant inclusion (Sainsbury, 2012). The UK represents a "liberal" welfare regime, a type of welfare system characterized by defining attributes of modest social insurance benefits, minimal benefits based on means-testing as well as reliance on private welfare benefits and market solutions (Sainsbury, 2012). This regime is different to the conservative and social democratic welfare regimes of Germany and the Netherlands. Finally, Spain represents something of a hybrid between those two ideal types (see Hemerijck, Palm, Entenmann, & Van Hooren, 2013).

The article draws on data from research in the UK conducted by the author, within a research team comprising Hiranthi Jayaweera, Sarah Spencer, and Vanessa Hughes. Some time has passed since data collection but arguably the messages from research have stronger resonance now than at the point of data collection, as the intervening years have seen restrictions escalate further (for example, in healthcare[1]). The prospect of Brexit also suggests that conditions will likely become more complicated.

The focus of the project was the issues of migrants' rights, but the team employed a lens on the topic by focusing on people moving to join family members. These included "third country nationals" (TCNs) who move legally from outside the EU to accompany or join a family member residing in the UK (e.g. spouse, partner, parent) as well as "dependents" joining others with temporary permission to stay (e.g. those on work or study visas). Family migration here is used as an instance, a good way to explore the topic, since this is far from a "unitary" category; the rights of migrants joining family members fragment and split according to the status of the sponsor they join or accompany, whether British citizen, refugee, worker, student and so on. In practice, however, the research found that the issues family migrants faced were common to many other migrants, and therefore the article broadens the reflections offered by practitioners to explain wider experiences by those beyond the specific policy category of family migrants.

The article draws on, first, a desk-based mapping exercise of policy documents, investigating entitlements to services and benefits for different migrants joining family members (Jayaweera & Oliver, 2013). A subsequent period of qualitative research with 43 individuals enabled both verification of the mapping, and exploration of the impacts of regulations in practice (Oliver, 2013). Particularly here, the experiences found to affect family migrants were often closely related to experiences of other migrant categories, and therefore at some points in the discussion of empirical data, I use those broader examples too. The research involved specialists at the national level, including in the Home Office, non-departmental public bodies (so called "quangos') and NGOs such as the Red Cross, the Refugee Council and Rights of Women. It also included research in two cities, Birmingham and Reading, with civil servants in local authorities, as well as advisors in citizens' advice bureaus and migrant-focused voluntary organizations. Policy workshops were held in both cities with (overall) 35 participants, facilitating respondent validation, probing of emerging findings and the development of further insight.

The selection of cities was inspired by the motivation to research a large and smaller urban area with relatively significant migrant populations. Selection was informed by considering administrative evidence on family migrants at a national level, using Home Office data from 2010 on the top five nationalities obtaining "family route" visas: those from Pakistan, Nepal, India, the United States, the Philippines. Annual Population Survey microdata was used subsequently to select local areas according to population and nationality criteria, selecting areas where the nationalities of the two local areas matched well the nationalities of family migrants overall in the UK enabling at least a focus on the top three nationalities (Pakistanis, Indians and Nepalis). Individuals within cities were recruited

by targeting local government officers in relevant departments and contacting local NGOs to explore their perspectives; the research team also used snowball sampling to reach more individuals through recommendations.

Interviews followed a semi-structured interview schedule, with variance in follow-up questions based on answers and the expertise of each participant. Discussions were recorded and fully transcribed. Fieldwork was approved by Oxford University's departmental Ethics Committee, guaranteeing participants' informed consent, rights to withdraw, and anonymized presentation of results. I conducted thematic data analysis using NVivo 10, applying a coding guide initially to assist comparison across the national studies, followed by inductive analysis. Emerging themes were connected to broader theoretical debates in the literature through a process of mid-range coding (Dey, 1993), peer review and discussions with critical friends, including policy experts and academics. Drawing on this research, in the following two sections, I present a brief summary of the regulations and official justifications, showing how civic stratification is expected to work, before interpreting local implementation.

4 | LEGAL AND POLICY CONTEXT

In this section, I summarize regulations dictating eligibility to services and benefits for migrants. This is, in many ways a vain exercise, since "this is an extremely complex and changing area of law and policy, which makes any written account likely to be out of date as soon as it is published" (Integration UpNorth, 2015). However, Table 1 indicates and summarizes in a very crude manner some of the key domains of services, locations of operation and conditions affecting access at the time of the research, with explanations of key terms beneath. Information should not be read line by line across the table into the final column, since the domains and access are not directly linked. Moreover, all the areas of policy have conditionality attached, and vary across the regions depending on whether the area of policy and law is devolved. Explaining fully how this applies to each area and category, however, would run into hundreds of pages (see Jayaweera & Oliver, 2013 for more detail).

As is characteristic of governmentality, the rules are dispersed and are linked to other functions beyond immigration. They operate through the Department of Health, the Department of Work and Pensions, non-ministerial departments like HM Revenues and Customs, and other arm's-length bodies, such as the Skills Funding Agency. Practical implementation occurs in hospitals, GP surgeries, further and higher education institutions, job centres, or in local authorities.

In summary, Table 1 shows that most migrants had access to compulsory education in schools, NHS accident and emergency services in hospitals, and primary care in GP services. However, depending on their immigration status, migrants could face qualified or no access to the labour market, state welfare benefits and social assistance, post-compulsory education, and non-emergency healthcare. In these domains, access to services and benefits depended on immigrant origin and entry categories: whether a migrant is a TCN,[2] from the European Economic Area, a Commonwealth citizen, and what their status is: as a refugee, a worker, family member, student or asylum seeker and so on (Morris, 2003). If a person moves for family reasons (e.g., to join a spouse or partner), eligibility depends on their sponsor's status. Many, but not all, family migrants experience a probationary period of five years before they can apply for independent settlement. They have "No Recourse to Public Funds" (NRPF) during this time, a condition documented in their passport or biometric residence permit, which restricts their access to certain welfare benefits.[3] It also enshrines a legal dependence on their sponsor, since they would lose rights if they separated.[4]

Access in some domains is governed not explicitly by immigration legislation, but by residence conditions about "settlement" and place of "ordinary" or "habitual residence." This continues to affect access to the National Health Service[5] and post-compulsory education, for example (Oliver & Hughes, 2019). A further factor is that the regulations also change frequently. Since the time of the research, for example, there has been the roll out of Universal Credit and stricter rules implemented on access to healthcare for non-EEA nationals subject to immigration control, through the immigration health surcharge (IHS) and an increasing use of biometric residence permits (BRPs).

TABLE 1 Indicative table of conditions affecting access to services and benefits for immigrants in the UK

Domain	Responsible department and agency	Location of service or benefit	Access
Compulsory Education (age 5–16)	Department for Education	Schools	Granted to all
Healthcare: - Emergency - Primary	Department of Health	Accident and Emergency departments; GP practices	

Labour market Welfare benefits (income and contribution based), housing and social assistance	Department of Work and Pensions, HM Revenues and Customs	Job-centres; Local authority departments	Conditional on:
			 • **Nationality and origin e.g.**
			   - Third Country National
			   - EEA National
			   - Commonwealth citizen

Post-compulsory education
 Eligibility for home student fee rate for Further Education and Higher Education
	Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, the (Education) Skills Funding Agency	Further and Higher Education Providers	• **Reason for migration, e.g.**
			   - Asylum and refugee (seeking, granted, on temporary leave to remain, refused, or refused and supported)
			   - Family reasons – depends on the status of *the sponsor* the migrant is joining (EEA mobile citizen; or British citizen, Refugee, Worker etc.)
			   - Work (EEA or points-based system)

Healthcare:
 Secondary
	Department of Health	Hospitals, Clinics	- Study (EEA or TCN)
			 • **Residence length and status e.g.**
			   - Settled
			   - Residence length and type, as ordinary or habitual residence for a specified period prior to applying for benefit or service
			 • **Changes in national, European and international law** governing the above, or ad hoc amendments
			 • **Exceptions applying** which may override the conditions above such as the *Destitution and Domestic Violence* Concession, or domain-specific discretionary exemption (e.g. for student funding).

Key terms used in analysis:

DDV: Destitution and Domestic Violence Concession;

EEA: European Economic Area;

Home Office: the lead government department for immigration and national security.

NASS 35: Document used by asylum seekers once they moved out of asylum support to prove entitlement to welfare benefits;

NINO: National Insurance Number, a number required to join an employer's payroll;

NRPF: No Recourse to Public Funds, a condition, which subject to their immigration status, prohibits many migrants' access to non-contributory benefits, tax credits or housing assistance.

TCN: Third Country National: people migrating from outside the European Economic Area.

Finally, rules change too because previous incarnations of regulations need swift action to overcome unforeseen consequences, demonstrating the rather ad hoc nature of policy making in this area. For example, the destitute domestic violence (DDV) concession was established to circumvent restricted access, in cases where

migrants were being forced to remain in relationships where they experienced domestic violence. Under the concession, spousal migrants could lodge a fast-track application to the Home Office and gain access to welfare and housing support.[6] However, eligibility is restricted and does not apply to all migrants experiencing domestic violence. Finally, ad hoc changes are also significant. For example the Case Resolution Directive[7] from 2006 was a one-off process to grant asylum seekers Indefinite Leave to Remain (ILR) but stopped short of giving them full refugee status. However, it was only when subsequent changes to the Family Migration Rules in 2012 were introduced that this lesser status became significant, reducing possibilities of family reunion and limiting entitlements of joining family members.[8]

The operation of civic stratification is clearly a complex process. In the following section, I turn to the empirical data, first considering how those aims were articulated at the Home Office, before exploring the implementation of regulations locally.

5 | THE NATIONAL VISION: FAIR AND CLEAR RULES

I begin by presenting an interview held with an official in the department from which the regulations originate, the UK Home Office. As the above explanation shows, national regulations are by no means simple. However, in a Home Office interview room, the explanation given by a senior civil servant (surrounded by four silent observing employees) was that they were clear and straightforward. He explained that administering the regulations was the task of public service workers. They were employed as "the custodians of publicly funded services," who had "responsibilities and must do their best to make sure they make the right decision." Appealing to the Weberian view of the legal-rational administration, he continued, "these are fair rules which command policing, to avoid fraud and error."

The web of regulations governing access to services and benefits had arisen "over a number of years" he said, some reflecting decades-old conditions, for example healthcare access had been defined by residence since the birth of the NHS. From the 1996 Housing Act, immigration rules started more pointedly to define access; during this period, the senior civil servant explained, the regulations reflected the political zeitgeist promoting immigrants' "self-reliance." In 2009, the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Access was particularly important in establishing new rules affecting TCNs' access to welfare, local authority housing and homelessness assistance (Dwyer & Scullion, 2014).

The civil servant explained that the logic for regulations increasing was ostensibly financial. For example, he explained that an extension of "the probationary period" of NRPF from two to five years before a migrant could apply for settlement (and restricting access to welfare) was founded on the belief that the government should not be expected to "subsidise family life brought in from elsewhere." Austerity was a driver too, with cuts affecting citizens and new migrants alike, in a context where "sacrifices were being made across the board." Policy changes reflected growing expectations from the government that migrants should not expect rights, but be prepared to meet responsibilities: "to stand on their own two feet and make a contribution to society." By restricting entitlements upon entry, he justified, "prevention is better than cure. Here the aim is for a properly controlled migration system, which is clear from the outset" (see Home Office, 2011).

6 | LOCAL IMPLEMENTATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF IRRATIONAL RATIONALITY

6.1 | Complexity and arbitrary outcomes

Local implementation of regulation revealed a picture at odds with the Weberian view of the fair and neutral state offered by the Home Office official. Rather than providing clarity (Eggebø, 2013), I consider now how the

bureaucracy of these regulations fuelled irrational rationality, where the complexity of rules was experienced as baffling and led to arbitrary outcomes and hypercorrection.

It was clear that only in limited domains (e.g., social housing) did practitioners consider the law to be straightforward. A housing operation manager in Reading, for example, explained about housing, "if you don't have the right immigration status, you can't access the service." In most sectors, it was less clear-cut. Interviewees reported that service-providers working in GP surgeries, job centres and further and higher education institutions struggled to interpret the complex rules around immigrants' access to services. The majority of interviewees described instead a regulatory quagmire, complaining of deeply complicated rules, dense explanations, and regular changes. The rules appeared to demand specialist knowledge of practitioners, for them to be able to understand and apply regulations correctly.

This point is exemplified through reference to access to funding for post-compulsory education. An expert from a national education think-tank explained, for example, that "the rules change every year and are incredibly complex." Admissions tutors had to interpret intersecting eligibility rules coming from multiple sources including immigration, educational arm's-length bodies and job centres. The interviewee explained:

> *I have yet to find a[n education] provider that fully understands them. The example I wanted to give you was that of the Skills Funding Agency rules. [These] are overlaid of course by the UKBA[9] rules so that ESOL[10] providers have to interpret the immigration status of their prospective learners, and then they have to interpret the eligibility for funding regulations for a prospective learner. And it's entirely possible as well that they may—if that learner was referred through the job centre, or the provider thinks that learner could be referred through a job centre—they then overlay that with a third set of rules—which are the Jobcentre Plus eligibility rules. So there are three possible sets of guidance.*

Frontline staff had little guidance in traversing this intricate maze of regulations when making eligibility decisions. Unsurprisingly, this led to arbitrary outcomes for migrants rather than results based on efficient, predictable calculations (see also Gupta, 2012). The education spokesperson explained that migrant learners with the same status across the country would likely receive different decisions on their eligibility for educational course funding, with some people unfairly refused access. She described one regional meeting of three education providers, where she had witnessed every provider arriving at a different interpretation of one migrant's eligibility.

Four interviewees at women's charities reported similar experiences in relation to access to welfare, describing how some migrant women experiencing domestic violence were incorrectly refused welfare benefits in job centres, despite their eligibility for the DDV concession. All agreed the concession itself was "fantastic" and could be "pretty efficient," but a study from the Department of Work and Pensions (Lloyd & Mulraney, 2013, p. 16) confirms the advisors' observations that practice in job centres was patchy. It states, "awareness and understanding of the DDV concession was limited...a large number [of interviewees] had either not read or did not recall reading this part of the guidance, and few demonstrated a detailed knowledge of it." A legal advisor in a migrant women's charity described this ad hoc awareness, stating, "We've heard pot luck really, as some *Jobcentre Plus* people know about it, some don't. Some are great, some will just turn the women away." She continued, "in [one London borough] there was a *Jobcentre Plus* that was excellent, but in other areas of London women would be told, 'well we've never heard of this, you're *no recourse to public funds*. Go away'." In another example, an advisor in a women's rights' charity explained the case of a woman separated from an EEA National who had received a letter from the Inland Revenue saying that she had no recourse to public funds and was liable for deportation. The advisor explained, "in fact that information was wrong—and that was coming from the central government agency." Those wrongly refused face a difficult choice between enduring further violence or leaving their sponsor and losing their legal status and rights.

Such examples were not isolated cases, and similar instances of limited knowledge and misunderstandings of regulations were found across multiple sectors of education, healthcare, and welfare provision. Echoing Gupta's

(2012) observation that "bureaucratic action repeatedly and systematically produces arbitrary outcomes in its provision of care," here too it is the case that rational systems produced perverse outcomes.

6.2 | Attrition, hypercorrection, and unintended consequences

The interpretation of irrationality of rationality is further supported in observations of other practices arising in workers' administration of regulations. Observers from NGOs described how they were aware of gatekeepers applying attritional tactics, where additional, unnecessary conditions for migrants to access services were imposed, and where practitioners thought they were doing their job well when they did so. I found cases where even when regulation was simple, frontline staff made it more complicated by hypercorrecting decisions. For example, I was told that migrants were asked to provide further information to prove their eligibility for services, particularly healthcare, generating unnecessary bureaucratic impediments or hoops for them to jump through. A voluntary service worker working with healthcare professionals in Birmingham explained:

> we found a lot of confusion, particularly amongst frontline health professionals not understanding what people's health entitlements are, particularly around primary care. And actually the situation around primary care is very straightforward, but people believe it to be very complicated. And there's been a tendency to refuse everybody, to demand people present passports they don't necessarily need, they actually don't need to provide.

Other examples of additional impositions were of GP receptionists asking migrants to get their partners to amend utility bills to include the joining spouse's name. Sending migrants away repeatedly to meet these added demands worked as a form of attrition, and was frustrating since on many occasions, there was not a genuine reason to do so. An advisor in Birmingham commented, "no surgery in [local area] is full and they're all supposed to take patients. But sometimes they refuse if they [migrants] haven't got paperwork. But they're not supposed to ask."

Requests for unnecessary evidence placed a burden on new migrants if they did not understand the request and in other cases, were unable to meet the conditions. An advisor in Reading explained, "How can a person who is staying in a room in a [shared] house produce a utility bill for a GP? It's very difficult." Satisfying requests could be technically impossible, especially when front-line workers requested outdated documents that were no longer in circulation. An NGO advisor in Birmingham gave the example of how staff in job-centres would ask refugees for a document known as the NASS35, a form documenting residence and when asylum support ends that is supposed to be provided by the Home Office (UK Visas and Immigration). Advisors mistakenly insisted on seeing the document before allowing clients to make a claim for welfare benefits, despite the fact it was only necessary in the final stages of assessment (Carnet, Blanchard and Apollonio 2014: 10, 16). This created frustration, as the advisor explained, at:

> the DWPs insistence on people presenting the NASS35 document and routinely not processing people's claims for welfare benefit until they provide a NASS35 document. That payment no longer exists, so it serves no purpose at all! And yet they insist that people present it before they even look at processing the claim. It was never a barrier to processing the claim anyway; it just told you how much extra money the person should be entitled to. That's a very typical [case]...

Two advisors from refugee charities explained how as a result, refugees experienced delays transferring onto mainstream benefits after asylum support, placing them at risk of destitution. In some cases, accessing one benefit often acted as a passport to other services, so refusals created a domino effect of further inconveniences. Four advisors described how some migrants faced difficulty getting access to national insurance numbers (NINOs). Since this was a prerequisite to working in the labour market and claiming benefits in the UK, the delay could have knock-on

impacts that could spiral disproportionately beyond the original effect. An advisor at a voluntary agency explained, 'Once a client is having difficulty getting their national insurance, then they can't access anything anywhere at all. From housing to seeking a job, everything would be affected'. Another NGO advisor in Reading explained how some EEA Nationals had experienced delays of six to eight months in getting access to child benefit through not getting a NINO, despite their legal entitlement. Another explained:

> *we've had...people losing their passports and if you send your passport off and it's there for months and months and months. And you start getting into visa problems because you haven't got your passport anymore.*

The evidence suggests a production of irrational rationality, as the "clear and fair system" envisaged within the Home Office produced a range of unfair outcomes in practice. Misunderstandings and attritional strategies at the frontline had counterproductive and domino effects, which in the long run, increased staff workloads and could lead to more severe exclusions for migrants than in law. Those consequences included destitution and migrants falling into illegality, outcomes that by no stretch of the imagination would meet the original aim of "reducing the burden" of immigration.

7 | 'TEACH US OUR OWN RULES': GOVERNMENTALITY-EFFECTED NEGLECT

The analysis thus far shows the operation of irrational rationality, where worse exclusions are created in practice than dictated by law. In this section, I show the system-wide acquiescence to this irrational rationality. Within a broader context of the "hostile environment," I show how a combination of factors operates at a range of scales (from individuals to workplaces as well as through the wider policy and regulation environment) to tip the balance away from a public-facing accountability towards system-wide indifference to mistakes. A similar observation was made in the Windrush review, which highlights that even when failings in the system were known, opportunities to act on them were simply ignored (National Audit Office, 2018). In this section, I examine how this occurs through what I term as "governmentality-effected neglect."

I advance my claim through considering another example of (mal)administration of restrictions. A voluntary sector worker in an NGO in Birmingham explained how, in a curious turn of events, he had been invited into a *Jobcentre Plus* to give the staff training on their national government department's (the DWP's) *own rules*. He explained:

> *I was in a* Jobcentre Plus *once—I won't name which one—and I went there to advocate for a client [...] And at the end a few managers came around just to learn about what we were saying, and said, "can you come back and give us training?" And I said "well I can't really, I mean this is your own [line of work]." So therefore the person...apologised actually, [and said] "we do these mistakes every day, we need help, we need training."*

The example was not a standalone case; it was clear that the NGO sector played a significant role correcting mistakes, since they had become knowledgeable about "the nooks and crannies" of the regulations (as described by an advisor in Birmingham). Five NGO participants referred to how they educated public sector workers, as one put it, "to develop a consistent base of knowledge." The example, however, is particularly important since it provides insight into the mentalities behind administrators' bureaucratic practices. It reveals that in some cases workers were not aware of the incorrect decisions they were making, and might even be embarrassed about the mistakes they made. Rather than exemplifying "street-level bureaucracy" where public servants held agency in operating discretion at local-level

(Lipsky, 1980) their apologetic admission and request for help in the example above revealed limited confidence in workers' understanding.

The irrational rationality described in the previous section can be understood then, at least partly, as a consequence of workers' insecurity. Jones (2013) observes with reference to local government workers that those who are operating governmentality are also often subject to it themselves. In this case, workers were aware that their decisions around eligibility might be scrutinized, yet they had no clear means of checking the validity of their decision-making. For example, staff in further education were audited on their funding decisions, with financial consequences for the organization—and perhaps consequences for individual members of staff—if they made incorrect decisions on eligibility to funding. A local authority official in Reading explained:

> we are audited to death by the Skills Funding Agency. So if we can't prove things like National Insurance Number, date of birth, things like that, we would have that money taken away from us. So it is very...it is an issue.

Under these conditions, it was more comfortable for service-providers to deny services rather than allow migrants' access, considering that if, due to their misunderstanding, this might be later exposed as the wrong call. Imposing false stringency in decision-making and overzealous guarding of public goods arose as a personal response to the absence of clear guidance. Hypercorrection was a means for workers to quell their own feelings of uncertainty, and yet still to be seen to be doing "a good job."

In addition to workers' limited confidence within an audit culture, the data suggested their working conditions, drastically shaped by austerity and public services' contraction, contributed to this climate of neglect. With services subject to stringent budget cuts, reduced capacity, and higher workloads, workers were already over-stretched (Hastings, Bailey, Gannon, Besemer, & Bramley, 2015). Researching migrants' eligibility was time-consuming. As a local government official in Reading explained with reference to assessing FE funding eligibility, "it takes time out of what most providers think of as teaching." In health services too, staff are experiencing rising workloads and there is concern about the impacts on staff of administering the health surcharge (Department of Health, 2017, p. 22). Understanding legal jargon for eligibility judgements required a heavy time investment for workers, which many could ill afford in pressurized working conditions. Moreover, there was little perceived need, given sanctions seemed to apply only if workers granted access incorrectly, not refused it—and the worst consequence facing a worker more likely would be embarrassment if an advisor exposed the mistake.

A second aspect compounds the system-wide acquiescence to irrational rationality: in encounters with public services, migrants were the weaker party. They lacked awareness of their entitlements (Morris, 2012) or had limited language fluency to question decisions, especially given the technical jargon involved. Practical barriers of time, expenses, or confidence to return repeatedly to job centres and surgeries also left mistakes unchallenged. The voluntary sector offered some chances for redress, but even there, severe funding cuts meant workers had competing priorities for their time. Moreover, there is also a very real possibility that racism was operating in encounters (Jones et al., 2017). Back, Shamser and Bryan (2012) show that social institutions engender white privilege, featuring implicit bias and racialization. In this study, two advisors suggested that TCN migrants were "just automatically assumed" by frontline workers to be ineligible for access to welfare. Migrants' legal status was incorrectly "automatically read" from people's bodies and nationality. This could help explain why advisors reported that TCN migrants joining EEA nationals often experienced the worst exclusions, despite often being eligible for benefits. A legal advisor gave an example of a Nigerian client married to a French man, explaining:

> She should be treated as if she is French, exercising her treaty rights in this country. But often I think the local authority or the JobCentre Plus or wherever she goes to seek help or financial support will see her Nigerian passport and will say "oh you must be no recourse to public funds, I'm sorry we can't help you."

Anderson (2013) and Mayblin (2017) argue that postcolonial legacies remain significant even amid "neutral," de-racialized political and policy discourse around migration control. Racialized and unequal encounters, combined with workers' own insecurity and internalization of responsibility in contexts of audit and austerity, powerfully combine to generate a collective culture of indifference to unjust outcomes. This, I suggest, reveals governmentality-effected neglect.

8 | CONCLUSION

The article has drawn attention to latent exclusions operating through the bureaucracies of multiple realms of state services and benefits—of further education colleges, GP surgeries, and welfare offices. It described a set of complex regulations that regulate membership privileges according to principles of "civic stratification" (Morris, 2003). These form part of a governmentality of immigration, operating via rules dispersed in domains far from the original immigration function, where the state can connect its aims around immigration "to a diversity of forces and groups" that already try to administer individuals' lives (Rose, O'Malley, & Valverde, 2006, p. 87). Rules come from multiple sources, and change regularly as old conditions are deleted or adapted. Actors outside the sphere of immigration control are entrusted to implement regulations, but against a backdrop of accountability and auster-ity, many did not feel confident, trained, or informed enough to do so. Bureaucratic reason was dislodged through hypercorrection, which was caused by personal uncertainty and limited knowledge. The fear of getting it wrong led to a wider and systematic "erring on the side of caution." Deep in the heart of "rational" administrations, an "irrational rationality" persisted (Ritzer, 1983) to the extent that administrators needed educating on their own rules. Reinforced by wider conditions of public sector work and implicit racialization, the result was an indifference to do anything about it.

The research has conceptual, political, and methodological implications. Conceptually, bringing together irra-tional rationalities with governmentality expands the explanatory power of both concepts. It shows how irrational rationality is shown to operate at a variety of levels: through policy that produces outcomes far from its intended aim, through misinterpretations of complex rules and through hypercorrection. It also shows how governmentality accomplishes the same ends not only through wilful technologies of control, but through apparently "accidental" byproducts of these "irrationalities of rationality" (Ritzer, 1983). The article demonstrates a collective metaphor-ical "shrug of the shoulders" and discharging of the state's duty of care, leading to perverse outcomes where "failings" ironically support the original aim of the state and there is no impetus to challenge those outcomes. Rose et al. (2006) posit that governmentality is contingent and invented. However, the true extent of that creativity is revealed in this case, when power operates even through irrationality and neglect: where illogical practices, and inaction rather than action, drives outcomes complicit with the government's aims.

There are also practical and political implications from the analysis. There is a clear need for streamlining and simplifying of eligibility rules, as well as the provision of training for public service workers. This is especially significant given the fact that migrants' access is likely to be complicated further[11] following the Brexit negoti-ations. More profoundly the analysis advances a critique of the nature of public services, which ultimately has implications for wider society. Failings in legal rational processes and unresponsive public services are factors that undermine trust in institutions, fueling populism and driving further demand for the regulation of migrants in the first place. I have shown that the effects of poor practice can be long-term social exclusion, and even destitution and irregularity. This does little to dispel sentiments of migrants as a burden to the welfare state and society (Schmidtke, 2012). In this way, there are only negative consequences for society and politics.

Finally, I return to the methodological implications of the study, especially the need to be alert to the sub-stantive issues lurking in the "dead zones" of bureaucracy (Graeber, 2012). When wading through complex ter-minologies of migrant entitlement devoid of emotion and voices to listen to, my sociological eyes glazed over. However, engaging in these "dead zones" (Graeber, 2012) was imperative for a rich sociological understanding,

since understanding how exclusion was created practically needed understanding of the finer detail of policies and regulations. This insight enabled fuller comprehension of the spread of immigration power across diverse governable domains, and awareness of "the new forms of power, authority, and subjectivity being formed within these mundane practices" (Rose et al., 2006, p. 101). If sociologists consider policy to be beyond the remit of the discipline, we close our eyes and ears to its effects. Dealing with the details of paperwork and bureaucratic regulation certainly can "repel the imagination" of social scientists; nevertheless as Graeber (2012, p. 123) points out, "if we ignore them entirely, we risk becoming complicit in the very violence that creates them."

DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

The data that support the findings of this study are available on request from the author. The data are not publicly available due to privacy or ethical restrictions.

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NOTES

[1] Since April 2015, the NHS introduced a surcharge for all overseas visitors (including migrants, visitors, and former residents) to gain access to non-emergency services.

[2] Intra-EU migrants are generally more privileged than TCNs, although are becoming subject to more aggressive restrictions (O'Brien, 2015). TCNs joining EU citizens enjoy "derived rights" but are vulnerable by their position at the fringes of EU free movement law and immigration law (Shaw, Miller, & Fletcher 2013).

[3] Benefits prohibited to those with NRPF include: income-based jobseeker's allowance; income support; child tax credit; universal credit; working tax credit; a social fund payment; child benefit; housing benefit; council tax benefit; council tax reduction; domestic rate relief (Northern Ireland); state pension credit; attendance allowance; severe disablement allowance; personal independence payment; carer's allowance; disability living allowance; an allocation of local authority housing; and local authority homelessness assistance (https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/public-funds--2).

[4] See: https://www.gov.uk/visas-when-you-separate-or-divorce/apply-stay-uk.

[5] As part of the health surcharge, "Ordinary residence" was qualified to include only those with "Indefinite Leave to Remain."

[6] Spousal migrants get three months' access to benefits while they make a fast-tracked application for ILR. The DDV concession followed lobbying from academics and voluntary organizations (Anitha, 2010).

[7] Aimed at clearing the backlog of undecided asylum cases from 2006.

[8] Those affected share the same rules as British citizens for Family Migration, needing to meet the income requirement and having joining children, for example, having less eligibility to services and benefits than those joining refugees.

[9] UKBA was an agency of the Home Office, responsible for border control. It was abolished in 2013, following complaints upheld by the Parliamentary Ombudsman about incompetence and poor service.

[10] English for speakers of other languages.

[11] Suggestions raised include that emergency services would be restricted for some migrants (Department of Health, 2017).

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ORIGINAL ARTICLE

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Deservingness put into practice: Constructing the (un)deservingness of migrants in four European countries

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Abstract

The increased comparative research on perceptions of public welfare deservingness studies the extent to which different subgroups of citizens are deemed worthy or unworthy of receiving help from the welfare state. The concept of *deservingness criteria* plays a crucial role in this research, as it theorizes a universal heuristic that citizens apply to rank people in terms of their welfare deservingness. Due to the mainly quantitative nature of the research and despite the indisputable progress it has made, the subjective existence and actual application of these deservingness criteria remain a bit of a black box. What criteria of deservingness do citizens actually apply, and how do they apply them? This article opens the black box of welfare deservingness and sheds light on the nature and practice of deservingness criteria. Empirically, the paper explores how the deservingness of immigrants is discussed and established within 20 focus groups conducted in Slovenia, Denmark, UK, and Norway in 2016 with a total of 160 participants. All 20 focus groups discussed the welfare deservingness of immigrants based on similar vignette stimuli. Our analysis shows that (1) deservingness criteria are used both to construct images of target groups *and* as normative yardsticks; (2) deservingness criteria do not work independently of each other, but rather co-function in specific hybridized discourses; and (3) the

moral logic of deservingness is supplemented by alternative moral logics, at least in the case of migrants.

1 | INTRODUCTION

The growing body of comparative research on popular perceptions of deservingness (see van Oorschot & Roosma, 2015) studies the extent to which different population subgroups are deemed worthy or unworthy of receiving help from the welfare state.

Within deservingness research, the crucial concept of *deservingness criteria* describes a generally shared heuristic (Petersen, 2012; Petersen, Slothuus, Stubager, & Togeby, 2011; Petersen, Sznycer, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2012) that people employ to rank other people in terms of their welfare deservingness (Larsen, 2005; Van Oorschot, 2000, 2006, 2017). Due to the mainly quantitative nature of the research—and despite the indisputable progress it has made—the actual application of these deservingness criteria remains a bit of a black box. This article contributes to the literature on deservingness through a qualitative exploration of the actual application of deservingness criteria. More specifically, we study discussions about the deservingness of *immigrants*. We analyse statements from 20 focus groups with citizens across four European countries.

We focus on *immigrants* for two reasons. First, immigrant access to welfare benefits and services has been a salient issue in most European countries after the enlargement of the European Union eastwards in 2004 and the so-called migration crisis of 2015 (Jørgensen & Thomsen, 2016; Reeskens & van der Meer, 2018), which makes this a highly contentious topic in terms of deservingness. Second, immigrants are an "extreme case" in terms of deservingness, a case type which potentially "reveal[s] more information because they activate more actors and more basic mechanisms in the situation studied" (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 229). More than any other group, immigrants challenge the identity deservingness criteria and constitute "the other" in regards to the notion of social citizenship linked to the nation state. Consequently, discussions of immigrants make up a suitable case for studying how contemporary European citizens actually put deservingness criteria into practice.

In the first section of the article, we engage with the deservingness literature, unfold its key concepts and present our research questions. The second section presents our methodological approach of using focus group interviews across four countries and describes the processes of data collection, coding, and analytical strategies. The third section presents our findings, and the final section summarizes and discusses the results.

1.1 | The deservingness heuristic

Predominantly, attitudes about the social rights of various population subgroups is argued to reflect self-interest, class-interest, institutional feedback and the ideologies or perceptions of the effectiveness of various policies. While these are undoubtedly important factors in attitude formation, the deservingness literature approaches welfare attitudes from another perspective. Welfare attitudes are argued to also reflect moral and cultural principles that people employ when they decide, for example, whether a given subgroup is worthy of receiving help or not (van Oorschot, 2000). One of the early main findings was the existence of what Coughlin (1980) labelled a "universal dimension of support". Across eight different countries, he found similar rankings of deservingness, placing the elderly as the most deserving, followed by the sick, the poor, the unemployed and social assistance

clients. Van Oorschot (2006) similarly found a strikingly consistent general pattern across 23 European countries: the elderly are perceived as the most deserving, followed by the sick and the disabled, while the unemployed are perceived as less deserving and immigrants even less so. Similar rankings have been found in a number of follow-up studies (Coughlin, 1980; Jaeger, 2016; Kootstra, 2016; Petersen, Slothuus, Stubager, & Togeby, 2007; Van Oorschot, 2006).

To account for this pattern, researchers developed the central concept of *deservingness criteria*, which theorizes a generally shared heuristic that people use to assess welfare deservingness and has proven helpful in accounting for the different levels of deservingness found in comparative survey research (Petersen, 2012). The suggestion is that people knowingly or unknowingly make use of deservingness criteria to assess and measure the relative deservingness of subgroups. Van Oorschot (2000) has suggested five such criteria—called the CARIN criteria—which have found general acceptance within the literature (van Oorschot & Roosma, 2015):

1. Control (the less in control of own situation, the more deserving);
2. Attitude (the more grateful, the more deserving);
3. Reciprocity (the more reciprocation, the more deserving);
4. Identity (the closer to "us", the more deserving); and
5. Need (the needier, the more deserving).

The CARIN criteria have primarily been deduced from historical studies of legislation (Cook, 1979; De Swaan, 1988; Will, 1993) and survey data. For instance, surveys have documented that a person who is not able to work is perceived as being more deserving than a person who is not willing to work; older people are perceived as more deserving than young people, and ethnic minority groups are seen as *less* deserving than the average population (Van Oorschot, 2000). This indicates the existence of criteria for control, reciprocity, and identity, respectively.

Existing deservingness research comes with some natural limits, however. First, the above-mentioned deductions are qualified guesses with no firm empirical connection to the actual processes of deservingness judgments. Favouring the person who is unable to work over the person who is unwilling to do so, for example, might suggest the importance of the control criteria, but it could also suggest the importance of attitude, because the unwilling can be seen as showing a lack of good faith. Likewise, favouring the pensioner over the younger person may emphasize the importance of the criteria of reciprocity—because the elderly has perhaps contributed more to society—but it could also be a question of need ("the elderly are more needy") or control ("the young person is, to a larger degree, in control of his/her situation"). Put differently, the actual functioning of the specific deservingness criteria—how citizens apply these criteria when making judgments—remains a black box. We agree with Oorschot and Roosma (2015, p. 25) when they note that there is a lack of qualitative research "in the form of in depth interviewing or forum groups, in which people are asked to freely discuss and reveal what kind of criteria they are inclined to apply to specific needy groups." Second, the deservingness literature often discusses the five criteria as more or less independent dimensions in which a given person or subgroup can score higher or lower. From this follows a discussion of which criterion matters the most, which is typically investigated by the strength of correlations in survey data or the effect sizes in experimental vignette studies. Rather than hierarchizing the criteria based on their respective importance, a qualitative approach makes it possible to study how the criteria are used and how they co-function and form hybrids when citizens argue. Third, the deservingness literature has had a common verification bias following most other research traditions. Unsurprisingly, literature on welfare deservingness is mainly focused on the presence of, rather than on the absence of, the deservingness heuristics, so the exploration of possible alternative normative logics of welfare worthiness has been somewhat neglected.

This article seeks to address these limitations by posing the following three questions: (1) Which deservingness criteria do citizens apply when discussing the welfare worthiness of immigrants? (2) How do the criteria interact and relate to each other during such discussions? (3) Which alternative normative logics do citizens rely on when morally assessing immigrants?

2 | METHODS AND DATA

2.1 | Data from four countries

We analyse data from a comparative focus group study from 2016 on deservingness containing five focus groups in each country, with a total of 160 participants, that was conducted in Oslo, Norway; Copenhagen, Denmark; London, UK; and Ljubljana, Slovenia. The 20 focus groups were carried out with a shared structure and a comparable format. During each focus group session, participants discussed the welfare worthiness of six specific subgroups, including migrants.[1]

Focus groups were conducted in two countries within a social democratic welfare regime (Denmark and Norway), one within a liberal welfare regime (the UK) and one within a post-communist welfare regime (Slovenia). The deservingness literature typically assumes deservingness discussions to be quite similar across countries (see, e.g., Aarøe & Petersen, 2014, for an example rooting deservingness in human biology). However, there *is* a large literature focusing on the ways in which public attitudes towards social benefits and services are shaped by differences in the institutional structure of so-called welfare regimes (Esping-Andersen & Esping-Andersen, 1999; Kumlin & Stadelmann-Steffen, 2014; Larsen, 2008; Larsen & Dejgaard, 2013; Svallfors, 2003). In discussions of deservingness, people's perceptions are typically believed to be much more important than the factual composition of the target groups. Thus, it is more important for our analysis that *the migration crisis* of 2015 made migration a salient issue throughout Europe than the fact that the inflow of immigrants in 2016 was around 20,000 in Slovenia, 60,000 in Denmark and Norway, and 454,000 in the UK.[2]

We focus our qualitative analysis particularly on *similarities* in argumentative patterns across the otherwise very different country settings, because looking for similarities across very different cases can pave the way for analytical generalization (Flyvbjerg, 2006): if you can find a similar pattern across highly different cases, the pattern is likely to be found in other cases as well. Consequently, we primarily include points in the analysis where empirical evidence is found in the material from all four countries.

2.2 | Focus groups and vignettes

Professional market research companies recruited participants for the focus groups and moderated the sessions in three of the four countries. They followed recruitment and moderation guidelines from the team of researchers, including the authors. In the fourth country (Denmark) the research team recruited participants and moderated the focus groups themselves.[3]

Within focus groups, participants were recruited with a certain degree of sociodemographic homogeneity—an approach dubbed "homogeneous strangers" (Kitzinger, 1995)—to capitalize on potential shared experiences or ideas and prevent dominant participants from overriding others who do not share their experiences (Smithson, 2000). Five focus groups were conducted in each country, consisting of 5–10 elderly citizens, young citizens, women with children living at home and people from a middle-class or working-class background.[4] For all focus groups, we sought to achieve a "representative" balance in terms of gender (besides, of course, the women with children-group) and political views.[5] However, due to absenteeism and other unforeseen events, the Danish and some of the UK groups saw an overrepresentation of left-leaning participants. This may have contributed to the facilitation of more "migrant-friendly" conversations than can otherwise be expected. Participants were informed in advance that the topic of the sessions was the welfare state and the distribution of goods and services. Participants were not informed about the migrant topic, making it unlikely that participants with extraordinarily strong views on migration issues were over-recruited. Small financial incentives were provided to encourage participation.

The sessions lasted for 2 hours and followed a very similar structure in all countries. After brief introductions, the participants were presented with six minimal vignettes, one at a time and with *very little information* given. Vignettes are typically defined as "short scenarios in written or pictorial form, intended to elicit responses to typical scenarios" (Hill, 1997, p. 177). Each vignette represented a typical policy target group (Schneider & Ingram, 1993) and was introduced to the participants with only the information given below:

An unemployed person of working age.

A person aged 70.

A family with average wages with children under three years.

A person in a low-paid job above the age of 25.

A comfortably off worker.

An immigrant.

After presenting each vignette, the moderator opened the discussion by asking: "What welfare services and benefits should this person/this family have—and why?" At the end of each focus group, the moderator would ask participants to rank the six vignettes according to welfare deservingness, and participants were encouraged to come to an agreement about this.

Minimal vignettes, with limited information given, were chosen to ensure that discussions were focused on the welfare deservingness of certain policy target groups, while avoiding the channelling of responses (Barter & Renold, 1999) and allowing the focus groups to be lightly moderated to activate the vocabularies and sense-making of the participants. The minimal vignettes effectively facilitated such group discussions (e.g., Brondani, MacEntee, Bryant, & O'Neill, 2008) and functioned as useful common external reference points (Kitzinger, 1995, p. 107) for comparative analysis across the four countries and the 20 group sessions. Using vignette-based focus group discussions allowed us to investigate the discursive and evaluative practices involved in assessing immigrant deservingness. On the one hand, we gathered rich, qualitative data on the evaluative practices involved and, on the other hand, the vignettes were sufficiently general to keep the discussions in the domain of general welfare attitudes rather than the domain of experience-based narratives about particular immigrants. While minimal vignettes do not allow the comparison of small vignette differences (e.g., Ejrnæs & Monrad, 2012), the possibility for exploring participants' self-directed constructions of deserving and less-deserving citizens is correspondingly higher, which was in line with our research objectives. Compared to the survey measurement of deservingness, we re-balanced control over data production between participants and researchers in favour of the participants' own contributions (see Taylor-Gooby, Leruth, & Chung, 2018). To achieve this, moderation was light, mostly keeping discussions on track by asking questions when necessary, encouraging participants to explicate or further develop their arguments and making sure that all participants were able to be heard. Likewise, when participants occasionally asked the moderator specific questions about the vignettes—such as, "does the migrant have a job?"—the moderator systematically returned those questions with counter questions such as "why do you think that is important?" The short vignettes initially prompted group responses building on stereotypical notions of *immigrants*. However, as the discussions progressed, the participants criticized these notions, presenting other stereotypes or building alternative, counter narratives of *the immigrant* to explore different levels and types of deservingness. Consequently, the minimal vignettes allowed participants to use different notions of deservingness to explore a range of "variations" on the *immigrant* theme.

2.3 | Data and data analysis

All focus groups were audio and video recorded, transcribed in their entirety and translated into English.

The analysis is based on the discussions about the immigrant vignette and the sorting exercises in which participants discussed how to rank the six vignettes according to their welfare deservingness. In the first coding pass, we deductively coded the material using the five commonly used CARIN-criteria as codes. To be assigned a code, the statement should generally (a) be *normative* rather than descriptive, (b) be about whether or not the immigrant should be granted the right to certain welfare services and (c) include some form of justification. Consequently, many statements were excluded from the deductive coding, including merely descriptive statements, normative statements unconnected to migration and statements that lacked any kind of justification. However, we did choose to categorize statements in which participants gave implicit justifications for their stand—for example, by nodding and saying "I totally agree" with a justificatory argument raised by another participant.

The deservingness criteria were operationalized as follows: The *control* criterion categorized statements about the immigrants' imagined control of the situation—such as when stating or implying that someone who deliberately chose to migrate is less deserving than someone who had no other choice. The criterion of *need* categorized statements linked the level of some form of need to the welfare deservingness of migrants. *Reciprocity* included all statements linking the welfare deservingness of the immigrant to a material or immaterial contribution to society in the past, present, or future. *Attitude* was used to code statements linking the behavior and the will of the immigrant to the question of deservingness. Finally, the *identity* criterion categorized statements that ascribed differences between "them" and "us" relevance for the perceived level of deservingness. Several statements referred to more than one deservingness criterion, and in such cases we ascribed the statements more than one code.

A second inductive coding pass coded moral statements that were normative, about migration and provided justification but still did not match the logic of deservingness. We found particularly one such alternative moral logic in all four countries, which we shall call *universalism*. Table 1 shows the distribution of coded statements within each of the four countries as percentages of the total amount of coded statements in the country. It provides some transparency to our coding. However, the significance of the specific percentages should not be overstated: in our quantification of statements, a brief remark stating that a participant agrees about something counts just as much as a monologue in which an informant actively seeks to convince others with well-reflected arguments.

All five criteria were found in the material from all four countries. In particular, many references were made to the reciprocity criterion. Existing research on attitudes to immigration would suggest that the identity criterion should be the dominant criterion, but this is not the case. The relatively sparse use of the identity criterion does not, however, indicate that identity is unimportant. On the contrary, we defined the two alternative moral logics found in the material as, respectively, the total dismissal of the identity criterion and the total embrace of its importance, connecting to our choice of immigrants as an extreme case in terms of the identity criterion. Before exploring these two alternative moral languages further, the following sections dig into the ways in which citizens apply criteria of control, need, attitude, and reciprocity when discussing the welfare deservingness of migrants.

TABLE 1 Quantification of appearances of deservingness criteria

	Need	Control	Reciprocity	Attitude	Identity	Universalism	Rejectionist	Total amount of codes
Norway	12.5	11.7	43.3	8.3	16.7	5.8	1.6	120
Slovenia	24.0	12.0	33.7	10.9	14.1	12.0	4.4	184
Denmark	11.7	5.5	54.7	2.3	6.3	18.0	1.6	128
UK	20.5	20.5	30.5	6.0	5.0	17.0	0.5	194

3 | THE APPLICATION OF CRITERIA OF CONTROL, NEED, RECIPROCITY, AND ATTITUDE

The migrant is by no means an unambiguous character for the participants (see Reeskens & van der Meer, 2018). Presented with the immigrant vignette, participants in all 20 focus groups sought to elaborate on the vignette to specify who the immigrant under discussion *is*. Often, the criteria of *control* and *need* were applied by participants across the four countries to establish two different and very well-known stereotypical images of what the migrant is (e.g., O'Rourke & Sinnott, 2006; Sales, 2002), calling for very different deservingness assessments for "the economic migrant" and "the refugee".

Generally, the economic migrant is implicitly or explicitly defined as a character for whom migration is a choice. Participants applied a range of words emphasizing this. They talked about "the intention" of people coming here, while others mentioned "benefit tourism" as a problem and emphasized how welfare benefits could function as "financial incentives" and generate a "desire" to migrate:

> *People are being sold a dream in other countries, that they are coming over here and they will live in a nice semi-detached house and have a 50-inch TV. They want to have those things. They might be living on top of each other, but for them it is worth it. [British participant, group 2]*

In such statements, migration is clearly connected to will. It is about following a dream, about desiring and wanting to have certain things. Often, this narrative of unforced migration is naturally connected to another narrative, namely that of economic migrants as resourceful people with "savings", "knowledge" and "plans for their future":

> *This is the middle class, they are educated. Two-thirds of them speak English and have a university education. That is to say that they are not exactly poor here, right? [Slovenia participant, group 1]*

In a very similar vein, several statements across the four countries expressed how economic migrants "have knowledge," "thick wallets," "iPhones," or "some savings." They "know why they've come here and where they want to live. They're *prepared*." Thus, when establishing the stereotypical image of the economic migrant, the deservingness criteria of need and control are intertwined and used to create a character, who *is in control* of his or her situation and who *does not need* a lot of public help. As expressed by one participant:

> *[P]eople who are capable of supporting themselves, people who have cash, should receive less from the state than people who don't have anything. [Slovenian participant, group 3]*

This statement is typical and shows how participants applied criteria of control and need to establish a less deserving migrant who is in control (capable) and without needs (has cash). Opposing the economic migrant stereotype is "the refugee." The refugee is most often defined as a person deprived of any form of control, being pushed into the present situation, fleeing from a war zone or something close to it, in contradistinction to other immigrants:

> *There are those fleeing from war-torn countries. Europe is different again because they can get anywhere in Europe. And then those that are just trying to get here for all sorts of other reasons. [Slovenian participant, group 5]*

The refugee is believed to have little control over his or her situation and a correspondingly high level of need:

> *[I]f you flee to Denmark as a refugee and don't have anything, I mean, then I think that of course you should get the same as everyone else. You might even have a greater need for help to get into society. [Danish participant, group 1]*

In all four countries, we find this co-functioning of (a surplus of) need and (a lack of) control, having fled from a war and being deprived of other options:

> *[t]he situation worsens up to a point where you cannot stay there in fear of being killed. Then they come to Norway, and speaking from a humane point of view, even though there is an economical difference between us, I think that they deserve the same benefits that we have. Especially if he can't live in his country any more. [Norwegian participant, group 2]*

Whereas the economic migrant is constructed as being in control and having a low level of need, the refugee, in contrast, is defined as a needy person with a low level of control of the situation. Participants explicitly used comparisons of the two in the dimensions of control and need to create a hierarchy of deservingness. This Slovenian participant, for example, establishes an opposition between two stereotypes based on the need and control criteria:

> *It [how much help they should receive] depends on how they get here. The economic migrants, I mean. My brother, for example, moved to the Netherlands. He had some savings and didn't need immediate help. But the refugees that have come recently, they need things immediately, they need a place to stay, food and medical care. [Slovenian participant, group 2]*

Participants skeptical of immigration tend to emphasize the characteristics of the economic migrant stereotype ("only those who are well-off have the means to get up here") and vice versa: participants with more immigration-friendly views tend to emphasize the characteristics of the refugee stereotype when defining the immigrant ("many are forced to come here"). Rather than tacit moral yardsticks, participants in these instances use deservingness criteria as tools to construct different target groups during discussions, and the criteria of need and control seem to form a hybrid criterion in discussions about migration. Claims that a person has no control of the situation, very often comes with the implicit or explicit claim that the person has a high level of need.

Conversely, claims that a person is in control of a certain situation is often implicitly or explicitly linked to a claim that the person does not have much need (e.g., "The people who are fleeing Syria, they have witnessed things that I have never witnessed in my life, like horrific things, so obviously they are going to need mental health support").

Rethinking the theoretical separation of deservingness criteria, this strong relationship between need and control may suggest that, in the context of welfare, only needs beyond the control of the individual are ever truly deserving.

3.1 | The three forms of reciprocity—monetary, functional, and behavioral

Reciprocity was the criterion most often used across all four countries (see Table 1). This resonates with recent survey studies showing that the issue of giving back to society is pivotal for understanding migrant deservingness (Reeskens & van der Meer, 2018). The reciprocity criterion was derived by van Oorschot from De Swaan's criterion of docility and Cook's criterion of gratefulness and pleasantness (Van Oorschot, 2000, p. 27). They both pointed to a "deeper criterion of reciprocity" in social relationships, where reciprocity may take on an array of different forms, including symbolic forms such as compliance or a smile of thanks (van Oorschot & Roosma, 2015, p. 15).

Despite this broad conceptual definition, reciprocity is mostly operationalized narrowly as exchange by repaying society through labor market participation and tax payments—in the past, present, or future. Thus, Reeskens and van der Meer (2018) use "labour market consistency" and "labour market reintegration strategy" as means to measure reciprocity and Van Oorschot (2000), similarly, uses "pensioners" versus "young people" and "extended work history" versus "short work history" to measure the importance of reciprocity.

Our qualitative material reveals a number of important nuances for the reciprocity criterion. Across the four countries, we found not just one, but three dominant ideas about what it means for the migrant to "give something back to society"—ranging on a continuum from material to immaterial or symbolic contributions. Thus, the migrant can contribute (or fail to contribute) to society through a reciprocal relationship based on *monetary means*, *functionality*, or *behavior*.

First, and unsurprisingly, the migrant can reciprocate through *monetary* means—for example, tax paying—echoing either a buyer-seller relationship, where taxes are a currency used to purchase welfare benefits and services, or a debtor-creditor relationship, where the migrant is granted a state loan that needs to be paid off—interest included.

Either way, the contributions are monetary and are balanced on the border between reciprocity and negotiated exchange. Several Slovenian participants, for example, linked the deservingness of the migrant directly to their contribution to "the Slovenian state treasury." Thus, it was unjust when migrants, "who contributed less to the state budget," were granted certain welfare benefits. Similarly, this British participant reflected upon the deservingness of a migrant:

> A lot of this [how much they deserve] is looking at how much they contributed through tax and to the actual resources they are going to be getting, which obviously you have just arrived in this country you haven't paid any tax yet. [British participant, group 2]

Using this monetary reciprocity criterion, migrant deservingness is determined by the former, present, or expected future tax contribution ascribing importance to "having a job" and being "employable":

> Isn't the intention behind the low benefits precisely to get people onto the labor market, and thereby turn them into tax-paying citizens? [Danish participant, group 5]

One Slovenian group even suggested that migrants looking for work should pay upon arrival, depending on the expected length of the stay. Such "pre-paid taxes" would reduce the state's risk of making bad investments:

> That's not such a stupid idea! To have them pay when they arrive. A foreigner, an immigrant who comes here, should come with knowledge. We will ask: "For how long are you staying? One month will cost €500, two months... So you pay this much and can stay this long." And only then will our country take care of you. That's not such a stupid idea. [Slovenian participant, group 4]

Requiring monetary reciprocation in exchange for welfare deservingness seems to work as an entry-fee incurred for symbolic and monetary debt. Consequently, it is questionable whether this is reciprocity—in which people respond to a positive action by other positive actions—or if it is an implicitly negotiated exchange in which there is a price for access to welfare benefits and services.

Second, the migrant can contribute by being *useful*. In contrast to monetary reciprocity, usefulness is about helping society function—about "doing those things that needs to be done":

> [Without them] no one would clean up after us, or work for us. [Slovenian participant, group 1]

> *It is not the immigrants' fault. They have come here to work. They tried to get local people to do the fruit picking and they wouldn't do it. They have got to have someone to do it. [British participant, group 5]*

In discussions across all four countries, participants emphasized specific things that would never be done if not for the usefulness of migrants. Cleaning in Slovenia, newspaper delivery in Denmark, fruit-picking, "working in the NHS" in the UK and "volunteer work" are suggested means of reciprocating. Usefulness is not always about getting migrants to do work that nobody else wants to do. Other participants point to the "special talents" of some migrants, which enable them to perform tasks that nobody else *can* do:

> *We just don't have the skills and the qualified British people to fill all of the jobs that we have within this country, particularly in areas like technology. We are just so far behind in growing our own talent, we have always imported talent from elsewhere.*

> *I think it is difficult because this country doesn't produce enough of its own talent so we are quite dependent on immigration. [British participants, group 3]*

> *Many immigrants come here with long educations. I mean how many professors haven't been hired by Xx University, or other universities, who are migrants? [Danish participant, group 5]*

The third form of reciprocal currency is what we call *behavioral reciprocity*. Reciprocating through behavior requires that immigrants show the right attitude, making this a strictly immaterial and symbolic criterion. This suggests that there is a blurred line between the reciprocity criterion based on behavior and the attitude deservingness criterion, and numerous statements in our material have indeed been coded as both. In practice, the migrants' attitude is often used to assess and articulate "the degree of reciprocation" (van Oorschot, 2000). Showing good behavior thereby functions as an immaterial means of reciprocating to society, just as monetary means and usefulness does. Attitude, in this regard, is not primarily about being "docile" or "compliant", but about actively paying back to society in the symbolic currency of "respect," "willingness," and "having the right intentions."

Showing good behavior is important in all countries, but is of particular importance in the Slovenian focus groups, where participants often separated "the willing" from the "unwilling" to distinguish the deserving from the undeserving immigrants. A refugee with no savings can still contribute to society by having the right "intentions." Rather than monetary reciprocation, attitude as behavioral mode of reciprocity involves "not just accepting, but respecting our culture" and showing "willingness," wanting to stay in the country and "expressing a desire to get involved in activities." The migrant with the right attitude is "full of energy" and willing to build a new life in Slovenia, in contrast to the "ill-mannered" migrant who is disrespectful towards Slovenian culture and has come "only to waste air" and to "destroy, refuse, criticize or disregard our culture." In all such cases, the right attitude is part of a reciprocal relationship between the migrant and society, increasing the migrant's deservingness.

When applying the criteria of reciprocity to argue for the perceived deservingness of the migrant, participants across the four countries referred to three established reciprocal currencies—that is, three different kinds of contributions the migrant can make or be unable to make: one can contribute—or fail to contribute—through monetary, functional or behavioral reciprocity. The latter of these seems to span the boundary between the reciprocity criterion and the attitude criterion.

4 | ALTERNATIVE MORAL LOGICS

Deservingness theory assumes that citizens evaluate welfare deservingness based on differences between groups or individuals in terms of their level of need, control, or contribution. This presupposes a connection

between individual characteristics and the perceived level of deservingness, where the former determines the latter. However, when discussing migrant deservingness, some citizens turned to alternative moral logics in their assessments and openly opposed the logic behind theories of deservingness.

We found evidence of one such alternative moral logic and traces of another. These alternative logics defy the deservingness logic through a refusal to link deservingness to differences in control, need, identity, attitude, and reciprocity. We label the first a universalist moral logic and the second a moral logic of rejection.

The universalist logic, found in all four countries, rejects deservingness criteria as unimportant—occasionally even unethical—because they rely on human differences instead of unity and equality. The moral language of universalism refuses to recognize the importance of deservingness criteria because *everyone* should receive in equal measure. The moral language of rejection refuses to recognize the importance of deservingness criteria because *no one should receive*. Either way, deservingness criteria are deemed insufficient or irrelevant tools for morally judging the welfare deservingness of migrants. In the following, we provide a brief sketch of the two moral logics and emphasize how they differ from the deservingness logic. Drawing on the logic of universalism, entitlement is ascribed universally to people in need, refusing to differentiate along the dimensions prescribed by logic of the deservingness heuristics such as, for example, by refusing the importance of distinguishing "migrants" from "natives":

> *The same criteria should be in place for all, right, I think. For they aren't anything special, whether they're a woman or a man, or an immigrant or refugee, or if you are just Slovenian or a Martian. Equal conditions for all!* [Slovenian participant, group 1]

The universalist logic denounces the idea of deservingness criteria and emphasizes instead the need for equal treatment of all—regardless of varying degrees of control, need or contributions to society. People, when drawing on such a logic, recognize individual or inter-group differences, but refuse to link these to welfare deservingness:

> *It's not okay to treat people differently, I think. If we have a person, who has come to our country, who we call an immigrant and who doesn't have a job, then they should have the same possibility to receive financial help.* [Danish participant, group 3]

> *But it should of course be free, I think. If we accept people to our country, and they come from different places, I mean I think they should get the same as us, as you also say Xx. They should get the same benefits as a family that's born and raised in this country for generations.* [Danish participant, group 5]

The universalist language is sometimes activated by participants explicitly to criticize policies targeting selected groups of migrants:

> *Well, regarding our conversation about everyone being equal in the face of the law, then I was shocked when this new integration benefit was passed in parliament, where immigrants [...] receive less in social assistance. Because this directly affects the children. I thought it was so shocking that we could treat them so differently here in Denmark.*

> *I agree completely. They should have the same conditions as everyone else who lives in Denmark.*

> [Danish participants, group 1]

In all four countries, participants drew on such universalist logic, valorizing "equality", "equal rights" and "a shared human nature" and thus ironing out the importance of intra-group or intra-individual differences. Occasionally, a moral logic based on distinctions was even explicitly denounced as unethical, as in the following example from the UK:

I think it is just a terrifying level of othering *that is going on where people see immigrants and refugees as different to them. At the moment it is just a bit chilling for me. You are getting more cases of race hate crimes and things like that but it is a slippery slope because that is how it always begins. It always begins with othering the person. It is like they are a different sort of person. "An immigrant is not a British person". That othering is dangerous. [British participant, group 2]*

The moral logic of universalism breaks down the connections between citizenship, nation and social rights entrenched in the identity logic of the deservingness logic. Given the contentious status of immigrants, the moral logic of universalism may be particularly relevant to this group. However, we do see the logic of universalism employed in discussions of other citizen vignettes as well; for example, when participants stated that *all* elderly people should be entitled to certain benefits or when participants refused to rank the different vignettes on scales ranging from the most deserving to the least deserving, despite being explicitly instructed to do so.

We also found traces of a moral logic of rejection, though less prominent in our material than the universalist logic. We found very few examples of it in the groups from Norway, Denmark, and UK and a few more in the Slovenian groups. Participants applying this logic typically spoke of "natural limits" to the number of immigrants the country can handle, because "we" are not able to take everyone in. This logic, like universalism, denounces the connection between individual merit and welfare entitlement, making welfare entitlement a matter of what "we" can afford or what "we" can handle, rather than individual merit. The logic of rejection draws on bureaucratic or logistical concerns, rather than concerns for the deservingness of the individual migrant. Whereas the universalist language functions as a total dismissal of the identity criterion—stating that everyone deserves equally because everyone is made of the same flesh and blood, and identity can therefore never provide an argument for denying entitlement—the rejectionist logic contrarily functions as the total embrace of the identity criterion, stating that no one who does not belong to the community of "us" can have anything.

The logic of rejection could very well have been more prominent had it not been for (a) a potential normative bias in the focus group setup preventing participants from expressing what they might think of as unwelcome politically incorrect reflections, and (b) the fact that some of the groups (cf. the section "Focus groups and vignettes") were imbalanced in terms of the political views of the participants. Still, tracking the rejectionist language under these circumstances indicates that it is worth looking for in future analyses.

5 | CONCLUSION: OPENING THE BLACK BOX OF DESERVINGNESS

This study offers insights into the discursive and evaluative practices of deservingness criteria. The analysis offers three main contributions to the existing literature on deservingness.

First, criteria of deservingness are usually conceptualized as automatized heuristics, mobilized by citizens to evaluate the deservingness of needy groups. Our study suggests that these criteria are more than a passive heuristic, as participants actively use deservingness criteria to construct and elaborate on stereotypical images of the (non)deserving immigrant. Consequently, deservingness criteria function both as tools for constructing images of the (non-)deserving *and* as normative yardsticks, applied by citizens explicitly to back up and justify their judgment. On the basis of this, we argue that deservingness criteria are not detached instruments, but part of a complexity-reducing sense-making process where people construct and classify images of needy groups that allow them to justify a particular judgement about deservingness. This sense-making process is strongly connected to a set of stereotypical images of the needy, which makes deservingness criteria an imagery or vocabulary, rather than a heuristic. This suggests that notions of deservingness are not very stable, because the justification of deservingness depends on the same heuristic as is used to construct an image of the deserving. Deservingness is, consequently, a process of ascription as much as it is a process of evaluation—a fact that is invisible to survey measurements.

Second, our analysis indicates that the relationship between deservingness criteria is more complicated than suggested by the deservingness literature. Some deservingness criteria tend to co-function rather than to work independently. In particular, the criteria of need and control are fused to form an antithetical relation, establishing two stereotypes characterized by, respectively, a surplus of control and a lack of need (the economic migrant) and a surplus of need and lack of control (the refugee). Need and control appear to be mutually and hierarchically defined, so that only needs without control are truly needs. Combined with the constructive nature of the deservingness heuristic, this indicates that an increasing emphasis on personal responsibility in social policy may prevent different types of need from appearing as deserving. Further theorizing deservingness, the hierarchy between the two criteria suggests that need must become subject to deservingness evaluations, but it is the issue of control that determines the level of deservingness. Arguably, control may be pivotal here, because deservingness is a question that arises when individual need becomes a collective problem, which is strongly connected to the issue of control.

The reciprocity criterion comes in three varieties and establishes reciprocity based on either monetary means, functionality, or attitude. Migrant reciprocity is thus only in part linked to monetary contribution, so the narrow focus on labor market participation in the survey literature on deservingness misses other more symbolic forms of reciprocity which are co-constitutive of deservingness perceptions. Our analysis also suggests that the relationship between the attitude and reciprocity criteria is more complex than assumed in much deservingness literature. The attitude of the deserving is not only quiet gratitude but also active demonstrations of willingness and respect. We suggest that attitude, in such instances, functions as a subcategory of the reciprocity expected from deserving migrants. To what degree these different forms of reciprocity may substitute for each other and whether there is a minimum requirement of each form is a question for further research.

Third, our analysis shows that the deservingness logic competes with alternative moral logics in discussions of migrants' entitlements. Evaluating the needy based on individual characteristics is certainly not the only way to argue for the distribution of welfare benefits and services. In particular, we find a prominent universalist moral logic that defies the premise of deservingness logic by stating that everyone is equally deserving. As a result, one may question whether the deservingness concept underestimates the ability and willingness of people to make moral judgements about entitlement and need outside the logic of intra-group or personal differences that characterize the deservingness heuristic. Arguably, the deservingness criteria connect to a bureaucratic problem of making sure that sparse resources are directed according to the best claims for these resources. In contrast, the universalist logic is based solely on the universal moral entitlement associated with human need. In that sense, it is not only a logic that does not differentiate between us and them, but is also a logic that does not recognize the restrictions imposed by political community, nation or welfare state.

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NOTES

[1] Besides discussing the deservingness of migrants, participants discussed the deservingness of an unemployed person, a pensioner, a family with average income, a person in a low-paid job and a comfortably well-off worker.

[2] Numbers are taken from Eurobarometer—Eurobarometer studies 2005–2018, http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Archive/index (data retrieved August 2, 2019).

[3] The focus groups were organized and conducted by the Breaking Blue Research agency in London (UK), by the Aragon Agency in Ljubljana (Slovenia), and by TNS in Oslo (Norway).

[4]Participants in the different groups had the following characteristics. *Middle class*: completed higher education (i.e., 3 years or more); an income level equivalent to 150% of national median wage for a full-time worker over 25; home-ownership for the majority of the participants; maximum two students or unemployed; and variation in their marital status (e.g., married/partner, single parent, parent with primary school children, parent with teenage children, empty nest parents, persons without children, etc.). *Working class*: less than 3 years higher education; the presence of at least four persons in the group without higher education; household income level below the third decile (e.g. under £348 weekly for UK); maximum two students or unemployed; and variation in marital status. *Old age pensioners*: aged 62 to 75 years (with majority age 67+); variation in pension benefit level (with at least two persons on lowest pension level/minimum pension); sufficient hearing as a condition for participation; some participants from single person households (widow, divorced etc.); and some childless participants or with children who live far away. *Young adults*: aged 18 to 35 (with the ideal aim to achieve as even an age distribution as possible); three students; at least three parents; and with some variation in family status. *Women with care responsibilities*: women with children living at home.

[5]When using quotations from the focus groups in our analysis, we state the country of the participant and a group number between 1 and 5. Group 1 refers to women with care responsibility groups, group 2 to the young adult groups, group 3 to middle class groups, group 4 to working class groups and group 5 to elderly groups.

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ORIGINAL ARTICLE

WILEY

Public social science in Norway: Migration research in the public debate

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Abstract

How do Norwegian migration and diversity researchers experience and maneuver participation in public debate? And do their experiences and strategies fit with Michael Burawoy's image of Norwegian social science and with his model of public sociology? In this article, the concept of public sociology is expanded to public social science, encompassing communication of research not just from sociology but social science in general. Semi-structured interviews with 31 Norwegian migration and diversity scholars from 10 academic institutions about their experiences of, and views on, public research communication constitute the empirical material. The article concludes that Burawoy is right about the relatively high participation in public debate among social scientists in Norway. And his ideal-typical distinction between four types of sociology is helpful in analyzing how researchers relate differently to the science-public interface. Yet the results indicate that his perspective on public sociology is overly optimistic and not sufficiently attuned to the normativity already attached to highly politicized issues in public debate.

KEYWORDS

migration studies, normativity, Norway, public sociology, research communication, science studies

1 | INTRODUCTION

Science studies show that western countries have different knowledge cultures which influence how research knowledge and experts are seen and used more generally by politicians, civil servants and the general public (Gieryn, 1999; Jasanoff, 2011; Lamont, 2009). Meta-studies on migration research in Europe (Thränhardt & Bommes, 2010) and comparative studies on the links between academic expertise in migration and integration and policy-making (Boswell, 2009; Entzinger & Scholten, 2013; Jørgensen, 2011) confirm such national differences.

According to Michael Burawoy (2005a, 2005b), Norway is one of the countries where sociology and the social sciences have had the most influence on politics and public debate. Studies of research communication confirm the image of Norway as a country with a relatively strong tradition of social science dissemination to the general public (Andersen & Hornmoen, 2011; Carlsen, Müftüoglu, & Riese, 2014; Kalleberg, 2005, 2013; Kyvik, 2005). One reason for the high occurrence of social research sources in the media is that Norwegian universities and the Research Council of Norway demand that researchers share their research knowledge with wider audiences (Kalleberg, 2013). Another reason is that the social research landscape in Norway is characterized by a large sector of independent research institutes dependent on external funding and on making their expertise visible in the public space. In this general picture of the science-media interface it is clear that certain research fields get more attention and are seen as more contentious in public debate than others. Migration and migration-induced diversity are themes that increasingly split the population and influence voting patterns in Norway, as elsewhere in Europe. Knowledge about how researchers from this contested field relate to the media and audiences can serve as a critical case for a broader discussion about public sociology and the barriers and stakes involved in contemporary research communication.

The two research questions in this article are as follows: How do Norwegian migration and diversity researchers experience and maneuver participation in public debate? And do their experiences and strategies fit with Michael Burawoy's image of Norwegian social science, and with his model of public sociology? The last question relocates a focus on public sociology to a wider group of social sciences. While Burawoy explicitly argues that sociologists, political scientists, and economists study society from different standpoints (civil society, state, and market) (Burawoy, 2005a, pp. 287–290), he does not discuss the standpoints that interdisciplinary research should adopt or the audiences it should cater to. He is quite aware that "disciplinary divides are far stronger in the United States than elsewhere" (2005a, p. 287), and in Europe many sociologists work in interdisciplinary research groups. Such research groups were foundational for the development of Norwegian migration research in the 1990s, where sociology and anthropology worked as "glue" disciplines providing a common orientation for researchers from different disciplinary backgrounds. Norwegian anthropologists in the migration and diversity research field were later, in a manner similar to Burawoy's conception, central to broader international debates about public engagement and policy orientation in their own discipline (Bangstad, 2017; Eriksen, 2006).

Recent Norwegian research on ethnic and religious minority intellectuals, activists, and journalists taking part in public debate shows that they often suffer from negative feedback related to their minority background (Bangstad, 2013; Midtbøen & Steen-Johnsen, 2014). Depending on which theme they discuss, and their gender, religious belonging, and political/ideological position, they may experience threats and ridicule from different parties. These results, along with meta-studies suggesting that migration researchers often are associated with normativity and positive attitudes to migration (Bommes & Morawska, 2005), may imply that migration researchers are easily seen as associates to the minority groups they study and that when entering public debate they may experience similar problems.

The article is structured as follows. Michael Burawoy's perspective on public sociology, and some of the criticisms of it, is followed by a section on methods. In the subsequent empirical sections, analysis focuses on experiences of, and reflections on, how to enter public debate and on how researchers see their role as academics at the science-media interface more generally. A discussion of the findings in the light of Burawoy's perspective follows before the conclusion.

2 | PUBLIC SOCIOLOGY

Since the early 2000s, the debate about the relationship between sociology and its audiences has been discussed according to the pros and cons of "public sociology," a concept launched by Michael Burawoy in his address to the American Sociological Association in 2004 (Burawoy, 2005a). In his plea for reinvigorating the public sociology of the classics, Burawoy argues that sociology students choose the subject because they wish to improve the world, while graduate and PhD programmes lead them away from such moral concerns onto an overriding concern with improving specific programmes in professional sociology. He highlights two questions which all sociologists should ask themselves: Sociology for whom? and Sociology for what? He further distinguishes between two types of knowledge: instrumental versus reflexive. The two questions and types of knowledge lead to a four-tier table where different types of sociology are defined: (1) professional sociology which provides instrumental knowledge for an academic audience; (2) policy sociology which provides instrumental knowledge for an extra-academic audience; (3) critical sociology which provides reflexive knowledge for an academic audience; and (4) public sociology which provides reflexive knowledge for extra-academic audiences.

Burawoy pays attention to two different types of public sociology: (1) traditional public sociology that is associated with the classics and that builds firmly on professional sociology; and (2) organic public sociology where sociologists ally with civil society parties to work with them and provide better knowledge about their situation. Both types of public sociology "bring sociology into a conversation with publics, understood as people who are themselves involved in a conversation" (Burawoy, 2005a, p. 263). Therefore, public sociology entails a double conversation. Examples of traditional public sociology given are W. E. B. Du Bois' *The Souls of Black Folk*, Gunnar Myrdal's *An American Dilemma* and David Riesman's *The Lonely Crowd*. These works, two of which focus on the situation for racial minorities, were read beyond the academy and became vehicles of public discussion about the nature of US society. Burawoy argues that contemporary sociologists writing in the opinion pages of national mass media about matters of public importance are within this same genre of traditional public sociology. But the audience for traditional public sociology is generally invisible, thin, passive, and usually mainstream.

The second type of public sociology, organic public sociology, demands by contrast a close connection with visible, thick, active, local, and often counter-publics. Examples mentioned here are social movements and immigrants' rights groups. For organic public sociology the goal is a process of mutual education and to make the invisible visible to a greater public. For Burawoy, the two public sociology types should be seen as complementary and he argues that public sociology's only normative valence (as sociologists will have different value commitments) is a commitment to dialogue around issues raised in and by sociology. Burawoy (2005b) makes a point of distinguishing between the different roles as public sociologists taken by two of the commentators to his original article. Whereas Etzioni (2005) takes a clear normative position in his public sociology, Vaughan (2005) focuses on dialogue and on bringing sociological concepts and theories to the public in order to facilitate understanding of specific events of great societal relevance.

While many received Burawoy's plea for public sociology with great enthusiasm, several had doubts about the feasibility of the project. One criticism was that Burawoy separated too stringently between the social sciences and their main audiences (Braithwaite, 2005). Other critical comments focused on the difficult situation for contemporary universities and the pressure towards them from governments, the media and other stakeholders. These comments pointed out that Burawoy may be far too optimistic regarding sociology's influence in the wider society, and some authors also warned against mass media's tendency to reduce sociological knowledge to their own genre of journalism. Beck (2005), for instance, describes how his earlier research about uses of sociological knowledge in Germany showed that policy makers and others ordering the research seldom used it. When the research was reported in mass media, however, politicians could pay attention to it and use it to develop policies, a conclusion resembling Boswell's (2009) research about the symbolic uses of migration research among British politicians. Beck argues that it is this indirect effect that sociology can have, and must hope for, in order to be significant for political change. This point is taken up by Burawoy in his reply article to the comments, where he

argues that this is one of the central reasons why sociology must actively look for its own audiences through mass media. As noted, Burawoy seems to be most optimistic when it comes to sociology's influence in Norway and the Scandinavian countries. He points specifically to Norway as a country where sociology is geared towards both the policy world and public sociology and where, for instance, feminism has had a great political impact (Burawoy, 2005a, 2005b).

This debate on public sociology, and its Scandinavian reception (Hviid Jacobsen, 2008), provides a background for analyzing how Norwegian migration and diversity researchers from a broader spectrum of the social sciences practice research communication. Whereas much research communication by Norwegian social scientists is the dissemination of results from applied and professional social science, a significant part also includes more general comments to politics or public debate, for instance through op-ed articles or debate participation—a genre that Burawoy likens to what he calls traditional public sociology.

3 | METHODS

The article is based on content analysis of qualitative data from thematic interviews with Norwegian migration and diversity researchers at different stages of their careers. The pairing of migration and diversity research in this article relates to the fact that most of the research on diversity in Norway focuses on migration-induced diversity patterns, earlier referred to as the IMER research field (international migration and ethnic relations). This differs from the situation in the UK and US, both countries with longstanding colonial and slavery histories and a longer tradition of seeing ethnic, racial, and religious diversity as independent research themes. The interviewees were first phoned and asked if they would contribute to the study and later sent an email describing the purpose of the research and the thematic interview guide. Three of the contacted researchers were not interested in participation, and were replaced by others who wanted to take part. The sample was constructed so as to include researchers with various experiences of research communication. Altogether 31 researchers, who vary in age from their early 30s to their mid-80s, and who work or have worked at 10 different research institutions in Norway (four universities and six independent institutes in different parts of the country), took part in the study. Their disciplinary background covers social anthropology, sociology, political science, economy, social geography, history, and ethnology. Most are sociologists and anthropologists. Of the 31 interviewees 17 are women, 3 have an ethnic minority background, and there is a slight overweight of senior researchers in the sample. Compared with an estimated number of Norwegian migration and diversity researchers which consisted of 120 researchers at the time of interviewing, the sample covers approximately 25% of the total population. The interviews were conducted during the autumn of 2013 and lasted between 1 ½ and 3 hr. All interviews were transcribed.

The thematic interview guide used in the interviews focused on five wide themes: researcher career and choice of research theme; experiences with research communication in mass media (as source, op-ed article author, or debate participant); reactions from discipline and research field colleagues to one's research communication; reactions to one's research communication from other citizens or groups; and opinions on one's role as researcher and societal responsibility. The interviewees were asked to describe concrete practices and experiences, formulated in questions such as "What do you do when journalists call?"

The fact that the interviewer herself was no outsider to the research field influenced the nature of the dialogue. The debate about insider- and outsider-positions in field-work and qualitative interviewing, familiar in fields such as ethnicity and migration research, generally shows that different kinds of knowledge can be obtained by different researcher positions. Interviewing researchers in my own field may have led to the interviewees holding back specific opinions and experiences. The overall experience from interviewing, however, is that knowing the everyday life of research communication in this specific field was important for obtaining quality data and trust from the interviewees. One indicator of the benefit of the insider position in this project was that after the interviews were finished many interviewees said they had not realized they had so much to say about the theme.

The analysis of data is based on the abductive research strategy (Blaikie & Priest, 2019) and has similarities with the method of stepwise-deductive induction (Tjora, 2019). A few theoretical concepts, boundary work, knowledge cultures, and public intellectuals, functioned as orienting concepts, guiding the research from the very start. In the first step of empirical analysis, data-near codes based on close readings of interview transcripts were summarized in 2- to 6-page reports from each interview. In these reports, the informants' own descriptions and terms were central. The next step comprised comparisons of the boundary work practices towards colleagues, journalists, and public pundits with regard to background characteristics such as seniority, work place, and access to national media. Later, such comparisons constituted the basis for more abstract emerging themes such as normativity and I developed ideal-types and concepts in an ongoing dialogue with already existing theories and concepts of relevance. Due to the relatively small population of Norwegian researchers in the field, no information about age, gender, ethnicity, or position is revealed when quoting from the interviews.

4 | ENTERING DEBATES—TROUBLES AND STRATEGIES

In the 1990s and the early 2000s, theoretical and methodological debates among researchers in this field partly resembled broader media debates over migration and diversity. Researchers could characterize each other as "moralist," "advocate for migrants," or "advocate for the state" (Brox, 1991; Figenschou & Beyer, 2014; Gullestad, 2002; Hagelund, 2004). Later, along with the maturing and increasing popularity and size of this research field, internal debate between researchers became less intense. Yet different research-based interpretations about, for instance, criminality among migrant young men, or discrimination against Muslims, are when mediatized, often seen by readers and listeners to represent different explicit political standpoints. This means, for example, that researchers communicating positive research findings about the integration of children of immigrants in the labour market risk being associated with a pro-immigration attitude in the wider public debate. Or it can mean that researchers finding an increasing likelihood for youth of migrant background to be involved in youth gangs, risk being associated with the anti-immigration lobby.

The interviewed researchers describe that they often reflect on whether or not to contribute to ongoing political or social debate that directly or indirectly refers to migration and diversity in national mass media. A debate raised by a frequent pundit in Norwegian migration and integration debate, journalist and writer Jon Hustad, in 2013 may here serve as an example. Hustad wrote an op-ed article called "Not my Minister of Culture" in the largest newspaper in Norway,[1] in which he argued that the present Minister of Culture in the Norwegian government, Hadia Tajik, who is of Pakistani descent, could not represent Norway properly since she denied defining Norwegian culture and did not take seriously the threat immigration posed to it. Many researchers reacted to this op-ed article and mentioned it specifically in the interviews. Some sent comment articles that the newspaper did not print. Others wanted to contribute, but hesitated:

> *Right, how do you manage to enter this debate, how smart will you have to be, how should you angle it in order to get a message out and not just be parked, ridiculed or defined away before you manage to say anything... When it gets that hard, I think no, I don't cope with that. And then there will only be a few taking the responsibility of doing it, on our behalf. Most don't cope. (I30)*

This quote is representative for several researchers and refers to a broader sample of debates seen as polarized and not initiated by researchers in the field. It points to at least three dimensions. First, that the frame for the debate is set by others (public pundits, editors or journalists) making it difficult to change the premises for the debate or to enter new lines of thought. Second, the quote accentuates the need for academic representation in the debate—"who is going to speak on our behalf?"—meaning the researchers with expertise in the field. Third, it draws attention to the barriers against taking part: being parked, ridiculed, or defined away. The quoted researcher goes

on to say that if only more researchers had taken part in the debate, it would have been easier for her to join it. Since debates in this field so often "leave the track," she argues, researchers would perform much better than many others. To her, if more researchers were involved it would be less risky to participate, and also less likely that the debate would lose its factual grounding.

When discussing such debates and the gatekeeper roles of journalists and editors more generally, the interviewees often draw attention to how journalists want researchers to take on specific roles—as expert witnesses of already written arguments or as giving legitimacy to one of two poles in an ongoing debate. Experiences of being asked by print media journalists to confirm or disconfirm specific statements in regard to news articles or commentaries referring to ongoing societal debate make some interviewees reluctant to make public contributions. When researchers identify strong media framings which contrast with their own research findings, many refuse to participate either as sources or debaters. Some argue that instead they prefer to participate in live radio and TV debates as this gives them the opportunity to correct journalists on the spot.

The general tendency in the material is to argue that it is still necessary that researchers participate in debates if they have a general competence on the topic under debate. Several argue that it is their responsibility to nuance and halt the worst tendencies in public debate, or to try to change the premises for debates seen as based on ignorance of the facts in the field. Media-experienced senior researchers tend to argue that they have become more generalist over time and that they do not monitor their public participation as closely as they did when they were younger. Some members of this group see it as one of their primary tasks as researchers to contribute to a differentiated public debate in mass media and other venues for research-based communication such as debate panels or open talks. They use metaphors such as "public debate as ecology" and researchers as "reverse chameleons" to illustrate how they see their roles vis-à-vis audiences and the broader mediascape:

> *I think a bit about public debate as a type of ecology, where it is necessary to fill some niches in order to get a more nuanced entirety. That means maximum nuances in the entirety so that one can see a topic from many sides. And this is an effort to counteract polarization. (I5)*

> *Over the years, a significant part of my competence has become to talk in a polarized field, because I become like the reverse of a chameleon. I have become rather good at sensing and turning the audience as to which side of the ditch they belong. Or in which ditch they stand. I have become rather strategic in this regard, when it comes to talks. (I2)*

This last researcher refers to her broad experience of giving talks to specific or open audiences. She works on a topic that the anti-immigration lobby typically refers to as evidence of the negative consequences of immigration. Her research regularly risks misuse for political purposes.

Deciding to write an op-ed article or to enter an ongoing mass media debate requires different considerations to deciding to give face-to-face talks to open audiences or to take part in face-to-face debate panels designed for a general audience. A typical attitude to participation in mass media debates is that it can be very time consuming. If the topic is "hot" in public debate, one must be prepared to "stay in" the debate and to reply to other debaters. One must also be prepared for normative critique, as "in the political picture everything said or written is controversial—black and white," as one experienced public commentator explains. When participating in panel-debates for general audiences, similar concerns about critique are present. In such settings, one also risks face-to-face confrontation from people attacking what they see as a political opinion and not "real research." Some also remark that the constitution of debate panels may be challenging. One researcher recalls her experience of participating in a panel debate with a think-tank representative who initially presented himself to the audience as an academic from a specific discipline. This researcher's experience was that the think-tank representative had a political agenda, and she argues that she finds it difficult to be a social scientist in such settings: "Their premise is like ... they start from an ideological approach, while I experience that the research I engage with endeavours to

start elsewhere." Her work and public statements have been attacked from opposite political sides, from anti-immigration activists blaming her for being "a brainwashed person who only sees what you want to see," to human rights activists accusing her of taking the wrong side in an ongoing debate.

The analysis so far shows that there is a paradox underlying the researchers' experiences and opinions related to participation in public debate. On the one hand, almost everyone sees this as a duty and an important part of the job. On the other hand, there is an implicit uneasiness because other participants or editors do not grant them sufficient authority as researchers who actually know the facts of the field. This paradox intensifies with the increasing focus on "research impact" and the mass media's growing demand for experts as sources and commentators in recent years. But there is also a more profound dilemma here concerning the roles of academics or experts vis-à-vis their publics. This dilemma is inscribed in broader cultural and political patterns and takes different shapes in different knowledge cultures (Knorr Cetina, 2007). In Norway, Gullestad (2002) has argued that egalitarianism, which is a central characteristic of Norwegian society generally, transforms in everyday life into practices of interaction that stress similarity or sameness. Broadly shared ideals of equality as sameness influence assumptions about how elites, such as researchers, ought to act in public deliberation (Ljunggren, 2015; Skarpenes & Sakslind, 2010). One implication of this is that professional elites should not give the impression they are better placed or more knowledgeable than others when participating in public debate. One interviewee who has broad experience with research communication to international media and audiences puts it this way:

> Norway is an egalitarian society. It is considered negative to belong to the elite. In the public debate you must act as an ordinary citizen. All points of view shall be treated on equal terms, ordinary citizen, politician and researcher, so you cannot perform with authority. (I18)

Norwegian migration and diversity researchers struggle to adapt to a mass media scene where researchers are wanted and urged to sharpen their arguments but not granted authority as superior knowledge bearers compared to others. They acknowledge the ideal of the public sphere as open to everyone. This ideal is, however, interpreted in different ways when it comes to how researchers should perform compared to non-researchers and to what degree researchers should be allowed to be normative in the same manner as other citizens participating in public debate.

5 | RESEARCH COMMUNICATION AND NORMATIVITY

Burawoy (2005a) starts his presidential address by arguing that researchers begin their careers by wanting to influence and change the world, but end it trapped in the academic world and its hierarchies of professional publishing venues. This argument partly reflects a North American perspective. As mentioned above, one major difference between Norway and the US in this respect is that in Norway much research—indeed perhaps most sociological as well as migration and diversity research—takes place in independent research institutes dependent on external funding and on making their presence visible through the mass media.

The question of normativity is central to how the researchers reason about their roles in the public. They share an idea that their role is that of an expert. But they interpret this expert role differently depending on how they view themselves as media figures. The researchers see themselves as inhabiting a continuum where, in Burawoy's terminology, objective professional social science is at one outer-point and organic public social science is at the other. Avoiding normativity altogether constitutes one outer-point of this continuum, while moving towards the other outer-point implies an increasing permission for normativity.

Most of the interviewed researchers argue, for instance, that they would find it difficult to be a member of a political party and simultaneously uphold credibility as researchers in this field. Those who are members of political parties state that they separate their role as an academic expert from that of a party member. Most also adhere

to Max Weber's ideal of value-free research, although they interpret the consequences of this ideal differently when it comes to how they see values informing their choice of topic, their epistemology, and their communication to publics. Some—here typified as exemplifying what I call a "purist" position—regard the status of social science in the public space as dependent on keeping all normative connotations at bay:

> There is a limit for how far we as researchers may go—without compromising our neutrality. For instance, if time after time you come out as the good one, you easily are defined as having a political standpoint. A social critic is something quite different from a researcher—two different roles [...] I seldom speak beyond research results and value neutrality. (I22)

> As a social scientist, one does not believe fully in value neutral research, but one ought to... When thinking of some researchers who use expressions like "we and the challenge from the radical right", where "we" refers to the left and not to researchers, I get provoked. Such expressions undermine the confidence in social research. (I14)

> The "fall mine" [trap] par excellence in the migration field is to identify too much with the objects of study. One can identify too much with power holders and one can identify too much with minorities. One must be careful and keep the analytical gaze. (I4)

These quotes indicate a preference among the "purists" for keeping to the role of the professional social scientist also in public communication, and they include indirect references to how the general audience and potential commissioners of research will react if the ideal of value neutrality is broken. Whereas the quoted researchers above have long experience with empirical research at well-renowned independent research institutes which allow free public participation, others emphasize how institutional directives at their workplace give them no choice but to write in a non-normative way. One researcher argues that his institution (not a university) must uphold a value-free image in the public space, and that this increasingly means that he has to formulate his public writings in the form of a "director meeting decision." According to him, this is problematic, both because mass media do not want such formats, and because researchers should be free to interpret findings in the public space as they see fit. Influencing public opinion means that one has to move into a normative field, as few are interested in reading dry facts written in a descriptive format. Researchers who work in such institutions must follow the ideal of instrumental knowledge directed at extra-academic audiences as a central norm.

Another position, here typified as "pragmatist," is to acknowledge the difference in keeping social science and normativity apart in this field of research communication:

> It is very hard to keep the boundary between research and politics clear and pure. Yes, I try the best I can not to be too political. But it is not possible not to be political either because everything we are involved with is, in a way, political. (I10)

> I believe it is important that society also adjusts to the idea that there are researchers here who have meanings and who have research results and that sometimes there is a mix of these, which also is important. It is right that the researcher shall also herself consider how the results could be used practically. (I18)

In Burawoy's terminology, these two quotes illustrate a position in between the ideal of instrumental knowledge directed to an academic audience (professional sociology) and the ideal of reflexive knowledge directed to an extra-academic audience (public sociology). There are also researchers who see their position in public space as more informed by what Burawoy calls "critical sociology." This group may, for instance, aim to challenge normal science and to provide other premises for research and social debate:

Most have a political engagement in the field in addition to being researchers. One should be open about it. All social research relates to politics. Politicization means that one questions things, opens up for discussion, which is important. (I16)

The "critic," a position illustrated by the quote above, often involves entering public debate with the aim of challenging the premises for political debate. Critics often engage themselves in debates with other researchers whom they may accuse of upholding a positivistic research ideal. The critical researcher may typically question the use of terms such as "refugee crisis" and "illegal migration," or engage in a public discussion about how certain research questions lead to certain results. Critics who adhere to a similar epistemological position as the quoted researcher's typically work in permanent university positions not dependent on external funding.

A final position, perhaps closer to Burawoy's idea of organic public sociology, is less concerned with epistemological critique of premises for debate, and more with influencing and changing the political landscape:

Social science should be an intervention in society. The goal is to influence public opinion, as this is the only way to get politicians to act. (I13)

The quoted researcher prefers to write in newspapers known to have many educated readers. In contrast to those who uphold the ideal of instrumental professional sociology when communicating to the general public, this researcher and others like her—here typified as representative of the "interventionist" position—is not worried about being seen as part of a political space. Such researchers attune to the political landscape, and see the role of social science as providing alternative perspectives to those held by the political parties in power or by most public debaters. In this camp, we typically find senior researchers educated in a period when action research was a common paradigm in social science. Such researchers, some of them managing to influence policy development through their engagement in public debate, are specifically vulnerable to being labelled "activists."

The analysis further indicates that the preferred mode of research communication correlates with broader theoretical and epistemological perspectives, and with images of how the public sphere works or should ideally work. One image of the public sphere—typical for the "purist" and partly for the "pragmatist"—resembles the Habermasian ideal-type (Habermas, 1984, 1991). Here, public debate ideally takes place in an open, deliberative space in which the best argument ought to win. The pragmatist, more so than the purist, sees this public sphere as porous, constituted by overlapping publics and by power relations that influence people's access to, and position in, public debate. A third image resembles Mouffe's theory of the public sphere as an antagonistic space of conflictual perspectives where agreement based on the supposedly best argument per definition is impossible (Mouffe, 2005). "Critics" and "interventionists" tend to have images of the public sphere more resembling this last image. These different images or ideas of how the public sphere works interact with preferred modes of research communication in such a way that certain communication modes and images of the public sphere overlap. The same researcher may occasionally, however—depending on media channel, constitution of debate panel and audience—switch from the purist to the pragmatist mode of research communication or from the pragmatist to the critic mode.

6 | DISCUSSION

The analysis of data confirms that communication of research findings to general audiences and participation in public debate are common practices among Norwegian migration scholars and that they are, in this sense, performers of public social science. Many practice public sociology of the classic kind, of directing themselves to the public as a thin, abstract audience. Fewer perform what Burawoy calls "organic public sociology," where social scientists ally with civil society parties to work with them and enhance knowledge of their situation. In contemporary

Norwegian social research, this is a position associated with action research and with the role of being a microphone for vulnerable groups, a mode of research communication that many, except for some of those communicating in the "critic" and the "interventionist" mode, consider "too normative" and therefore view negatively.

Yet the analysis shows that researchers relate to their role as public social scientists in very different ways, indicating that the performance of public social science tends to vary more than the distinction between ordinary and organic public sociology suggests. My results from research in a politically sensitive field in Norway suggest that Burawoy advocates an overly limited perspective on public sociology, where, for example, dissemination of professional sociology to civic audiences is not included in the definition. The finding that some researchers are strongly committed to the "purist" mode, seeing it as the only valid public expression of scientific expertise and objectivity, is a strong reason for including it in the public sociology genre.

Another factor that may help shed light on preferred communication modes is the distinction between what I, inspired by Clifford Geertz, call "experience-near" and "experience-distant" methodologies. Social scientists who work with specific minority groups or minority-related issues over several years—and who utilize qualitative methods—also acquire knowledge about issues that may harm the image of groups if communicated to the public. They come closer to the central ethical dilemmas in the field compared with researchers working with survey- or register-data. Debates among Norwegian migration scholars in the 1990s typically centered on this aspect—whether or not to reveal knowledge that could contribute to stigmatization of minority groups in public debate. Researchers who were skeptical about revealing such knowledge risked accusations of political correctness and/or activism, whereas others framed themselves, or became framed by the media, as those who dared speak the truth. Such debates between researchers were often transposed to represent explicit political standpoints when displayed in mass media debates about migration and diversity.

Burawoy maintains that his appeal to public sociology has no specific political undertone, as "public sociology's only normative valence (as sociologists will have different value commitments) is a commitment to dialogue around issues raised in and by sociology" (Burawoy, 2005a, p. 265). He accentuates this point by illustrating different roles among public sociologists. Some, like Amitai Etzioni, who works with research in diversity and migration, adopt a clear normative role, while others focus on dialogue and on bringing sociological concepts and theories to the public in order to facilitate understanding of specific events of great societal relevance (Burawoy, 2005b). Burawoy does not, however, go further and ask why it is that Etzioni takes this normative role, or why others do not take it or more easily avoid politicization. In his own distinction between different functional types of sociology—professional, critical, policy, and public sociology—there is an implicit expectation that public sociology is liberating for people in and by itself, and little discussion about political framings and readings of research, or negative consequences for research subjects or researchers.

My study from Norway shows that, according to the researchers, audiences often interpret research-based knowledge in politically sensitive fields in line with their own pre-existing political views. Many researchers fear such politicization because it may threaten their professional status. Some also fear possible consequences for their families after having received hate mail and/or violent threats. To researchers employed in independent research institutes, being labelled by outsiders as an "activist" may in addition pose a threat to new research contracts. Researchers employed in regular university positions are in this sense freer to engage with the public in the various modes of critic, pragmatist, and interventionist—a freedom some view as involving stronger obligations to be normative for university researchers.

Burawoy's argument about self-chosen normative positions further presupposes that researchers have the opportunity to present themselves as they wish in public debate. Social media platforms offer researchers such opportunities, but knowledge about echo chambers and harsh person-related critique may hamper their desire to engage on these sites. Mass media acceptance of op-ed or debate articles, and celebrity researchers' high profile on radio and TV, may be interpreted as further evidence of Burawoy's presupposition of self-chosen normative positioning. Quite typical, however, is that researchers do not get their articles accepted by the newspapers or experience that their message has to fit polarized debates or pre-made journalistic frames. As several

commentators to Burawoy suggest (Beck, 2005; Ericson, 2005; Etzioni, 2005) this illustrates a mediatized public sphere where journalistic and commercial developments seek to package research in specific ways. Another, and more general criticism, is that the idea of a public sphere that Burawoy operates with is premised upon, but does not consider seriously enough, how the public sphere is a culturally and emotionally embedded discourse in which certain themes and concepts evoke underlying stories, images, norms, and emotions (Alexander, 2003; Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006).

Researchers working on controversial fields where public opinion is split and the themes are high on the political agenda face specific challenges of research communication. In the migration and diversity field, competing interpretations of scientific concepts such as immigrant, ethnicity, racism, arranged marriage, multiculturalism, and religion are commonplace, both in the general audience and among political parties. Take a seemingly neutral concept like "immigrant." In public debate this concept implicitly refers to non-white persons, and to minority groups much debated in terms of problems. In public opinion, young Swedes working in Oslo restaurants for 2 years in order to save money for their big international trip are seldom discussed quo their status as immigrants. In migration studies, however, immigrant is a technical term describing people who move across national boundaries with the aim of staying (for a longer or shorter time) in a new country. It does not only characterize non-white newcomers as is the implicit tone in much societal debate, and it is not a normative concept as implied by some activist groups. So when, for example, migration researchers write op-ed articles or give talks arguing that the integration of immigrants in the labor market or in schools is going well or badly, this message is already impregnated with long-term cultural meaning. And, accordingly, different publics will react differently to the message. Such long-term cultural frameworks in fields of vital political disagreement energize pre-packaged interpretations of research dissemination in mass and social media (Stacey, 2004).

7 | CONCLUSION

In this article, I ask how communication of migration and diversity research in a country recognized for communication of social science resonates with Michael Burawoy's perspective on public sociology. The analysis shows that Norwegian migration and diversity researchers are experienced practitioners of research communication to mass media and oral publics, and that they consider this an essential part of their mission as researchers. This confirms Burawoy's broader assumption that Norway is a country where social science plays a vital part in the public debate, something that is also the case for interdisciplinary social science fields like migration and diversity. The article also documents how researchers struggle with research communication in a field of polarized public opinion. Among the barriers to taking part in open panel debates, writing op-ed articles in the printed press, or discussing on social media sites, are risks of verbal abuse, politicization, and fear of the consequences for one's family.

I further show that Norwegian migration and diversity researchers have contrasting opinions on how to perform as social scientists in public debate, and that these opinions relate to broader images of the public sphere and to epistemology. On a continuum suggesting different ideals of public sociology, one outer pole suggests that public sociology resembles the ideals of professional sociology. At the other end of this continuum, public sociology is normative, either by the will of researchers, by the logic of a mediatized space, or both. Although all researchers agree that a public performance qua expert ought to build on solid research experience, different degrees of normativity, as well as the range of what one could speak about qua expert, distinguish different positions. The purist, the pragmatist, the critic, and the interventionist, here represent different ideal-typical positions on research communication.

The analysis shows that researchers confront a dilemma. They want to participate but are afraid that audiences may reduce their expert knowledge to mere opinion on a controversial issue. I interpret this dilemma in the light of broader cultural and historical frames in Norway stressing egalitarianism and equality as sameness, and in the context of the political polarization of the immigration and diversity debate itself.

Michael Burawoy's plea for more public sociology is an important contribution to the discussion of vital and relevant social sciences in these post-truth times. However, he does not pay enough attention to the challenges of such public participation and seems to imply that researchers are free to interpret their role as public sociologists based on their own values and preferences. Polarized debate frames, fake news, click journalism, and digital communication that opens the way for ridicule and expressions of hate are among the obstacles that, in the Norwegian case, hinder such untrammeled engagement on the part of public social scientists.

DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

The data that support the findings of this study are available on request from the corresponding author. The data are not publicly available due to privacy or ethical restrictions.

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NOTE

[1]*Aftenposten*, "Ikkje min kulturminister," January 2, 2013, pp. 4–5.

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ORIGINAL ARTICLE

WILEY

Foundational stigma: Place-based stigma in the age before advanced marginality

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Abstract

This paper joins the debate on the formation of territorial
stigma by uncovering the existence of a form of "founda-
tional stigma" that preceded place-based stigma of the era
of advanced marginality. I show that not only were the traces
of stigma present prior to the era of advanced marginality
but that these early traces facilitate later forms of stigma
by providing the necessary foundations upon which adhe-
sive and detrimental stigma was operationalized. Following
a critical discourse analysis approach, this paper examines
coverage in the British press of Toxteth, Liverpool between
1900 and 1981 as a paradigmatic case study to show that
this primitive stigma existed in three key ways: relating to
inter-community strife, to crime, and to substandard hous-
ing conditions. These traces of stigma laid the foundations
for later forms of stigma based on the presence of the poor,
violent, deviant other that would be operationalized by
dominant voices during the era of advanced marginality.

KEYWORDS
Liverpool, marginality, print media, stigma, territorial stigma, Toxteth

1 | INTRODUCTION

In their 2014 paper, Wacquant, Slater, and Pereira contend that territorial stigma is a new phenomenon. They
place its emergence solidly in the era of advanced marginality, explaining that "spatial taint is a novel and distinc-
tive phenomenon that crystallized at century's end along with the dissolution of the neighborhoods of relegation
emblematic of the Fordist–Keynesian phase of industrial capitalism" (2014, p. 1270). This assertion was challenged

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in 2018 by Tyler and Slater (2018, p. 728), who argue that stigma has a much longer history than previously acknowledged.

It is my contention that place-based stigmatization is not a novel process; it is not unique to the era of advanced marginality. It *is* a feature of advanced marginality, but the era of advanced marginality is not its genesis. Not only can its traces be seen before "century's end," but it is imperative that we see these traces as the foundational elements of place-based stigma in order to understand the persistent attack on the spaces of the marginalized and oppressed.

The term "territorial stigma" has been adopted by academics to refer to stigma attached to certain locations but, in this paper, rather than use "territorial stigma," I use the term "place-based stigma" as a hypernym to refer to the overarching and enduring concept of stigmatizing particular geographies. I use "territorial stigma" to refer to place-based stigma in the era of advanced marginality (i.e., attached temporally to the neoliberal practice of stigmatizing places for particular economic and political ends, often as part of an attack on the welfare state and welfare recipients). I use the term "foundational stigma" to refer to the place-based stigma that occurred *prior* to the era of advanced marginality and which, I argue, was in part a feature of the industrializing city. In this way, "place-based stigma" is both atemporal and superordinate to both the temporal foundational and territorial stigmas. I argue in this paper that foundational stigma was a necessary precursor, the existence of which allowed later territorial stigma to adhere, and to be easily politically and economically activated. This paper explores the idea of foundational stigma and, relatedly, suggests that these terminological differentiations could be useful to highlight the temporal variances in place-based stigma.

This paper first situates the study by providing a brief account of the case study location of Toxteth in the 20th century, before offering a review of the thinking regarding the historical antecedents of territorial stigma, then discussing the methods used in this paper. Next, I give my argumentation for a notion of foundational stigma and discuss how this can help us to understand better the story of place-based stigma, before turning to the case of Toxteth to demonstrate how foundational stigma was operationalized by the press in relation to the area through a focus on inter-community strife, crime, and housing safety. Finally, I conclude with reflections on how this understanding of place-based stigma as a temporal concept can help to better engage with and understand the long and complex story of stigma.

2 | TOXTETH

Toxteth is an area of the city of Liverpool in the north-west of England. Once distinct from the city, it was incorporated into Liverpool in 1895 (Belchem, 2006, p. 515). Toxteth has always had a diverse population and is home to much of Liverpool's black population, many of whose ancestors arrived either as foreign sailors or through the slave trade (Hunt, 2014, p. 391). By 1919, the area was referred to as the "New Harlem of Liverpool," comparing it to the African American area of Harlem in New York City (Belchem, 2007, p. 20). It was referred to in *The Times* in 1967 as a "twilight area" (MacArthur, 1967, p. 3), reflecting its national status as a deprived area with an uncertain future, showing how it had already gained national infamy by the mid-20th century.

By the mid-20th century, Toxteth was a place of "unemployment, thuggish policing and what a later inquiry would call a culture of 'institutional racism' in the police towards Britain's black and minority ethnic urban population" (Hunt, 2014, p. 383). By 1981, the racial discrimination, racial enclosure, and socioeconomic deprivation had become too much to bear and the area erupted in four nights of revolt on the streets (Frost & Phillips, 2011, p. 1). The result of these four nights of violence and the "subsequent six weeks of aftershocks" (Frost & Phillips, 2011, p. 1) was an intense stigmatization of the area in the national press and a government focus on Toxteth as the poster child of British inner city problems (Butler, 2019).

While the stigma towards Toxteth increased with the events of 1981, there were the roots of a stigmatizing narrative already in effect onto which the later stigma adhered (Butler, 2019). In this paper, I focus on earlier

constructs of stigma and I develop an argument that builds on calls from recent literature to see stigma as part of a longer and more nuanced process (Loyd & Bonds, 2018; Tyler & Slater, 2018). Twentieth-century British press coverage of Toxteth serves as a paradigmatic case that shows the precedent traces of place-based stigma that were already present by the era of advanced marginality.

3 | DEBATES: PLACE-BASED STIGMA IN A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Though this study has only referred as far back as the year 1900, it is apparent that place-based stigma was a feature of the "modern city" on both sides of the Atlantic. Maurice Davie (1932, p. 100), in his *Problems of City Life: A Study in Urban Sociology*, explains that "a certain social stigma" attached to the discourse of the "slum" in the early 20th century, which served to give "some people a chance to feel righteous," thereby creating a social and spatial hierarchy and stratification.

Alan Mayne's (1993) study of newspaper representations of slums in the English-speaking world looks back to between 1870 and 1914 and highlights the ways that urban spaces were framed by dominant voices for particular "punitive"—to use Wacquant et al.'s term—purposes. Mayne (1993, p. 10) explains that the discourse of the "modern city" is imbued with notions of "capitalist progress." The related discourse of "city improvement" casts certain areas as resistant to change. In press coverage of the Birmingham Improvement Scheme (1875–1914) that razed slums from the city, "working-class tenants were labelled as dirty, immoral, and unresponsive to housing improvements" (Mayne, 1993, p. 59). Slum residents and slums themselves are pitched in the press as the challenge to modernity; they are painted in language of "social disintegration," to borrow Wacquant et al.'s terminology (2014, p. 1270). The term "slum" "portrayed lower-class life in essentially negative terms—*dis*ease, *dis*tress, *dis*order, *dis*affection—and always from a lofty middle-class point of view" (Mayne, 1993, p. 3), reflecting Bourdieu's (1984) notion of symbolic violence whereby dominance is imposed on marginalized populations. The universal use of the term "slum," "subsumed the innermost working-class districts of every city…into one all-embracing concept of an outcast society" (Mayne, 1993, p. 1).

Though Wacquant et al.'s vision of place-based stigma has generally discounted these earlier forms of spatial smear, casting them as distinct from later "territorial stigma," Wacquant et al. (2014, p. 1270), even while drawing a demarcation, acknowledge that "territorial stigmatization is not a static condition." We need to appreciate the dynamism of place-based stigma and, rather than see a demarcation, see instead a longer story of stigma that has its roots in the capitalist subjugation and disregard for the rights and needs of the urban poor in its quest to make a "modern city."

More recent literature, as well as focusing on the reality of life in a stigmatized geography (see Jensen & Christensen, 2012; McKenzie, 2013; Slater & Anderson, 2012), has joined this call to elucidate the longer story of stigma. Tyler and Slater (2018, p. 728) write that "stigma is not a self-evident phenomenon but like all concepts has a history." Relatedly, Loyd and Bonds (2018, p. 902), in their work on the US zip code 53206, ask "is territorial stigmatization distinctive to the contemporary 'post-industrial' moment?" Here, I suggest that framing the debate around "place-based stigma" would be helpful, and Loyd and Bonds' question can be answered by showing that territorial stigma as one subsection of the overall hypernymic "place-based stigma" is, indeed, a feature of the post-industrial moment. There is, however, another story to be told and that is the longer story of place-based stigma to which Loyd and Bonds allude.

4 | METHODS

The British press was selected as the medium of analysis for this project in order to capture a dominant elite discourse in society that shapes how people perceive the world around them (Herman & Chomsky, 1988; Schemer, 2012;

van Dijk, 1995). Newspapers were selected according to their political leanings and formats to give a full picture of the spectrum of news coverage (Hartmann & Husband, 1974, p. 128) and following an approach and rationale that I detail elsewhere (Butler, 2019). *The Times* and the *Guardian* represent traditionally broadsheet papers that have, since the 1980s, transitioned to comprise some elements of the tabloid press. The *Daily Mirror* and the *Daily Express* embraced tabloidization earlier in 1934 and 1977, respectively (Bingham & Conboy, 2015, pp. 14–19). While the *Daily Express* and *The Times* represent the political right-of-centre, *The Guardian* and the *Daily Mirror* sit left-of-centre. The *Financial Times* is included following Chomsky's proclamation that it "tells the truth" (Kennard, 2013).

A search was conducted on the respective newspaper archives for all mentions of "Toxteth" between January 1, 1900 and January 1, 1981 in order to examine the levels of coverage and stigmatization of Toxteth prior to the sudden peak in coverage in 1981 that coincided with the uprising of that year (see Figure 1). This yielded a final sample of 261 newspapers (9 from the *Daily Express*, 64 from the *The Times*, 22 from the *Daily Mirror*, 166 from *The Guardian*, and 0 from the *Financial Times*). A further two rounds of analysis were conducted following the approach that I have explained elsewhere (Butler, 2019). The first was an intra-textual analysis and saw the assignment of codes from an iteratively developed coding schedule that noted the article's code reference number, title, page number, author name, news type (hard news, entertainment, editorial etc.), code (i.e., in what discourse Toxteth was entered in the article), sub-code, tag words, descriptors, valence (i.e., whether Toxteth was mentioned in a positive or a negative way), quote source (i.e., if the article included a quotation, from whom did it come?), and a summary of the article. The second round of analysis considered the beyond-the-text and connected the intratextual elements to broader discourses. In addition to these 261 newspapers that were thoroughly coded according to a Critical Discourse Analysis tradition, further regional newspapers are drawn on in the analysis for context. The use of a discourse analysis of powerful voices fits with other place-based stigma research, such as that by Gray and Mooney (2011, p. 8), who consider the discourse surrounding the "regeneration" of Glasgow East in preparation for the city's 2014 Commonwealth Games. Analysing the techniques used by mainstream media to negatively brand and stigmatize Glasgow East, their analysis underscores the necessity of examining the role of the media in place-based stigma studies.

FIGURE 1 Coverage of Toxteth in the British media over the 20th century [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

5 | FOUNDATIONAL STIGMA

This paper develops a thesis that traces of stigma can be found prior to the era of advanced marginality and, using Toxteth as a case study, shows that the area was being stigmatized in the years before the uprisings of 1981 but not to the levels it would experience in the post-Fordist era. A key feature of this early stigma is its obliqueness and subtlety. Where later stigma of the era of advanced marginality is direct and overt with reliance on stigmatizing terminology and with the reader being told directly which negative features to associate with Toxteth (Butler, 2019), this earlier stigma is constructed through stigmatizing attributes, indirect and subtle references, and contextual knowledge; I term this early stigma "foundational stigma." My argument is not that Wacquant et al. (2014) were incorrect in noting a difference between "spatial smear of earlier epochs" and later territorial stigma; rather I suggest that creating a division between earlier forms of spatial smear and territorial stigma fails to capture the foundational aspect of this early stigma.

In the same vein, rather than seeing place-based stigma as a unique feature of the age of advanced marginality or of the post-Fordist economy (Wacquant, 2008; Wacquant et al., 2014), I hold that "foundational" stigmatization was the necessary precursor to territorial stigmatization. In order for the stigma of the era of advanced marginality to attain such an adhesive grip, such that "urban hellholes" gain "national eponym" status (Wacquant, 2008, p. 238), a form of stigma had to precede and enable it, much as the capitalist system required a formative transition phase.

Returning to Wacquant et al. (2014, p. 1273), they suppose that "the confluence of urbanization, industrialization, and upper-class fears as well as fantasies about the 'teeming masses' rallying in the city" led to a "spatial smear of earlier epochs" but they argue that this differs from territorial stigma in five ways. Territorial stigma is, they argue, "autonomised, nationalised and democratised, equated with social disintegration, racialised through selective accentuation, and it elicits revulsion often leading to punitive corrective measures" (2014, p. 1270). Here it is beneficial to revisit again the restructuring I suggest that sees "territorial stigma" become a subsection of the overall hypernym of "place-based stigma." This lexical restructuring allows us to avoid creating a stark division between the "spatial smear of earlier epochs" and later forms of territorial stigma. Rather, we can see earlier "smear" as foundational for territorial stigma, and we can structure this as a temporal flow instead of a division. This reframing affirms Wacquant et al.'s assertion that there is a difference in character between stigmas of different eras but, rather than discount this earlier stigma, incorporates it into study of place-based stigma in order to understand its full story.

Where foundational stigma can be seen as low-grade, oblique, and gradual, territorial stigma associated with the era of advanced marginality is often overtly operationalized, weaponized and activated for political and economic ends. This activation is described in Gray and Mooney's (2011) study of Glasgow East, which shows the way that the media structure Glasgow East as a "problem place" which is home to "problem people" who need "civilising." Their work highlights how contemporary place-based stigma is often part of a larger debate about places of "broken society" and "welfare dependency" that gentrification seeks to erase. While these narratives would come to the fore later in Toxteth (Butler, 2019), the foundational stigmatization of Toxteth marks a time where place-based stigma was less overtly operationalized. Separating the later weaponized forms of stigma from the gradual, gnawing stigma of years prior, deprives territorial stigma of its undeniable history. Instead of seeing the advent of territorial stigma as the post-industrialization of society, I suggest that stigma of place can be seen as a feature that began with the industrial "modern" metropolis, as urban land use economies and patterns changed, and areas of the city came to bear particular purposes and demographic characteristics (Kivell, 1993, p. 4).

The following sections serve as an elaboration on the theoretical underpinnings of foundational stigma and demonstrate how the foundations of territorial stigma can be seen in the British press in the early to mid-20th century, highlighting the obliqueness and necessary contextual knowledge upon which foundational stigma relies. This is in direct contrast to the overt and direct stigma that the media activated in relation to Toxteth in 1981 (Butler, 2019).

6 | INTER-COMMUNITY STRIFE

One of the ways that the press stigmatized Toxteth in the decades prior to the uprising was through a focus on inter-community strife, in relation to Catholic-Protestant sectarianism. Coverage of sectarian disputes subtly highlights that the area is a place of otherness and difference with a diverse population struggling to get along.

At the dawn of the 20th century, Liverpool was known as a cosmopolitan city (Belchem, 2005, p. 147) with immigrants arriving from all corners of the world; it had a more varied and diverse population than London in the mid-19th century (Lawton & Pooley, 1974, p. 276). The city was unusual among British cities in its "modern" forms of spatial segregation with different ethnic communities and social classes occupying different areas of the city (Belchem, 2005, p. 151). Though many of the Irish who arrived in Liverpool following the famine of the 1840s settled in the north end of the city in and around Vauxhall, a significant proportion also settled in the south end of the city near Toxteth (Neal, 1988, p. 4). Most of those who arrived on the mainland from Ireland following the famine were Catholic, and the terms "Irish and Catholic were readily synonymous" (Belchem & MacRaild, 2006, p. 326). Toxteth, at the dawn of the 20th century, was a mixed area of Catholics and Protestants and the *Belfast News-letter*, in addition to stating that Liverpool remained loyal to Ulster (suggesting it remained a Protestant city), referenced a large presence of Orangemen in the area (1912, p. 7). The Orange Order, a Unionist Protestant fraternity, has long been connected with working-class Loyalist culture (Walker, 1992) and reference to a high number of Orangemen in Toxteth would not only conjure up images of Protestantism but, more so, of the presence of the working class, thereby stigmatizing Toxteth on class and economic grounds. As later research highlights (see Gray & Mooney, 2011), place-based stigma often has a significant class component, smearing the poor and marginal and the places that they live. Liverpool's Protestant presence was further upheld through its Protestant political party—the Protestant Party led by George Wise—and both Wise and members of the party were frequently arrested for obstruction, often in Toxteth (*The Guardian*, 1904b, p. 12). Wise's aims were initially to reduce ritualism in the Protestant liturgical tradition but eventually the aims of the party became directly anti-Catholic (Coslett, 2009).

In addition to the Protestant presence, however, an article in the *Nottingham Evening Post* (1904, p. 3) mentions the existence of the Catholic Democratic League in Toxteth. There is no literature to be found on the Catholic Democratic League in Liverpool, but it appears to be a political movement based on Christian democracy and Catholic social values (O'Malley, 1903, p. 264).

In the press, the Catholic and Protestant populations of Toxteth were not reported to live in harmony, and, in the first decade of the 20th century, inter-community tensions were portrayed as being high. By 1909, Liverpool was referred to as the "Belfast of England," reflecting the sectarianism in the city (Coslett, 2009). Several years prior, *The Times* (1904, p. 10) reported that:

> A disturbance occurred in Liverpool yesterday morning between members of the George Wise Protestant Crusade and a strong Catholic opposition… When the procession was marching through Toxteth in the direction of St. George's Hall it encountered strong opposition.

A month later, marches and disturbances were continuing and a report in *The Guardian* (1904a, p. 8), explains that:

> Late on Saturday night a Protestant band was attacked in the Toxteth district, where Orangemen are numerous… Seven arrests were made. Last night a Roman Catholic band paraded the district, and the disturbance was renewed and four more arrests were made.

Although not a key part of this study, a pilot study using regional newspapers revealed that sectarianism in Toxteth was widely discussed in local daily papers with the *Shepton Mallet Journal* (1904, p. 7) describing the scenes in Toxteth as "notorious" and the *Daily News* (1904, p. 9) adding that Toxteth is an area where religious disturbances have become prevalent.

The nature of the sectarian conflict in Liverpool may have been linked to religious discrimination in the search for employment. Frank Neal (1988, p. 32), an economist and historian whose work has centered on the role of the Irish in Britain, explains that "in Liverpool the docks and warehouses became the battleground for jobs between Catholic and Orange equivalents of the *Mafiosi*," implying that religious sectarianism spread as far as the realms of employment. With Catholics and Protestants competing for jobs in a sectarian market, and clashing on the streets, Toxteth was portrayed as an area of inter-community strife.

This national press coverage of sectarian strife in Toxteth in the early years of the 20th century signaled that the area was one of disruption and otherness. Sectarian strife hinted at the presence of the Irish, which cast a deeply stigmatizing pall over Toxteth, with the Irish representing a threat of otherness, poverty, and society's "dregs" (Belchem, 2005, 2007). The area was constructed as a place of turmoil, strife, and difference that could not be tamed. Stigma was operationalized at a district level to single out Toxteth as a troubled subsection of Liverpool, and the focus on inter-community strife contributes to foundational stigmatization by painting Toxteth as bearing the attributes of (Irish) otherness, strife, factionalism, and disorder. This foundational stigma provided the under-pinnings for later and more adhesive forms of territorial stigma based on the presence of violent others, such as was operationalized by the press during the uprising of 1981 (Butler, 2019).

7 | CRIME IN TOXTETH

Like inter-community strife, criminality is built into a background picture of an area creating an inseparable connection between place and deviance, resulting in the emergence of foundational stigma. A focus on criminality or the criminalization of an area is recognized to be a stigmatizing attribute (Hancock, 2008). Much of the pre-1981 coverage of Toxteth focuses on diminishing public order and crime-based stories. The argument here is not that stories of these crimes were fabricated by reporters; these crimes likely occurred. Rather, the argument is that a continued focus on crime is deeply stigmatizing (Hancock, 2008) and, when combined with other stigmatizing coverage, continued reporting of crimes in Toxteth—at the expense of more balanced stories—serves to smear the area as bearing core attributes of criminality and deviance, thereby creating a form of foundational stigmatization of the area.

The century opened with stories of domestic murder and attacks. At the dawn of the century, the *Daily Express* (1902, p. 5) reports that a father in "distressed circumstances" shot his daughter and, two years later, the *Daily Mirror* (1904, p. 5) reports that "mutilated and charred beyond hope of identity, the dead body of a newly born child has been found near Toxteth Park, Liverpool." A further story tells of a father killing his six-month-old son by beating him with a belt (*The Times*, 1938, p. 16). These tales of infanticide hint at domestic criminality and deviance in the area.

By the 1950s, however, the crime coverage relating to Toxteth had changed and was no longer considered domestic crime but, rather, violent or random crime. This reflects a wider story of what was happening in terms of crime in Britain. Social, technological, and legal changes affected the reporting of crime:

> An increase in the number of burglaries reported, for example, may partly be due to the relatively recent need to inform the police in order to make an insurance claim, rather than an indication of any real increase in the level of burglary. New inventions, creating new opportunities for misdemeanour, a growth in the value of ordinary people's personal property, and the criminalisation of drug use have had real effects on crime levels during the 20th century. (Thompson et al. 2012, p. 153)

This suggests that the coverage of crime in Toxteth, shifting from fewer domestic crimes to more violent or random crimes, is in line with the changing crime patterns in Britain more generally. That coverage of crimes increased in the press despite the fact that there may not have been a numerical increase in the number of crimes committed, reflects the fact that stories of crime and deviance are newsworthy (Galtung & Ruge, 1965, p. 68).

The early 1950s saw attacks on police in Toxteth being reported in the national press. In August 1950, *The Guardian* (1950, p. 8) reports an attack during which a Toxteth resident hurled "two half-bricks" at a police constable. The article describes Toxteth in the article as "on the fringe of the city's 'Chinatown'," which immediately connotes notions of difference, foreignness, and, crucially, trouble. After a "yellow peril" in Liverpool at the dawn of the 20th century (Belchem & MacRaild, 2006, p. 370), the city's Chinese population was again viewed with suspicion during and after the Second World War. Chinese sailors had been caught in disputes during the war as the pay offered to Chinese seamen serving in the British forces was significantly less than what British seaman were being paid. The Chinese unions fought this point and the Chinese population became noted for being "troublemakers" (Foley, n.d., p. 10). An article in the *South China Morning Post* explains that "at the Public Records Office, in London, there was documentary evidence of a meeting, on October 19, 1945, at the Home Office, at which the government decided to remove the Chinese seamen, referring to them as 'an undesirable element in Liverpool'" (Heaver, 2017). Thus, the syntactic juxtaposition of Toxteth and "Chinatown" serves to mark the residents of Toxteth as being in some way connected to or linked to trouble, foreignness, and "otherness" and further lays the foundations for the enduring and adhesive stigma of the era of advanced marginality.

In November 1953, *The Times* (1953, p. 3) reports that a Toxteth resident, John Field, aged 23, had attempted to murder a policeman, Thomas Booth. In the details of the trial in February the next year, the paper reports that "a man alleged to be Field went up to him with a story of men fighting, and stabbed him in the back as he was leaving a deserted chapel yard, after searching it" (*The Times*, 1954, p. 3). Such attacks on the police painted Toxteth residents as being hostile to authority figures and opposed to legality, which further smears the area.

Crime was not directed solely against the police. In 1966, a pedestrian was found dead, stabbed in the heart in Geraint Street, Toxteth (*The Times*, 1966, p. 10). Reports of murders, shootings, stabbings, aggravated robberies, assaults, and kidnappings continued into the 1970s. In an article exhibiting the tabloid concern for gory details, *Daily Mirror* journalist Frank Corless (1970, p. 28) reports the murder of a "rich widow." The article describes how Marjory Ellis, who had rented out rooms in her house on Falkner Street in Toxteth "was found gagged with a piece of lace curtain and battered about the head in the ransacked bedroom of her home." As well as providing a detailed description of the crime, this article and the details supplied within, describe Toxteth in a particular stigmatizing light. Readers are informed firstly that this is an area where larger houses are being subdivided and sublet and, with subletting historically being associated with poverty (Burnett, 1978, p. 67), the article subtly informs readers of the socioeconomic status of the area.

While the crimes reported in the first part of the 20th century likely occurred, the coverage of them in such intensity is deeply stigmatizing. Persistent reference to the crimes occurring in Toxteth are problematic in two key ways. Firstly, coverage refers back to the pathological Victorian belief in the "criminal class" that sees "concentration and recurrence of crime within groups and across generations" (Hagan & Palloni, 1990, p. 265). Consistent coverage of Toxteth in relation to crime, implies a pathological tendency for Toxteth residents to be engaged in crime and deviance, and paints Toxteth as an area of deviance that threatens national values. It structures Toxteth residents as a subversive deviant class that threatens the fabric of society. Secondly, the focus refers to the media's tendency to "consistently underplay petty, nonviolent and white-collar offenses while they overplay interpersonal, violent, and sexual crimes" (Barak, 1994, p. 11). This highlights that while the media widely and freely report the crimes of the marginalized, it veers away from reporting the ever-present structural violence that creates poverty and destitution. This intense focus on the crimes of the marginalized foundationally stigmatizes Toxteth as a marginal, dangerous, and deviant section of society.

8 | THE STIGMA OF SUBSTANDARD HOUSING

While the stigmatization of Toxteth as an area of inter-community strife and criminality was overt and direct, the final way in which the press stigmatized Toxteth in the early and mid-20th century was through indirect and

contextual references to the substandard nature of housing. This obliqueness is a defining feature of foundational stigma and it relies on assumed temporally relevant context. The oblique references, often masked as tragedies, all hint at the substandard housing in Toxteth in the early 20th century. Moreover, the type of language used, and the inclusion of certain details give clues to readers as to the type of area that Toxteth was, thereby indirectly stigmatizing Toxteth with a smear of poverty and deprivation, suggesting that the stigma of welfare and poverty noted by Gray and Mooney (2011) and Hancock and Mooney (2012) is a feature of all place-based stigma regardless of time period: the poor and marginal, and their homes, are subjected to a critical elite gaze that sees them in need of "civilising" (Gray & Mooney, 2011).

In an article in 1900, *The Guardian* (1900, p. 3) references houses in "the crowded districts of Scotland Road and Toxteth, where recently large demolitions of insanitary and decaying property have taken place" thereby displacing the population. Housing was again foregrounded by *The Guardian* (1956, p. 12) half a century later, when the conditions in Toxteth were singled out among Liverpool housing for being among the worst examples of slum housing in the city. The article tells of a visit to Liverpool by Duncan Sandys, Conservative Minister of Housing and Local Government, to see "the worst slums that Liverpool has to offer." After deeming the "gloomy tenements round [sic] Scotland Road...not bad enough," Sandys was advised to visit "some slum dwellings in the Toxteth Park area." The article reports that Sandys "said that they were even worse than those that he had seen in the morning. In one house of three rooms, the windows of which were stuffed with cardboard, eight people were living." This coverage in *The Guardian* provides a glimpse into what Toxteth was like in the early part of the 20th century from a housing perspective: it was overcrowded with substandard housing, and deprivation. While possibly factually correct, the singling out of Toxteth for bearing these attributes smears the area.

While these examples from *The Guardian* describe overtly the conditions endured by Toxteth's residents, it was more common for the press to describe the horrific manifestations of the deprivation that were occurring in Toxteth with little consideration of the wider and more pressing causes. Press coverage of Toxteth focused on the substandard nature of housing through oblique references to explosions and fires. Stigmatization was present through the language used and through the inclusion of certain details, which serve to indirectly smear Toxteth as an area of deprivation and substandard housing stock without giving readers the full picture of the structural causes of the deprivation.

In 1962, Toxteth resident Joseph Amao of Verulam Street was killed when an oil stove exploded as the "heater [was being carried] between the rooms of the house, which was let out into flats" (*The Guardian*, 1962, p. 1). *The Times* (1962, p. 10) reports that the "explosion was in a terraced house in one of the most densely populated suburbs in the city," thereby informing readers of the overcrowded nature of the area. That the building is reported to be subdivided reflects the housing poverty in the area (Burnett, 1978, p. 67).

In 1963, another exploding paraffin heater caused a death in Toxteth (*The Guardian*, 1963, p. 22). These articles about exploding paraffin heaters are particularly revealing. Not only do the reports situate Toxteth as a place of danger that can lead to personal tragedy, but they tacitly give a clue to readers regarding the type of housing that residents were enduring. Oil stoves or paraffin or kerosene stoves/heaters were commonly used prior to electrification but their use subsided in the early part of the 20th century as electrification and gas-based heating systems became more prevalent; kerosene heaters are now seen most commonly "in the developing countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America" (Lam, Smith, Gauthier, & Bates, 2012). That the houses in Toxteth were still using paraffin in the 1960s highlights the substandard nature of housing that residents endured where homes were not heated or lit sufficiently, combined with *The Guardian* reference to the house being subdivided into flats serves as an example of the press indirectly referring to the housing shortcomings in Toxteth, and highlights the stigma of slum living. Readers would have been aware that electricity, having been nationalized in the 1940s, was fairly widely available in homes and that those homes without electricity were, likely, considered "slums."

In addition to explosions and, continuing with the same theme of urban infrastructural paucity through revisiting the early twentieth century once more, house fires are also reported. Building fires can be seen as a marker of rapidly urbanizing, industrializing, crowded cities. In his work on Glasgow as a Victorian "tinder box city," Shane

Ewen (2006) explains that commercial and domestic risks were inherent in the industrializing city. Densely packed combustible materials in warehouses and equally densely inhabited tenement housing were significant fire risks in the industrial city. Reference to fires, then, hints at the densely packed, industrializing nature of an area.

In 1931, a major house fire claimed the lives of four Toxteth residents. This story was reported in the *Daily Mirror* and *The Guardian*. The *Daily Mirror* report (1931, p. 2) covers two pages, with the story making a front-page splash before being repeated on page 2. The front page features a photograph of the destroyed kitchen along with photographs of some of the victims, reflecting the *Daily Mirror's* role as "an illustrated paper" (Bingham & Conboy, 2015, p. 9) developed by Alfred Harmsworth who, by the 1930s owned *The Times*, the *Daily Mail*, and the *Daily Mirror*. The *Daily Mirror* article includes descriptions of the rescue attempts made by neighbors, including a man who attempted to shin up the drainpipe to reach the bedroom window and another who tried to crawl along a window-ledge to reach the trapped residents. The same story is reported in *The Guardian* (1931, p. 9) with the additional comment that "Herman Bootman, a coloured man" also tried to help in the rescue. While the focus of these articles is negative, and they center on the effects of dangers inherent in living in Toxteth, a level community spirit and camaraderie is evidenced by neighbors risking their lives to attempt the rescue of trapped residents. This coverage raises questions about how foundational stigma was managed by residents. Literature on managing life in a territorially stigmatized location suggests that the stigma may be internalized as a form of devaluing of the self (McKenzie, 2013) or subverted into a form of pride (Jensen & Christensen, 2012; Slater & Anderson, 2012). Quite how residents managed earlier stigma needs to be examined.

While the text of these articles suggests danger associated with life in Toxteth, it is the *Daily Mirror's* (1931, p. 2) use of an image of the destroyed kitchen that is ultimately most stigmatizing. It highlights the poor condition of housing and adds an element of visual stigmatization to coverage of Toxteth. The image shows a kitchen that would have been characteristic of compact working-class kitchens of the era with few electrical commodities (Bock, 2012). Readers would have been aware that the kitchen they were viewing was outmoded and, as such, that Toxteth residents were enduring substandard conditions.

Referring back to Ewen's work (2006), Toxteth's plight was not unusual in terms of its conflagration affliction—Glasgow, too, was badly affected—but it also reminds us that the coverage of Toxteth in relation to domestic fires in multi-occupancy residences heated by paraffin, would passively inform readers of the character of the area as a densely populated, poverty-stricken district of an industrial city. This means that while the stories of fires were grounded in reality, the type of coverage casts a stigmatizing pall over the area, reminding readers of the "character" of Toxteth and its challenges. Of course, the true story here should be the structural changes that led Toxteth and similar areas to experience such tenacious and damaging blazes. Focus could have been on the lack of structurally sound housing available to the urban poor, on the destitution of residents, on the lack of suitable fireproof building materials used in buildings, on urban crowding, and on the need for government-funded housing for the urban poor. This is an example of the press upholding the status quo rather than challenging and drawing attention to the inequitable structures governing society, and points to the media's lack of challenge and refuting of existing power structures.

As with reports of explosions that give clues to readers as to the type of housing stock that comprised Toxteth, some of the reports of fires give away clues as to the type of housing stock available in the area and ultimately serve to mark the area as deprived. An article in *The Guardian* (1965, p. 18) refers to a fire in Devonshire Road, Toxteth. Six residents were taken to hospital and the article explains that "altogether 15 people, including six children, living in single-room flats in the five-storey building were able to get to safety." This implicitly informs the reader that the house is a "subdivided" multi-occupancy residence (a tenement), split into multiple dwellings to house the urban poor, as was common practice in the 19th and 20th centuries (Burnett, 1978, p. 67).

The press coverage of fires and explosions in Toxteth does not merely report on various conflagrations and the often-associated loss of life. Rather, it is apparent that through this coverage the press indirectly stigmatizes Toxteth's housing stock and infrastructure. Choice of language and inclusion of certain details serve to smear

Toxteth from a housing perspective. The press includes details such as a dwelling being multi-occupancy and being overcrowded, signalling to readers the type of property in question, and, indirectly but subtly, stigmatizing the area as home to slums, welfare recipients, or deprivation. References to oil heaters may seem minor but they provide clues that the property is being marked out for its lack of amenities and lack of modernity.

The continuation of tacit housing stigma—first directed at slum conditions, then at the high rises that replaced slums—serves to show that territorial stigmatization has been in existence since prior to the post-Fordist era, contrary to the assertions of Wacquant et al. (2014). Certainly, they are correct that the stigma attains a new depth and volume at the rise of the post-Fordist era when it becomes territorial stigma in the Wacquantian sense, but the traces of territorial stigma based on existing forms of stigma such as poverty, race, and class, predate the era of advanced marginality and, as such, tell us that the history of territorial stigma is longer than we have previously thought.

9 | CONCLUSION

Where the main body of literature from Wacquant on territorial stigma suggests that territorial stigma is decidedly different to previous forms of spatial smear (Wacquant et al., 2014), more recent literature suggests that there is a need to remove the temporal restraints from the conceptualization of territorial stigma and to consider its longer history in order to fully understand its structure (Loyd & Bonds, 2018; Tyler & Slater, 2018): foundational stigma is a way to understand the earlier section of the temporal continuum of place-based stigma.

I see foundational stigmatization as the necessary precursor to territorial stigmatization in the era of advanced marginality. It sets the stage for the pernicious, politically and economically motivated stigma that emerges in the post-Fordist era. It builds up a background stigma that saw, as this paper shows, the reputation of Toxteth being gradually eroded and smeared so that when a major event occurred such as the uprising of 1981, the essence of Toxteth was already tainted. Foundational stigma explained temporally, can be seen as marking the transition zone between the industrial era and the post-industrial era, implying that the story of place-based stigma can be seen as a consequence of the industrializing and modernizing city rather than solely as a feature of the post-industrial society.

I suggest that this theorization of foundational stigma as a precursor to territorial stigma can be useful for understanding the longer history of place-based stigma. This framing sees "place-based stigma" becoming the superordinate term under which the temporally bound "foundational stigma" and "territorial stigma" sit. This classification affirms Wacquant et al.'s (2014) assertion that there is a difference between earlier and later forms of stigma, but it simultaneously sees that they are related. Rather than separate earlier stigma from the story of contemporary stigma, this framing suggests that place-based stigma can be seen as a story or a continuum that begins in the industrial era and endures—changing in type and intensity—into the post-industrial epoch. Crucially, the conceptualization of foundational stigmatization acknowledges that the territorial stigma of the post-Fordist metropolis cannot simply emerge at the dawn of the post-industrial era. Rather, this prominent and pernicious form of stigma is enabled *because of* its origins as a low-level oblique stigmatizing force. Finally, by acknowledging that stigma exists on a temporal continuum, we shall, in future, not miss the warning signs of rising stigmatization against marginalized communities and, instead, actively work to combat it by challenging dominant voices.

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ORIGINAL ARTICLE

WILEY

Materializing architecture for social care: Brick walls and compromises in design for later life

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Abstract

This article reports on an ethnography of architectural projects for later life social care in the UK. Informed by recent debates in material studies and "materialities of care" we offer an analysis of a care home project that is sensitive to architectural materials that are not normally associated with care and well-being. Although the care home design project we focus on in this article was never built, we found that design discussions relating to a curved brick wall and bricks more generally were significant to its architectural "making". The curved wall and the bricks were used by the architects to encode quality and values of care into their design. This was explicit in the design narrative that was core to a successful tender submitted by a consortium comprising architects, developers, contractors, and a care provider to a local authority who commissioned the care home. However, as the project developed, initial consensus for the design features fractured. Using a materialized analysis, we document the tussles generated by the curved wall and the bricks and argue that mundane building materials can be important to, and yet marginalized within, the relations inherent to an "architectural care assemblage." During the design process we saw how decisions about materials are contentious and they act as a catalyst of negotiations that compromise "materialities of care."

1 | INTRODUCTION

This article reports on an ethnography of architectural practice in the UK. The study examined the work of architects who design and develop buildings for social care, with a particular focus on the production of settings for dementia and later life. The aim of the research was to open the "black box" between the initial commissioning of buildings through to their delivery, in order to cast light on what happens during the design and construction stages of development. In addition, we sought to explore if, and if so how, ideas about care can be operationalized into design projects. In this article, we follow a rather prosaic design feature—a curved brick wall—while also examining the proposed brickwork of a building to reveal how, in one architectural project, attempts to encode values of care into a design were negotiated. In our analysis, we bring together literatures from sociological studies of material culture (Ingold, 2013; Shove, Watson, Hand, & Ingram, 2007) and conceptual innovations of "materialities of care" (Buse, Martin, & Nettleton, 2018; Fox, 2016). As a heuristic "materialities of care" makes visible inconspicuous aspects of material culture that are not routinely thought of as salient for care. It prompts exploration of the ways in which taken-for-granted materials infiltrate care practices and encourages analysis of the way material things are embedded into the socio-political making of care settings. Through foregrounding the active role of materials in design work, and so "materializing architecture", we offer a contribution that unpacks the micro politics of "care-full" design (Boys, 2017) by revealing how designs for care are shaped not only by architectural form, but by the messier interplay between the inextricably interlinked processes of an *architectural care assemblage*.

Our data were generated during a UK based Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) funded study called "Buildings in the Making: A Sociological Exploration of Architecture in the Context of Health and Social Care." As the title of the study implies, our focus was on "making": how people and artefacts collaborate in the production of buildings. The project was a response to Ingold's call for more studies of "architecture in the making," which he argues are rare (2013, p. 11). Although there are some sociological studies that examine the day-to-day work of architects (e.g., Imrie & Street, 2011; Sage & Dainty, 2012; Yaneva, 2009), to date there has been little research on the day-to-day practices of architects designing for health and social care. Drawing predominantly on data from one case study nested within our wider ethnography, in this article we aim to demonstrate how a conceptual shift in focus, from architectural buildings as "objects" to architectural buildings comprising "materials" that are continually in the "making", helps us to think differently about architectural practices in the context of design projects for care. We present a case study that reveals how enthusiasm for "a" particular design feature fragments when negotiations inherent to its operationalization become contentious and "messy" (Turnbull, 1993).

We begin by introducing theoretical debates in studies of material culture informed by the writings of Shove et al. (2007) and Ingold (2013), before turning to describe our study methods. Drawing on our empirical data we then analytically reflect on the comings and goings of a "feature" curved brick wall, and the brick work more generally, of a care home design project. Our focus on the curved wall and bricks foregrounds knotty questions of negotiation, tension and compromise. The building we will focus on was never fully realized because of the results of an election which changed the political composition of the local authority that had commissioned the care home. Nonetheless, we will see how materials disrupt architectural design processes even where a building is not constructed.

2 | MATERIALIZING MATERIAL STUDIES

Architects are invariably interested in the pragmatic, aesthetic, and symbolic significance of materials (Böhme, 2013). Contemporary debates have come to focus on "materiality," rather than just materials, so as to explore

the "immaterial" aspects of substance (Hill, 2006). Architectural scholars have explored materiality in terms of its sensory, atmospheric, political, phenomenological, and ecological dimensions (Löschke, 2016). These analyses complement both sociological histories (Cuff, 1992) and critical analyses of the architecture profession (Samuel, 2018). The focus on materiality resonates with recent sociological and anthropological studies that have begun to deconstruct relations between design and construction, creativity and controversy, and materialities and making (for a review see Verkaaik, 2016). To use the language of science and technology studies (STS) researchers, "materiality" foregrounds the agentic potential of materials (Jacobs & Merriman, 2011; Yaneva, 2009, 2012), and seeks to put "materials back into material culture" (Shove et al., 2007, p. 94).

Ingold, like Shove, argues that studies in material culture give an "overwhelming" focus to "objects" while neglecting the "materials" from which they are made (2013, p. 31). Of course, this distinction between objects and materials is fuzzy, but his analytic shift is important.

Ingold argues that "materials do not *exist*, in the manner of objects, as static entities," but "as substances-in-becoming" (2013, p. 13). If we foreground "objects" of material culture (e.g. spoons, pans, or bowls) rather than what they are made of (e.g. wood, metal, or plastic), we underestimate their mutability. We also underestimate how "things" change in relational ways as they negotiate with other artefacts or elements, such as the weather, chemical reactions, or simply day-to-day use. In limiting our attention to objects, "the creativity of the productive processes that bring artefacts themselves into being … gets lost" and is therefore "swallowed up in objects made" (Ingold, 2013, p. 7). Ingold offers the concept of "correspondence" as an analytic for appreciating this relationality of architecture, where every material "becoming" arises through "a maze of trajectories" (2013, p. 31). We argue that turning the lens from objects to materials in this way provides a conceptual way in to explore the significance of architectural practice in the materialized assemblage of care (Buse, Martin, & Nettleton, 2018; Martin, Nettleton, Buse, Prior, & Twigg, 2015).

Shove and her colleagues point to the "potential of a more thoroughly materialised analysis of objects" (2007, p. 98). In their analysis of design practices, they aim to "describe material substances, like wood, aluminium and plastic, rather than discrete objects" (2007, p. 154), in order to produce a nuanced understanding of the translation of design projects in practice. In the context of architecture this means examining building as intrinsic to, rather than separate from, design where both are materialized activities. Ingold again:

> Much can ride, in English, on the indefinite article. Building is an activity; it is what builders do. Add an article, however, and the activity is brought to a close. (Ingold, 2013, p. 47)

Informed by these insights, in the analysis of our empirical data we understood architectural projects as collaborative activities that comprise architects, designers, engineers, investors, builders, *and* materials weaving together more, and sometimes less, harmoniously. This is consistent with Shove et al.'s theorizing, in which design projects involve more than "deliberate human planning and decision making," because they are invariably "materially implicated," "exploratory," "unpredictable," and "surprising," emerging "through and in the course of practical engagement between people and the material properties with and on which they work" (2007, pp. 61–67).

We extend these analyses through our attentiveness to "materialities of care" (Buse, Martin, & Nettleton, 2018) and, in what follows, we move on to examine what Latour (2004) calls "matters of concern" and Puig de la Bellacasa (2011) suggests are also "matters of care." Latour proposes that sociologists should be alive to how things are assembled and stabilize into "matters of fact". Puig de la Bellacasa argues that sociologists should not only look at how actors and actants sustain "facts" but should also explore their capacity to embed care. She writes that "to care signifies: an affective state, a material vital doing, and an ethico-political dimension" (Puig de la Bellacasa, 2011, p. 90). And so, in our focus of building materials, we should be alert to how actors and actants are able to assemble and sustain "matters of care" as well as "matters of concern." Empirical analysis has the potential to reveal how the heterogeneous elements of a design project for care come into being, by shadowing materials as their associated relations, networks, and tensions unfold (Latour, 2005). Architecture in this way is understood as an "assemblage," both metaphorically

and literally (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988). An architectural "care" assemblage (Fox, 2016) that is vigilant to matters of care is integral to the production and delivery of settings for later life. Exploring a design project in this way complements extant research on the architecture of long-term social care and dementia (Buse, Nettleton, Martin, & Twigg, 2017; Nettleton, Buse, & Martin, 2018a; Nord, 2018; Nord & Högström, 2017; Del Nord, 2003; Torrington, 2006), and studies of health and social care architecture that examine how buildings are used, experienced or evaluated (Adams, Theodore, Goldenberg, McLaren, & McKeever, 2010; Gardner & Williams, 2015).

In sum, we are interested in following how materials are implicated in the architectural "making" (Ingold, 2013) of settings for care, tracing compromises made and observing how these alter the shape of buildings at different stages. Although the care home design project we concentrate on in this article was not actually built, materials are invariably implicated in the architectural processes. Early consensus between the various project stakeholders about the merits of the initial design features of the wall and textured brick work fractured and became fractious as the project progressed. In what follows we show in detail how materials are implicated in design and construction, and how different forms of professional knowledge (between architects, developers, construction professionals, care providers, clients, users, and others) become entangled through everyday materials. Bricks and brickwork are not conventionally considered significant for social care, yet here we show how such commonplace materials were deployed by architects to engineer care qualities into their design, so as to enact what Bille et al. refer to as "staging an atmosphere" for "collective affect" (2015, p. 3). But first we offer some notes on our study methods.

3 | STUDY METHODS

This article focuses on data from a single case study of a care home design that was nested in a wider ethnography of architecture for health and social care (2015–2018).[1] The first stage of the study comprised 20 qualitative interviews with 26 architectural professionals (some interviews were with two participants) involved in design for care. Ethnographic research generated further data where the research team worked with nine architectural firms to observe their work in practice. The team then followed three design projects for later life care, each from different architectural firms, longitudinally for between 12 and 18 months. "Target ethnography" (Sage & Dainty, 2012) involved observing key moments including: design review meetings in architectural firms; wider project design team meetings (DTM) and construction site visits (variously attended by architects, care home operators, contractors, engineers, developers, and surveyors, amongst others); and public and user consultations. Working alongside the architects and their collaborators the aim was to generate a materialized thick description (Geertz, 1973) as we trailed the routes of materials through the intricacies of the design project.

The ethnography also involved analysis of documentary sources, such as minutes of meetings, planning documents, design and access statements, drawings, and design guidelines. An additional nine audio-recorded discussions were conducted with architects involved with these projects as they talked though documentary sources and plans, and eight further interviews were undertaken with clients, developers, building contractors, and regulators. Interviews and case studies were numbered to ensure anonymity, and any names of individuals or companies used are pseudonyms. The research was approved by the University of York research ethics committee.

In this paper, we focus on case study three (CS3), a project we followed for 18 months. A specialist dementia care home had been commissioned by a local authority using a "design, build, finance operate" procurement route, and was financed, project-managed and led by a developer (Ellis and Brown). This form of public private finance initiative (PFI) was the most complex model of procurement that we observed (Buse, Nettleton, & Martin, 2018; Nettleton et al., 2018a). The consortium led by Ellis and Brown were successful in their tender to the local authority, and included an architectural firm, a building contractor (ENT Constructions) and a third sector care provider. The architectural team was led by the director of the practice (Brian), who worked alongside a senior partner (Alan), and the project architect (Nick). All were registered architects.

Our data analysis comprised members of the research team reading interview transcripts, fieldnotes, and documents and then discussing them in detail. Interview transcripts and the field notes were uploaded together to the qualitative data software package NVivo, allowing the project researcher to comprehensively apply the coding scheme developed during our extensive discussions. Our analytic approach was consistent with "non-representational ethnography," defined by Vannini as "becoming entangled in relations and objects, rather than studying their structures and symbolic meanings" (2015, p. 320). And so, although we deployed conventional tools of data collection (interviews, observation and so on), we sought to cultivate a "material imagination" (Richardson-Ngwenya, 2014) when reflecting on how bricks and a brick wall had the capacity to effect change and rework the architectural making.

4 | BRICK WALLS AND MATTERS OF CARE

Case study 3 (CS3) was a care home project designed by an architectural firm which, as part of a wider consortium, had won a competitive bid to develop the property for a local authority. The architectural practice has an established portfolio of work in the social care sector and most especially for later life care and for people living with dementia. The design for this care home had been developed in response to a brief that emphasized the importance of embedding dementia-friendly design principles (Dementia Services Development Centre, 2011), while ensuring that it would also be financially viable. The concept design submitted by the consortium presented a two-storey care home with 60 bedrooms, split into smaller wings or "households" to create more domestic scale dwellings. The design featured a community "hub" with a shop, pub, cafe, and hairdressing salon. There was an emphasis throughout the bid documents on materials and design features that would ensure a "domestic" feel.

One architectural feature of the proposed care home was a curved brick wall with distinctive brickwork at the entrance of the building. In the bid, the feature wall was described by the architects as creating an entrance that would be "welcoming" and "homely" and "encourage a sense of belonging." The materials in the documentation are depicted as "brick of two colours" (red and white), in order to create a "residential" façade while "being a high-quality modern design." The value of the feature was reiterated throughout the *Design and Access Statement*:

> *The curved wall by the entrance will present a pattern using the two colour bricks, inviting visitors and staff towards the entrance. ... The laundry wall facing towards the access to the site has been designed in a way that will mark the access of the building inviting people towards the entrance. The radius of the curve is wide enough to avoid "faceting" of the bricks and creating a smooth elegant curve. The pattern will be created using the two types of bricks used throughout the building adding to the dynamic nature of the curve and enhancing the impact of the wall.*

The brick wall was presented as an architecturally significant feature, not just aesthetically—"a smooth elegant curve,"—but also meaningfully, "inviting people" towards the home.

After the award of the tender a series of project DTM were held to develop the details of the design, including the services, structural issues, planning matters, sustainability requirements, and materials. During a DTM where the developers, building contractors, and care home providers discussed the design, Brian said that he "doesn't want the main focal feature of the building to be a utilitarian wall." Pointing to the plans laid out on the table he talked about the value of "exploring the materiality of the wall" and how the brick patterning would "connect to the patterns in the paving" in ways that would "draw people into the entrance" (Fieldnotes, summer 2016). The thinking behind the curvature of the wall, combined with two types of bricks, was to introduce movement—"the dynamic nature of the curve"—so as to off-set what might otherwise communicate an austere, "utilitarian" façade. Brian's comments echoed Kraftl and Adey's (2008) findings where they described how architects used design features "to kindle certain capacities for inhabitation" in order to "intentionally shape the experience of, and emotional response to, a place through the material environment" (2008, p. 225). Our data show how what to

those outwith architecture might consider to be mundane building materials were mobilized to invoke a *domestic* feel, so as to avoid the care home looking like an institution. The architects saw the brick as having the potential to foster an appropriate atmosphere and affect (Bille, Bjerregaard, & Sorensen, 2015), indicative of a phenome-nological architecture (Paterson, 2017). This finding touches on a recurrent theme throughout our wider study where architects told us how important it is that care settings are "domestic" and "homely" in scale so as to avoid any suggestion of the institutionalized care that they associated with a bygone age (Buse et al., 2017; Nettleton et al., 2018a, 2018b).

Shelley, a representative of Ellis and Brown (developers), told us during an interview that the curved brick wall was a design feature that had been appreciated by the client and that this type of architectural detail communi-cated a sensitivity to care, all of which had contributed to the success of the bid. She explained the importance of working with architects who are able to embed care into the design narrative through, for example, "the use of colour," and "having things you can touch that are tactile." Although at times she drew on negative tropes of ageing, such as references to residents "wandering" that would jar with contemporary social commentators (Higgs & Gilleard, 2016), she nevertheless articulated a design narrative that was attentive to materialities of care. For example, during one project DTM she challenged the contractor's assumption that "modern" design and interiors would not be suitable for older people when she said: "you can't assume they want chintz, why should they have chintz and thick curtains" (Fieldnotes, DTM, spring 2016).

We begin to see how materialities of care give rise to tensions. Although there had been agreement about the merits of the wall and the brick work during the tender process, when it came to the construction, the initial enthusiasm of ENT Contractors waned. As Shelley from Ellis and Brown explained:

> *[the builders] are always going to come from the perspective "the architect's drawn something a bit stu-pid" that they don't think is easy to build. They just want a rectangular box often and we have to say, "that's not what's going to win us schemes". (Interview developer representative CS3)*

Curved brick walls are awkward. As Unwin writes in his seminal textbook, "it is not easy to construct curved form from rectangular bricks," but nonetheless he argues such walls are attractive because circular forms can "accommodate the social geometry" and so encourage human interaction (2014, p. 161).

A curved wall featured in another of our case studies (CS7) where we followed a building for extra care (that is housing that allows residents to have independence while having varying levels of supported care in place if needed). In this dwelling, the curved wall had been constructed despite, as the project architect put it, the chal-lenges of the "buildability of curves which for the contractor was a bit of a nightmare." This architect was also pleased that the extra care facility was built from "real stone from the local area," and so spoke to the vernacular suggesting a rootedness to place. She therefore articulated a materialized narrative of care.

> *The windows that in these dormers, they are all clad in real zinc, and the council wanted this triple glazing in VELFAC, which is aluminium so it's not UPVC, and it's got this nice wood finish internally. So all these little things mean that it takes it away from what people associate with affordable, which is really good … Older people who don't have a lot of money shouldn't have to put up with rubbish. (On site walking interview architect CS7)*

For this architect ideologies of egalitarianism were materialized where bricks, stone, aluminium, and wood serve as what Puig de la Bellacasa refers to as "matters of care" (2011). The haptic quality of the building was understood to be integral for its affective capacities and for enabling a respectful environment for future inhabitants.

For architects in CS3 the quality, type, and layout of the bricks were important. At the outset, they envisaged that they would use clay bricks but, as the project progressed, they compromised with the contractor's preference

of cement bricks. Project architect Nick told us towards the end of our fieldwork that they had been "very nervous about the cement bricks because they tend to discolour" but he described how the contractor convinced them otherwise:

> Apparently they've found a way to protect the colouring of the bricks from UV radiation. So yeah, we're getting there, and they also took us to see a care home in [named town] that had these bricks, and they actually look alright, so I'm kind of happy with that. (Interview project architect).

But our data show that this was no easy compromise. Early on in the project we observed how Nick had been keen to get the bricks "signed off" by the wider team. Prior to a project DTM he submitted costings for his preferred bricks to Jeff the building manager (ENT Constructions) and then followed this up in the meeting:

> Nick: *Did you receive my update on the bricks?*

> Jeff: *Yes, white bricks. It was £750 per square metre … which is over twice what we normally look at. Normal brick is £250/£300 for an external wall.*

> Nick: *(starts doing some calculations …): How many bricks per square metre?*

> Jeff: *It is an expensive brick.*
>
> (Fieldnotes design team meeting (DTM) spring 2016)

Jeff closed off the discussion and when he saw Nick scribbling cost calculations he commented that no amount of mathematical gymnastics would make the proposed bricks affordable. We see in these data how we are already beginning to move from an objectified image of the brick façade to the correspondence between the human and non-human participants (Ingold, 2013), offering an example of the relational dynamics of architecture where "things" change in their making. Nick's efforts to use materials as a means to encode a quality of care into the design had prompted concerns. In this humdrum example, the bricks become what Latour calls "matters of concern" (2004); "things" acting as "issues" and provoking tensions. As we go on to see, Nick would have to rethink the bricks, which have become "social" (Yaneva, 2009).

5 | BRICK WORK AND REMAKING ARCHITECTURE

During CS3 we observed design review meetings (DRMs) held in the offices of the architecture practice. We saw how Brian (director of the firm) and Alan (senior associate architect) appraised the progress of the project. Nick (project architect) and Jess (an architectural trainee) displayed printouts of computer aided design (CAD) drawings, plans, and elevations of the care home. The format of the DRM was reminiscent of the tradition of the "crit" that we had observed during our wider project, when we sat in on student assessments in architectural schools (Webster, 2004). There, students presented their plans and elevations to peers, staff, and external practitioners and the feedback process was reminiscent of professional rituals that, as Lipstadt (2003) points out, inculcate an architectural habitus. During the CS3 review, the team discussed a range of options for the layout and shaping of the wall. Nick proposed options for addressing the "problem" that had resulted from the contractor's rejection of his proposed bricks.

Nick said "how to move forward with the building depends on the quality of bricks they are using. One idea is maybe popping out the parapet—three bricks—which could bring a different element to it". Nick gestured to an image of the exterior and the windows which he said, "are looking a bit plain" and "the question is can we do anything else with the brick without making it a lot more expensive? Maybe sinking a brick 25ml or taking a brick out 25ml that could influence the brick bringing additional texture to the way the windows work." He said he "wants to add more texture—something, along those lines" as he gestured to the drawings "without having to go to special brick." He took one of the drawings down from the wall and explained to Brian "the bricks are being taken out 25ml, so here the bricks are poking out 25 ml, and this side the bricks are poking in 25 ml." Brian responded this "is going too far" and they should "keep it simple." Alan suggested that they "leave that sort of detail for the curved front wall." At this Nick questioned "really?" and Alan said "yes it is already enough." (Fieldnotes, DRM, spring 2016)

Again, we see here architecture as correspondence (Ingold, 2013); although the architects do not directly work with bricks they do consider how they "will work." This term "will work" was ubiquitous throughout our data, implying the continual effort, activity, and efficacy of materials. Perhaps they were thinking about the famous architect Louis Kahn, who is reputed to have said that even bricks will want to "be something," urging his profession to engage in dialogue with them (Lesser, 2017). Materials are not presumed to be inert but relentlessly "working" in correspondence with other materials. But, as we have seen, Brian and Alan were not fully convinced by Nick's plans when they suggested that he was "overcomplicating" the building. Perhaps sensitive to the contractor's preference for the workability of a "square" box (as noted in the developer's quotation cited above), Brian commented that "presumably ENT Constructions will have a view about that," implying they will query the cost implications of the proposed non-conventional brick layout.

Later during the DRM Nick asked "Is it really more complex?", to which Brian replied "of course it is." The tenor of this discussion reflects the findings of Sage and Dainty's ethnography of architects where they observed a "curiously submissive power dynamic" infusing professional practice (2012, p. 9). Other artifacts associated with design were also brought to the fore in our data: we saw how play of the materials of construction worked alongside other materials in the architectural office, such as the CAD drawings, pencils, and sketches that have been written about elsewhere (Ewenstein & Whyte, 2007; Henderson, 1999). All actants in the DRM served as intermediaries as the designers reflexively co-constructed proposals. In architectural practice, we saw too how hand drawing as a way of thinking and communicating continued to overlap with newer practices of CAD (Groleau, Demers, Lalancette, & Barros, 2012). Indeed, throughout the meeting Brian annotated and traced over Nick's printed plans, enacting the hierarchical relations of the team.

Brian started redrawing the area on the tracing paper whilst saying, "if you did that the reception can have a window", and "we'd just get back the simple geometry". He said "what I'd like is that the geometry be absolutely rectangular everywhere except for that curved area, so that the curved line has its own big specialness. And it's made more special by it being the only thing that changes, you know what I mean?" Nick agreed and commented: "so you get the kind of calm rhythm of the orthogonal geometry, just life going through the building, and then you get this one snaky beautiful thing". Brian said: "I think it will look better". To which Nick replied "okay", and Brian said, "so that's the curved thing which is lovely, and it's still lovely, it's survived." (Fieldnotes ,DRM, spring 2016)

This again echoes Sage and Dainty's findings where senior architects display "an embodied, or tacit, knowledge, based on decades of enjoyable success of finding a balance between what architecture can do aesthetically, culturally, emotionally, commercially and functionally" (2012, p. 9).

The exchange was hierarchical yet participatory, indicative of what Murphy calls "architectural imagination" where creativity is situated and communal, and designers "must constantly imagine what they are all talking

about" (2004, p. 270). Imagination, he argues, is a "joint activity" facilitated through sharing drawings, plans, and sketches during "continuous meetings." What "emerges in the moment of interaction," Murphy argues, "is a temporarily imagined building" (p. 270), but also a temporally imagined building through each iteration. Each version of the design is a response to challenges or possibilities and will undergo a myriad of further changes in the face of financial constraints, local residents, environmental considerations, building regulations (Latour & Yaneva, 2008) and, for these architects, a sensitivity to the anticipated users of the building.

During the DRM the senior architects discussed other care homes and health care projects where brick walls "have worked." Alan recalled an "even more subtle" example of a health centre:

> *"All we did there was just changed the mortar, changed the joint, from a slightly recessed to a flush and it just makes a huge difference, and it is almost similar to what you are showing here" [as he pointed to Nick's drawing]. Brian suggested Alan digs out an image of it because "Nick needs convincing." Alan said he liked this idea because "we're playing within their rules then aren't we? Because you know they are saying you can only have one brick and you can't do fancy stuff, well all they need to do is, when they lay the bricks, is rake the joint out or trowel it out flush, and it's literally the guy who is laying the bricks that is making the difference, it's nothing else." (Fieldnotes, DRM, spring 2016)*

This exchange was mildly teasing so as to "convince" but not undermine Nick. Moreover, through the reference to the builders' resistance to their "fancy stuff," Alan also played on their collective professional architectural habitus, and their educational and cultural capital (Stevens, 1998), implying that as architects they can appreciate the socio-historical significance of bricks (Campbell, 2003). This relates to other examples of the use of brick in later-life care settings, such as, for example, the iconic brick-built *Guild House* in Pennsylvania, designed by Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown in the early 1960s to accommodate older people on low incomes (Upton, 1998, pp. 244–245).

We see this as a nuanced exchange especially when we consider the architectural precedent of using mortar joints to add texture, quality, and atmosphere in the brick buildings of the Swedish architect Sigurd Lewerentz (Flora, Giardiello, & Postiglione 2013), whose reputation within the profession is highly prized because of the refined use of simple materials to create calm and atmospheric spaces (St John Wilson, 1997). Within standard UK practice, the mortar joint is expected to maintain a consistent standard application by builders, with any deviations reconciled through cutting or adjusting the brick. In Lewerentz's church at Klippan in Sweden, this relation was reversed, with the architect specifying no changes to the brickwork, but all deviation to be resolved through variations to the mortar (McVicar, 2010). Reversing the traditional hierarchy in UK construction between brickwork and mortar work, Lewerentz's church had the additional effects of closer working on site between architect and builder, an increased recognition of the skill brought by construction workers (an issue we return to below) and an invitation to visitors to "look at bricks as if they were a new material" (Caruso, 2008, p. 79).

In our example, the option of varying the mortar joint was believed to offer an effective and low-cost solution to the use of expensive bricks. Alan's suggestion that a solution to the expensive brick could be found in the laying of the bricks and mortar relies on the "work" of bricklayers, which prompts further contingencies. This was illustrated in an account from another architect during an interview in our wider study. He recalled an example where the brick of a care home project had not been laid correctly.

> *"You take bricks from different pallets so it's all mixed up. But the bricklayers didn't do that here, and no one noticed until the scaffolding came down and it's pretty obvious that there's different bands of brick, all slightly different shades. Same brick but because it comes out of the brick kiln at different times it all is slightly different. Look at the building over there, all those bricks are slightly different, but there is darker bricks and lighter bricks all mixed up, so you don't really notice. But you can imagine all these lighter bricks up to a certain height, then all the darker bricks were another height, because they just took them*

from one pallet at a time. ... Two years later it's weathered and it's not as noticeable now, but when that scaffolding came down it was really noticeable." (Scoping interview 8, architect).

We know that brick can be malleable; in this example, we were told how the weather had gradually smoothed over the troubled wall and bricks became inconspicuous. In another of our case studies, the subcontractors "messed up" and the brickwork judged by the site manager to be substandard had to be redone causing delays and additional costs (CS9).

Thus bricks "work" in ways that can be capricious, especially in relation to things such as weather, heat, chemical reactions, mites, plants, and builders (Hill, 2013; Mostafavi & Leatherbarrow, 1993). Working and making are in effect the same (Ingold, 2013); both unpredictable, exploratory and often surprising (Shove et al., 2007). Bricks carry on "working" after they have been laid, as their varying properties (cement, clay or concrete) are mutable and can invoke sensory affect. Indeed, we saw Alan and Nick become quite quixotic when Brian suggested that they do further research to scope types of brick for the project.

> *Alan said that "down in [Named] County they have done it Flemish bond" and added that "because of the way [the bricks] are cooked in the kiln all the long sides are red, and the ends are blue and so you turn the brick round" and "the ends are a different colour but it is the same brick". Nick remarked "that's cool."*
> *(Fieldnotes, DRM, spring 2016)*

Here we see an attachment to materials that have scope to enact care, through a heightened understanding of the salience of materialities for nurturing atmospheres and for adding texture to spaces for affect (Bille et al., 2015). In the DRM, Brian listened to his colleagues' reflections on kilns, the craft of brick making, and the merits of Flemish bond, but then brought them back into line, when he pointed out that they "don't need to have special brick if we follow Alan's suggestion of the pointing, where you are simply setting them in and out by most probably 10 mls." In Brian, we can sense a juggling between the architect's empathetic appreciation of craft and the affective properties of the materials that can encode care through the introduction of texture, set against what is financially acceptable. The team acquiesced but were still cautious about the choice of bricks. Alan pointed out that if they use "red bricks they will have to be clay, I have a thing about concrete red bricks because they fade, they go pink, it's the pigments they use, and we don't want to have a salmon pink building in twenty-five years' time!" But as we saw above, the building contractor managed to persuade them that new material technologies would ensure that concrete bricks would not discolor and so the architects had agreed to forgo their preference for clay.

6 | MATERIALS AND MESSY PRACTICES

While the DRM meetings took place in the architectural office, DTM took place adjacent to the case study site. Builders, developers, electrical engineers, mechanical engineers, care operators, and fire safety officers were amongst those who attended these meetings. Here Nick outlined the plans for the patterning and/or pointing which he proposed as a "no cost solution." ENT Constructions were not convinced.

> Adam *(ENT Constructions): Who did you talk to? It will cost.*
> Shelley *(Ellis and Brown Developer): It adds extra complexity.*
> Adam*: Is it a random pattern?*
> Nick*: It is a line of bricks pulled out 10 ml.*
> Jeff *(ENT Constructions): It will cost more.*
> Nick*: Mentions "plan B" the "pointing of mortar."*
> Jeff*: "Anything that steps away from the ordinary will add cost."*
>
> *(Fieldnotes, DTM, spring 2016)*

"Away from the ordinary" implied a bespoke crafting and attention to detail that rubs up against costs. Adam, a member of the construction team, explained why during a subsequent interview:

> "If you've got a red brick building which is just straight up red brick, no discrepancy or flair in it, and you can stick a graduate on there with a couple of not too experienced bricklayers and they will knock it out no problem. As soon as you start going 'well, actually I want white bricks here and here I'm going to set it out three bricks in from the edge and then it will repeat every four or so', suddenly people have to think about it a little bit more. Although the architects are thinking, well 'that's surely not an extra cost', unfortunately it is. It increases the time amount, because instead of just laying every brick they're having to go and get another white brick and then they're thinking about where it goes and if they put it in the wrong place the architect is going to say that brick needs to move."

> (Interview building contractor CS3)

The additional cost was therefore not only about the materials themselves, but also about the practicalities and contingencies of bricklaying, something the contractor felt was not appreciated by the architect. We see here an exemplar of wider tensions between construction and design, builders and architects, design and buildability (Imrie & Street, 2011).

During this same DTM, and as a result of an intervention from Shelley the developer when she said that they would be "mad not to do something," it was decided that the curved brick wall with patterning would be retained. And so the feature wall survived although, as Nick later told us, the building contractor subsequently reduced the brickwork across other facades as part of a wider set of value engineering (VE) reviews.

> Another VE exercise was us having to flatten a lot of the façades to reduce costs. The transitions between one colour of brick and the other ended up happening on the same plane, and we didn't like that, because it just tends to look cheap. We wanted to do it all around the building, but we weren't allowed to do so, so this was just left on the front, the entrance façades. But the rest, it's going to be flat. Which is a bit unfortunate. (Interview project architect CS3)

Through the reference to brickwork looking "cheap," Nick implied that this undermined the potential to engender a positive sense of value and quality for the anticipated residents of the home. Nick's enthusiasm for particular bricks and for the curved brick wall may also have been tied to professional pride and esteem, as retaining the initial design concept was a marker of his creative skill and architectural inventiveness. Brown, Kornberger, Clegg, and Carter (2010) suggest this is a key feature of the negotiation on identities within architecture firms. However, it seemed to be about more than this. The architects' dedication to the brickwork throughout the project exemplified what Caruso calls acting in architectural "good faith," whereby architects can act critically in the construction process through insisting on upholding qualities of materiality, design, and vernacular sensitivities, in spite of market pressures (2008, pp. 49–53). We have seen from the outset how these architects felt it important to avoid a "utilitarian" feel and instead stage a materialized atmosphere of care (Bille et al., 2015). The curved wall was an architectural manoeuvre to "inject life," "movement," and "calm rhythm," in order to invoke dwelling *with*, rather than merely existing *in*, a place.

We saw evidence of this commitment to care elsewhere on the project when Nick had to compromise on other materials. For instance, Nick's choice of wood window frames for a "warmer homely feel" was replaced with UPVC composite frames, in order to meet the client requirements for a high score on a measure of sustainability as set out in the BREEAM assessment criteria (see https://www.breeam.com/) (Fieldnotes, DTM, spring 2016). In fact, the windows of the residents' rooms were part of a wider tussle. The bay design with a deep sill was intentional because, as Nick explained, it would have created space for residents to "have their own stuff ... bits and pieces that connect to your previous life and to your family." As McCarthy found in her research, bay windows are an integral

element of cultural ideas of the "ideal home" for many in the UK (2018, p. 972). But the bay design was resisted by ENT Constructions who preferred a single rather than three-paned window because it would be quicker and cheaper to construct. Neighbors, too, during a planning consultation, opposed the bay designs, arguing that these would comprise their privacy. But the architects stood their ground, imagining the space to be crucial to the lived experiences of the residents and giving scope for ongoing processes of homemaking.

Our focus on materials and making therefore reveals how the competing priorities of architects and building contractors are entangled throughout the processes of design and construction, supporting Ingold's thesis that the creative work of the building is not purely "concentrated in the process of the design" (2013, p. 47). Imrie and Street (2011) also argue that the separation of architect and builder has been overstated. In his analysis of the construction of Gothic cathedrals, Turnbull (1993) challenges an assumption that these spectacular buildings "must" have been designed, and then designs passed on to obedient builders. Instead, then and now, buildings are better understood as "experimental laboratories" (p. 322), where masons and architects work with plans through a series of "local and 'messy' practices" (Turnbull, 1993, p. 317). Architectural projects for care similarly are not designed then made, but are assembled through the practices of contractors, builders, engineers, care providers, and materials. Within this "architectural care assemblage," where we see a series of challenges and compromises or "messy practices" there is a danger that the values and vision of care inscribed in the initial design plans and statements may be diluted. As we noted in our discussion of Lewerentz's church (McVicar, 2010), it is important that all members of the design and construction team are cognisant of and committed to creating a space for "care."

In another case study (CS6), the contractor joked to us that "we build it then Arthur [the architect] draws it." Of course, designs were in place at early project stages to secure planning approval, prepare costs, contracts, and so on, but there is substance to the joke. Contractors modify instructions in situ. On one occasion, the builders built a wall with bricks that were conveniently to hand, rather than those detailed in the design plans. On seeing this, during a site visit, the contractor and architect agreed that the wall would still "work" and together they would mollify the client. Designs rarely go according to plan, as the site manager on this case study put it:

> "things look fine on a flat piece of paper, but out on the coalface, in the real world, it doesn't always work, so we've got to make it work on the hoof!" (Interview site manager CS6)

The freedom for the contractor to modify the design in situ reflects the fact that in CS6 there were long-standing relationships with high levels of trust between the architect, contractors, and client, who had worked together on many care homes and crucially shared a vision of, and a commitment to, the qualities of care. This was in contrast to CS3, where contractual relations were complex and formal. It also points to the contribution that builders can make to crafting the atmospheres of places. Materializing architecture for care needs the commitment not only to the proposed architectural form, but also to the "detailed crafting of materials and spaces" (Boys, 2017, p. 157).

7 | CONCLUSION

In this paper, we have sought to "materialize architecture" by following the trajectory of a curved brick wall and brick work in a care home design, and we have cast light on the social processes of architectural work as they unfold between the commissioning and construction of a building. We have argued that prosaic materials as well as design details are significant to creating spaces for care. In the case study presented in this article, we saw how at the initial tender stage there was a consensus between the developers, contractors, clients, and designers about the merits of the curved brick wall, and that colored and textured brickwork would engender a welcoming, hospitable feel. However, once the project team came to focus on the making, the initial unanimity began to unravel. The "*architectural care assemblage*" destabilized and sustaining it involved tenacity and creativity. The brick wall and proposed brick work acted as catalysts and created tensions. We saw how a commitment to a "materialities of care" (Buse, Martin, & Nettleton, 2018)

comprising the immaterial qualities of things such as texture, aesthetic, color, atmosphere, and feel fractured, as these qualities became "matters of concern" (Latour, 2004), and also risk becoming marginalized as "matters of care" (Puig de la Bellacasa, 2011). This materialized analysis of design work therefore demonstrates how the agency of mundane materials complicates the construction of spaces for care. The curved wall and the brick work was chosen to encode values of hospitability and affective care, yet they were resisted in the context of anticipated resource constraints.

Attention to materialities illuminates the level of mundane detail at which compromises around care are assembled during design and construction. Territorial disputes between architects and builders about the merits and demerits of particular bricks may evoke underlying ideas about architectural habitus and professional integrity (Stevens, 1998). However, taking a wider view, they also point to the situated contingencies and priorities that all contributors bring with them to the project. The fact that CS3 was never built reflects some of the problems with PFI models of funding in health and social care sectors (Jones, 2018; Pollock, 2005). Our example shows how buildings designed to be sensitive to practices of care in later life may be undermined as design concepts become design concessions within funding envelopes and the use of particular procurement models.

By limiting our focus to the brickwork in this case study, we have understood the architectural feature of the curved brick wall not by imagining it in a completed, definitive state but, rather, by tracing its materiality through the earlier and ongoing struggles between architects and others and, indeed, between fellow architects. In doing so, we have come to a better understanding of the interlocking technologies, regulations, and relations that underscore architecture as a collaborative practice (Kraftl & Adey, 2008). An attention to architecture as a materialized activity, rather than deferring analytically to the designed or eventual articulation of its buildings, opens up the potential of understanding architecture, and its making, as "a process of correspondence" (Ingold, 2013, p. 7) and, in this case, its contribution to building new spaces of care. Brick work enabled us to recognize the flux by which our built environment comes into being (Shove et al., 2007) and, moreover, hold onto a sense of its becoming (Gieryn, 2002). Doing so prompts an understanding that, as well as an art of creating space, architecture is a profoundly temporal practice, with the meaning of its artefacts never stable, but always mutable and dynamic. Through materializing architecture, we contribute to an understanding that leads us to know architecture as involving more than just architects and designers, but a host of other human and nonhuman contributors—and to recognize that all have a pivotal role in an *"architectural care assemblage"* over the fullness of time.

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NOTE

[1] For further details of the study see the Buildings in the Making project website: http://buildingsinthemaking.org.uk/about/

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ORIGINAL ARTICLE

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Sibling violence: Understanding experiences, impacts, and the need for nuanced responses

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Abstract

Sibling violence is an under-researched field, and the impact of adolescent family violence (AFV) in particular on siblings is not yet well understood. The Australian study *Investigating Adolescent Family Violence in Victoria* elicited responses from siblings who had experienced AFV from their brothers or sisters, as well as reflections from parents and practitioners on the difficulties of addressing AFV directed towards siblings. This article explores characteristics of sibling violence identified in this study, impacts of the violence on siblings, parents, and families, and responses to sibling violence in Victoria, Australia. Siblings described experiencing severe physical, psychological, and emotional violence, and beyond this recounted a range of difficulties such as not being believed by the adults in their lives; the violence being dismissed as normal sibling behavior; an inability to access support services without the help of parents or other adults; sadness and distress at the loss of the sibling relationship; and resentment towards parents for their perceived inaction against the violence. Practitioners highlighted the dearth of services and resources available for siblings affected by AFV, and the inadequacies of current Child Protection responses. This research sheds light on the hidden issue of sibling violence and highlights the need for nuanced responses rather than a one-size-fits-all approach.

KEYWORDS
adolescent family violence, Child Protection, family violence, intergenerational violence, sibling violence

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1 | INTRODUCTION

Family violence presents in myriad forms and configurations, but one of the most underexplored of these is sibling violence. Eriksen and Jensen (2009, p. 184) note that few studies "have directly addressed the extent, dynamics, correlates, or effects of sibling violence". In this article we seek to contribute to research and understandings of sibling violence by exploring the experiences of siblings affected by violence, the impacts of this violence, and barriers to accessing help and services. We focus particularly on the experiences of siblings affected by adolescent family violence (AFV) carried out by brothers or sisters, though some sibling participants noted violence continuing into adulthood. Insights from parents and service providers are also drawn upon in this article. Siblings are some of the most hidden affected family members of this already hidden form of family violence.

Within Victoria specifically and Australia more broadly, the term "family violence" has been adopted as preferred terminology to "domestic abuse" or "domestic violence". The terminology of family violence reflects and brings to the fore the familial structure within which such violence takes place. Family violence as a term is therefore helpful for uncovering the issue of sibling violence. Edwards, Ribbens, McCarthy, and Gillies (2012, p. 732) argue the need for sociology to retain a focus on the concept of "family", which, they argue, "allows sociologists to capture important aspects of people's connected lived experiences, and to engage directly in political debates about contemporary family policies and their consequences".

AFV can be defined as "violence by a child or young person used against a parent, carer or sibling that takes place 'within a wider backdrop of family violence' (Holt, 2012, p. 294)" (Fitz-Gibbon, Elliott, & Maher, 2018). We consider sibling violence as violence carried out against a person by her or his brother or sister. As the excerpts from participants throughout this article highlight, sibling violence can include forms of violence such as physical, emotional, sexual, psychological, and economic abuse. Phillips and Grupp (2009) argue that common discourses coding violent behavior from siblings as "normal sibling conflict or rivalry" invisibilize sibling violence, obscuring the experiences of those siblings who have been victimized and hindering interventions into this form of violence. For this reason, and because participants in this research were asked to define AFV themselves, we utilize a broad definition of sibling violence in order to capture a wide range of sibling experiences of violence. There is much debate over the definition of "adolescence", with the Victorian *Royal Commission into Family Violence* (2016) noting that different agencies in Victoria define adolescence as being anywhere from zero to 25 years old.

As Eriksen and Jensen (2009) point out, much research on sibling violence focuses on young children, leaving unexplored sibling violence in adolescence and adulthood. The study *Investigating Adolescent Family Violence in Victoria* elicited qualitative survey responses from 23 siblings aged 16 or older in Australia who had experienced violence from their brothers or sisters. These siblings reflected on violence they had experienced or were experiencing during adolescence, though for some the violence extended beyond the period of adolescence. The voices of the sibling participants drive this article and our analysis, bringing important understandings and awareness to this underexplored issue. Excerpts from siblings are supplemented with survey responses from parents who witnessed AFV carried out by one of their children against his or her brothers and sisters, and interviews and focus groups conducted with 45 service providers and experts in the Victorian family violence and legal sectors. We begin by reviewing previous research on sibling violence before considering the survey participants' experiences of sibling violence, the impacts of this violence, and responses to sibling violence in Australia. The siblings' survey responses highlight that this form of violence needs to be identified and addressed, and that nuanced responses are required.

2 | SIBLING VIOLENCE: AN UNDER-RESEARCHED ISSUE

Sibling violence has been noted as a highly prevalent form of family violence, and one of the least researched (Eriksen & Jensen, 2009; Kettrey & Emery, 2006; Relva, Fernandes, & Mota, 2013). Much work on sibling violence draws on quantitative studies stemming from the United States, with research by Straus, Gelles, and Steinmetz

(1980) first drawing attention to the issue in the United States in 1980 (see more recently Caffaro, 2014[1998]). Wiehle's (1997) qualitative research with 150 survivors of sibling violence, also in the United States, identified severe psychosocial problems ongoing into adulthood for affected siblings.

Hoffman and Edwards (2004) argue that while the focus of much research on sibling violence has been on physical violence, psychological and emotional abuse must also be considered as prevalent and severe aspects of sibling violence. They draw on feminist theory, social learning theory, and conflict theory to devise a theoretical model for investigating and understanding sibling violence. This model leads them to suggest that:

> cultural norms, structural arrangements in families and society, divergent interests among siblings, and parents' tolerance of sibling violence all create a social environment that fosters the likelihood that engaging in abusive behavior will be reinforced, successful, and rarely negatively sanctioned. (Hoffman & Edwards, 2004, p. 197)

Hoffman and Edwards (2004) outline the inability of siblings to simply leave violent situations in the home during childhood and adolescence. Eriksen and Jensen (2009), again in the context of the United States, review research on the impacts and effects of sibling violence, including trauma, effects on relational ties, anxiety, eating disorders, and problematic drug and alcohol use (see also Kettrey & Emery, 2006). Dantchev and Wolke (2019) find in the United Kingdom that children who carry out sibling bullying "are more likely to show antisocial behavior in early adulthood".

Phillips and Grupp (2009) draw on Foucauldian and Butlerian understandings of discourse and power to consider the ways sibling violence is silenced in the United States and portrayed as benign, or as normal sibling behavior or rivalry. This silencing, they argue, minimizes and normalizes sibling violence, serving to hide its impact and limit the ability of those affected to identify and speak out against it (Phillips & Grupp, 2009; see also Khan & Rogers, 2015; Wiehe, 1997[1990]). In the United States, Kettrey and Emery (2006) found that those who experienced sibling violence could not recognize the behavior(s) as violence, while Caffaro (2014[1998]) highlights the importance of de-normalizing sibling violence in schools and in families. Khan and Rogers (2015, p. 451), exploring perceptions of sibling violence in the English context, suggest that childhood experiences of sibling violence could lead to "a normalization of physical [sibling violence] that is symptomatic of a cyclical relationship between child abuse and acceptance of interpersonal violence within later (e.g., adult) intimate relationships".

Caffaro and Conn-Caffaro (2005) focus more specifically on sibling incest, citing evidence that estimates it occurs three to five times as often as father-daughter incest. They note the difficulties that arise from "the lack of universally acceptable criteria for distinguishing abusive sexual contact from normal sexual exploratory behavior" (p. 609), but "question the concept of sexual contact between siblings as a mutually consensual experience" (p. 618). Like AFV more broadly, sibling incest is minimzed and overlooked, with shame and guilt perpetuating silence around the issue (Caffaro & Conn-Caffaro, 2005).

In Australia, the Victorian *Royal Commission into Family Violence* (RCFV 2016, vol. 4, pp. 150–152) described AFV as a "distinct form of family violence", noting that it occurs in all communities and geographic areas of the state and accounts for approximately one in ten family violence incidents reported to Victoria Police. Looking specifically at sibling violence, the Royal Commission highlighted several of the data limitations that presently hinder an accurate understanding of the phenomenon. Specifically, the Commission noted that while data from the Children's Court specifies that in 9% of cases over a one-year period (2013–2014) the affected family member was the sibling of the respondent, Victoria Police data does not distinguish between "siblings" and "other family members" in records of police attendance at a family violence incident. This makes it difficult to estimate how many incidents of sibling violence are being attended and reported to police in Victoria.

Beyond the work of the RCFV, Walker and Woerner's (2018) report on "adolescent sibling violence" in Victoria analysed violence against siblings in cases where a criminal offence was recorded. Though this form of counting is likely to underestimate the extent of the issue, they found sibling violence increased significantly over the past five years in Victoria. Walker and Woerner found that around three-quarters of those committing sibling violence

were male, with an average age of 14.7 years old; 59% of siblings identified as affected by violence were female, with the average age of those affected 11.9 years; 46.2% of cases involved a brother offending against his sister, 34% a brother against his brother, 13.9% a sister against her sister, and 6% of cases involved a sister offending against her brother. The report adds that 30% of those carrying out sibling violence "were recorded as a victim of a family incident in the five years prior" (Walker & Woerner, 2018, p. 2). Eriksen and Jensen (2009, pp. 202–203) similarly highlight the gendered character of sibling violence, finding that "[o]verall, boys are significantly more likely than girls to engage in sibling violence" (see also Kiselica & Morrill-Richards, 2007; Krienert & Walsh, 2011; Relva, Fernandes, & Mota, 2013).

Thus, sibling violence can in some ways be seen to share similarities with family violence more broadly, including in terms of its gendered character, experiences of shame and stigma, the forms of violence experienced, and victims' reluctance to report. However, throughout this article we demonstrate why sibling violence requires consideration in its own right. We highlight some of the challenges and complexities of sibling violence that distinguish it from other forms of violence, leading to the necessity for nuanced understandings and tailored responses.

3 | INVESTIGATING ADOLESCENT FAMILY VIOLENCE IN VICTORIA: STUDY METHODS

The study *Investigating Adolescent Family Violence in Victoria* sought to understand experiences of AFV and gain insights from practitioners and experts into the issue and current responses in Victoria. The study adopted a multi-methods approach, combining focus groups and in-depth interviews with a range of experts, family violence and youth service providers, legal practitioners, general practitioners (GPs) and health service providers, and an online, open, anonymous survey that sought to capture the voices of those who have experienced or carried out AFV. Specifically, in-depth interviews were conducted with seven GPs and seven experts on AFV in Victoria working in the fields of child and youth health, well-being, and support, particularly in relation to family violence. Six focus groups were conducted with a total of 24 service providers and justice professionals, as well as one focus group with seven health service providers. The project therefore canvassed the knowledge of 45 experts, service providers, legal practitioners, GPs, and health service providers with experience in the field of AFV. These participants were recruited through the researchers' networks as well as through Twitter and a monthly email digest collated by members of the project team.

The online survey was made available through the survey development software Qualtrics to capture voices of those over the age of 16 who had either experienced or carried out AFV, or both. The survey included closed questions to capture demographic data, and open-ended questions about the context in which the AFV occurred, the services involved (if any), and what forms of reporting took place (if any). The survey was distributed through Twitter and the monthly email digest, and by asking service providers and experts to pass information about it on to their clients. A total of 138 responses were received, 18 of which were excluded from the sample as blank (*n* = 14) or because the participant did not have any experience of AFV (*n* = 4). This left a sample size of 120 survey responses. Pseudonyms have been used for all participants throughout this article to ensure anonymity, and the appropriate ethics approval was sought and granted. An additional ethical consideration for this research was the use of an online survey, rather than interviews, for those who had experienced AFV. The survey ensured free and voluntary participation and enabled those who had experienced AFV to anonymously share as much or as little of their stories as they liked. While the survey was targeted at persons affected by AFV or adolescents who use violence, no responses were received from adolescents who had used violence in a family setting. The study's analysis was thus confined to the experiences of those affected by AFV. In this article, we focus primarily on the data gathered from the 23 survey responses received from siblings affected by AFV, with added reflections on sibling violence from the service providers and experts, as well as from parent survey participants who reflected on their experiences witnessing and managing sibling violence.

Though some research suggests sibling experiences of AFV are less gendered (Holt, 2016; Howard, 2015), 22 of the 23 affected siblings who responded to our survey identified as female. Participants could choose from a set of age ranges in the survey. From these ranges, one participant indicated they were aged 16–19; two were aged 20–25; seven were aged 26–30; four were aged 31–35; two were aged 36–40; five were aged 41–50; one was aged 51–60; and one was aged 61–70. For country of origin, 16 of the sibling participants indicated Australia; three indicated Australia with another background; two indicated other "Western" countries; one stated they were born in another "Western" country but raised in Australia; and one did not specify a country of origin. The one male sibling participant reported experiencing sibling violence from his older siblings, but did not specify the gender of these siblings. Of the women participants, nine experienced sibling violence from an older brother; six from a younger brother; three from a brother of an unspecified age; two from an older sister; one from a sister of an unspecified age; and one had witnessed violence between her brother and father. Sibling violence in our study therefore presented in gendered ways, with those affected mostly women, and those carrying out the violence mostly referred to as brothers.

This pattern of violence carried out by older siblings was observed by service providers and experts interviewed for this research, who found that adolescents who use violence in the home typically do so against persons who are either younger and/or physically weaker than them. As one expert relayed:

> [The behavior is] often putting down or bullying often their mother, or it might be as well a younger sibling or siblings ... the criminality of the behavior isn't something that comes up, except where the behavior is sexual in nature and is targeted at siblings usually, although sometimes a female parent. ... In my experience ... it's overwhelmingly adolescent male violence towards female parent, overwhelmingly, and sometimes also younger siblings. (Expert interview)

4 | PRESENTATIONS OF SIBLING VIOLENCE

By drawing directly on the voices of the 23 individuals who participated in our research and recounted their experiences of sibling violence, a key aim of this article is to provide insight into the largely undocumented phenomenon of sibling abuse. In order to do so, the following two sections examine experiences of violence in adolescence, the prevalence of recursive and intergenerational violence, and the impacts of sibling violence, including experiences of family relationship breakdown and conflict.

4.1 | Experiences of violence in adolescence

The siblings in our research were both directly and indirectly affected by violence carried out by their brothers or sisters. The violence included physical, psychological, emotional, financial, and sexual violence and abuse. Service providers too reflected on the severity of violence directed towards siblings they had encountered in their professional work. The following excerpts highlight some of this violence:

> My sister became increasingly violent following the separation of my parents when she was ten and I was six. She was verbally and emotionally abusive (towards the whole family), and this escalated to physical and sexual violence (against me only) by the time she was 14 to 15 ... The abuse is characterized by secrecy (usually only occurring in the home) and threats of harm if I told anybody or got help. (Emily, sister)

> My younger brother … acted violently towards our mother and me … I would get involved and try to stand between my mother and brother and de-escalate the situation, but not very well. (Sarah, sister)

Sisters in our research were targeted by their brothers through sexual violence in several instances, with verbal abuse from brothers often including a focus on bodies and weight. Tessa, for example, recounted that her brother "told me I was ugly and a bush pig. No one can imagine the ongoing and permanent psychological impact being told that every day of your life as a child, teen and young adult. That you are fat, disgusting, and worthless." Kristy's brother was physically violent towards her, but would also engage in a range of other abusive behaviors:

> My older brother terrorized me when we were young. He was physically violent … and he would also, for example, break into the toilet while I was in there. … I also remember if I was having a private conversation with my mum, about my period for example, he would often come in and demand information. (Kristy, sister)

Another sister, Chelsea, described escalating violence from her brother over the years, including destroying her property, obscenities scratched into her car, and attempted rape:

> Childhood violence by my younger brother escalated when he was 13. Bites, scratches and punches escalated into nipple cripples and groin punches. Black eyes [caused me to miss] major events because my mother forbade me to bring shame on the family. Speaking about it was forbidden on the grounds of "family loyalty". Other incidents involved [the destruction of personal property]. [Obscenities were] scratched into … my car. Friends did not visit due to the violence, which became increasingly sexual. Attempted rape. Killed my pet. (Chelsea, sister)

While not directly identified by name by participants in our research, sexual violence extending to incest must also be recognized as a form of sibling violence (on incestuous abuse see further Middleton, 2012).

Shame surrounding sibling violence is mentioned by Chelsea in the above excerpt, as it was by Nicole who stated "my family were 'comfortable'—private schools—very much 'street angels/home devils', don't talk about it, it was a shame you didn't share." Emily too shared that:

> I begged my mother to call the police on many occasions (including one incident where my sister was holding a knife to my throat), however, she was very scared and also committed to "keeping up appearances" in our middle-class suburb. She was also fearful of my sister getting a criminal record and this hindering her employment prospects down the track.

Similarly, Tammy wrote:

> We did not access any support services. As a middle/upper-middle class family with children in private schools it wasn't something that was discussed.

These experiences of shame match findings surrounding the prevalence of feelings of shame and stigma in families affected by AFV more broadly (Fitz-Gibbon et al., 2018; Holt, 2016; Howard, 2015). The Royal Commission (RCFV 2016, chapter 23, p. 150) concluded that stigma and shame associated with AFV was "most devastating" and that it "arises from unfair assumptions about the victim's ability to be a good parent … Shame is exacerbated by lack of community awareness about this form of violence. All these factors create enormous barriers to seeking help."

4.2 | Recursive and intergenerational violence

Daly and Wade (2016) suggest that in cases of AFV, the adolescent carrying out the violence may also be or have been a victim of family violence perpetrated by an older male in the family (see also Hoffman & Edwards, 2004 on intergenerational violence). In our study, service providers reflected that some of the young people they had been working with who were carrying out AFV had been, or continued to be, victims of violence themselves. One practitioner told us "currently I have a 13-year-old male [in my service] who's come from quite a traumatic history with his mum, and now is in his dad's care … he's violent at home towards his siblings, because it's all he knows." Another spoke of the issue of some young people not wanting to leave the family home as they see themselves as protectors for their mother or younger siblings:

> Some young people don't want to leave [the family home], especially if there's continued violence, because they see themselves as a protective factor for mum. So if they leave, what does that then mean for mum or the younger siblings? So they just choose not to leave, to keep everyone safe. (Service Provider)

Alisha (sister) spoke of the difficulty of the issue of protecting siblings when she stated "[my brother] did not like that I held him accountable for his actions or tried to protect my younger siblings from him."

Another sibling participant, Anna, described how her and another sibling would attempt to protect their mother from their violent sister, stating "my older sister beat and berated both me and my younger sister for all of our adolescence and into our 20s. … Mum copped a lot of emotional abuse from [her] as well, so we tried to protect mum and deal with it ourselves." One service provider drew out some of the complexities of AFV by identifying the positive role siblings could play in a violent young person's life and pathway to change, noting:

> In terms of siblings, that can be a great motivator for a young person to engage [with services] … So, identifying that their younger siblings are having these terrible experiences because of their use of violence can be a motivating factor for young people as well. … "Would it be alright if I was talking to your younger sibling in ten years' time about the same things as you're talking to me about with your dad?" … And then they'll say "No, it's not okay".

The use of a sibling in this way requires some caution and a delicate balance to be struck between trying to best address the needs of the adolescent using violence and ensuring the safety and well-being of siblings in the home. These observations and experiences from service providers and siblings point to some of the complexities of family violence, highlighting that it can involve multiple generations and family members carrying out the violence as well as multiple victims, and shining a light on the complex dynamics and webs of familial relationships.

5 | IMPACTS

The impacts of sibling violence were described by siblings and by parents throughout our study as severe. Siblings in this research detailed ongoing and serious impacts of violence on their lives, including their ability to work, maintain adequate mental health and sustain intimate and familial relationships. The following responses focus on some of these impacts as they were experienced by participants:

> It has taken me years to realize and work through the full impact of my brother's actions towards me. I developed anorexia and then bulimia. My issues around food and body image persist to this day and have impacted on my social skills and my relationships. I suffer from severe depression …

I remain depressed. My work suffers. I don't trust people and easily cut friends out of my life for perceived slights. I am so sad all the time. (Tessa, sister)

It made me never want to visit home. It made the times spent at home, visiting, which should have been happy times, filled with tension and threats of violence. (Bianca, sister)

I feel overwhelmingly guilty for not trying hard enough to fix things. (Hannah, sister)

One impact focused on by several of the participants was the breakdown of family relationships as a result of sibling violence. Some participants described moving out of home early in order to escape their violent sibling, and some emotionally recounted the breakdown of the former relationship with their sibling. One mother highlighted both these issues, relaying the impacts of sibling violence and the breakdown of relationships:

Our daughter … suffers from anxiety and panic attacks and moved out of home because she could no longer live with the brother she was once very close to. (Carole, mother)

Chelsea revealed she "left home at 18 and have spent most of my life avoiding this brother", while Frances described moving out of the family home as soon as she turned 18, acquiring her driver's license and beginning an apprenticeship. Hannah, on the other hand, explained how she "delayed moving out of home for years, because I felt I needed to protect my mum and younger brother from [the older sibling]." Regardless of whether they remained physically present in the home, several siblings described the subsequent breakdown of familial relationships. Anastasia and Alisha poignantly described this:

I do not love [my brother] anymore. I loved the eight-year-old who was my best friend in the entire world and was closer than a twin to me, but that person is gone. He wishes I loved him, mum wishes I loved him, but I can't. (Anastasia, sister)

My mum claimed that she was terrified [the violent brother] would kill himself, asked me on more than one occasion what I did to provoke him, and eventually encouraged me to leave home … I am now estranged from my mum and most of my siblings, including my brother. (Alisha, sister)

The siblings in our research at times felt a sense of frustration or blame towards their mothers, who they saw as failing to keep them safe from their violent siblings during their adolescence. The following quotes illustrate some of the feelings of blame experienced by sibling survey participants:

My parents, especially my mother, would make excuses for my brother's behavior, apologize for him, say things like "It's just the way he is", or chastise me when I became angry or otherwise intolerant of his behavior. They would make concessions for him and his behavior and hold me to a higher standard. They would never stick up for me when my brother would start arguments. (Bianca, sister)

I began by excusing my parents and loving them. … In recent years it has hit me how much they failed me, especially as I see my brother hasn't changed and continues to live a good life, while I have fought so hard just to survive the impact of his abuse. (Tessa, sister)

I was always in the second seat, despite being a really good kid and ending up at uni. It was always about him. My mum is particularly biased towards looking after him, even now. (Jordan, sister)

Some mothers who responded to the survey, however, described another perspective to this, highlighting the dilemma they faced: ensuring the safety and care of both the affected sibling(s) and their child who was using violence. A sense of guilt and responsibility for not being able to keep other members of their family safe permeated responses, as the quotes from the following two mothers illustrate:

> Sadly, our middle child was the recipient of the violence and has significant trauma, anxiety and depression issues. As parents, we could not keep him safe, and as a mother I feel devastated for his suffering. (Katrina, mother)

> In hindsight, I should have taken my friend's advice and removed [the violent adolescent] from the family home, because the cost has been great for other family members. I did investigate housing services. … We were scared of contacting police as we didn't want to be a DHS [Department of Health and Human Services] case. On one occasion our son smashed his brother's head into a stone wall. Instead of taking him to outpatients, I kept him home and watched for concussion symptoms. I greatly regret this decision, but also know why regarding the reasons as above. A terrible dilemma. We wanted to involve police at times but couldn't because of effects and ramifications for the whole family. (Katrina, mother)

As these quotes demonstrate, the impacts to families of sibling violence were felt by all members of the family, parents and siblings included, and extended beyond those directly targeted by the violence to those who witnessed this form of abuse. Family members involved highlighted the impacts as difficult and distressing within and beyond childhood and adolescence.

6 | RESPONDING TO SIBLING VIOLENCE IN THE CONTEXT OF AFV

The Royal Commission (2016, chapter 23, p. 149) noted of AFV that there is currently "no systemic response to the needs of these young people and their families." Our research supports this conclusion, revealing a dearth of responses and resources available for addressing sibling violence specifically and AFV more broadly (on the latter, see Fitz-Gibbon et al., 2018). While a small number of programs for AFV were being run in Victoria at the time of our research,[1] service providers interviewed noted a lack of capacity, funding, and time, alongside the difficulty of working with both the adolescent carrying out the violence and the affected sibling(s). Two service providers explained:

> I don't have the capacity to do case management because we don't have that level of resourcing, and quite often I have a strong alliance with the young person [using violence] in terms of their journey of change. And that makes it actually quite complex to be working with younger siblings who are at risk and to be considering their needs. Not to say that I can't do both those things, but I think that there is a bit of a gap from my point of view in terms of how it is that case management occurs, and how it is that you work therapeutically around a young person's violence in the home. (Service Provider)

> We focus mainly on violence towards the carer. We obviously work and try and address violence for the siblings as well, but one of our requirements is violence towards their current carer. (Focus Group Participant)

Similar gaps in service responses have been identified elsewhere. Caffaro (2014[1998]), for example, suggests in the context of the United States that training for service providers and professionals around sibling violence is

required. Our research supports this recommendation in our identification of the need to ensure there are responses available for and tailored towards both the adolescent using violence and any siblings within the home affected by that violence. At present, critical gaps in the response in Victoria to this form of violence leaves both parties inadequately supported.

6.1 | Adults as gatekeepers to accessing help

Beyond the violence they experienced, siblings recounted difficulties such as not being believed by the adults in their lives, or the violence being dismissed by parents as "normal sibling behavior". During adolescence or childhood, siblings in our research were unable to access assistance without the help of parents or other adults. They often viewed this as curtailing their options for safety from the violence and seeking assistance. As Phillips and Grupp (2009, p. E12) note, a "child's description and appeal for help may not even be heard because of the relative powerlessness of his or her embodied voice within the context of society that does not recognize children as legitimate stakeholders due to age and place in the family."

Jordan's story makes apparent some of the difficulties of not being believed, and of adults acting as gatekeepers—and in her case barriers—to accessing help:

> I tried to tell school counsellors, talk to my parents and even other adults I trusted. No one believed it was that bad. I would try to tell them I hated being alone with him, but everyone just told me it was normal sibling angst and I was overreacting. The counsellors were often condescending; being empathetic, I knew straight away they weren't taking me seriously. And my mum was in denial that it was as bad as it was. (Jordan, sister)

Other sibling participants in our research described similar experiences:

> People told me how "lucky" I was to have a brother like him. The adults in my life didn't get him help and told me just to ignore him … I'd feel terrified … He was violent, aggressive and cruel. No adults in my life stood up to him. (Tessa, sister)

> It never occurred to me to seek support, as it was something we did not discuss. It was put down to ongoing issues with my brother and my dad in the first instance, and later as an issue between siblings when he continued to target me. To this day, [my family] do not understand his actions in the context of violence. (Alisha, sister)

Some participants recounted being advised by police not to report the violence at all, with Belinda's story again framing the issue of recursive violence and the presence of multiple people using violence in the home:

> Police picked up [my] brother after stealing my car—I was URGED not [to] press charges, as it would "destroy my brother's life". … I'm terrified he'll find me, break in and kill me. In hindsight, I wish I had pressed charges … I also wish I'd called the police on my father more often. (Belinda, sister)

> Police were called at one point and told me that I could be ruining my brother's life if I reported [the violence]. (Claire, sister)

While not the direct focus here, these responses highlight the critical role and influence police can have in their gatekeeper interactions with families experiencing AFV more broadly, and specifically their influence on siblings affected by AFV. Our research revealed mixed experiences when families contacted police (Fitz-Gibbon et al., 2018).

This echoes previous research in the United Kingdom by Condry and Miles (2016), which highlights the need for a differential policing response to AFV in comparison to family violence perpetrated by adults. Specialized police training is essential to ensure effective frontline responses to adolescents who use violence and to protect siblings affected by AFV.

6.2 | Child Protection and removal of children from the home

Some survey participants, mainly mothers, described situations in which Child Protection had removed either the violent adolescent or the affected sibling(s) from the family home in an attempt to keep the sibling(s) safe. Service providers, experts and, for the most part, survey participants noted the inadequacy of the response of removing children from the home on its own, stressing that it fails to address the complexities of AFV. One expert noted that more severe cases of AFV are reported to Child Protection, which can lead to the removal of the violent adolescent into kinship care, while another reflected that in their experience cases of AFV involving siblings are "the ones that are more likely to get Child Protection involved." One expert spoke about the problems surrounding removal of children from the home in cases of AFV and sibling violence, explaining:

> Child Protection will act if the violence is against a younger sibling. So they're elected to protect the child at risk of the violence, and that may at times mean the child [sibling] is removed from the family home. The victim of the violence is removed for their own safety, which is a really inadequate response because it still leaves the mother unprotected. It means the young person using the violence doesn't get any support to change his or her behavior, and the mother also then loses the child from her care. ... often the lens is on the child that's at risk from their siblings or another child's use of violence, not to actually do anything to address the offending behavior in the adolescent. ... So it's that tricky thing of holding the vulnerability of the young person but also being clear their behavior is unacceptable, and intervening around the safety and well-being of the other children in the home.

Service Providers explained some of the further complexities around sibling violence and Child Protection and the removal of children from the home:

> I've got a client who's 17 and a half, and he's perpetrating family violence against his mum and his nine-year-old sibling, and Child Protection have recently removed the siblings and said it's a result of his behaviors. It's quite complex: mum was sectioned and stuff as well, so there's more to it than just that. ... We had this big plan of putting him into [a program] where he could stay and learn independent living skills and stuff, but they won't take him because he's on a Child Protection Order, that Child Protection won't close, so then we're kind of stuck in this rut of, well, what do we do? Because he's 17 and a half, it's like, the best bet to improve their relationship is to get him out, so he can live independently and then build it up a little bit more. (Service Provider)

> At the pointy end, the police might have been called out to their house, there's been an incident of family violence, and the police are worried about mum or the other siblings in the house and they've applied for an intervention order ... so you get a young person coming along who might have been removed from their home to live with another parent or another family member. But then their mum comes along to court and often obviously mum's not supportive of the police application. She feels, I guess, often really distraught that things have escalated that far, and that she's opposed to criminalizing her child in that regard. And even if the police have the power to go ahead and ask the magistrate to make an intervention order, even if the mum's not supportive, but then you just know

that she's never going to call the police if there's an incident at home because of the ramifications for the child. (Service Provider)

There's a real lack of adequate [inaudible] for young people that don't have the protective factor of the help-seeking parent or families. Particularly those who expose younger siblings to the risk of the violence and that have been removed from the home and placed in out-of-home care, residential care, and are in the statutory system now. And they just live in resi [residential care] and they don't have their families around them, and it reinforces the trauma, their abandonment, whatever else. (Service Provider)

One sibling participant's story illustrates how the threat of having a child removed from the family home can act as a barrier to siblings seeking to access help:

When my brother tried to keep me from leaving the house when I was 17, I was afraid his [young] son would be taken from my parents' care, as they all lived in the same house. ... This deterred me from going to the police at the time. It did not seem like an option, as my parents would not have liked me to come forward. (Bianca)

A mother who participated in the survey reflected on the hard decision over whether to have an adolescent using violence removed from the home, and this was informed by the need to protect his siblings. This mother's response captures the tension between the need to protect other children in the family and the fear of criminalizing the adolescent using violence:

Police took out an intervention order against him [the adolescent using violence] on behalf of me and my daughters, and he was removed from the home and into DHS [Department of Health and Human Services] care. He was 14 and I was heartbroken. I felt like a failure as a parent and I was very concerned about his well-being. Due to a shortage of places, DHS started putting enormous pressure on me to ask the court to allow me to take him back home, but I knew that to keep my other children safe, I had to refuse. It was extremely difficult in the face of comments like "but you are his mother, and you're responsible for him, whatever he does" and "there are no places for him, he may have to sleep in our offices tonight". I had to stand firm and keep saying, "I have three children who are my responsibility, not just one, so for the safety of my other two children, he can't come back home". (Zoe, mother)

The views from service providers and experts, and the stories relayed by survey participants, support the findings of the Royal Commission (2016), which recognized that removing a young person from the family home should be avoided wherever possible, but that in cases where there appears to be no other option, families should be provided with appropriate supported accommodation. Unlike situations of intimate partner violence, where the goal is often to remove the perpetrator from the home and extricate the primary victim safely from the relationship, simply removing an adolescent using violence without further care, services or therapeutic responses was not seen as appropriate in cases of AFV and retaining the family structure safely was often the key outcome sought by those affected. While it is appreciated that, in cases where there is an ongoing risk of violence, removal of the adolescent from the family home may be the only option, it does little to address and resolve the reasons why an adolescent is using violence and further divides families.

In the Australian context, it is important to acknowledge the Stolen Generation, "the systematic removal of [I]ndigenous Australian children from their families, largely for the social engineering purpose of the gradual and systematic annihilation of Aboriginal cultural identity" (van Krieken, 1999, p. 297). The *Bringing Them*

Home (National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from their Families (Australia), 1997) report identifies that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children were removed from their kinship networks but were also often separated from their siblings. The impacts of this forcible removal of children continue for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities in Australia to this day (see, e.g., Marchetti & Ransley, 2005; National Inquiry, 1997).

7 | CONCLUSION

This article has sought to draw attention to the underexplored and poorly understood experience of sibling violence, particularly violence carried out by adolescents against their brothers and sisters. Centring the voices and experiences of affected siblings reveals layers of complexity and difficulty when identifying appropriate responses to, and the impacts of, AFV. In highlighting these complexities, this research aims to bring attention to some of the hidden family members affected by AFV specifically, and by family violence more broadly. Though we have focused here on experiences of sibling violence during adolescence and childhood, future work should consider sibling violence across the life course. Some participants reported violence continuing into early adulthood and later in life, and the characteristics of this continuing violence and its implications—including how it connects with sibling violence during adolescence and childhood—need to be elucidated and better understood. Our research was unable to address directly the experiences of those who have used sibling violence, another task for future research.

The stories of siblings in this research revealed that sibling violence was often dismissed as normal sibling behavior or minimized within families due to feelings of shame and guilt. Service providers noted there is currently little support available for affected siblings, and participant responses confirmed the inadequacy in most instances of children being removed from the home. Mothers were faced with the complex and competing responsibilities of ensuring the safety of all children in the home, including both the adolescent using violence and the affected sibling(s). The difficulties of this task were reflected in the blame sometimes apportioned to mothers by affected siblings.

The voices of siblings who responded to our survey highlight the severe nature and impacts of this complex form of family violence, and the limited means adolescent or child siblings have for addressing the violence. With sibling violence a highly prevalent form of family violence (Eriksen & Jensen, 2009; Kettrey & Emery, 2006; Relva, Fernandes, & Mota, 2013), this research highlights the necessity of listening to and understanding the experiences of individuals who experience violence from their brothers and sisters, and of developing more effective, nuanced, and age appropriate responses. It points to the need to assist affected siblings, while at the same time supporting parents and the young person using violence and, ideally, keeping the family unit intact. Importantly, the creation of support services and specialized frontline responses for persons affected by sibling violence must be accompanied by clear strategies to facilitate access to those supports by those who need them. As our research reveals, numerous barriers exist that impede a young person's ability to seek help external to the family when affected by sibling violence.

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NOTE

[1] See RCFV (2016, vol. 4, pp. 160–165) for details of programs addressing AFV available in Victoria at the time of the Commission's research. Other interventions addressing AFV globally include Break4Change in Europe (see Wilcox et al., 2015); The Non Violent Resistance Programme in Ireland (see Lauster, Quinn, Brosnahan, & Coogan, 2014); and work on nonviolent resistance in Israel (see Omer, 2004).

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ORIGINAL ARTICLE

WILEY

Successful societies: Decision-making and the quality of attentiveness

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Abstract

Combining moral philosophy with sociological theory to build on themes introduced in Hall and Lamont's *Successful Societies* (2009), the paper outlines a distinctive perspective. It holds that a necessary condition of successful societies is that decision-makers base their decisions on a high level of attentiveness (concern and comprehension) towards subjectively valued and morally legitimate forms of life. Late modern societies consist of a plurality of forms of life, each providing grounds for what Alasdair MacIntyre has called *internal goods*—valued and morally valuable practices. The status of such goods is examined, and distinctions are drawn between their *manifest* and *latent*, and *transposable* and *situationally specific*, characteristics. We integrate this refined idea of internal goods into a developed conception of habitus that is both morally informed and situationally embedded. The sociological approach of strong structuration theory (SST) is employed to demonstrate how this conception of habitus can guide the critique of decision-making that damages internal goods. We identify the most pervasive and invidious forms of damaging decision-making in contemporary societies as those involving *excessive forms of instrumental reasoning*. We argue that our developed conception of habitus, anchored in the collectively valued practices of specific worlds, can be a powerful focus for resistance. Accounts of scholarship in higher education and of the white working class in America illustrate the specificities of singular, particular, social worlds and illuminate critical challenges raised by the perspective we advocate.

1 | INTRODUCTION

The purpose of our paper is to outline and advocate a distinctive perspective on successful societies. We *combine* sociological theory's attention to the subjective worlds of actors and to the structural contexts in which these are anchored, *with* moral philosophy's attention to normative questions of human flourishing and the good life. The perspective places a special emphasis on relations between society's decision-makers and the lives of those who are affected by their decisions. For ease of exposition we shall call the individuals or groups affected by decisions "in situ actors", although, of course, decision-makers are also themselves "situated"—embedded in contexts. The focus is on decision-makers who are either external to the organizations or groupings affected by their decisions, or who occupy a higher position in a hierarchy within the same organization or grouping.

We start from the premise that decision-making should be motivated by a high level of concern for those affected, and that decisions should be informed by a significant level of comprehension of both the subjective frames of meaning of in situ actors, and of the structural conditions that sustain the aspects of their lives that they value. Our overarching normative position is that attributions of success in society, and within the plurality of the smaller social worlds that make up a society, should not bypass consideration of the well-being of their inhabitants. Adequate consideration of objective well-being, moreover, must involve high levels of respect and concern for the subjectively valued forms of life and ideals of individuals, as long as these fall within the broad cultural parameters of moral legitimacy. It must also involve a commitment to foster forms and degrees of self-government that are appropriate to particular spheres of activity, and to allow the levels of autonomy necessary to enable in situ actors to draw on their specialized and locally embedded forms of knowledge and awareness.

The first section of the paper discusses two themes taken from the landmark volume, *Successful Societies: How Institutions and Culture Affect Health* (2009), edited by Peter A. Hall and Michèle Lamont. We outline the ways in which these themes have informed our own approach, and give an initial indication of how we have built on and extended their insights and formulations. This is followed by a summary outline of key elements in our own standpoint, and a critique of instrumental reasoning's excessive and pervasive role in decision-making in contemporary societies. The subsequent two sections present the normative position we advocate, adopting elements from moral philosophy drawn primarily from the writings of Alasdair MacIntyre and Michael Sandel. We integrate these elements into a de-veloped conception of habitus and draw on sociological meta-theory to demonstrate how this conception can guide the empirical analysis and critique of destructive forms of decision-making. We also indicate how this conception of habitus can provide a powerful focus for resistance. The paper concludes with examples drawn from the worlds of scholarship in higher education and of the white working class in America, which illustrate the different specificities of singular, particular, social worlds, and illuminate some of the critical challenges raised by the perspective we advocate.

2 | PETER A. HALL AND MICHÈLE LAMONT'S *SUCCESSFUL SOCIETIES*

There have been many valuable contributions to the subject of successful and unsuccessful societies. Many of these studies have involved sophisticated statistical analysis of large data sets, whilst others are comparative analyses of national societies in the tradition of historical sociology or comparative political economy. Prominent recent examples include Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett's, *The Spirit Level: Why Equality Is Better for Everyone*

(2010); Michael Marmot's, *The Health Gap: The Challenge of an Unequal World* (2016); Simon Pemberton's *Harmful Societies: Understanding Social Harm* (2016); and Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson's *Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty* (2013). One common characteristic which differentiates these works from our own approach is that they all adopt one or other variant of an "externalist"—non-hermeneutic—approach, not least because of the large scale of their studies. Their analyses are also pitched at a high level of abstraction from the details of the contextual fields that provide the setting for strategies and decision-making in situ. An important area for future work will be how to better connect these particular kinds of "expert" study to the embedded vantage points and subjective values of situated actors.[1]

In this paper we will situate our argument in relation to Hall and Lamont's *Successful Societies* (2009), mentioned above. This has been a key inspiration for our own approach to successful societies. Whilst the authors of this volume draw significantly on statistical, epidemiological approaches, they also complement this with a substantive, qualitative emphasis on institutions and culture, which brings their approach much closer to the in situ aspects of our own perspective. The edited collection is a product of a joint enterprise between "a heterogeneous group of social scientists" and the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR), and the book's chapters integrate research from the fields of population health and human development with a wider range of social factors affecting these fields. The approach, which is broadly—but only broadly—shared by the contributors to the volume, and which focuses on the societal and cultural determinants of health, takes "population health as a proxy for social well-being" (Hall & Lamont, 2009, p. 2).

Certain aspects of the volume's approach have fed directly into our own perspective, and have provided key aspects of its scaffolding. There are two discussions of particular significance. The first is the volume's emphasis on "the magnitude of the *life challenges* facing individuals, namely the tasks associated with reaching goals they consider important" (Hall & Taylor, 2009, p. 84; original emphasis). Life challenges can range from making a living and raising a family through securing material goods, social connections, prestige or companionship, to many other cares and concerns depending upon the individual. A person's health and sense of life satisfaction are said to depend on the relative fit or mismatch between their life challenges and their capabilities (Hall & Taylor, 2009, p. 97). Where the life challenges facing a person stretch his or her capabilities and resources for coping with them then that person can be expected "to experience higher levels of wear and tear in daily life, feeding into feelings of stress, anger, anxiety, and depression that take a toll on health" (Hall & Lamont, 2009, p. 6; cf. Turner, 2006, pp. 25–44).

We certainly want to recognize the emphasis given here to objective factors, but also to reinforce and deepen the emphasis given to what people themselves regard as being most important to their lives. For the concern expressed for subjective valuations in this and other passages in the Hall and Lamont volume is not always translated into systematic and concerted attention to the subjectivity of situated actors. We also feel that the specific way subjectivity is framed in the CIFAR volume, seen in terms of challenges and the tension between capabilities and resources, narrows the area of attention, focusing it too intently on the overcoming of problems. We want to broaden out the scope of subjectivity so that it also encompasses the more positive involvements, pleasures, and fulfilments that count as a society's accomplishments.

Lamont's own chapter is one that does sustain a consistent emphasis on subjective frames of meaning, mediated through culture, as one would expect from her previous work (e.g., Lamont, 2000). She shows how exclusion and stigmatization in the form of racism present life challenges to individuals in ways that can have profound effects on their mental and physical health (Lamont, 2009, pp. 151–168). This works both through limiting access to objective resources such as quality health care and decent housing, but also by affecting feelings of worth and belonging. The value of the inter-disciplinary character of the volume, and the seminars and discussions that led up to it, can be seen in the way in which Lamont frames these points. She is speaking most directly about racism but her observations and analysis can be applied to experiences of all forms of disrespect and powerlessness based on social hierarchies of power.[2] Lamont writes of how such negative life events produce their effects:

through a variety of stress-related biological pathways, including psychoneuroendocrinological and psy-choneuroimmunological mechanisms. Perceived discrimination can bring about emotions such as shame, anger, distancing, privatizing, and stereotyping, as well as envy, resentment, compassion, contempt, pride, deference, and condescension. These emotions are intimately tied to the experience of inequality and misrecognition and they contribute to the health gradient. (Lamont, 2009, p.152; see also Keating, 2009, and Marmot, 2016).

The emphasis of Lamont's account on the "psycho-social" has a close affinity with structuration theory's emphasis on the internalization of the external (see Bourdieu, 1977; Giddens, 1984; Stones, 2005, pp. 87–94). Our approach is designed to develop this emphasis in such a way that it encompasses aspects of social experience that are subjectively disliked and abhorred *and* aspects that are valued and appreciated. Importantly, we also introduce and emphasize normative concerns, a dimension that is not addressed in the Hall and Lamont volume.

The second strand of the Hall and Lamont collection influential in the development of our own approach is the insight that decision-makers in search of instrumental efficiencies have an inveterate tendency to develop policies that erode valuable social goods and resources. Hall and Rosemary Taylor draw attention to the significant damage that is routinely caused "as an unintended consequence of policies adopted for other purposes" (Hall & Taylor, 2009, p. 97; cf. Merton, 1968). Their strictures against inadvertent damage directly inform our own emphasis on the significance of the levels of comprehension demonstrated by external decision-makers. We take the strictures further, however, by insisting that decision-makers have a non-trivial duty of care and concern for those affected by their decisions. We argue that this entails a moral responsibility to do everything possible to comprehend the consequences of their policies. This criteria can be used to reproach individuals in positions of power for abrogating this moral responsibility each and every time they adopt an overly narrow, "arm's-length" and instrumental orientation towards decision-making.

3 | SUCCESSFUL SOCIETIES AND THE QUALITY OF ATTENTIVENESS

We take it as axiomatic that decision-makers should be concerned for the well-being of those affected by their decisions, and that the comprehension of context that needs to inform this concern must include knowledge of the existing subjective understandings and values of actors within the affected milieu. Many questions are raised by this principle. One of these is the potential role of experts in helping to translate concern into comprehension. There are, of course, many objective features to judgments about well-being that may well not be recognized within the subjective frames of meaning of actors affected by decision-making. Forms of life that are subjectively valued by some, can, for example, have objectively negative effects on critically important aspects of the lives of others, and on broad current dynamics in the social and natural worlds. One can see this immediately with respect to the social causes of climate change, financial instability, ill-health, the construction of poverty, nuclear risk, and many other determinants of the negative "wear and tear" central to the Hall and Taylor thesis. Numerous aspects of these dynamics may be invisible to both decision-makers and in situ actors. Many see such truths as cues for unmediated objective, expert intervention. However, we draw on the deeply reflective hermeneutic traditions of sociological theory to resist such responses. These traditions place a great onus on comprehending and respecting subjective frames of meaning. There is a role here for experts, to be sure, but these must be "experts who connect" with the subjective frames of meaning of in situ actors. There should be a heavy burden of proof on decision-makers who feel disposed to justify forms of intervention into subjectively valued elements of life that go against the wishes of those affected.

Expressed formally, we hold that decision-makers' analysis of their strategic context should be informed by *a high quality of attentiveness*—something we treat as synonymous with *a high quality of comprehension and concern*—to the forms of life their decisions will affect. Decision-makers' attentiveness to in situ forms of life should focus

on what is subjectively valued by in situ individuals; on what is considered to be morally valuable in terms—following the Aristotelian tradition—of the "internal goods" or "intrinsic purposes" of a form of life; and on a comprehension of the structural conditions that underpin and sustain these valued and valuable forms of life. From within our perspective, societies become more successful each time there is an increase in *the quality of the attentiveness* that decision-makers pay to actors' morally legitimate subjective values and to the structural conditions that serve these. The perspective is designed to encourage careful epistemological and moral reflection on decision-making affecting specific sub-worlds or sets of practices within society.

It is important to be very clear that our insistence that decisions should be "informed" by a high quality of attentiveness to any particular group of in situ actors, does not mean that we believe decision-makers should always take actions that follow the subjective interests of that group, or even their presumed objective interests. There can be many reasons—including structural constraints, the need to consider the conflicting interests and values of other groups, and the morally legitimate need for certain forms of external regulation—why our normative appraisal of actual judgements and decisions needs to be differentiated from our normative appraisal of the quality of attentiveness that *informs* these judgements and decisions. The first of these two problematics concerns the ability of decision-makers to satisfactorily account for, and justify, the actual decisions they come to make. But the other, which is the focus of our argument, is about placing an onus on decision-makers to adequately comprehend the situations of the people who will be affected by their decisions, and to have genuine concern for what those people value about those situations. The purpose of the perspective is to foreground the textures and quality of attentiveness in society. Where decision-makers chronically fail to demonstrate adequate levels of attentiveness then there will be a strong prima facie case for devolving decision-making to sites and levels where this state of affairs could be remedied.

4 | INSTRUMENTAL REASONING, DISEMBEDDING, AND DECISION-MAKING IN LATE MODERNITY

Most concretely, our paper focuses on the moral critique of forms of decision-making that are excessively dominated by instrumental reasoning (*excessive instrumental reasoning*). These destructive forms are ubiquitous in contemporary societies; they are a particularly damaging type of inattentive decision-making. By "excessive instrumental reasoning" we refer to the constricted reduction of sensitive and judicious reasoning about social life to technical questions of how actors within systems can most efficiently achieve pre-given ends decided on elsewhere. This is the impersonal, generalizing, "one-size-fits-all", style of thinking and calculation captured in Max Weber's thesis of the rationalization of society (Weber, 1978), promoted as a hallmark of modernity by Talcott Parsons (cf. Turner, 1999), and held up as a major object of critique by the Frankfurt School of social theory (see, e.g., Outhwaite, 2009). Excessive instrumental reasoning is tightly focused means-end reasoning, often carried out from a distance, which typically has efficiency, competitiveness, profit, standardization, and calculability, and other narrowly defined goals, as its overriding preoccupation. In their contemporary guise, these narrow forms of *instrumental reasoning* are aided by an extreme and dehumanizing reliance on formal numerical targets, metrics, and KPIs.

Excessive instrumental reasoning has relentlessly expanded within late modernity, employed as a means of exerting external control on the multiple sub-worlds within society. Such external control serves to limit the capacity for the self-government of social actors within the plurality of social worlds—of occupational, institutional, civic and community associations and groups—situated between the state and the individual (Turner, 1992, p. xxxviii; cf. Cladis, 1992, pp. 136–184). Key decisions about both ends and means are increasingly made "externally." These often result in *generalized* instrumental rules that are characteristically administered too rigidly from afar, not allowing the autonomy and flexibility that would enable them to be brought into a dialogue with local concerns about the integrity of practices.

There is some irony in the fact that the dangers inherent in the generalized character of rules and norms are an inherent side effect of enlightenment thinkers' determination to establish the impartial rule of law and administrative mechanisms free from favor and corruption (cf. Barry, 2001, pp. 9–17; and Bernstein, 1991, p. 4). The "pattern variables" that Parsons characterized in terms of universalism, achievement, specificity, and emotional neutrality represent just these kinds of rules and norms (Parsons, 1951). Parsons saw the emergence of these normative patterns as progressive markers of the age of modernity and, indeed, elements of such patterns must surely play some kind of role in any acceptable form of contemporary society. There is, of course, a significant place for elements of control and regulation exerted on the basis of external laws and norms. However, the use of instrumental reasoning has become disproportionate and indiscriminate, employed in areas where it has no right to be, and taking on an inflated presence in domains where its role would be legitimate only if much diminished.

Anthony Giddens's powerful discussion of the *disembedding* tendencies of late modern societies, and their tendency to lift "social relations out of their 'situatedness' in specific locales," identifies an intensifying of the forces outlined by Parsons (Giddens, 1990, p. 53, and see pp. 21–29, and 137–149). By "disembedding," Giddens is referring to the instrumental processes by which largely impersonal and abstract systems, such as money and what he calls "expert systems," play a major role in coordinating social relations between present and absent others. Sub-worlds and local practices, in this conception, become cross-cut and "emptied out" by the power and authority of spatially "stretched" external forces imposing themselves from outside. Seemingly substantial local "places" or settings take on an increasingly spectral character (Giddens, 1990, pp. 17–29).

We want to bring the role of external decision-makers back into the very heart of this imposing picture, as Giddens ultimately presents his analysis in highly systemic and limited terms. His focus is on the thematic issue of trust, and to the extent that decision-makers are considered at all it is as those that have a narrowly defined responsibility for what he calls "abstract systems." These "responsible" actors are only of interest to Giddens for the part they play in sustaining the trust that lay actors (our in situ actors) have in systems. They do this through various "displays of manifest trustworthiness and integrity" in those moments when they come into direct, human, contact with lay actors—where they act as *access points* to the otherwise impersonal systems (Giddens, 1990, pp. 83–88). Our aim is to provide a less fatalistic conception of the current state of affairs by shifting the emphasis towards external decision-makers' more encompassing duties of attentiveness, towards the damage that is caused when this is absent, and towards the identification of potential points of resistance.

5 | THE MORAL WORTH OF INTERNAL GOODS AS THE GROUNDS OF RESISTANCE

Individuals and organizations who excessively prioritize instrumental reasoning tend to do so because they value what Alasdair MacIntyre has called *external goods*—such things as wealth, power, status, and fame (MacIntyre, 2013 (1981), p. 219)—over and above the character and worth of the practices that are the distinguishing features of a given sub-world or field (MacIntyre, 2013 (1981), pp. 217–228; Horton & Mendus, 1984, pp. 10–11). The latter are *internal goods*, representing the ideals that are specific to, and intrinsic to, particular kinds of institutions and sets of practices—chess, football, farming, medicine, and architecture are examples mentioned in the relevant literature—and these are essential to what Aristotle called *eudemonia*, or human flourishing (Aristotle, 1980; Turner & Contreras-Veja, 2018; Greenhalgh, Stones, & Swinglehurst, 2014). In the Aristotelian tradition there is an intimate relationship between the internal ideals or *telos* of institutions and the capacities, values, and virtues developed within them.[3]

Political philosopher, Michael Sandel, is one of the most skilful and persuasive exponents of such an Aristotelian position adapted to contemporary concerns. It is no accident that the target of his volume, *What Money Can't Buy* (2012), is one of the core mechanisms of instrumental reasoning—the abstract system of money—even though he comes to it through years of critical engagement with moral and political philosophy, rather than from within

social theory. Sandel's stark warning is that institutions that allow themselves to be disproportionately driven by narrow criteria of market exchange, subordinating or excluding wider, more human, more encompassing, norms and values, threaten the very purpose of the institutions they profess to defend and promote. They threaten their "integrity—the fidelity of an institution to its constitutive ideals" (Sandel, 2012, p. 110; see also pp. 93–130). One of the key principles of Sandel's argument about what money shouldn't be able to buy is what he calls "the corruption objection," which highlights "the moral importance of the goods at stake" (Sandel, 2012, p. 112), forcing questions about "the attitudes and norms that market relations may damage or dissolve" (Sandel, 2012, p. 110). He gives examples of how such corruption can work, from the selling of human kidneys, the auctioning of university admissions and Nobel prizes, to being able to purchase the right to immigrate. With each example, Sandel insists that we need to reason about those norms that are significant and are worth preserving against forces of subversion. One can see this also in two further brief examples. The first criticizes the damage done by emissions trading or voluntary carbon offsets to the moral norms of a caring attitude to nature and a spirit of shared sacrifice (Sandel, 2012, p. 75). More prosaically, the second addresses the subtle diminishing of the norms of friendship by the giving of monetary gifts in place of attentively selecting a present that "engages and connects with the recipient, in a way that reflects a certain intimacy" and thoughtfulness (Sandel, 2012, p. 101).

The sheer quantity and variety of the illustrations Sandel is able to draw on in this volume indicates just how pervasive a "neutral" attitude to social practices has become, one in which an implicit dismissal of moral arguments about the good life, or, what amounts to the same thing, about the internal goods of a particular set of practices, has become the hegemonic, default position.[4] In this and other publications, Sandel argues that, whilst well-intentioned, such liberal neutrality has "prepared the way for market triumphalism and for the continuing hold of market reasoning" (Sandel, 2012, p. 14). Decision-makers fail to meet our criteria of success when they allow narrow market values, or, we must add, narrow bureaucratic criteria of efficiency and control, to "crowd out" their grasp and appreciation of other deeply valued, normatively legitimate, elements within forms of life. We will now move on to examine more explicitly what we mean when we imply that certain elements in forms of life should be recognized as "normatively legitimate," whilst others should not.

5.1 | Embedded subjective values and the autonomy of moral judgement

Whilst *moral* conceptions of internal goods need always to be grounded in the embodied, subjective, and cultural values of situated actors, such conceptions also have their own relative autonomy. Recognizing the relative autonomy of moral reflection means acknowledging another way in which the internal goods most worth preserving within a given set of practices will not always be those that can be directly and straightforwardly derived from the current subjective values of individuals and groups. This point will bear further explanation. For, as a first step, we should appreciate that the most developed conceptions of internal goods are indeed, for the most part, rooted in and formed out of subjective values lodged within the field of what American moral and political philosopher, Mark Cladis, has expressed as a society's "historically situated ideals, customs, beliefs, institutions, and practices" (Cladis, 1992, p. 227). This reflects the view that it is meaningless to try and ground moral judgements on an ahistorical form of abstract reasoning: "[h]istory shapes humans, and to take them out of history is to deprive them of their humanity" (Cladis, 1992, p. 39; see, also, Scruton, 2017, pp. 51–53, 90).

Cladis bases his argument on an interpretation of the writings of Émile Durkheim in which the latter moves closer and closer over his lifetime to a form of immanent moral critique. Judgments about moral legitimacy within this Durkheimian form of critique must always take place from within the flow of history, from within the historically situated ideals of the society in question. In developing this idea, Cladis creates a space, however, in which current subjective values can be subjected to what he calls "internal social criticism." This seeks "to reform society by self-consciously working within its historically fashioned social inheritance" (Cladis, 1992, p. 227). It is criticism that draws out tensions and contradictions *between* the deeper, more reflective, beliefs, norms, and ideals that are

held within a social world *and* actual practices and behaviors, including the treatment of others. By not accepting actual practices, behavior, and attitudes at face value, this position rejects the reduction of morality to what has elsewhere been referred to as an "opinion polling" view of ethics (Dworkin, 1978, pp. 240–258). In Cladis's words, "internal social criticism" involves "an exploration of our best norms, standards, and thinking about social justice, ethics, and political theory" (Cladis, 1992, p. 234), and this, in turn, needs to rely on "thick genealogies" of the "institutions and social forces in which a subject of inquiry is embedded" (Cladis, 1992, p. 243).

We fully endorse this position, as far as it goes, along with the commitment to in situ embedding and analysis it represents, but our argument with respect to moral reasoning also implies the need for something more. For if equipped only with its emphasis on tensions, contradictions, and digging deeper to excavate our best moral thinking—important as these stresses are—we believe that "internal social criticism" will often be unable to gain sufficient critical distance on "the values that predominate in any given community at any given time" (Sandel, 2005, p. 252). This is the kind of limitation that Sandel has criticized communitarians for, notwithstanding his general sympathy for many of their other ideas (Sandel, 2005, p. 252).[5] It is Sandel's solution to this limitation that we follow—combining it with the idea of "internal moral critique"—for the neo-Aristotelian emphasis on the internal goods, or highest purposes and standards, of a given sub-world, indicates the possibility of additional explicit forms of reasoning and justification around the moral significance and value of specific purposes and goods within that world (Sandel, 2005, pp. 254–255, and 1998, pp. ix–xvi). Whether writing about rights to religious liberty or to freedom of speech within the wider public sphere (Sandel, 2005, pp. 252–260), affirmative action policies within the institutional practices of higher education (2009, pp. 167–183), arguments for great public provision of medical care (2005, pp. 174–178), or grounds for the abolition of slavery (Sandel, 2005, pp. 226–230; 242–243; see also, 2009, pp. 210–212), Sandel insists there should be a dual process involved in issues of moral reasoning and legitimacy, the two aspects of which need to be closely interwoven.

The first aspect of the process does indeed concern the historically inherited contextual and cultural embedding of the kind emphasized by communitarians, and by Cladis's emphasis on our "best" historically fashioned norms, standards, and conceptions of justice. Sandel makes much of such inheritances in discussing "thick," situated, issues of self, identification, loyalty, membership, and solidarity, and the moral commitments and obligations that emerge from these (e.g., Sandel, 2009, pp. 223–228). But the second part of the dual process gives greater emphasis to what we might call the relative, and indispensable, autonomy of in situ moral reflection, reasoning, and judgement. There are indeed many aspects of one's situated position that it would be impossible to dispense with or relinquish even if one wanted to. But it is both possible and essential, from within this positioned standpoint, to engage in focused and reflective deliberation about moral principles and the moral significance of particular practices in relation to specific forms of life. Carried out in a spirit of openness, such situated reflection can not only be enriched by a range of general ideas brought in from beyond that standpoint (cf. Sen, 2009, pp. 124–126), but also, and more directly to the point here, by drawing carefully on the deeply considered traditions of moral philosophy.

Moral arguments, for Sandel, and for us, have an "unavoidably judgemental aspect," depending "for their justification on the moral importance of the ends they serve" (Sandel, 2005, pp. 254–255). In other words, it is just not enough, in Sandel's view, only to invoke community and cultural inheritance—only to "invoke the claims of thickly constituted selves" (Sandel, 2005, p. 258)—when dealing with difficult moral issues. For example, in 1858 opponents of slavery in the United States could not simply appeal to their inherited political culture, for the notions of equal citizenship implicit in the American political culture of the times "were arguably hospitable to the institution of slavery" (Sandel, 2005, p. 230). Further moral reasoning—even over and above internal moral critique of the more readily discernible cracks and fissures within one's historically fashioned cultural inheritance—is required in such cases. Without this relatively autonomous moment of moral reflection one is too much at the mercy of "[d]efining projects and commitments [that] can range from the admirable and heroic to the obsessive and demonic. Situated selves can display solidarity and depth of character or prejudice and narrow-mindedness" (Sandel, 2005, p. 257). This "unavoidably judgemental aspect" of moral reasoning—assiduously drawing out the implications of

particular moral principles for in situ worlds—would apply to cases of racism, patriarchy, or inadequate systems of housing or healthcare, for example, as much as to slavery. The requirement for careful reasoning about the most adequate moral principles to bring to particular forms of life needs to be explicitly brought into play whenever there is conflict and contestation between groups, each laying claim to the highest forms of moral-cultural inheritance.

5.2 | Integrating moral philosophy and sociological meta-theory

5.2.1 | Habitus, ethical dispositions, and internal goods

We now need to indicate how the emphasis on internal goods and on the relatively autonomous moments of moral reflection can be brought into the heart of sociological analysis. More specifically, we need to point to how these normative elements can complement and inform sociological critiques of excessive instrumental reasoning and its consequences for the quality of decision-making. Not least, by integrating the two sets of emphasis into one frame, we hope to create a conceptual guide for the empirical identification of the nexus of external forces and decisions that damage subjectively valued and morally valuable forms of life. To this end we draw on strong structuration theory (SST), a development of structuration theory that has extended and refined the concepts and protocols of the perspective in close proximity to the empirical research of particular worlds.[6] The concepts of SST are able to focus on the experience and values of actors engaged in particular sets of practices in situ. Habitus is one aspect of two kinds of "internal structure"—internalization of the external—encompassed within SST. As such, it plays its part in a process in which external forces and contextual fields are internalized by actors, in situ and over time, and in ways that are always mediated by these actors' pre-existing subjective, phenomenological, frames of meaning. These frames of meaning are an intrinsic dimension of habitus, and—together with other elements within habitus—they shape and permeate actors' perceptions of unfolding forms of life, including the life challenges these forms present.

We want to argue for the value of integrating actors' conceptions of internal goods into the concept of habitus, and it is worth beginning by reminding ourselves of Pierre Bourdieu's considered definition of habitus as:

> *a system of lasting transposable dispositions which, integrating past experiences, functions at every moment as a* matrix of perceptions, appreciations, and actions *and makes possible the achievement of infinitely diversified tasks, thanks to analogical transfers of schemes permitting the solution of similarly shaped problems. (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 83, original emphasis)*

Building on a deservedly influential article by William Sewell Jr. (Sewell Jr., 1992), SST works with a version of Bourdieu's concept that is faithful to its core dimensions, is expansive regarding the elements that constitute habitus, and is self-consciously reflective about the various analytically distinct elements embraced within the concept. These latter elements include, *inter alia*, the cultural schemas, stocks of knowledge, dispositions, values, involvements, and commitments, and mutual understandings, that are embedded within actors' subjective frames of meaning (see Stones, 2005, pp. 67–74, 87–89, and 104–107; cf. Sewell, 1992, pp. 1–29). Andrew Sayer's inventive extension of the concept of habitus, through the inclusion and elaboration of the emotional and ethical dispositions within it, exemplifies the value of a reflectively self-conscious and analytical approach to the notion (see Sayer, 2005, pp. 35–39 and 42–50; 2011, pp. 146–148). We believe that the values focused around the *internal goods* of specific forms of life can also be valuably included within habitus. These can be seen as falling within the category of ethical dispositions introduced by Sayer, but ones that are more strictly focused on the *collective practices of specific social worlds*.[7]

The integration of ethical dispositions and internal goods into habitus allows one to examine the impact of external decision-making from the standpoint of the situated actors who have subjectively internalized norms

around the moral value and integrity of internal goods. This ethical expansion of habitus also allows one to see clearly that the cultural-moral inheritances emphasized by Cladis are constituents of the cultural schemas that are so central to habitus. Likewise, it becomes easy to conceptualize as aspects of habitus the constitutive identities and commitments, and the obligations and loyalties of belonging and solidarity, within the parts of Sandel's accounts that lean towards communitarianism (e.g., 1998, pp. 149–152; 2009, pp. 208–243).

5.2.2 | Manifest and latent internal goods

Having constructed this frame, we are now able to introduce a distinction between manifest and latent internal goods, as the more precise foci of each can provide an additional acuity to how the phenomenology of internal goods should be conceptualized within habitus. The category of *manifest internal goods* refers to those internal goods that are attached to the most clearly apparent and explicit purposes of an institution, as is the case, for example, with organizations and practices devoted to healthcare, university education and research, sports, law, environmental protection, and various forms of welfare, to name but a few. *Latent internal goods*, on the other hand, can initially be thought of as the derivative consequences of, almost the by-products of, the sets of practices that are explicitly focused on the manifest purposes of an organization. Latent aspects of internal goods built up whilst pursuing manifest purposes embrace such things as trust, loyalty, mutual concern, altruism and generosity, gratitude and humility, friendship, empathy, care, and tenderness, all focused on particular others, as well as obligations and responsibilities owed to particular people, and a concern with the nurturing of, and the dignity of, particular persons.

These latent goods are latent in the precise sense that they are not "the main point" of the organization's purpose, they are not the reason why this particular kind of organization has been established. That is, they do not have to be unintended or unacknowledged, in the sense that is often associated with Robert Merton's notion of latent functions or consequences, but they do share the quality of not being the main point of a set of practices, the reason for their existence (Merton, 1968, pp. 73–138). Whilst they are not the "main point" of an organization or institution, however, latent internal goods are not secondary in a functional sense, for they typically provide necessary conditions for the achievement of manifest purposes. Neither are latent internal goods secondary in an existential or moral sense, for, as we shall see, they are intrinsic to well-being and to the lived quality and moral integrity of the social practices and social relations in focus. They are a significant part of what makes life worth living, and, in the process, they provide individuals with precious resources for coping with "the wear and tear of daily life" (Hall & Taylor, 2009, p. 97).

The idea of dispositions as "transposable" is an essential element of Bourdieu's concept of habitus. It is, however, worth dwelling on the implications of this for particular sub-worlds, and for manifest and latent internal goods. It is indeed the case that some aspects of *both* manifest and latent internal goods are transposable between settings and organizations. Many aspects of manifest goods such as professional knowledge, understanding, and skills are of this kind, as are latent capacities for such things as civility, tact, and empathy. Both of these kinds of internal goods, grasped in all their subtlety within the habitus of practitioners, are themselves inherently important aspects of the social good that are constantly at risk from narrowly conceived decision-making. But there are also other aspects of both kinds of internal goods, ones that are only transposable *within* particular settings and organizations. These are the aspects of internal goods—of the interlaced moral and functional quality of practices—that entail knowledge and awareness of, and involvement with, *particular* entities, relations, and processes. These involvements and capacities involved in "going on" in a particular form of life constitute a great deal of what is valuable in a life worth living—of "the good" in the terms of moral philosophy—yet they are typically the first casualties of inattentive decision-making.

With manifest internal goods, these include the knowledge and awareness of such things as the particular spatial and communicational architecture of organisations that are routinely drawn on in engaging in valuable,

formative and operational, kinds of interaction and support. They also include the equally facilitating awareness of norms, duties, and obligations, schedules, networks, and protocols and procedures of a particular organization, and, closely interwoven with these, the characteristics of particular people relevant to achieving manifest purposes. Significant elements of this shared knowledge and awareness of the ecological conditions for the achievement of manifest purposes are developed and sedimented slowly over time as a consequence of mutual involvements and joint actions with *particular* people in *particular* organizational settings.

Time is equally significant with latent internal goods, which also include a range of dispositions towards *particular* people in *particular* settings, involving shared memories, emotional orientations, in situ ethical dispositions, and enduring involvements and attachments. Although, for the most part, these will not be generated as the "main point" of a set of practices, they are as significant and valuable as manifest internal goods in the constitution of a good life. At their best, these aspects of practices implicitly involve respect for the individual at the same time as they rely on social, communal dispositions, and it is in combination that they evoke sentiments and textures of being that are noticeably absent both from the lexicon of contemporary decision-making and from much social science discourse—as is the case with many of the things that truly "matter to people" (Sayer, 2011).

As the *particular* aspects of both kinds of internal goods can be analytically distinguished from—although they are substantively intertwined with—those generalized dispositions of habitus that are transposable across time and space, they can be seen as significant ethical elements of what we can call the *situationally specific dispositions of habitus*. They emerge from worlds that are heavy with shared histories, mutual involvements, and ethical commitments. These are the more *particular* elements of what Alfred Schutz conceptualized as the shared stocks of knowledge developed within relatively enduring forms of life (cf. Schutz, 1967; see also Giddens, 1976, pp. 29–30; Heritage, 1984, pp. 37–74). They often, but by no means always, exist in tacit, "taken-for-granted," non-propositional forms, below the level of reflective awareness (cf. Garfinkel, 1984; Dreyfus, 1991, pp. 10–29).

5.2.3 | Conjuncturally specific forces, active agency, and internal goods

The full value of SST for our purposes, however, lies with its provision of additional concepts around structure and agency that are able to integrate the notion of habitus—including the internal goods valued within habitus—with the experience in situ actors have of "receiving" particular instances of decision-making. The accrued dispositions of both general and situationally specific habitus will certainly be a profound locus for their emotional and ethical responses to these instances. But their experiences of decisions will most immediately be impacted by their perceptions of what SST calls the "conjuncturally specific" forces embedded within structural contexts. These forces are internalized by in situ actors as a second kind of "internal structure," mediated by their frames of meaning embedded within habitus (Stones, 2005, pp. 87, 89–94; 2015, pp. 44–49, 59–93, 96–101). Conjunctural injunctions, instructions, and regulatory systems set in motion by inattentive and excessively instrumental decision-makers will frequently be experienced by in situ actors as disembedded external forces threatening valued elements in their constitutive forms of life. Equally, such injunctions and decrees can also be experienced as external forces failing to remedy, or exacerbating, existing harm and damage, perpetuating injustice, unnecessary suffering and other moral ills. In turn, the lack of conjunctural awareness on the part of excessively instrumental decision-makers will very often be most acute with respect to the combined manifest and latent internal goods embedded within the situationally specific aspects of the habitus of in situ actors.

When in situ actors perceive conjunctural forces as threats or dangers they will do so, as noted, through the phenomenological frame of meaning within habitus. Both aspects of internal structure—habitus and the conjuncturally-specific—will always be involved in these perceptions, in combination with each other. There is, however, a further moment that is categorized by SST as "active agency." This moment is also always involved in social practices in one form or another, and cannot be reduced to the influence of internal structures (Stones, 2005, pp. 100–104). Active agency is brought into play, for example, when in situ actors contest external decisions through

focused forms of mutual reflection and deliberation in which they gain critical distance from the routine dispositions of habitus. Such forms of reasoning and deliberation can include their "unavoidably judgemental aspects" (Sandel, 2005, p. 254). Here, both forms of internal structure would be involved, but in a quite specific process that also included the active agency required for engagement in the further deliberations.

6 | EXTERNAL THREATS TO INTERNAL GOODS: ILLUSTRATIVE EMPIRICAL CASE STUDIES

Something of the potential of this successful societies perspective for empirical analysis and critique can be provided through two brief examples drawn from the worlds of scholarship in higher education and of the white working class in America. These cases bring out aspects within the fine texture of forms of life lived by in situ actors—insiders, practitioners—that can be threatened when the attentiveness of decision-makers is poor and inadequate. Deep within these illustrative cases lies the precept that it is impossible to be genuinely humane, truly cosmopolitan, without the sociological and moral imagination to appreciate the singular involvements, commitments, and values of particular actors in particular conditions. The differences between the two cases, both in the substance and the scope of the practices we focus upon, further illuminates the range of the critical challenges raised by the perspective.

6.1 | Excessive instrumental reasoning and the internal goods of scholarship in higher education

Scholars and researchers in higher education frequently experience the imposition of metrics and KPIs on their activities as wholly inappropriate to the patient depth of engagement required by the academic practices of scholarship, thought, reflection, and writing (cf. Collini, 2012, pp. 61–85; Mountz, Bonds, & Mansfield, 2015; Berg & Seeber, 2016). These are familiar external forces, including impersonal, standardized, and disciplinary pressures: to produce specified numbers of publications within a given time period, perhaps with numbers subdivided depending on the number of co-authors; to place the publications in certain journals or with certain publishers; to engage in research projects designed to bring in large amounts of research money, perhaps in collaboration with designated partners, and so on.

Specialization, specificity, and locality within the academy matter here, as elsewhere, and there will be differences in the ways in which such external forces are experienced between the natural sciences, the social sciences and the humanities, and within branches, perspectives and tendencies within each of these. Stefan Collini has provided a powerful portrait of the particular character of the humanities, for example, which is certainly distinctive, but just as certainly shares many qualities with sub-traditions within sociology and the social sciences more broadly. One feels, in Collini's account, the weight of disciplined constitutive commitments and involvements, and the intrinsic values attached to the purposes at hand. He conveys important issues of clarity, exactness, rigor, and argument, but also the flexibility of intelligence involved in developing new ways of seeing, in which advances in understanding rest in such intangible endeavors as building "more plausibility and more illumination into a rearrangement of what is already in some sense partly known" (Collini, 2012, p. 79). He conjures up the shared, hermeneutic "density and inwardness" of the internal goods of the humanities by invoking such things as the qualities of expressiveness, and of tone, imaginative sympathy and interpretative charity, and the capacities for noticing, characterizing, and judgment exhibited by historians, literary critics, and philosophers as they engage with their various subject matters. Collini's characterization revolves around the general, shared, internal goods of the humanities, conveying how these rely on shared background knowledges and overlapping values built up over a lifetime of disciplined engagement (Collini, 2012, pp. 61–85). He depicts a world that possesses a richness

of texture and complex grounds for judgment that are not easily understood from the outside, but which can be summarily damaged by careless or indifferent forms of external decision-making.

Collini's account, however, is pitched at a relatively generalized, meso, level of the character of the humanities in contemporary academia. The dangers of inattentive decision-making, and especially of instrumental forms of reasoning, are seen to be even greater once one combines his general account with a sensitivity to particular academics, departments, and universities. For it is the *particular* dimensions of both manifest and latent internal goods that are especially vulnerable to those vagaries of poor decision-making that Hall and Taylor draw attention to. For the organizational conditions for the flourishing of the humanities within particular departments, and for human flourishing within these, are typically created by distinctive ecologies of finely woven intellectual and personal relationships, and it is here that the concept of *situationally specific habitus* plays its most decisive role in our argument. For the character of situationally specific habitus includes tacit, taken-for-granted, as well as explicit, knowledge and awareness of the conditions underpinning the *particular* aspects of both manifest and latent internal goods. Such knowledge is an essential condition of actors' capacity for appreciating and valuing their environments, for understanding how to "go on" in these settings, and knowing how to feel at home within them. Typically, when external decision-makers initiate, from afar, their relentless top-down forms of change management, they inadvertently, unknowingly, alter multiple aspects of the contextual conditions that support particular dimensions of manifest and latent internal goods.

SST's concepts, as we have seen, allow space for actors to actively react back upon their internal structures, but the structuration perspective has also always noted that actors are typically chastened and inhibited by their awareness of the power asymmetries lodged within their contextual fields. Homing in on the specifics of such processes allows one to appreciate precisely how the power of decision-makers can combine with the excessive instrumentalism of their decision-making to gradually subvert and corrupt internal goods (Stones, 2005, pp. 85, 100–109, 187). The pressure to seek out given quantities of research money, for example, can lead early career academics to focus their attention, their phenomenological "horizons of action" (Stones, 2005, p. 101; Schutz, 1962; and Habermas, 1987, pp. 122–123), on subject matters that have little meaningful connection to the gradually evolving integrity of intellectual projects that have arisen organically and reflectively out of prior intellectual and scholarly involvements. Such externally prompted "reordering of concerns," or reframing of an early career researcher's "hierarchy of purposes" (Giddens, 1976/1993, p. 90; Archer, 2000, pp. 230–241; 2003, *passim*; Stones, 2005, pp. 103–104, 114–115, 169) often disrupts the more reflective development of intellectual biographies, and can lead to the adoption of a series of disparate research roles, resulting in the fragmentation of horizons, superficial engagements, and stymied, if not stalled, intellectual development.

6.2 | Excessive instrumental reasoning and the internal goods of America's white working class

An analogous analysis of valued forms of life can be found in Joan. C. Williams's book *White Working Class: Overcoming Class Cluelessness in America* (2017).[8] Here, however, the scope of the analysis does not only encompass just one category of practice (as with scholarship in higher education). This account takes in the interconnections between different sets of practices, each playing its role within the lives in question. Synthesizing academic research in a political conjuncture in which Donald Trump had been elected to the presidency in 2016, Williams's argument is that unless they understand the point of view of the white working classes, the political decision-makers within the Democrat Party, and progressive elites more generally, won't be able to grasp why "business as usual isn't working" (Williams, 2017, p. 110; Stones, 2019a). Williams helps to express and clarify the often only half-articulated frames of meaning and subjective values of the white working class in today's United States, and it is not difficult to discern a good deal here of the internal goods within the various sets of practices that make up these lives.

Drawing from Michèle Lamont's *The Dignity of Working Men: Morality and the Boundaries of Race, Class, and Immigration* (Lamont, 2000), Williams notes the prominence within the hermeneutic frames of the white working class of hard-work, responsibility, providing for family, protecting family, personal integrity, sincerity and direct talking, traditional morality associated with being anti-drugs and anti-crime, and interpersonal altruism (Williams, 2017, p. 18, table 1). Williams contrasts, for example, working-class investment in sincerity, straight-talking, and close and enduring friendships with what they see as the "phoniness" of professionals who seem to have no qualms about combining quite personal forms of socializing with instrumental strategies directed to building "entrepreneurial networks" (Williams, 2017, pp. 29–30).

Williams focuses on the relations between workers' frames of meanings, including their values, and their positioning within particular socio-structural conditions. She attends both to the articulation of frames of meaning and to their rootedness in certain forms of life, bringing to the fore the elements of these forms that are subjectively valued, and which make life worth living for the white working class. Where professional managerial elites tend to be oriented to themes of self-actualization, working-class lives typically produce a different set of values. Williams writes, for example, that for "working-class members of all races, valuing hard work means having the rigid self-discipline to do a menial job you hate for 40 years, and reining yourself in so you don't 'have an attitude' (i.e. so that you can submit to authority)" (Williams, 2017, p. 20). Paid work is something that has to be done, something, at best, that makes a contribution, rather than something that has manifest intrinsic value. Where the standard professional-class ice-breaker is "what do you do?", this makes little sense for working-class whites. Any intrinsic value within the hours of paid employment is to be found more in the latent internal goods of lasting friendships and loyalties, and in the dignity gained through enduring the daily grind. They are more invested in character, in "who they are," than "what they do" (Williams, 2017, p. 31): "The focus on character, morality, and family values is a key expression of class disadvantage; we choose baskets we can fill" (2017, p. 33). Williams writes that "[t]hey want respect for the lives they've built through unrelenting hard work" (2017, p. 5).

In arguing her case, Williams does not concede any ground to the manifestations of xenophobia and racism within the populist discourses that find an audience amongst some of the working class. Whilst her case is made intuitively, her sense of the limits of moral legitimacy is consistent with Cladis's idea of "internal social criticism." For such prejudices, implying hatred, contempt, disrespect, or conceptions of inferiority, are inconsistent with the shared or common higher-level principles of the American political community. Most formally and systematically the rejection of such prejudice is inherent in—whatever their other differences—all of the respected traditions of moral reasoning in American society, from liberalism and republicanism to neo-Aristotelianism and all but the crudest forms of utilitarianism.[9] Alongside her insistence on these boundaries of moral legitimacy, however, Williams remains clear that what she regards as the core subjective values of the working class are morally legitimate, arguing that they "demand dignity—and they deserve it" (2017, p. 5; and see pp. 59–82).

In contrast to our presentation of scholarship in higher education, which was treated in isolation from other activities, here the emphasis is on the ways in which different sub-worlds within the lives of the working class interconnect with each other. One needs to understand these interconnections in order to grasp what we can call—borrowing from MacIntyre—the "narrative unity of their lives" (cf. MacIntyre, 1981, pp. 237–261). The kinds of latent goods that make life bearable at work are those that are their manifest goods within the family, friendship, and community institutions. These are the worlds they are devoted to, worlds with purposes, meanings, and internal goods that revolve around *particular* people and places. It is against this background that one should grasp the insecurity, fear, and frustration the working class experienced when the objective conditions underpinning their forms of life were radically assailed in the first decade of the new millennium as 42,000 factories closed down (Williams, 2017, p. 114).

Once one understands something of these structural conditions and hermeneutic frames, it is not difficult to see what is so wrong-headed and presumptuous about the disembedded injunctions from afar of the professional elites, as in the disapproving refrains that serve as the titles of some of Williams's chapters, such as: "Why Doesn't the Working Class Just Move to Where the Jobs Are?", and "Why Doesn't the Working Class Get with

It and Go to College?" The valued internal goods of working-class lives are embedded in dispositions of habitus crystallized over lifetimes in situations that are severely constrained, but which are enriched by circles of mutual involvements and support. The internal goods in their lives have always been embedded in frames of meaning in which one eye is always alert to a range of shifting conjunctural factors, such as personal finances, the changing economic landscape, declining levels of job security, and perceived family obligations and responsibilities. To have their predicament met with little or no comprehension or concern as the material grounds of everything they have is pulled from under them stands as an arresting motif for the chronic damage wrought by inattentive forms of decision-making in countless sub-worlds across contemporary societies.

7 | CONCLUSION

The approach to successful societies presented here is distinctive, ambitious, and practical. Somewhere along the line, societies have come to take for granted a primitive preoccupation with distant and narrowly focused means–end reasoning as the beginning and the end of the good. We have criticized a pervasive failure of responsibility in decision-making, arguing that the focus of concern and comprehension must be widened and deepened. We have argued that decision-makers have a duty to seek out ways of genuinely and deeply connecting with the legitimate values that in situ actors invest in the singular, particular, social worlds they inhabit. We have developed a framework by which it is possible to identify, analyse, and morally judge the quality of attentiveness that informs empirical cases of decision-making. As such, the perspective provides a strong theoretical, moral, and empirical basis for criticism, reproach, and resistance whenever, and wherever, decision-making is based on an inadequate level of concern for, and comprehension of, the lives of those it affects.

DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Data sharing is not applicable to this article as no new data were created or analyzed in this study.

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NOTES
[1]A key additional site and source for such reflection would be Princeton University's program, *Innovations for Successful Societies*.

[2]On respect, see also Lamont et al., 2016, Sennett, 2004, and in the tradition of critical theory, Honneth, 2007.

[3]On the complexities of the relationship between specific types of practice and virtues in the context of rationalization, see the discussion of "volunteering as virtue" in Turner, 2011, pp. 191–211.

[4]It is important to register that Sandel's substantive arguments are developed in the context of a critique of the contemporary liberalism of John Rawls and others for according "priority of the right over the good." See, for example, Sandel, 1998 and 2005, pp. 211–247.

[5]When Sandel writes of communitarians he is referring, amongst others, to MacIntyre (1981), Charles Taylor (e.g. 1989), and Michael Walzer (1983).

[6]See, for example, Coad, Jack and Kholeif (2016); Greenhalgh and Stones (2010); Greenhalgh et al. (2014); Neves et al. (2018); Stones (2005, 2015, 2019b); Stones et al. (2019); Upham, Bögel and Johansen (2019); Warren and Jack (2018); Wherton et al. (2019).

[7]Sayer includes his own instructive discussion of MacIntyre's notion of internal and external goods in *The Moral Significance of Class* (Sayer, 2005, pp. 11–121). However, his thematic focus, on the normative significance of inequalities

in the distribution of internal and external goods, differs from ours on the normative integrity of internal goods in specific worlds.

[8]For a more extended theoretical and political discussion of Williams's analysis see Stones (2019a).

[9]See, for example, Dworkin (1978, pp. 240–258); Sandel (2009, pp. 173–178); Skorupski (2006, pp. 34–38); and Stones (2017, pp. 269–270).

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BOOK REVIEW

WILEY

TIME, SCIENCE AND THE CRITIQUE OF TECHNOLOGICAL REASON

Jose Esteban Castro | Bridget Fowler | Luis Gomes

In the Epilogue to *The Maker*, written in 1960, and by his own admission the most personal of any of his motley collections sent to press, Jorge Luis Borges (1998 [1960]) writes:

> A man sets out to draw the world. As the years go by, he peoples a space with images of provinces, kingdoms, mountains, bays, ships, islands, fishes, rooms, instruments, stars, horses, and individuals. A short time before he dies, he discovers that that patient labyrinth of lines traces the lineaments of his own face. (p. 327)

I would be hard pressed to find a better and more bespoke description of Herminio Martins—a thinker who until recently was largely unknown to me—but a man whose silhouette, after engaging the 300 or so pages of the *Festschrift* devoted to him by people who did know him, has arisen in vivid colour. The volume traces a vibrant image of a philosopher, friend, husband, social theorist, and a keen observer of various political and institutional encroachments on our creative freedoms. The result is a type of layered biographical collage. We are "gifted" the microcosm that Herminio Martins was in outline, whilst not abandoning the horizon that gives the reader a sense of the man and his environment as a "total social phenomenon" (to borrow from Marcel Mauss)—an especially valuable exercise for any reader who has not had the opportunity to enter Martins' dynamic range of thought, which collected experience in his own, uniquely designed "cabinet of curiosities."

Indeed, Martins (1935–2015) came from a very similar constellation of events and phenomena as Borges—a zone of trauma, exile, and creativity shared with other intellectuals that have made inordinately long and circuitous journeys (intellectual and otherwise) through the proverbial "short twentieth century." Straddling two cultures and linguistic spaces—English and Portuguese (broadly speaking)—his work has fallen into a crevice of "yet to be discovered," revelatory positions. But given Martins' range, intellectual acumen, and prescient analysis of the modern social condition (a good portion of it still awaiting translation) that comes through the 17 essays comprising the *Festschrift*, he deserves to be much better known, as Bridget Fowler points out in her Introduction. Better known not because we need another "celebrity intellectual" but because we need Martins' full scope of thought to aid our own sensory vertigo in a world rapidly losing the old coordinates.

Born in Mozambique—a Portuguese colony at the time—Martins, like many other intellectuals of the time, sought periodic refuge from the events which after bearing directly on his life and well-being, became well-known historical phenomena—first the end of European colonialism in Africa, and then authoritarian fascist regimes gripping Portugal and Spain well into the 1960s and 1970s. Prudently trying to outrun what he called "the optimum coefficient of terror" of "500 to 2000 executions" per year to snuff out any effective opposition (p. 3), the

merchants of terror enabled under Salazar's dictatorship finally forced Martins into exile in Britain, in 1951. It is also Britain that could use Martin's wisdom and experience at this very moment.

It is especially this troubling and increasingly unsettling convergence of historical and contemporary paths that makes Martins' thought as well as the volume celebrating his life and work especially timely and significant.

The collection follows the "variations on a theme" approach. The variety of topics is impressive, although at times overwhelming. Divided into four broad segments dealing with such leitmotifs as memoirs and recollections, theories of scientific revolutions, social developments in Portugal, techo-scientific ethos, as well as more specific subject matters such as "transhumanism," modelling of speech in America and Britain, the '68 disobedient generation, and the history of think tanks (to mention just a few), the project would have benefitted from a bit more "chiseling" of content and form. For instance, Part III "Patrimonialism and Social Development in Portugal" is comprised of only one essay—a very technical study of the history of the Portuguese "new state" (*Estado Novo*) that does not engage with Martins at all, apart from one mention in the references. But an essay on the topic was not only one of Martins' seminal publications (p. 174, n. 2) but even more significantly this is the same "new state" to whose climaxing nationalist identity Martins himself fell victim. The topic then is more than relevant and bringing it back to Martins' biography and intellectual output was a clearly available path. There are a few of these instances in the *Festschrift* where Martins receives something of a "short shrift," with one or two obligatory mentions, before the main text of an article that could have otherwise stood on its own. One of the most obvious instances of such a missed opportunity to engage Martins is the chapter on liminality, biography, and creativity (pp. 209–230), that in an otherwise interesting argument proposes to deploy the biography of a thinker as a formative, explanatory factor in understanding his style of thought and intellectual insight. In this instance, the two chosen figures are the 20th century's prophet of new media, Marshall McLuhan and the French philosopher and media theorist Régis Debray. Both good choices, but what about Martins, given his own "social and biographical conditions out of which significant 'visionary' insights into the historically conditioned nature of modernity" (p. 211) have indeed emerged? This is especially so, given that the core of what Martins called "historical-philosophical and reflexive" sociology (p. 160), is premised on a meticulous and vigilant study of technology—in itself a force that fuels "liminality" by pushing the entire human sensorium to the threshold of humanity as a meaningful point of orientation (the trans-human, etc.).

Having said this, these "loose stitches" are relatively minor, and only visible precisely because the reader has at his or her disposal an exciting and dynamic range of content that begins to interact in a stimulating way across the pages, the further one delves into the volume.

In an interview on the "State of the Social Sciences" included in the *Festschrift*, Martins remembers Schumpeter's dictum that "there can be no analysis, however sophisticated, exact, and precise it may be, without a view or vision of society as a whole" (p. 40). A serious engagement with Martins' multifocal, "visceral sociology" (p. 173) can provide us with at least the coordinates for a beginning of this type of such holistic, renewing vision that is perennially in short supply.

Therefore, this *Festschrift* is more than a commemoration, but a publication of the times and for the times. There is certainly more than enough there not only to serve as "food for thought" but to help mitigate, in Martins' words, "the monoculture of the academic mind" and its "prosaic mentality" (p. 161). It is especially this take on the mission and purpose of thought as the battering-ram against self-imposed analytical myopia that I take to be of special relevance and inspiration. In this sense, the *Festschrift* has performed its task exceptionally well by not only remembering but stimulating a meaningful encounter for present and the future!

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