Military Control in Pakistan

The parallel state

Mazhar Aziz

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

Military Control in Pakistan

This book examines the role of the military, the most influential actor in Pakistan, and challenges conventional wisdom on the causes of political instability in this geographically important nuclear state. It rejects views that ethnic and religious cleavages and perceived economic or political mismanagement by civilian governments triggers military intervention in Pakistan. The study argues instead that military intervenes to remove civilian governments where the latter are perceived to be undermining military's institutional interests. The book shows that the Pakistani military has become a parallel state, and given the extent of its influence, will continue to define the nature of governance within the polity. Overall, this book is a timely reminder and an important resource for both scholars and policy-makers, clearly demonstrating the need to refocus attention on the problem of an influential military whilst drawing appropriate conclusions about issues ranging from democratic norms, political representation and civilian–military relations.

Mazhar Aziz (PhD, University of Nottingham, 2006) is a former Pakistani civil servant and an independent scholar with research interests in democracy and political representation, civil–military relations and foreign policy.

Routledge Advances in South Asian Studies
Edited by Subrata K. Mitra, South Asia Institute,
University of Heidelberg, Germany

South Asia, with its burgeoning, ethnically diverse population, soaring economies, and nuclear weapons, is an increasingly important region in the global context. The series, which builds on this complex, dynamic and volatile area, features innovative and original research on the region as a whole or on the countries. Its scope extends to scholarly works drawing on history, politics, development studies, sociology and economics of individual countries from the region as well as those that take an interdisciplinary and comparative approach to the area as a whole or to a comparison of two or more countries from this region. In terms of theory and method, rather than basing itself on any one orthodoxy, the series draws broadly on the insights germane to area studies, as well as the tool kit of the social sciences in general, emphasizing comparison, the analysis of the structure and processes, and the application of qualitative and quantitative methods. The series welcomes submissions from established authors in the field as well as from young authors who have recently completed their doctoral dissertations.

Military Control in Pakistan

The parallel state

Mazhar Aziz

To my parents

Contents

Acknowledgements

Introduction

That Pakistan experienced its latest military[1] *coup d'état* on 12 October 1999 makes it temporally relevant that an investigation be undertaken to understand the military's role in the political dynamics of this geographically important nuclear state.

We explain that the emergence of the military as the foremost decision-making entity probably creates its own set of precedents and institutions that enables the military to be, in effect, a parallel state, and continue to define the nature of governance within the polity. It is then likely that the civilian governments in Pakistan will remain unstable and weak given the scope of the military's capacity and influence.

The book is a timely reminder to both academics and policy-makers, making a strong case for the need to refocus attention on the problem of military control in Pakistan and draw appropriate conclusions about the issues ranging from democratic norms, political representation and civilian oversight of the military.

The present inquiry is bounded by two essentials. The first reports the discovery of new facts and fruitful sources that have been drawn on to investigate the Pakistani military's embedded influence in the country since independence in 1947. We interrogate sources of information that particularly shed light on the Pakistani military's approach to political issues prior to the first military coup in 1958, demonstrating the senior commanders' determination to influence the trajectory of political developments. The other set of data has been obtained by accessing the military's premier training institution, the National Defence College, which trains and prepares the military leadership of the country. Other sources include, for instance, an important internal publication of the Army that is evaluated to gain insight into the military's perception of issues of nation-building and national security. We also enquire into the three military interventions of 1958, 1977 and 1999 that occurred in Pakistan and argue that these coups took place to protect and extend the institutional interests of the military. Contrary to popular belief, they were not a response to political mismanagement or corruption.

The second essential underpinning this study relates to the application of the theoretical frameworks of path dependency and historical institutionalism in

understanding the degree of the military's salience in our present context. This framework provides us with the most appropriate theoretical lens to coherently investigate and account for the civil–military relations, as it facilitates a careful analysis of relevant events and institutional arrangements. It sheds light on why, for example, starting from the similar outcome of independence in 1947, both India and Pakistan charted a different trajectory of political developments. Furthermore, in Pakistan's case, the involvement of the military in civilian administration after the establishment of the country can arguably be noted as a relatively 'smaller event'. Over a period of time, however, this involvement institutionalised to the extent that the military exercised considerable influence over political outcomes, a phenomenon that has proved very difficult to reverse.

The following section briefly summarises the key themes outlined in the book.

Chapter 1 examines some of the more important developments in Pakistan and demonstrates how conventional explanations of political crises are weakened by the failure to ascribe sufficient instrumentality to the extent of the military's involvement and subsequent institutionalisation in civilian affairs. The chapter also briefly sketches the historical antecedents of Muslim separatism in India that eventually led to the demand for Pakistan. It introduces the problem of threat perception in relation to a hostile India that subsequently defined many policy choices made by Pakistan in the following years.

Chapter 2 sets out the theoretical framework of path dependency and historical institutionalism and the novelty of this approach to studying the problem of the ascendance of military in Pakistan. It is shown how the processes of path dependency generate patterns, making it appreciably difficult for polities to change direction. The chapter draws on the explanatory power of the theoretical framework to provide the best available lens with which to develop a coherent account of the military's influence in our present context. This approach then makes it possible to argue why the transition from a military to the civilian form of government in Pakistan remains problematic and incomplete.

Chapter 3 draws attention to some of the more important attributes of the military, including the professionalism and organisational coherence that distinguishes it from the civilian sphere. An inquiry into the competing explanations of the problem of military control in various settings in this chapter offers important insights. By drawing on the example of Pakistan, it is shown that variables such as the absence of parliamentary or civilian oversight of defence affairs, and the involvement of the military in civilian administration, illustrates the military's incremental increase in influence and control. Considering the experience of the military coups in some Latin American countries, the chapter further demonstrates that once established, it becomes increasingly difficult (barring systemic crises or critical junctures) for the countries to roll back the extent of the military's influence, once it is politically asserted.

Chapter 4 critically evaluates the 1958 military coup in Pakistan, shedding light on how the institution gradually established its control over the affairs of the state. This particular coup was preceded by a growing involvement of the military

in the public realm, indicated by the induction in 1948 of military officers in civilian administration. Pakistan's participation in the security alliances with the West during the Cold War is further seen as strengthening the capacity of the military. The chapter, by drawing on evidence, persuasively demonstrates that the military coups here are a predictable response of the armed forces to safeguarding of its institutional interests, rather than manifestations of ethnic, religious or regional dynamics. By revisiting the first military intervention of 1958 in Pakistan, it is strikingly demonstrated that the then army chief General Ayub Khan was, even in 1952–53, prepared to constrain the political leadership in order to protect the military's institutional interests.

Chapter 5 continues with the investigation of the problem of military control and excavates further evidence of the military's embedded influence within the polity. Key to this is the range of different constitutional measures adopted by the military to consolidate its institutional presence. This recourse to constitutional measures by the military is not unique to Pakistan: similar features for exercising control have been exhibited by some of the militaries in Latin America and in Turkey. During the course of the chapter, we see that in addition to occupying the political space, the military has continued to expand its economic profile through embarking on business ventures, ranging from power generation, engineering, construction, and health services, to name a few.

Chapter 6 draws on fieldwork and primary data for analysing the perceptions of the armed services of the political developments within the state. This examination illustrates that the military is not likely to encourage the establishment of viable political institutions in Pakistan. It is shown that the military has come to identify itself with the state, rather than see itself as just one of the key components of a constitutional state. This analysis then reveals how a powerful military has incrementally penetrated and exercised control over political developments. The constitutional, political and economic dimensions of this control show that the institution perceives, and arrogates to itself, the task of nation-building as part of the military discourse. The evidence presented illustrates the almost universal mistrust that the senior military commanders have of the political leadership in Pakistan.

An investigation into the role of the military in political developments then moves the research agenda forward, rescuing it from the weaknesses inherent in conventional explanations that generally draw on religion or ethnicity as the major causes of political instability in some polities. This study on the other hand, applies path dependency and historical institutionalism to demonstrate how policy choices made at the beginning of the structure are likely to shape political outcomes. The findings of this inquiry, we argue, also add to the body of knowledge that investigates the trajectory of political developments in societies with either the experience of military coups, or the presence of influential militaries in their midst. This also helps in capturing, to some extent at least, the range of issues involved in consolidating civilian control of the military.

1 Conceptualising political developments in Pakistan

An examination of some of the existing accounts of political developments in Pakistan lays the foundation for a better understanding of the institutionalised role of the military. The analysis demonstrates how conventional explanations of political crises are weakened by the failure to ascribe sufficient instrumentality to the extent of the military's involvement in civilian affairs. It is shown that the lumping together of Pakistan with the political trajectories of a number of other developing countries under the rubric of 'post-colonial experiences',[1] is not very illuminating. Such arguments do not persuasively account for the variation that one encounters within these political systems. For example, where India (and for that matter Sri Lanka) managed elections and serial changes of governments, Pakistan's trajectory of political developments has taken a different course. We also sketch some of the crucial historical antecedents of Muslim separatism in united India to identify the problem of threat perception in relation to a hostile India that defined many policy choices made by Pakistan in the subsequent years.

Pakistan's conflict with India over Kashmir, among other contentious issues, translated into the pursuance of self-defence and state survival as the prime objective of national policy.[2] Though the studies that have dealt with the aforementioned issues have added to our understanding of the complexity of the issues, the analyses are generally marked by a lack of engagement with the role of the military as an explanatory variable in the political developments of the state.[3] That in Pakistan the military and the bureaucracy were fairly entrenched and organised in 1947 compared with the other political institutions, became evident once the political leadership had to cope with the problems of running the business of the state. The government increasingly relied on the civil bureaucracy and, later, the military in an attempt to extricate itself from the problems of partition, including the issue of resettlement of millions of refugees and coping with a poor economic infrastructure, among others.[4]

The events leading to the partition of India and their aftermath shed light on political outcomes in the successor states. There are three aspects to the argument. First, though India too had to come to terms with the traumas of partition, it managed and mediated the systemic pressures of the event more coherently.

Second, equally important was the continuity of the political leadership in India, encapsulated in the consolidation of the main political party, the Indian National Congress.[5] Third, what was absent from within the Indian political equation was the threat perception from a hostile, larger neighbour and the issue of the survival of the Indian state itself. Pakistan, created out of a united India, perceived its larger neighbour as not reconciled to the partition as the final settlement.

Political problems

An earlier study mapping the difficulties in nation-building in Pakistan is Keith Callard's historical account.[6] Observing the failure of political parties to organise in terms of aggregating and representing public interest, Callard informs the '[Pakistani] state has been run largely by the Civil Service, backed by the Army'[7] acutely observing that politics in Pakistan would be defined by the legacy of partition and the country's relations with India.[8] Now, explaining the salience of path dependence (as a factor in economic performance), Douglass C. North points out that 'Path dependence means that history matters. We cannot understand today's choices . . . without tracing the incremental evolution of institutions'[9] and that 'once a development path is set on a particular course . . . the historically derived subjective modelling of the issues reinforce the course.'[10] The argument alerts us to the importance of understanding the historical role and subsequent growth of the military as the most powerful institution in Pakistan.

In the autobiographical account of Chaudhri Muhammad Ali[11] (a civil servant turned finance minister, who briefly became the prime minister of the country from August 1955 to September 1956), there is evidence the main pillars of the establishment, the civilian bureaucracy and the military, were well entrenched within the polity. The creation of the civil service position of Secretary-General to the government in 1947, on Ali's initiative, demonstrates this; the arrangement was designed to maintain 'effective liaison between the cabinet on the one hand and the administration on the other.'[12] Ali thus became the cabinet secretary and took charge of the Establishment Division, overseeing all transfers and postings in the civil services. Another significant example relates to Ali's argument for inducting the military personnel into the civil administration of the state. The task of running the government needed trained personnel, so went the argument, and it was imperative that the base of the civil services be enlarged. Thus 'a number of military officers and provincial service officers were appointed to it [the federal civil services].'[13]

A penchant for control, political and administrative, is similarly discernible in the statements of Iskander Mirza, another civil servant who later become the Governor-General of Pakistan in 1955. Mirza declared that the 'masses of this country [Pakistan] are overwhelming illiterate. They are not interested in politics. They are bound to act foolishly sometimes' and the 'people of this country need *controlled democracy* [emphasis added] for some time to come'.[14] Mirza probably introduced the notion of controlled democracy for the first time in the political discourse in Pakistan, though the notions of illiterate and, by extension,

irresponsible masses seemed to be more generic across the executive branches, including the military.

In his influential (if controversial) work, Samuel P. Huntington[15] identifies the military as a source of stability and a modernising influence[16] in the post-colonial state. While the approach taken to the study is reflective of the top-down model of economic and political development in line with the prevalent theoretical accounts of the times, Huntington does refer to the imperative of having an institutionalised polity based on political parties and the party system.[17] Nevertheless, on Pakistan's first military ruler, Huntington makes the extraordinary comment that 'More than any other political leader in a modernizing country after World War II, Ayub Khan came close to filling the role of a Solon or Lycurgus or "Great Legislator" on the Platonic or Rousseauian model.'[18]

Strikingly, Huntington failed to account for the fallout of an unrepresentative regime in Pakistan and especially its impact on the politics of the country's eastern wing, East Pakistan. Here, the leader of the strongest political party in the region had already issued his demands for regional autonomy in 1966,[19] (before the publication of Huntington's book and during the military regime of General Ayub Khan). Another serious drawback of his study is contained within its argument to justify the Basic Democracy system invented by the military government in Pakistan. Under this system, the influential civilian bureaucracy was mandated a key role[20] in propping up an authoritarian regime.

While Huntington's study can be considered as more a piece of how history should be, it remains important for identifying themes and studying political developments of the region. It could perhaps also be argued that Huntington, in his attempt at constructing a general theory, had consciously avoided any normative references to the question of the unrepresentative character of the military regime in Pakistan.

Pakistan's first military *coup d'état* of 1958 is analysed by Herbert Feldman[21] with an emphasis on the persona of the coup leader and army chief General Ayub Khan, rather than the institution of the military itself. Feldman's narrative, with an historical overtone, presents evidence of the centralisation of the state in the Pakistani context and notes the blurring of the lines between the government, and the administrative machinery required to run the government. Feldman correctly identifies the 1962 Constitution of Pakistan promulgated by Ayub Khan as redefining the terms of reference between state and society and severely diluting the powers of the National Assembly through introduction of presidential form of governance.[22] Ayub's constitutional re-engineering has been a model for all military rulers in Pakistan where they have designed constitutional provisions to restrict the powers of the prime ministers or the parliament. Feldman's study therefore sheds light on significant historical events that continue to impact negatively on the politics of contemporary Pakistan.

We have referred to the problems associated with the partition of India and briefly mentioned the difficult state of affairs that marked the birth of Pakistan. Equally significant is the instrumentality ascribed in the literature to the historical antecedents of this event. Thus, Khalid B. Sayeed informs us that 'Pakistan

was the end product of Muslim anxiety' to safeguard its interests within a united India and the 'bold assertion that Muslims, being a separate nation, must have a separate state.'[23] Sayeed draws on history to account for the political evolution of Muslim separatism, and from this narrative one can tease out the national security dilemmas faced by Pakistan based on the fear of a much larger India, probably contributing to the consolidation of the military–bureaucratic nexus in Pakistan. In a later study, Sayeed notes that given the growing political disorder, a distinctive role for the establishment (namely the civilian bureaucracy and the military) emerged to the effect that 'Pakistan could be governed best by tightening the grip of these two institutions on its government and people.'[24]

The problems of weak political institutions dominated by an authoritarian bureaucracy are an important theme with Lawrence Ziring.[25] This is another study with a limited scope, for it does not engage sufficiently with the military interventions (there had been two by the time of the publication of the book in 1980). Instead, observations such as 'the time had arrived for those more experienced in the craft of ruling to assume responsibility for Pakistan's political future'[26] and that 'there was little resentment, and quite a bit of relief'[27] in the wake of the overthrow of the political governments, pepper this account. Thus on the one hand, Ziring re-frames a coup as 'responsible', and on the other reports, without evidence, on the psychological state of mind of the population. The questions that are consistently left unanswered are as to what empirical evidence or theoretical framework of inquiry explains or legitimises military intervention? And more to the point, what political training or capacity-building skills the military brings in to assist governance at all? Is there a case for the legitimate acceptance of the military in the political framework, beyond the modernisation or developmental equation? Ziring does provide the useful insight that the American military aid to Pakistan from 1953–54 onwards gave the Pakistani military confidence to overthrow the government.[28] It is debatable, however, that the absence of this military aid would have restricted the military in any way. Ziring comments on the disintegration of Pakistan, and makes an important observation that regardless of the ineffectiveness of the political governments 'they [the political governments] did not preside over so grievous a national loss'[29] that is, the loss of more than half of the population of the country, never mind the territorial and strategic ramifications of the crisis.

It can therefore be hypothesised that military regimes in Pakistan have tended to introduce deep fissures in the politics of the country while leaving the succeeding political governments with legacies with which the latter are not equipped to cope. This observation dovetails with the original research proposition, namely, that a transition from the military rule to an elected form of government in Pakistan is likely to produce weak civilian governments due to the presence of a strongly institutionalised military. It is also highly likely that the government thus formed shall remain unstable and in the transitory phase, given the nature of the military control. This assumption is explained by briefly outlining some of the consequences of the military coups in Pakistan.

As an illustration, consider the likely legacies of the military *coup d'état* in

Pakistan. General Ayub Khan (1958–69) resigned in the wake of political unrest and handed over power to the army chief General Yahya Khan (1969–71). A significant outcome of the Yahya interlude was the emergence of Bangladesh after a civil war and the war with India in 1971. Later, General Zia-ul-Haq's military intervention (1977–88) probably introduced a retrograde political order marked by religious extremism and the problems indicative of a booming arms and drugs trade (a direct fallout of the conflict in neighbouring Afghanistan). The events following the 1999 military coup in Pakistan indicate the past pattern of military interventions, suggesting increasing marginalisation of the national political parties and the rise of the peripheral political elites[30] among others.

Understanding political developments

The genesis and the subsequent political developments in Pakistan are some of the issues of concern for Tariq Ali, though the argument that the 1958 military intervention was some sort of a counter-revolution does not present a fruitful line of inquiry. In the same way, Tariq Ali's suggestions that 'possibilities of radical advance and mass explosion were built into the very structure of the new state',[31] are difficult to substantiate. There is no evidence, for example, that any political party or group in Pakistan was prepared to embark on a revolution, mandated by the masses.[32]

Analysing the demand for Pakistan, Ayesha Jalal comments that in this instance 'religion appears to have been the determinant of nationality.'[33] Jalal's study is also important for highlighting issues of weak political institutionalisation in the post-1947 order and alerts us to the question of the eventual shape of the polity in the new state, with a reminder that Muhammad Ali Jinnah (the founder of the nation) had envisaged a parliamentary form of governance, with the government and the legislature 'finally responsible to the electorate, and the people in general without any distinction of caste, creed or sect.'[34] This is a useful point of contrast to be made with the military regimes' proclivity to claim the moral high ground for dismissing an elected government, often by alleging political mismanagement or corruption by the civilian governments.

The engagement and the application of the concepts of civil society and good governance are incorporated in Iftikhar Malik's work[35] that addresses the issues germane to democracy in Pakistan. With these tools, Malik speaks of democratic deficits, and attributes these to a 'continuous disequilibrium between state and civil society' and Pakistan's failure to 'establish good governance.'[36] While in essence it is a fair comment, it does need to be pointed out that the attributes of what constitutes good governance[37] are difficult to define and capture. Disequilibrium as an explanatory factor is still harder to come to terms with methodologically, as it presupposes a state of equilibrium in any political process. If politics is about negotiation, conciliation, settlement and compromise, all political processes are likely to reflect an unequal relationship. Malik refers to questions of legitimacy, controversy over the form of government, and the lack of national leadership after Jinnah as a source of political crises.[38] It will only be noted here that the

governments of leaders such as Liaquat Ali Khan and Khawaja Nazimuddin did not face the issue of legitimacy during the 1950s while the controversy over form of government was at best peripheral, as most of the national and regional parties consistently supported parliamentary form of government.

Also grounded in history and the context of the colonial legacy is Ian Talbot's contribution; the argument 'the colonial legacy is crucial for understanding Pakistani politics',[39] however, needs to be tempered with the recognition that political study has to interface with, and account for, political developments post 1971. Talbot's work substantially reflects and draws on historical narrative to unlock the probable causes of democratic deficits in the polity. Observations such as 'The state's contested national identity, uneven development, bureaucratic authoritarianism and imbalance between a weak civil society and dominant military can all be traced to the colonial era'[40] are useful as descriptive constructs but limited in analytical application. The contention that Pakistan's political development post-1971 requires a different set of analytical tools is premised on the assumption of recognising the limitations of a discourse based on colonialism as the determining factor. After 1971, arguably, the issue of ethnicity has not engendered systemic pressures[41] of the nature that had led to the separation of East Pakistan. The military in Pakistan is one constant that has sustained authoritarianism in the polity; the study of this core executive as an institutional player is more likely to enrich the scholarship, than a purely historical analysis approach.

Similarly, the emphasis on the 'Punjabisation' of the Pakistani military (referring to the presence of personnel from the majority province of the Punjab)[42] is reductionist in essence in that it glosses over the approach of the military as an institution that defends and extends its institutional interests. The removal of prime minister Nawaz Sharif in October 1999 is a significant piece of evidence that the 'Punjabisation' of the army is not a useful analogy. In this instance, a prime minister from the majority province of the Punjab (Sharif), with a comfortable majority in the National Assembly, was overthrown after a military coup led by an army chief (General Pervez Musharraf) belonging to the Urdu-speaking (Muhajir) ethnic minority group. The military's preponderance, it is argued, can be conceptualised and coherently explained by applying the path dependency and historical institutionalism approaches.[43] Talbot is, however, correct in emphasising that Pakistan lacked 'any of the characteristics of a consolidated democracy.'[44] In a later study, Talbot does refer to the 'Army's long established image in Pakistan as an employer, educator and development agency'[45] and, had this line of inquiry been pursued further, it could have accounted for its pervasive influence as a crucial determinant in most power equations.

The broader issues of legitimacy and crises that have defined the Pakistani political experiences are captured in Rounaq Jahan's work. Jahan cites Lucien Pye in explaining political developments in new states in terms of crises of identity, legitimacy, penetration (in terms of building social capital, as understood presently), participation, integration and distribution.[46] Jahan emphasises that in the 'early years of Pakistan's existence, the viability of the new state was so much in doubt that the nations' policy-makers were compelled to pursue policies

maximizing the state's cohesion.'[47] These policy-makers constituted not only the political, but also the executive arm (the civilian bureaucracy and the military) of the state. That the executive had steadily expanded its sphere of influence is validated by Jahan's observations on the first military intervention in 1958 recording 'Long before the coup, the military had been working as a silent partner in the civil–military bureaucratic coalition that held the key decision-making power in the country.'[48] For Jahan, the military intervention was then a defensive manoeuvre on the part of the ruling elite to thwart the challenge of the vernacular elite[49] showing the military responded institutionally to the aforementioned challenges.

The regional context

As contended by Bilal Hashmi, the transformation of civil and military elites to political elites began in earnest right after Independence, facilitated by the country's participation in international security alliances. The substantial military and economic aid sent out by the United States of America to Pakistan generated new power equations and strengthened the existing ones, for the power elites had become the direct beneficiaries of the assistance.[50] Now, a reference has been made to the problem of threat perception where Pakistan feared a hostile India, believing that the latter had accepted the partition of the subcontinent as a temporary arrangement. Arguably, Pakistan's participation in security alliances with countries such as the USA was a manifestation of its intent to secure the polity from the perceived or real threats from a hostile India. In this context Hashmi reminds us that:

> as late as June 1947 (only two months before the Partition) when the All India National Congress had finally accepted the idea of Pakistan as a separate foreign state, it still insisted that such a political solution was only a transitory one and in the last analysis there would be one independent nation on the subcontinent in the form of united India.[51]

We know Pakistan embarked on a series of security agreements with the USA. In May 1953, John Foster Dulles visited the country, followed by the visit of a seven-member House Armed Services Committee in October 1953.[52] The US military assistance to Pakistan was announced on February 1954, while the first US–Pakistan defence treaty was signed on 19 May 1954.[53] Not to overstate the case, the US was following its Cold War agenda and its declared policy of containment of communism in Asia, while for Pakistan it was the question of power maximisation in relation to India that was most salient. Where the Cold War and the American policy of containment of communism was concerned, we are informed in American National Security Council position paper no. 48/1 (December 1949), that 'Should India and Pakistan fall to communism, the United States and its friends might find themselves denied any foothold on the Asian mainland.'[54] The US also extended cooperation in institution-building to strengthen the administrative machinery of the government of Pakistan, where the 'Ford Foundation was

instrumental in establishing a number of "in-service" training institutions such as the Pakistan Administrative Staff College at Lahore'[55] for training the higher echelons of the civilian bureaucracy at a policy-making level.

Documenting US–Pakistan interaction from 1947, Dennis Kux reports that the viability of the new state was a matter of concern to foreign observers, given the enormity of problems faced by it.[56] Kux's account rests on firm historical foundations and maps the evolution of the politics of American aid to Pakistan. One constant to emerge from the narrative is, once again, the fear of a hostile India among the policy-makers in Pakistan.[57] For Pakistan, aid was not about containing communism in South Asia; the 'core fact of Pakistan's national security policy has been its hostility toward India, especially over Kashmir' and the 'pursuit of external partners, especially the United States, [dictated by the desire] to offset India's preponderance of strength.'[58]

The intricacies of the pattern of engagement between India and Pakistan have also been assessed by Sumit Ganguly who states: 'Few other conflicts in the post World War II era, with the possible exception of the Arab–Israeli dispute, have proved as intractable. Both India and Pakistan have expended considerable blood and treasure fighting each other since independence.'[59] For Ganguly it is thus critical that the conflict in Kashmir is understood, more so given the acquisition of nuclear weapons technology by both India and Pakistan.[60] Interestingly it is in Kashmir, the only Muslim majority area, where the Indian Union's claim to secularism has historically been challenged.

The emergence of a consolidated central authority is seen as an anomaly enmeshed between state formation and political processes in Ayesha Jalal's comparative account of authoritarianism in South Asia. Jalal notes that the 'implicit, if not explicit, assumption of a shared sovereignty between the Hindu-majority and Muslim-majority groups was unacceptable to a Congress advocating a composite nationalism based on an indivisible sovereign authority.'[61] Cognisant of the territorial disputes between India and Pakistan, Jalal explains the ascendancy of the military–civilian bureaucratic consensus in Pakistan and suggests that for the latter, strong administrative machinery was one of the more viable options 'to augment meagre state resources and finance the requirements of the defence establishments.'[62] It is, however, with some scepticism that Jalal alludes to the interlocking of the external (from India) and internal (weak state structures) threat scenario facing the state. She warns that this assumption 'should not lead to the simplistic conclusion that the weaknesses inherent in the political process were the main reason for military dominance in Pakistan.'[63]

This claim can best be explained in relative terms. For example, the Pakistani military was considered weaker relative to the Indian capacity to project power, but it is equally likely that the military was stronger and more coherent an institution relative to the political institutions in Pakistan. Therefore military weaknesses relative to external threat does not preclude the subsequent consolidation of the armed forces' influence within the state.

Religion and separatism

This section investigates Muslim religious identity as a problem in a united India, and the articulation of Muslim separatism as a possible solution. An analysis of the dilemma of threat perception of the Muslims from the dominant Hindu majority in India provides important insights to the background of the persistence of this conflict, as represented by the antagonistic relationship between the successor states of India and Pakistan. This entails an investigation of the issue of religious conflict in India and, very briefly, outlining the evolution of both of the political parties, the Muslim League (as representative of Muslim aspirations for separatism based on religious identity) and the Congress Party (claiming exclusive representation of the Indian aspirations). On Muslim representation in colonial India, Farzana Shaikh draws attention to the idea of a 'quest for power amongst Muslims', arguing that it emanates from the 'actual historical roots of Islam as an emerging sect forced to deal politically with a hostile environment, as well as its traditional image as a code of action rather than as a speculative philosophy.'[64] This is not to suggest that the Indian Muslims themselves were not divided over the different interpretations[65] of what constituted Islam. The objective here is to identify the social, political and religious concerns of the minority Indian Muslims in a time of transition, that is, from the ending of the Muslim rule to the consolidation of a colonial power, within the spectrum of a Hindu India.

The comment therefore, that in India 'Muslims were a minority and many believed that both their cultural autonomy and their political future were in danger of being displaced by the demands of a predominantly non-Muslim secular nationalism'[66] takes on added significance when examined in the backdrop of the 1857 Indian War of Independence. One political outcome of the War was the marginalisation of the Muslims by the British. Syed Ahmad Khan, the founder of the Mohammadan Anglo Indian College at Aligarh,[67] therefore noted:

> I am an attentive reader of the newspapers, and I have also read the various works that have been written upon the Mutiny and the Rebellion [of 1857], and in all do I find the most bitter denunciation against Mohomedans, who are freely represented as being everything that is vile, treacherous and contemptible.[68]

Muslim apprehensions surfaced again over the question of Indian representation when it became clear that it was the 'declared intention of the newly elected Liberal Party [in the UK in 1880] to institute some form of political representation for Indians along Western lines'[69] It was Syed Ahmad again who articulated 'the real political fears of a minority who had sensed that political competition [envisaged in the concept of representation] such as was embodied in the principle of election, was certain to affect their political future'[70] in that it 'presumed political homogeneity to exist in the face of religious differences . . . [and] sought to persuade men that homogeneity on other than Muslim principles was both workable and worthwhile.'[71] This awareness among at least a section of the Muslim

scholars of the likely impact of a (representational) political system on the minority community's interests led to the insistence for adequate guarantees for the Muslim minorities. For instance, Nawab Muhammad Ismail Khan, one of the co-founders of the Muslim League noted in September 1896 that 'In a country where the Hindus and Muslims are in a ratio of five to one, the Muslims must go to the wall if any elective or representative system came to be established.'[72] In an earlier comment on a local Self-Government Bill of 1883, Syed Ahmed had similarly observed:

> in a country like India, where caste distinctions still flourish…where religious distinctions are still violent . . . I am convinced that the introduction of the principle of election . . . for representation of various interests on the local boards and district councils, would be attended with evils of greater significance than purely economic considerations…The larger community will totally override the interests of the smaller community.[73]

The formation of the All-India Muslim League on 30 December 1906 at Dhaka was then 'undertaken on the premise that it constituted the authoritative voice of Muslim India.'[74] Essentially:

> What the League and its Muslim followers sought to establish . . . was not only that [the Indian National] Congress did not represent the vast majority of Muslims in India, but that as a non-Muslim body, it *could not* [original italics] represent a Muslim consensus.[75]

The idea of Muslim separatism and the movement for the establishment of Pakistan has been questioned. For example, Hamza Alavi bases his criticism on the grounds of Pakistan Movement (for a separate homeland for the Muslims of India) being opposed by 'virtually the entire Muslim religious establishment in India.'[76] This line of argument, that opposition by the religious elite to the idea of Muslim separatism in India subtracts religion out of Muslim politics, is, however, simplistic. That it was the secular and Western-educated Muslim leadership recognising Muslim separatism as an adequate tool for political mobilisation is evidence of a politically astute mainstream Muslim leadership, rather than a rejection of religious identity as a significant determinant of Muslim politics. The observation the 'Indian Muslims were not merely a construction of twentieth-century British colonial social engineering'[77] therefore underscores the importance of the issue of Muslim separatism articulated as a political construct, against the backdrop of the problems of threat perception and religious distinctions.

Problems of representation

The Indian National Congress came into existence in 1885 to meet the following objectives:

First: the fusion into one national whole of all the different, and till recently discordant, elements that constitute the population of India; second: the gradual regeneration of along all lines, mental, moral, social and political, of the nation thus involved; and third: the consolidation of the union between England and India, by securing the modification of such of its conditions as may be unjust or injurious to the latter country.[78]

It is evident that the Congress Party sought to represent the political aspirations of the whole of India, with its programme firmly based on secular credentials. The Muslims, for their part, attempted to put forward a political argument to the then Viceroy of India. In 1906 a Muslim deputation submitted the demand for elections on the basis of separate electorates for Muslims and non-Muslims. Using population statistics to advance a case for self-determination for the Muslim minority, it was pointed out that:

the Mohammedans of India number, according to the census taken in the year 1901, over sixty-two million or between one-fifth and one-fourth of the total population of His Majesty's Indian dominions . . . Under any system of representation, extended or limited, a community in itself more numerous than the entire population of any first class European power except Russia may justly lay claim to adequate recognition as an important factor in the State.[79]

In the same year (1906) the All-India Muslim League was established with three objectives, the first being that of promoting among the Muslims of India 'feelings of loyalty to the British government', second 'to protect and advance the political rights and interests of Musalmans of India', and third to 'prevent the rise among Musalmans of India of any feelings of hostility towards other communities without prejudice to other objectives of the League.'[80]

A cursory glance at the designated objectives of both the League and the Congress reveals the essential difference of emphasis on religious distinction by the League. The only common ground seems to be the declaration of loyalty to the British government by the two parties. In contrast, where the Congress sought to represent the Indian Union, the Muslim League sought a voice to represent the political interests and aspirations of the Indian Muslims. Hence, arguably, the fault-lines within the Indian polity were to come to the fore, defining an area of contestation not only for political space but also for the right to take on the mantle for representing India itself. The acceptance of the demand for separate electorates by the British government caused the Congress in 1909 to register its disapproval of this system of elections grounded, as it was, on religion.[81]

It needs to be emphasised that the underlying assumption of the problem of conceding separate electorates as a tool of political representation was seen as an implicit acceptance of the Muslims as a distinct community (the distinction being based on religion). Therefore, in addition to challenging and contesting the claim of the Indian National Congress of its right to represent India, this development, given the emerging shape of political competition, probably contested the explicit secularism espoused by the Congress leadership.

This emphasis on religious distinction is important at two different levels. First, before the partition of India the construct retained its efficacy for the Muslim League as providing a platform of political mobilisation given the apprehensions of the minority community. Second, after the creation of Pakistan, the issue of Muslim identity could no longer be a reference point for political mobilisation, since 'In Pakistan, the right to Muslim self-determination was nowhere at risk.'[82] In terms of political salience therefore, religious identity had receded in importance as the driving force for national or state cohesion within the polity depriving the League the platform of religion as a political mobiliser. The League, socialised as it was in the politics of confrontation with the Indian National Congress, had its structural and organisational deficiencies exposed. The failure of the League to transform itself into a national political party was exemplified by its reliance on the executive institutions of the state, namely the bureaucracy and the military. In complex societies, arguably, stable political parties not only define political culture, but also facilitate governance. For example, Subrata Mitra opines that in the context of underdeveloped societies, the 'party rather than being the dependent variable is more in the nature of an independent actor, one which tries to glue together the elements of politics with bonds that are of the society.'[83] Thus, in the absence of a viable political party, most of the disputes arising within the polity are not likely to be adequately addressed or resolved. It has been argued that the '[political] Parties are *the* [original emphasis] central intermediate and intermediary structure between society and government'[84] for a 'political system, whether in the Muslim world or elsewhere, inevitably involves the management of competing, even clashing interests.'[85]

We do not assign unconstrained instrumentality to the political party. What is being highlighted here is a path of political development institutionalising the salience of the civil–military executive over the other organs of the state in Pakistan. From the centrality of the arguments noted above, it would be helpful to outline how the absence of the attributes assigned to a political party impact on the construction of a political regime. First, this line of reasoning suggests that such a system will lack a reliable and, more problematically, a legitimate recourse to political representation and accountability. Second, and inferring from the first point, the affairs of the state are likely to be dominated by the executive given the absence of mechanisms for accountability and representation. The institutionalised dominance of the executive can take various forms – including bureaucratic, military or a combination of both – as is seen in the case of Pakistan, and is likely to create difficulties such as undermining the 'ability of the political system to convert anti-state movements into political parties and to make it possible for them to enter the arena of competitive elections.'[86]

Political contestation: the 1937 elections

This section examines the nature of contestation between the Indian National Congress and the All-India Muslim League in order to illuminate the issues of separatism based on religious distinction. The 1937 elections, where the Indian

National Congress was able to form ministries in some of the Indian provinces, present such an example of political contestation. The section further outlines how the League, comprehensively defeated in the 1937 elections, secured an overwhelming Muslim vote during the 1945–46 elections, establishing its right to call for a separate homeland for the Muslims of India. These elections and the actual method of the Congress Party governance are the more important variables that probably explain the revival of the League as the legitimate voice of a substantial majority of the Indian Muslims at a crucial juncture of history. The purpose here is not to narrate all the factual details of the events under discussion, but to identify the pattern of contestation and opposition deriving from the perception of the League and the Congress.

   The 1937 elections were held following the constitutional reforms proposed by the British government, resulting in the Government of India Act of 1935.[87] The Congress was able to form governments in seven out of the eleven provinces, obtaining clear majorities in five provinces.[88] Zaman lists the breakdown of the number of seats won by the Congress to '704 out of 1,585 seats in the lower houses of all the Provinces taken together' but points out that the 'Congress electoral success was mainly confined to the Hindu constituencies. In the 491 Muslim constituencies in the British Indian lower houses as a whole it won only 26 seats.'[89] The League on the other hand had 'fared particularly poorly in the Punjab, Sind and the North-West Frontier Province'[90] and had only 'won 106 out of a total number of 491 Muslim seats' overall.[91]

   Taking note of the election rhetoric of the two political parties, Sayeed observes that both Jinnah and Nehru, leading the League and the Congress respectively, held sharply divergent views over the political programmes and principal objectives of their parties. Jinnah made it clear that:

> We are not going to be the camp followers of any party or organization. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru is reported to have said in Calcutta that there are only two parties in the country, namely the Government and the Congress, and the others must line up. I refuse to line up with the Congress. There is a third party in this country and that is the Moslems. We are not going to be dictated to by anybody.[92]

After the elections the Muslim League expected to be offered at least two ministerial positions, but the plan fell through since the 'Congress demanded from the Muslim League, as the price for its inclusion in the Congress Ministry, the complete merger of the Muslim League Party in the Congress Party.'[93] A prominent Congress leader Acharya Kirplani explained that Congress being a '*Political Party* could not in his opinion sacrifice the principle of Cabinet unity by joining hands with the League which was a *Communal Party*'[94] [original italics]. The end result, not unexpectedly, was greater division between the Congress and the Muslim League with further hardening of the policy postures once the Congress governments started functioning. One consequence of Congress electoral victory was that the 'Symbols of Hindu raj and Hindu culture were adopted in govern-

ment institutions paid for by all tax payers' and a 'Systematic effort was made to replace Urdu, which was the common cultural heritage of Muslim and Hindus, with Hindi. Urdu schools were closed down or amalgamated with Hindi schools.'[95] The Congress was, according to this interpretation, challenging the construction of Muslim sentiment, based as it was on language among others, and introducing symbolism deemed offensive by the Muslim faith. At another level, it can be argued that the representation of the Hindu nationalism was threatening to confront and subsume a substantial civilisation.

The Congress Party's decision to initiate a Muslim mass contact programme (an announcement to this effect was made by Jawaharlal Nehru in March 1937) became another deeply contentious issue when 'it was made clear to Muslim lawyers and landlords that their political future and material prosperity lay in associating themselves with the Congress party and not in condemning themselves ' "to a lifetime in the wilderness" by joining the League.'[96] The anxiety of the Congress in undermining the Muslim League in the Hindu *majority* areas need not be seen as a contradiction in terms for, arguably, the threat perception of a minority community is likely to be heightened where the fundamental point of differentiation is based, as it was in this instance, on religion. The perception of what lay in store for the minorities in India, given the experience of the Congress rule, institutionalised the Muslim League's policy of confrontation with the Congress Party.

The present analysis of the 1937 elections and the subsequent formation of the Congress Ministries, illuminates as an exemplar, the essential nature of political contestation between the Congress and the League, established on the opposing poles of the religious and the secular. A striking theme that emerges from the evidence under review is that of the Muslim League, formed for protecting the interests of a religious minority in India, but looking to coalition politics as a guarantor of safeguarding its interests. The Congress on the other hand, while espousing secularism as a basic tenet of its policy, was using the political constructs with underlying religious connotations. The argument can be made that both the political parties were attempting to secure and maximise their respective chances of attaining their preferred political outcomes by employing stratagems, instead of political strategy.[97]

Taking full advantage of the growing nationalist posturing and ethnocentrism of Congress, the League criticised 'the formation of Congress Ministries, which were exclusive of genuine minority representatives', and declared the 'establishment in India of Full Independence in the form of a federation of free democratic states in which the rights and interests of the Mussalmans and other minorities are adequately and effectively safeguarded',[98] as its principal objective. This articulation of policy was not the breaking of new political ground in the wake of the 1937 elections, during his presidential address at the Allahabad Session of the All-India Muslim League on 29 December 1930, the poet–philosopher Dr Muhammad Iqbal had suggested that:

I would like to see the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state. Self-government within the British

Empire, or without the British Empire, the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim state appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims at least of North-West India.[99]

Recognising the problem of cleavages within India, based as it was on distinct communal identity, Iqbal noted 'that the various caste-units and religious units in India have shown no inclination to sink their respective individualities in the larger whole.'[100]

Returning to an assessment of the Congress rule, the two years of the Congress Ministries (1937–39) starting from its refusal to form a coalition government, armed the Muslim League with a political argument for substantially extending its support base. The next development took place when Britain declared war on Germany in 1939 and the Viceroy announced that, for all practical purposes, India was also at war. The Congress objected to the declaration of war and the Congress Ministries ended in 1939 after the 'Working Committee of the Congress saw in all this [the declaration of war] nothing but the pursuit of the same old imperialist policy' and asked the Ministries to tender resignations.[101]

The League and the Congress, socialised in the politics of confrontation, embarked on paths at the opposing ends of the political continuum in India. During his presidential address at the annual session of the All-India Muslim League in Lahore on 22 March 1940, Jinnah elaborated on the theme and declared that the 'problem in India is not of an inter-communal character but manifestly of an international one, and it must be treated as such' and the 'only course of action open to us all is to allow the major nations separate homelands by dividing India into "autonomous national states".'[102] Finally on 24 March 1940, the All-India Muslim League passed a resolution, later referred to as the Pakistan Resolution, stating:

> it is the considered view of this session of the All-India Muslim League that no constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to the Muslims unless it is designed on the following basic principles . . . that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted, with such territorial adjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority as in the North-Western and Eastern zones of India should be grouped to constitute 'Independent States' in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign.[103]

It is quite beyond the scope of this inquiry to undertake an analysis of this resolution or the political considerations resident in the call for establishing 'Independent States.' It is only noted that the resolution became a point of reference for the two-nation theory. Unexceptionally, the Hindu leaders rejected the Resolution as it amounted to a 'vivisection of Mother India', with M. K. Gandhi calling it 'a moral wrong and a sin to which he would never be a party.'[104]

Another important landmark in the history of undivided India arguably occurred

with the elections to the Central and Provincial Legislatures held towards the end of 1945 to facilitate a 'permanent settlement'[105] of the Indian question. That the Muslim League had failed to make inroads in the Muslim constituencies during the 1937 elections has been documented in this chapter. By the time of 1945 elections however, the League had capitalised on the perceived or real shortcomings of the Congress rule. As for the elections, there was a sea change in the political fortunes of the League:

> The Muslim League won every Muslim seat and the Nationalist Muslims, who opposed it, forfeited their deposits in many cases. The success of the Congress was also very impressive in general constituencies and many opposing candidates withdrew in these constituencies.[106]

The League had, at the very least, established that the Congress was not the sole representative of the Indian aspirations. An outline of some of the major political developments before the partition of India remains incomplete without a reference to the Cabinet Mission Plan: on 19 February 1946 the British government 'announced its decision to send to India a special mission (the Cabinet Mission) consisting of three cabinet ministers' to seek an agreement from the stakeholders on the future constitutional arrangements for India.[107] Given the fundamental differences between the positions of the League and the Congress (the latter claiming 'it would never agree to the partition of India', the former declaring that 'the Muslim nation will never submit to any constitution for a unified India'[108]), the Mission chose to publish its statement of intention on 16 May 1946, which centred on the idea of preserving the Indian Union[109] and declared its intention for 'setting up at once of an interim government.'[110] The Mission rejected the 'proposal for two independent sovereign states' on 'administrative, economic, and military grounds.'[111] What the Mission did propose, Stanley Wolpert reports, was 'a three tier scheme with a minimal central Union at the top for only foreign affairs, defence, and communications, and Provinces at the bottom' and 'free to form Groups with executives and legislatures' with each Group given the power to 'determine Provincial subjects to be taken in common.'[112]

Significantly, the Muslim League accepted the Cabinet Mission proposals,[113] even though the Mission had not conceded an independent Pakistan. The Congress Party, however, remained evasive on the proposals forwarded by the Plan; Nehru epitomised this ambiguity by remarking:

> We have committed ourselves on no single matter to anybody. Naturally, even though one might not agree to commit oneself, there is a certain compulsion of facts which makes one accept this thing or that thing. I do not know what that might be in a particular context.[114]

It is then likely that the Congress realised Jinnah had extracted 'valuable concessions from the Cabinet Mission' including the 'compulsory grouping of the Provinces, and a weak Centre' and therefore rejected the Mission's proposal on the

compulsory grouping of the Provinces.[115] The Muslim League on 29 July 1946, in turn, withdrew its acceptance of the Cabinet Mission Plan and passed a resolution that 'the time has come for the Muslim nation to resort to Direct Action to achieve Pakistan to assert their just rights, to vindicate their honour and to get rid of the present slavery and the contemplated future Caste-Hindu domination.'[116] One can again see the contradiction inherent in the posturing of the two political parties: the Muslim League, banking on the platform of Muslim separateness had accepted the Cabinet Mission Plan that did not concede a sovereign independent state for the Muslims of India; the Indian National Congress, arguably the strongest proponent of a secular, undivided India remained equivocal.

Threat perception revisited

The concluding section of this chapter demonstrates that the problem of religious violence in India permits the continuing interpretation of threat perception as an important variable in advancing our understanding of the conflict between the Hindu and Muslim communities. Paul Brass examines the problem of religious conflict in India and states:

> Partition [of India] certainly arose out of political struggles, but one of those struggles was over the past, combined with the fear of a future in which two cultures [the Muslim and the Hindu] perceived as historically distinct would not be able to live together in peace.[117]

Brass carefully outlines the communal problem in terms of Hindu–Muslim conflict, and makes the striking observation that 'there has never been a period in modern Indian history, most especially in the north, when Hindu–Muslim riots have not occurred.'[118] That this history of communal tension during, before, and after the partition still plays an important part in the construction of violence is seen by Brass in the Indian town of Aligarh, categorised as a 'choice exemplar of riot persistence' due to the town's identification with the Pakistan Movement; it is so because 'in the minds of many Hindus, the Aligarh Muslim University stands in for the Muslims of India, for Partition and the creation of Pakistan, and for so many ills that afflict Indian society.'[119] How perceptions then translate into policy is illuminated by Brass's prescient observation:

> India was soon perceived in the minds of Indian nationalists…as a potential power, the equal of great powers of the West. It was a great, modern state that Indian nationalists, both secular and Hindu, sought to create after Independence.
>
> In the pursuit of that goal, the Muslims of India came to be seen, particularly by Hindu nationalists, as an obstruction, along with Pakistan, whose very existence has . . . been the principal post-Independence obstacle to India's achievement of its rightful place in a world dominated by great nation-states.[120]

Inferring from the above, it is therefore reasonable to conclude that the politically conscious Muslims, both in the undivided India and later in Pakistan, were likely to be aware of the underlying assumption of their community's representation as part of the problem in the context of Hindu–Muslim conflict. Expanding his conceptualisation of communal tension and its aftermath, Brass concludes 'In pursuit of its grand design to achieve Great Power status in the world, the Muslims of South Asia are a hindrance. They are seen as perpetual threats in Pakistan, in Kashmir, and in so-called mini-Pakistans in the cities and towns throughout India' and 'must be molded into political Hindus or be disciplined, defeated, and otherwise put in their place.'[121] The argument clearly identifies the religious faultlines existing within India, and by implication and association, impacting not only on its relations with Pakistan, but also on the political developments in Pakistan.

Reviewing Brass's work, Subrata Mitra has voiced scepticism with the former's analysis on methodological grounds arguing that, 'his [Brass's] reading of India as a whole is wrong, based as it is on a flawed use of the case study method.'[122] Starting from this position, Mitra contends, 'Aligarh is atypical of India, let alone of north India' and asks the question as to 'why did Brass choose it as his microcosm on which to plant macro-generalizations about the production of Hindu-Muslim violence in contemporary India?'[123] Mitra then contends:

> This has much to do with the contemporary salience of ethnicity, anxiety for the rights of minorities, and vulnerability of the Indian state to external pressure. Communist China can shrug off Tiananmen, and the United States can remain adamantly unapologetic about 'collateral damage.' India, very visible to the world on account of its open society, and sensitive to Western disapproval, must face the spectacle of the world sitting in judgement on every *lapse* [emphasis added], be it in Kashmir, Gujarat, or Ayodha.[124]

This interpretation is problematic, for a state (India) that claims secularism and democracy as its guiding principles is likely to be held accountable for serious crises euphemistically referred to as a 'lapse'. For instance, India's regions have borne the brunt of New Delhi's 'determination to preserve territorial boundaries inherited at the time of the independence' and to quote one example 'Since 1947, at least 50,000 people have been killed in insurgent violence in the Northeast.'[125]

Though the purpose of this chapter is not to engage in an argument over the normative value of democracy, the problem of communal conflict probably affects a very large minority of 130–140 million Muslims living in India; if Brass's contention is confirmed by empirical evidence as he argues it is, then this clash mirrors the conflict between India and Pakistan in a tradition that has been institutionalised to a large extent. That pattern has already been identified in the sphere of political competition between the Congress and the League before the partition of India. Kashmir (the only Muslim majority state in India, its territorial status contested by Pakistan), Gujarat (the scene of major Hindu–Muslim violence as recently as 2002) and Ayodhya (where the Hindu extremists had demolished the historic Babri Mosque to construct a Hindu temple in its place), all stand out as

adequate exemplars within the context of religious violence in India. In Kashmir, to quote another example, the Indian military forces have killed thousands of Kashmiri Muslims in an attempt to curb the on-going insurgency against the Indian state, while it is likely that an equal, if not greater, number of people have been brutalised by this conflict. As Pankaj Mishra argues:

> The uprisings in Punjab and then Kashmir, were portrayed by the Indian government and the middle-class media as fundamentalist and terrorist assaults on secular democracy. In fact, although tainted by association with Pakistan and fanaticism, the Sikhs and Kashmiri Muslims expressed a long-simmering discontent with an anti-federalist state in Delhi: a state that had retained most of the power of the old colonial regime, and often wielded it more brutally than the British ever had.[126]

Brass questions why 'large-scale violent events, in which mostly Muslims are killed, mostly by the police, get classified in the press, by the authorities, and by the public as riots, rather than pogroms'[127] and then answers in an elegant phrase, 'often one explanation emerges dominantly, and sometimes a hegemonic consensus arises that lasts for a long time in the form of a master narrative that requires no knowledge of facts on the ground for its immediate acceptance.'[128]

Mitra's engagement with the position of Indian vulnerability to external pressure[129] is then problematic on two counts: first, it does not ascribe adequate instrumentality to the history of violence between the two religious communities that precedes the partition of India by a considerable number of years; second, the reference to both China and USA, it would seem, underlines and not undermines, Brass's contention of Muslims being perceived as a hindrance[130] in the likely schema of global Indian aspirations. Brass, however, is not alone nor is he the first scholar to problematise the concept of threat perception between India and Pakistan. The legacy of political contestation and religious violence also finds resonance in Buzan's earlier account where Pakistan fears 'absorption by an omnivorous India', and Pakistan, carved out of a united India, raises the 'spectre of a breakdown of the Indian Union into a number of independent, single-religion, successor states',[131] demonstrating the resilience of the idea of threat perception and state survival.

2 Explaining politics

Of institutions and institutional theory

Drawing on the explanatory power of the theoretical framework of path dependency and historical institutionalism provides the best available lens with which to develop a coherent account of the military's influence in Pakistan. It is shown how the processes of path dependency generate patterns, making it appreciably difficult for polities to change direction. This approach then makes it possible to argue why the transition from a military to a civilian form of government in Pakistan remains problematic and incomplete. The importance of the theoretical framework lies in the inadequacy of accounts that have sought to investigate the problems of political development in Pakistan. The other part of the answer is possibly more eclectic but ultimately relates to the inadequacies within the literature again: there is a need to systematically examine the role of the most powerful institution, the military, within the state as, we argue, explanations based on the argument of ethnic or religious cleavages as a driver of political instability presents a limited perspective. An analysis of the institutions is therefore a fundamentally ontological position and it will be recognised as such from the beginning.

The premise, as is seen, reinforces the case for the need to shift the focus of scholarship away from explanations driven by class, religion and/or ethnicity-based interpretations[1] to the explanation proposed by an institutionalist frame of reference. The 1999 military *coup d'état* in Pakistan for example, toppled an elected government that was led by a Punjabi prime minister, with his political party commanding a two-thirds majority in the parliament of the country. According to the received wisdom therefore, a military dominated by the majority Punjabi ethnic group and led by an army chief belonging to the minority ethnic group (the Urdu-speaking Mohajir community) should not have mounted a coup against the government of the day. That it did so successfully, with the declared objective of protecting its institutional interests calls for a research programme that goes beyond the conventional approaches of ascribing outcomes to specific causes that do not stand up to the test of prima facie evidence.

We also note that there is scant evidence of religion playing a decisive role in political developments in Pakistan. Though Husain Haqqani has argued that 'Pakistan's Islamists made their strongest showing in a general election during

parliamentary polls held in October 2002',[2] it is more relevant to be able to explain the reasons for this outcome. The religious parties won electoral support primarily because the two mainstream national political parties (Pakistan Peoples Party of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif's faction of the Pakistan Muslim League) were systematically constrained by the military government. It is also likely that the religious parties were able to capitalise on the anti-American sentiment (following the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan) in the two Pakistani provinces of Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier Province, where they subsequently formed the governments (in coalition with the ruling party in the province of Baluchistan). This is the reason why Frederic Grare contends that 'No objective observer believes that Pakistan's Islamic Parties have a chance to seize power through elections in the near future' and that it is actually the military that has 'used Islamic organizations for *its* purpose [original italics].'[3] More fundamentally, there is not a single Islamic organization with the capacity to challenge 'the one and only center of power in Pakistan: the army.'[4] It is therefore reasonable to infer that the religious parties in Pakistan are not likely to capture the popular vote exclusively on the basis of their programme or in a freely contested election where the national political parties are able, and allowed, to participate more fully. Elsewhere, while accounting for the rise in religious extremism, Haqqani articulates that '[General] Zia went farthest in defining Pakistan as an Islamic state and he nurtured the jihadist ideology that now threatens to destabilize much of the Islamic world.'[5] This claim is, however, problematic. There was indeed a sustained attempt by the Zia regime to adopt an Islamic discourse as one way of legitimising the military rule in Pakistan. But the other part of the story relates to the influence of both Iran and Saudi Arabia over the construction of their interpretations of jihad and Islamic ideology that is perhaps far greater if assessed as a function of instability within the Muslim world. In Pakistan, one would argue that the military regimes have historically adopted the dominant discourse and adapted policies to maximise advantage within the international community. For instance, from being a front-line state against communism to a front-line state in the war against terror (led by Generals Ayub Khan, Zia-ul-Haq and Pervaiz Musharraf), the military in Pakistan has shown a remarkable consistency in pursuing its institutional interests, regardless of the terms of debate. The observation that there 'has never been any possibility of a Pakistani theocracy on the Iranian model; not even a theocracy under military protection'[6] is then most prescient; there was none under Zia and certainly not under the military government of General Musharraf.

Before attempting to determine the contours of institutionalism, both old and new, one needs to remind oneself of the exigency of some of the broader theoretical assumptions that will frequent the discourse. For instance, Kenneth Waltz states that 'Theory, rather being a mirror in which reality is reflected, is an instrument to be used in attempting to explain a circumscribed part of a reality of whose true dimensions we can never be sure. The instrument is of no use if it does little more than ape the complexity of the world.'[7] The reference to Waltz is warranted due to the argument of the thesis positing that Pakistan's threat perceptions right from the time of its creation in 1947 had a far-reaching impact on the nation and

state building project. Waltz elegantly lays out the ramifications of the argument while describing his structural theory: 'I built structural theory on the assumption that survival is the goal of states and power is one of the means to that end.'[8] Now, the threat perceptions of a newly formed state, in this instance the one carved out of a united whole (the British India) as Pakistan was in 1947, would relate to the very condition of state survival that Waltz lays out. A hostile India, the problems of settling millions of refugees, the communal violence, and the territorial disputes both with India and Afghanistan, were some of the more pressing concerns of the nascent state. Ralph Bairbanti thus acutely observes that 'no other new nation which gained independence after 1947 has experienced the variety or the intensity of traumas that Pakistan has suffered.'[9]

The intention here is not to argue that the subsequent trajectory of the country's political development was predestined, but simply that the policy choices made in 1947 can probably be bracketed as strategies for state survival. Before the analysis moves on, it will be readily acknowledged that the state survival perspective may not be the only explanation applicable in this scheme of arguments, for it has been argued that 'There is no theory that is not contradicted by some experiment.'[10] What is being claimed nonetheless is that an institutional framework of analysis will profoundly illuminate the problems of threat perceptions and subsequent policy choices in an emerging nation. Arguably, state survival as a policy choice per se is a deceptively simple concept but extended to the sphere of foreign policy, explains Pakistan's persistent quest for means of securing its borders and also its international security alliances-driven policy of the formative years.[11]

The conceptualisation then proceeds on the following premise: that the 'dominant goal of states is security, since to pursue whatever other goals they may have, they first must survive.'[12] Seemingly, the concept suggests that survival being the immediate short-term goal, the states shall 'value relative gains over absolute ones', arguing that 'Very weak states cannot make themselves secure by their own efforts. Whatever the risks, their main chance may be to jump on a bandwagon pulled by stronger states.'[13] What is striking in the application of the conceptual framework is its capacity at generalization across time and space, be it the Cold War years, or beyond, as demonstrated by the case of Pakistan.

Faced with complex problems, Pakistan joined a number of security alliances led by the United States during the 1950s in the search for that elusive security, relative to the Indian threat, which, it must be noted, has remained more or less consistent over the decades, the shades and the degree of it notwithstanding. On problems with India, Latif Ahmed Sherwani for instance cites the remarks made in 1971 by one of the Chairmen of the Indian Institute of Public Affairs: 'Platonically, we may plead all virtue but the harsh reality is that Pakistan was wrested from us and its basis – the two-nation theory – has never been palatable to us.'[14]

That this perception was reinforced by the policy posture of the Indian National Congress leadership has been noted by Ayesha Jalal, among others, who informs that the 'Congress's interpretation of Partition cast Pakistan in the role of a "seceding" state, with the added implication that if it failed to survive the traumas of its creation the Muslim areas would have to return to the Union of India', making it

critical for 'Jinnah and the [Muslim] League to create a viable central authority over the Pakistan areas.'[15] The Indian leadership's further posturing over the distribution of assets including defence stores had the paradoxical effect of convincing the policy-makers in Pakistan to search vigorously for avenues for bolstering up its military capacity. For the Indian Congress leadership:

> Allowing the central Pakistan Government a separate defence establishment was tantamount to equipping it with false teeth to bite and chew up the Muslim areas once and for all. What Congress wanted instead was the right to exercise control over undivided Indian army.[16]

It is therefore reasonable to infer that from the viewpoint of policy-makers in Pakistan, there was a clear and present danger from a hostile India, given the level of the threat and the perceptions of it.

On institutions as explanatory variables

This section explores the theoretical parameters of an institutionalist approach in understanding politics, and more centrally, how it fulfil its potential in an explanation of political developments within a state. The scope and the aim of the work are limited to outlining the salient features of an institutional approach appropriate to this study.

Guy B. Peters contends, and one would agree with his position, that:

> institutions are the variable that explain most of political life, and they are also the factors that require explanation. The basic argument is that institutions do matter, and that they matter more than anything else that could be used to explain political decisions.[17]

Peters adduces a syncretic value to the concept of institutionalism in that the definition encompasses the whole while seeking to explain the partial, that is, an explanation of political decision-making within the polity. Delineating what are identified as features of institutionalism, a note is made of characteristics alluding to the institution being a structural feature of the society or polity (either formal such as legislature, public bureaucracy and legal framework, or informal such as shared norms), and having stability over time, among others.[18]

Of the different strands inherent within the concept, historical institutionalism holds the promise for providing a lucid and credible explanation of the military's pattern of domination and intervention in Pakistan. Historical institutionalism affords one the opportunity to push beyond interpretations based purely on an historical or a cultural approach by elegantly putting forward an alternative explanation: choices that are made early in the history of any polity subsequently develop into institutionalised commitments and determine subsequent decisions,[19] or as Krasner suggests, 'policies are path dependent and once launched on that path they continue along until some sufficiently strong political force deflects them

from it.'[20] By way of further explication then, historical institutionalism 'appears much better suited to explain the persistence of patterns than to explain how those patterns might change.'[21]

If the evidence corroborates the theory then the pieces of the puzzle should fall into place, namely, an explanation of the pattern of military interventions in Pakistan. To retrace our steps, state survival imperatives leading to a spate of military-cum-security alliances from the 1950s onwards further entrenched the military elite in the decision-making processes, exemplified by, for instance, the 1954 induction of the serving chief of the Pakistan Army (who led the first military coup of 1958) General Muhammad Ayub Khan as the Defence Minister in the cabinet. The event shows as an exemplar, critical to one's understanding of how and why the policy choices made at the initiation of the state structure had a lasting effect on the subsequent political developments in the country.

A coherent approach to the institutional theory benefits from the significant contribution of James March and Johan Olsen on establishing, and more importantly justifying, the theoretical parameters of the debate:

> Social, political, and economic institutions have become larger, considerably more complex and resourceful, and *prima facie* more important to collective life. Most of the major actors in modern economic and political systems are formal organizations, and institutions of law and bureaucracy occupy a dominant role in contemporary life.[22]

It is then pointed out that most of the theories attempting an explanation of political life fall short due to in-built inconsistencies, which the institutionalist approach seeks to circumvent.[23] This is an important assumption as the approach has been defined as a 'narrow collection of challenges to contemporary theoretical thinking in political science', while acknowledging the debt of economics (in developing the approach) 'which has discovered law, contracts, hierarchies, standard operating procedures, professional codes, and social norms.'[24] The argument for treating institutions as autonomous and coherent political actors is central to the theory, for a 'claim of coherence is necessary if we wish to treat institutions as decision makers',[25] while the 'claim for autonomy is necessary to establish that political institutions are more than simple mirrors of social forces'.[26] Thus institutions, once established, will have their own dynamics which will be played out until there arises an opportunity for an alternative, and this alternative will only be dependent on, among others, 'the level of support from key political groups and figures, in short on political leadership.'[27]

Following from this proposition, one can argue that where institutions become grounded and part of the political processes, say as has been the case with the military in Pakistan, any alternative to the prevalent model of governance can become viable only when the political leadership capitalises on the opportunities following a major political development or a crisis situation. An argument is made here that the opportunities to bring about a qualitative change in the power equation in Pakistan were presented in 1971 where the military withdrew after the

war with India, and then again between 1988 and 1999 when Pakistan had elected civilian governments and the military had relinquished formal, direct control.

Explaining military dominance as a function of its coercive capacity alone will not take one far and, again, March and Olsen support this point by suggesting that 'political institutions affect the distribution of resources, which in turn affects the power of political actors, and thereby affects political institutions.'[28] Here we note that policy choices made at the time of creation of Pakistan ensured the military a major share of the annual budgetary appropriations, regardless of the form of government, that is, civil or military,[29] meaning that the institution is likely to continue to exercise an overarching influence and capacity within the state. For the sake of clarity, we note that the military engineers constitutional provisions for what it perceives as its nation-building project, be it political (curtailing powers of the legislature and/or the prime minister[30] for the sake of an 'equitable' power distribution), or economic.[31]

In recent history, the formulation and the passage of the Eighth Constitutional Amendment, introduced during the military government headed by General Zia-ul-Haq (1977–88), can be identified as a negotiated political arrangement leading to the formation of unstable civilian governments in Pakistan. Briefly, it will be recorded that this amendment relegated the office of the prime minister and the legislature to a secondary position, while the president (Zia-ul-Haq, who was also the serving army chief) had the authority to dismiss both. The present negotiations between the present government and the opposition in Pakistan over the Legal Framework Order (LFO) constructed by the military is yet another striking example of the negotiating processes[32] that repeats previously established patterns of interaction and political outcomes.

Thus, according to a news report on the negotiations over the amendments, the military retains the upper hand: 'If [President] Musharraf has calculated correctly, there will be no crisis to worry about and Parliament will rubber-stamp all his actions',[33] so perpetuating the pattern of unstable civilian regime formation in Pakistan. The issue of constitutional engineering, as in the past, is an example of tried and tested behaviour, with the military government promulgating 297 ordinances in three years from 1999 to 2002, in addition to 'issuing a plethora of Constitutional Amendments in the form of LFO.'[34]

We can infer from the preceding discussion that the inquiry at hand is also about the problems of political structure in Pakistan, a direct consequence of the institutionalised powers of the military. Since a reference has been made to the term 'political structure', there is a need to clarify the phrase. March and Olsen's definition of it merits careful consideration as it highlights issues that justify the theoretical underpinnings of the statement:

> By a political structure we mean a collection of institutions, rules of behavior, norms, rules, physical arrangements, buildings, and archives that are relatively invariant in the face of turnover of individuals and relatively resilient to the idiosyncratic preferences and expectations of individuals. In contrast to theories that assume action is choice based on individual values and expecta-

tions, theories of political structure assume action is fulfilment of duties and obligations.[35]

The research on the role of the military thus operationalises most of the features of political structure outlined above, by attempting to review and analyse manuals, course outlines and publications produced for the consumption of the military leadership, in addition to locating the main thrust of premier training institutions that aim to:

> enable senior officers of the armed forces and civil services of Pakistan and friendly countries to study factors bearing on national security and defence with a view to preparing them for formulation of national strategy and assignments at the policy planning level.[36]

That the military arrogates to itself the role of reforming political, economic and social institutions in terms of being duty bound, or as the institution of the last resort, underpins the justification of military interventions elsewhere, as it does in Pakistan: such 'regimes . . . [claim] that circumstances have compelled them to intervene in the political process, that this intervention is temporary, and that political competition will be normalized as soon as conditions permit.'[37]

Of comparisons and competing models

This section outlines how the phenomenon of military interventions has fared as an explanatory variable in selective academic accounts. While discussing economic crises and their potential fallout on regimes, Mark J. Gasiorowski[38] takes stock of past and current theorising on the subject. Where military interventions were initially understood to be of a temporary character and the military seen as more inclined to relinquishing power, recent evidence suggests otherwise: it is now thought 'that a new professionalism or idiosyncratic conditions have often led the military to play a much more permanent role in politics and therefore presumably to be *more* [original italics] resistant than civilians to relinquishing power and permitting democratisation to occur.'[39] Gasiorowski is sceptical of explanations based on the application of structural factors in understanding regime change arguing, 'they do not consider the *processes* that actually bring it about and therefore cannot fully explain its *causes*' and alerts us to the 'concrete historical situations' and 'momentous contemporaneous events such as economic crises or war that *trigger* [original italics] processes of regime change.'[40]

Now, Douglass C. North reminds us that 'Path dependency is a way to narrow conceptually the choice set and link decision-making through time. It is not a story of inevitability in which the past neatly predicts the future.'[41] This proposition rejects determinism on the one hand and notes that economic and political choices remain available within a polity. For historical institutionalism, the claim is its relation to the 'theoretical project aimed at the middle range that confronts issues of both historical contingency and "path dependency" that other theoretical

perspectives obscure.'[42] Though the issues of regime change are not the central concern presently, Gasiorowski's findings that 'military rule generally has an exceptional, temporary character', that the 'emphasis placed on "demonstration effects" in much of the recent literature is well founded', or suggestions that 'other international political factors (e.g., pressure from the developed countries and human rights organizations) may also facilitate democratization',[43] will be disputed. The demonstration effect here refers to the presence of democratic countries in the neighbourhood among others, and should presumably be conducive to democratic transition and democracy itself.[44] The concept of 'demonstration effect' has its own set of problems once an attempt is made to either deconstruct or operationalise it. If one considers the claim as adequate, then the regions or the countries without democratic neighbours are likely to remain prisoners of geography and equally likely to remain in whatever phase of governance and administration they are in. There might seem to be a circularity of argument about democracy not taking roots due to a lack of a 'democratic atmosphere' within the region and vice versa.

More importantly perhaps, the evidence does not support the contention that pressures from developed countries and international organisations can necessarily be factored in considerations of democracy as a general rule. There are many variables and contextual factors that can impact either way on the progression or contraction of democratic governance. If one considers foreign aid as a tool to convey international acceptance or censure, then the case of Pakistan is instructive. Thus, out of the 12.6 billion US dollars' worth of military and economic assistance provided to the country between 1954 and 2002, '$9.19 billion were given during twenty-four years of military rule while only $3.4 billion were provided to civilian regimes covering nineteen years.'[45] To further illustrate the point, the annual foreign aid to Pakistan during 1976–79 amounted to $900 million; it increased to $1.3 billion a year during 1981–85, whereas the USA gave Pakistan grants worth $3.2 billion between 1981 and 1987.[46] We recall that during 1977–88, Pakistan was under the military government of General Zia-ul-Haq. A recent example relates to the war against terrorism that has seen democratic, non-democratic and semi-democratic regimes (following Gasiorowski's categorisation) attempting to maximise state interests in tandem with one another. After the terrorist acts of 11 September 2001 for instance, the military regime in Pakistan joined the fight against international terrorism as a front-line state. In real terms, this cooperation generally with the Western nations and more specifically with the United States, translated into regime legitimisation, increased foreign assistance and military regime consolidation in Pakistan. A report by the Asian Development Bank informs that in 2005 alone, Pakistan received about $1.1 billion in lieu of the logistical support that it provided for fighting terrorism.[47] Quoting the US Congressional Research Service, it is also noted that the USA 'disbursed about $3.7 billion to Pakistan for counter-terrorism operations during January 2002 to August 2005' with another $900 million promised for the current year.[48] So, the military regime not only escapes censure, but also reaps the benefits of contextual determinants, including those linked with security concerns of the developed

world. Similarly, major international financial institutions (IFI) dominated by the advanced industrial countries reflect the concerns of these stakeholders, and generally follow the guidelines determined by the participating countries. It will therefore be highly impolitic for the IFIs to initiate policy contrary to major power expectations and play a consistent role towards the processes of democratisation.

These are not the only problems with Gasiorowski's analysis; there are difficulties in the scope of the conceptualisation itself. For instance, the data is based on information from about 97 Third World countries,[49] but Gasiorowski has neither clearly determined how he construes a 'Third World' state nor provided the definitional value of the phrase itself. The inclusion of countries such as Turkey, Argentina, Chile and South Korea, along with Congo and Ghana, to take a few examples,[50] in the same model begs the question of signposting attributes associated with less developed countries. Similarly, the argument of military rule being temporary obfuscates the difference between overt military intervention and the embedded capacity of the military to influence political developments in countries that have experienced military intervention at some point in their history. It might then well be a mistake to declare 'victory' for democracy in Chile, for example, where the military still enjoys reserved powers under the constitution. This point is made clear by Robert Barros, who argues:

> The military dictatorship in Chile was not personalist. Regime cohesion and longevity did not rest upon the concentration of power in a single person or party, but upon a collegial organization of power that was institutionalized through rules and procedures which protected and reinforced the original foundation of military rule.[51]

Barros further notes that the 'solidity of other state institutions prior to the [1973] coup was equally striking' in that before the military rule in Chile, most of the state institutions such as the Chilean Congress (elected through regular elections) and the Supreme Court had been functioning since the nineteenth century.[52]

Similarly in Turkey, the military exercises both overt and covert influence in political and economic affairs. Explaining the phenomenon historically, we are then informed: 'It is important to note that the 77-year-old Turkish Republic rests on a 600-year Ottoman legacy. This legacy contains two important traditions, one bureaucratic and statist, the other military.'[53] In Argentina similarly, the periodic economic crises support the argument for remaining alert to any possibilities of emergence of authoritarianism. It will be remembered that the military in Argentina had only withdrawn in the event of a military defeat that proved to be an important factor in the subsequent political developments. This withdrawal of the Argentinean military from the political sphere was not due to an indigenous mass civil movement for the restoration of democracy, but was 'a transition by collapse.'[54] The validity of lumping together countries under the umbrella of the 'Third World', therefore, is not a fruitful line of inquiry in this instance. One is reminded of Charles Tilly's cautious approach on the subject: 'Although shared

colonial experience imposed common properties on many Third World states, no great homogenisation has so far occurred among them.'[55]

There is a need, therefore, not to over-theorise in drawing assumptions from data that might be too wide-ranging in scope and general in detail to present an unproblematic account, despite Waltz's concern over complexity. While identifying the paths to military hegemony, Tilly suggests that this hegemony could arise from either a failure of civilian-dominated institutions, or the 'disproportionate support that outside powers give to Third World military organizations might be lending those organizations extra strength vis-à-vis their competitors within their own states' or 'the process of negotiation and containment of the military that occurred widely in the West may not be occurring' or 'all three could be happening at once.'[56]

History and design in institutionalism

We evaluate how history, acquisition of skills, knowledge and experience by the institutions play a significant role in the making of some choices and disregarding the others.

North provides justification for retracing the past:

> History matters . . . not just because we can learn from the past, but because the present and the future are connected to the past by the continuity of society's institutions. Today's and tomorrow's choices are shaped by the past. And the past can only be made intelligible as a story of institutional evolution.[57]

Robert E. Goodin similarly argues that the past leaves a 'residue in the present', the traces of which 'are the institutions created by past behavior and choices' and thus helps to explain 'not just where we sit at the moment but also how we got there. Most phenomena in social life manifest "path dependence" of just this sort.'[58] Thus, if in a given polity, at the time of the initiation of that polity, certain choices are made according state survival a premium over other considerations, then the evolution of powerful institutions such as the military and (or) bureaucracy can be accounted for.

Given similar policy choices (defined by state survival permutations), the capacity of other institutions such as the political party or an elected legislature to constrain the influence of the military or the bureaucracy will then remain severely limited. The issue of 'constraints' is also critical for North for 'Institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction' and 'reduce uncertainty by providing a structure to every day life.'[59] Constraints, at one level, refer to the possibility of thinking of institutions as proactive and not inert entities that affect, and are in turn affected by its environment. Thus, it is emphasised 'Not only are institutions man-made, but also men institution-made – they are socialized by the educational or "hidden curriculum" effect of institutions into the values, norms, and rules embodied in them.'[60] Robert Grafstein argues similarly that the institu-

tions 'reflect the distinctive purposes, beliefs, interactions, values, and norms of the people who compose them', in addition to structuring our interactions, and defining 'what the feasible courses of action are.'[61]

Moving on to the cumulative experiences absorbed by the institutions, North reflects that the institutional framework will shape the direction of acquisition of knowledge and skills, and 'that direction will be the decisive factor for the long-term development of that society.'[62] The argument progresses with the comment that 'Ideas and ideologies matter, and institutions play a major role in determining just how much they matter. Ideas and ideologies shape the subjective mental constructs [perceptions] that individuals use to interpret the world around them and make choices.'[63]

Now, it will be proposed that if the subjective mental constructs, or perceptions if you may, are acquired through experience and knowledge, then these will tend to translate into a function of legitimacy. For instance, if the issue is that of state survival and a heightened threat perception, both will be experienced as legitimate concerns, and this concern will subsequently develop into acquired knowledge in case of a threat of, or actual conflict and war, which subsequently will be supplied as a policy choice to the decision-makers and decision-making institutions.

This point is illuminated by referring to Nirad C. Chaudhri's observation on the partition of India: 'at best twice if not three times, between 1947 and 1954, India intended to invade Pakistan and was deterred only by American and British remonstrations.'[64] It can be inferred therefore that during Pakistan's formative phase the perceptions would have impacted on the learning processes and experiences of the decision makers in their choice to strengthen one institution of the state (the military) at the expense of the others. One can therefore identify the contours of emerging institutionalisation of behaviour 'which is more stable and predictable'[65] thus 'reducing costs associated with uncertainty across time.'[66]

The political armies

One can now familiarise oneself with the conception of a military that will emerge as a significant player in the political development of the state. Koonings and Kruijt apply the term 'political armies' for 'those military institutions that consider involvement or control over domestic politics and the business of government to be a central part of their legitimate function.'[67] Accepting that the conception of a non-political military is a 'dominant paradigm in North America, Western Europe . . . ',[68] it is argued that 'military rule does not depend only on the intrinsic nature of a political army but also on its relationship with civilian actors, the broader institutional context of military rule within the state, the public domain and various kinds of social contradictions and struggles.'[69]

Continuing with the problem of military legacies, Koonings *et al.* argue that, for instance, the changes (from a military to a civilian dispensation) in Nigeria and Indonesia are too recent to pronounce final judgements as 'even in Latin America, where democratic transitions took place during the late 1970s and the 1980s political interventionism by the armed forces is far from over.'[70] The 1999

military intervention in Pakistan has been cited as a counterargument to the claim that 'political intervention by the military has been superseded by the global wave of democratization' and that 'Pakistan's most recent coup testifies sufficiently to the contrary.'[71]

To recap, there are at least two functional considerations that need to be incorporated into an analysis of politically active militaries. Kooning has referred to criticism of military intervention for being 'the antithesis of democratic governance',[72] while elsewhere he mentions that in Latin America 'alliances between the military, civilian technocrats, a handful of politicians, business sectors, and the urban middle classes gave medium-term stability to authoritarian rulers.'[73] Here is an important variation in the military-as-a-colossus theme: as a general rule, powerful sections of the civil society, for reasons of their own, seem willing to support the military or an authoritarian set-up thus perpetuating the pattern of behaviour that accounts for the phenomenon of military intervention.[74] As argued earlier, international pressures do not always succeed in aborting such interventions (which could also be due to the secrecy of the actual event), after all, 'the Pakistan military were not sufficiently deterred from their recent [1999] intervention by the international financial and economic vulnerability of the country.'[75] Another issue that has been raised within the context of an institutionalised military will be briefly outlined to wrap-up the present argument; it identifies the 'so-called tutelage problem, when the military continues to exert considerable influence over the political process and are able to dictate or draw bottom lines in key policy areas'[76] during transitional phases with considerable implications for the consolidation or otherwise of an emerging civilian order.

Footprints of time: of paths and historical institutionalism

The following section addresses the extent of the influence and legacies of military rule in the present context, and how path dependence theory and historical institutionalism seek to account for it.

It is a simple enough proposition that an individual learns from experience and, logically, based on those experiences one would adopt or disregard the choice of a particular course of action for future references. Institutions, arguably, emulate similar learning trajectories, and then seek to either follow a certain path or opt for another, the choice being based on the accumulated experience and the learning imbibed by that institution. These learning processes 'will in turn play a major role in the way the stock of knowledge evolves and is used.'[77]

As an exemplar, North alludes to the political development of England and Spain at the beginning of the sixteenth century, whereby representative government grew in England along with a corresponding decrease in rent-seeking, whereas Spain registered an upward trend in the bureaucratisation of the state.[78] Even though North detects 'mediating factors of common ideological influences' among the two states, it is equally clear to him that the pattern of development trajectories of both the countries are dissimilar as an institutional framework conducive to a 'complex interpersonal exchange necessary to political stability'

evolved in England.[79] In Spain, on the other hand, it seemed the 'personalistic relationships are . . . the key to much of the political and economic exchange'[80] impacting on political stability.

Moving on to an assessment of path dependency in its varied manifestations, Paul Pierson's exposition of this phenomenon deserves a fuller reference:

> The notion of path dependence is generally used to support a few key claims: specific patterns of timing and sequence matter; starting from similar conditions, a wide range of social outcomes may be possible; large consequences may result from relatively 'small' or contingent events; particular courses of action, once introduced, can be virtually impossible to reverse; and consequently, political development is often punctuated by critical moments or junctures that shape the basic contours of social life.[81]

If timing and sequencing matter, then Schmitter and Santiso provide a useful analogy by noting that during the transitory periods the politicians are invariably pressed for time and they 'have to take decisions on diverse matters within the same time frame and the consequences of these decisions play themselves out at different rates.'[82]

The choices to be made at such times of transition within the polity (that one might describe as the time of initiation of new structures), could range from the holding of elections to forming a provisional government, drafting a new constitution or removing price controls to controlling budgetary deficits.[83] While Schmitter *et al.* are concerned with the issues of democratic consolidation, they nevertheless warn that the postponement of such tasks at the time of transition will make it especially difficult for the polity 'to reach agreement of the rules of competition and cooperation that are basic to any type of democracy.'[84]

An explanation of why undertaking a certain path increases the possibility of it being followed by succeeding orders is offered by Pierson, drawing on the theme of increasing returns; thus the argument that 'the probability of further steps along the same path increases with each move down that path' occurs because 'the costs of exit – of switching to some previously plausible alternative – rise.'[85] But does it then mean that one is destined to remain forever a hostage to the choices made at some point earlier in time? Pierson reflects: 'Identifying self-reinforcing processes help us understand why organizational and institutional practices are often extremely persistent – and this is crucial, because these continuities are a striking feature of the social world.'[86] Another reason cited by Pierson as to why it is difficult to change policy relates to institutional design, namely, that policies and choices are made to ensure continuity and therefore to 'constrain themselves and others, designers create large obstacles to institutional change.'[87]

Pierson's definition of path dependency mentions 'critical moments or junctures that shape the basic contours of social life.'[88] For the exigency of research, it will be useful to identify some critical junctures in the political developments in Pakistan and present an analysis of their subsequent impact. It has been brought up in the course of this chapter how and why the twin issues of state survival and

threat perception would have steered policy-making in a certain direction. The fact that Pakistan faced issues of survival given a hostile neighbour at the time of its creation need not obscure the fact of the internal presence of a relatively stronger bureaucratic and military establishment; there is an argument that the 'first 11 years of independence were crucial to moulding and shaping Pakistan's political and administrative profile.'[89]

As briefly referred to in Chapter 1, in 1947, to quote possibly the earliest example of such a moment in Pakistani history, the position of permanent Secretary-General to the government of Pakistan was created. Another important development warrants a mention: the military was brought in to help the civil authorities administer the state. Although it is debatable what special competencies the military might have brought in for administering the state at that point in time, one can validly infer that the military would have taken the first steps in accumulating experiences and skills in managing civilian affairs. It is likely that these steps laid the foundation of institutionalisation of the military–bureaucratic nexus within the state. That these choices substantially contributed in expanding the influence of the bureaucracy is recorded in Allen McGrath's account.[90] Once again, the path of political development in Pakistan seems to be falling into a pattern. McGrath thus draws attention to the growing influence of the military: 'The ever-present opinion that India was a threat to Pakistan's existence, and the Kashmir dispute with India, made it ill-advised to deny the Army a sizeable portion of the nation's resources.'[91] As noted above, the defence allocations remain a major component of the national budget, and the precedence of inducting military officers to the central civil services of Pakistan also continues, supplying evidence to the central assumptions of the path dependence theory. One then finds the argument valid when it is suggested, 'this [path dependency] is fertile territory for developing new propositions about the conditions that facilitate or impede various types of political change.'[92]

Some tentative assumptions on the relevance of historical institutionalism

The closing section of the chapter summarises some of the salient points associated with the theory of institutionalism. For Steinmo *et al.* historical institutionalism represents an attempt to illuminate how political struggles 'are mediated by the institutional setting in which [they] take place', and that 'historical institutionalists work with a definition of institutions that includes both formal organizations and informal rules and procedures that structure conduct.'[93] A failure to engage with the unfolding of events, conversely, will result in an incomplete description of the changes within a polity. An historical institutionalist approach supports the proposition that 'institutions play a much greater role in shaping politics, and political history more generally'[94], without subtracting variables such as the 'players, their interests and strategies, and the distribution of power among them. On the contrary it put these factors in context, showing how they relate to one another by drawing attention to the way political situations are structured.'[95]

Peters and Pierre engage with the question of why institutions matter, and posit that institutional theory 'addresses and attempts to explain some of the key problems in contemporary political science', reminding us that the theory deals with a whole gamut of variables and 'refers not just to manifest political organizations but also to aggregation of norms, values, rules, and practices that shape or constrain political behaviour.'[96]

That there are potential pitfalls embedded in an institutionalist approach is not denied: 'Institutional theory, which accords institutions a significant explanatory capability of political behavior while at the same time it assumes that such behavior shapes those very institutions, thus is faced with the potential problem of circular evidence.'[97] The way out of this quagmire would be to consider 'interaction between individuals and institutions as being repetitive, having a pattern, instead of being "singular", that is, unique and thus odd.'[98] In the context of historical institutionalism, it is noted that the institutions are seen 'emerging through what is referred to as their formative periods' where there evolves 'a dominant set of collective values' standing 'in stark contrast to the existing, predominant norms and practices in the system.'[99] Arguably, the formative years of Pakistan saw such a struggle whereby the cabinet style of government gradually lost out to the more authoritarian pattern of governance represented by the bureaucracy and the military. The argument also suggests time as an 'important variable' and acknowledges that 'institutions are learning organizations; institutional development is embedded in myriad social, cultural, and historical factors that define the parameters of permissible change.'[100] The concept of time then imparts vigour and dynamism and addresses the 'unfortunate stereotype of institutionalism as unresponsive and unreceptive to change.'[101]

To sum up, there is much purchase in institutional theory to formulate an explanation of the phenomenon of military interventions. This chapter has illustrated the ways in which the path dependency and historical institutionalism approaches illuminate the trajectory of political developments by elucidating how policy choices made at the beginning of the structure impact on subsequent political outcomes within the state. The salience of the approach is in its application that yields important insights into the processes constructing precedents that are subsequently difficult to reverse with the passage of time.

3 The military in politics

An inquiry into the competing explanations of the problem of military control in various settings offers important insights. During the analysis of causal factors likely to precipitate military coups, it is strikingly revealed that variables such as high defence expenditure are not a sufficient cause of coups. Similarly, the presence of a professional military is unlikely to act as a deterrent to the occurrence of a military *coup d'état*. By drawing on the example of Pakistan, variables such as the absence of parliamentary or civilian oversight of defence affairs and the involvement of the military in civilian administration illustrate the military's incremental increase in influence and control. Considering the experience of the military coups in some Latin American countries, this chapter demonstrates that it becomes increasingly difficult (barring systemic crises or critical junctures) for countries to roll back the extent of the military's influence, once it is politically asserted. These conclusions challenge the conventional views on political developments in Pakistan, and raise questions about the appropriate response of the international community.

While discussing the organisational salience of the military, Huntington's work on the history of the American military[1] identifies professionalism of this institution as a key theme. In this account, Huntington seeks to generalise civil–military interaction on the basis of his study of the American military at one particular phase of its history. On professionalism of the soldier, Huntington argues that the attribute is 'characteristic of the modern officer in the same sense that it is characteristic of the physician or lawyer,'[2] and '[the officer's] responsibility is the military security of his client, society.'[3] Huntington's assumptions are criticised for the narrow focus of his study that singles out the 'West Point curriculum', thereby missing 'a broad range of professional thought and activity.'[4] Attention has further been drawn to alternative interpretations of the genesis of the American military institution, implying that Huntington failed to incorporate the cumulative evidence or give it adequate attention.[5] Moreover, one can argue that the linkage between professionalism of the soldier and that of a physician or a lawyer is tenuous at best and indicates an absence of contextual sensitivity.[6] Being a strictly formal hierarchical institution, measuring the military's professionalism is likely to be useful *relative* to comparable institutions.

Mapping the military's role in polities of the developing world,[7] S. E. Finer's account provides important insights by positing two interlinked arguments explaining the occurrence of a military coup. The first is articulated in terms of the coup being the military's response for defending its 'corporate status and privileges.'[8] The second relates to the institutional interest of the military, where preservation of autonomy 'provides one of the most widespread and powerful of the motives for [military] intervention.'[9] Reflecting on the strengths (in terms of its capacity to project power) and weaknesses (in terms of its lack of capacity to govern, given the dynamics of civilian society) of the military, we are reminded of the organisational cohesiveness of the army that makes it 'far more highly and tightly structured than any civilian group.'[10] On the political weaknesses of the military, Finer identifies two significant issues; one is the 'technical inability [of the armed forces] to administer any but the most primitive community', and the other 'their lack of legitimacy: that is to say, their lack of a moral title to rule.'[11] The position taken by Finer is striking. The substantive part of the argument relates to the complexity of the political sphere that is unlikely to be mediated or resolved by the military lacking requisite skills and competency and, more importantly, the legitimacy to do so.[12]

An explanation of the role of the military cannot be divorced from that of power, seen as comprising 'anything that establishes and maintains the control of man over man. Thus, power covers all social relationships which serve that end, from physical violence to the most subtle psychological ties by which one mind controls another'[13]; the concept is further refined by differentiating between legitimate and illegitimate power, and so forth.[14] Elsewhere, the elites within a society are identified by C. Wright Mills as wielders and custodians of power 'composed of men whose positions enable them to transcend the ordinary environments of ordinary men and women; they are in positions to make decisions having major consequences.'[15] Here it is possible to argue there are institutional links that define the power equation. For instance, Mills explains that '[the elites] are in command of the major hierarchies and organizations of modern society. They rule the big corporations. They run the machinery of the state and claim its prerogatives. They direct the military establishment.'[16] As the latter is a principal concern of this investigation, we also note Mills' important insights into the military mind when he suggests a general distrust of 'theorists' within and by the military institution, and a marked preference for structured and organised thinking,[17] reflecting the nature of the military as a strictly hierarchical institution.

Locating military power is also the key in Peter Paret's estimation, for it 'always has political implications.'[18] Taking a broader view of the emergence and consolidation of the military as an institution in Europe, Paret contends that 'political and military power are never two unitary partners working towards a common goal.'[19] Implicit in this argument is the assumption of a natural tension between the civil and military, with the likelihood of one prevailing over the other. Paret notes the functional problems associated with the application of military power for meeting ends that might have political or military implications. In the former case it is argued that the military power might destroy what it had intended to maintain (the

example of maintaining primacy of the military as an institution readily comes to mind), while in the latter case, the 'process of applying physical force may fail'[20] given any number of limitations.

Another study seeking to enrich the debate on civil–military relations is by David E. Albright drawing on the 'experiences of the sixteen [then] communist states.'[21] The account refers to 'the blurring of military and civil functions for at least a while'[22] and considers guerrilla warfare as an exemplar that impacted on the civil–military relations in many of the communist regimes. The presence of the political commissars within the communist armies including those of China and the former Soviet Union for indoctrination purposes similarly provides evidence for the 'murky'[23] dividing line between the civil and the military.

On competing paradigms

An important article by Robert W. Jackman summarises the key themes of contending paradigms offered to account for the causes of military intervention in the developing countries where, invariably, 'the leaders of the coup d'etat and new juntas declare that their action is necessary for national reconstruction and economic growth.'[24] In Jackman's study, the competing analyses explaining the intervention identify the military's corporate interest as the driving force behind regime change. Corporate interest in this context is defined as the military governments' 'concern with maintaining or increasing the prerogatives and status of both the military and the middle class, even when such efforts conflict with the interests and aspirations of the wider society.'[25] Noting the contributions made on the subject of military interventions, Jackman makes the useful point that such studies, restricted to Latin America (given the frequency of the military coup in the region), 'cannot fully address any hypothesis concerning the effects of military rule in non-industrialized settings'[26] for a number of reasons.[27] Jackman has nonetheless addressed the question of the impact of the military interventions in the Third World rigorously and concludes that the 'military governments have no unique effects on social change, regardless of level of economic development'.[28] This observation essentially weakens the cogency of explanations built on the idea of the military either as a modernising agent or a driver of social change.

The occurrence of a military coup is rated by David C. Rapoport as an 'usurpation',[29] arguing that the 'usurper is obsessed with reading public moods because resistance even on a minor scale' could divide the military leadership on moral grounds.[30] The obsession with anticipating the public mood can be understood in the context of the quest for legitimacy by the military, after the intervention. Though Rapoport acknowledges that 'Every concept of legitimacy can open a Pandora's box',[31] it is to be noted that legitimacy has always been associated with authorised government which, for at least 200 years, has been understood within a framework of popular and democratic representation and participation.

In his investigation of the armed services, Martin Edmonds argues that when the state is threatened with disintegration[32] or facing crises, these 'services are constitutionally recognized as the institution of the last resort.'[33] There will, however,

be alternative views on what constitutes state disintegration, and when can one justifiably claim that the time has come for the military to intervene 'legitimately' (as a last resort). Nevertheless, it is important to delineate the role the armed services are expected to perform within the state under a variety of circumstances. We are warned of a critical threshold noting that 'once the armed services have intervened, and have gained experience of government, the precedent has been established.'[34] This refers to the difficulty of re-establishing political control once there has been a military intervention and its consideration is important theoretically for constructing models that are likely to facilitate our understanding of political developments such as the success or failure of democratic consolidation in a given context.[35]

The politics of military

An attempt to narrow down and investigate the parameters of military preponderance in terms of domination of preferences is made by Michael C. Desch, stating that military institutions are undemocratic in the sense 'they are hierarchically organized' and 'have a near monopoly on coercive power in a state.'[36] As a matter of detail, there is no argument with the reality of military having coercive power, for this is a universal attribute of all modern standing armies. Desch also considers external factors as impacting on civil–military relations within the state and observes that 'While international structure is not always decisive, international variables are . . . the place to begin in order to understand the strength of the state's civilian control of the military.'[37] So, how do we identify a politically active military?

Arguably, one way of dealing with the problem is in evaluating the legacies of the military intervention. Thus, the scope and extent of constitutional and political re-engineering exercises, the presence of military personnel, in service and retired in the civilian sector, and the presence or absence of the military's economic and business interests in the economy, are some of the possible indicators that can be examined to gauge the relative power position of the military within a polity. To reiterate, the point of reference here is the states with a history or experience of military *coup d'état*. In addition to helping form an informed understanding of the political power of the military, these indicators are also likely to explain why some countries manage transition to participatory models of governance, while others seem to languish in a state of what might be called 'perpetual transition' with limited scope to develop stable polities.[38]

An examination of polities with the experience of a military coup shall remain incomplete in the absence of assigning instrumentality to the military's salience, for example by investigating the economic role of the military within a state. That there will be difficulties in such a project is recognised by Peter Lock who explains that as the military's influence in such activity is 'not mandated, they . . . [the military are likely to] sanction social scientists and spoil their careers if they deem research on their role as counterproductive to the pursuit of their interests.'[39]

Moving on, we are advised that for grasping the 'wider context and the underlying structural pattern' of the phenomenon, 'it is important to understand that the period in which the role expansion of the military started determines the present configuration', located as it is in a 'triangle between economic, sociological and institutional analysis.'[40] Lock also finds that the idea the military should take over the affairs of the state in times of grave national crises originated with Erich Ludendorff (1865–1937), who 'portrayed the military as an ultimate arbitrator above the constitution and eventual saviour of the nation-state.'[41] This notion of the military as a saviour found wide currency within the Latin American military circles. Similarly, the modernisation function of the military is viewed considering Turkey's experience (under its founder Kemal Ataturk), which 'imbued the corporate military identity with an explicit mission extending far beyond the ideal-type role of the armed forces to militarily defend the country' and preparing 'the ground for the creeping process of the formal and informal, legal and illegal cases of the role expansion which presently characterises civil–military relations in many countries.'[42] In Turkey's case, what we have is the concept of a military that transcends far beyond its role as a 'modernising agent' to that of extending and formalising its role as the most powerful actor in the state. This aspect of the Turkish military, from defending the geographical frontiers of the state to penetrating the civilian society, will serve as a useful point of reference in an evaluation of the role and influence of the military in Pakistan.

The military in Pakistan

An early attempt at mapping US–Pakistan military cooperation is James W. Spain's 1954 study that draws on newspaper accounts of how the negotiations progressed.[43] Thus, where Pakistan might have had different considerations for actively participating in the security alliance, for instance in response to the perceived threat from a hostile India, what the USA primarily desired was 'the clear and specific implementation of [America's] established policy of supporting regional alliances of free nations to "contain" Soviet aggression and to prevent further expansion [of the Soviet influence].'[44] Nonetheless, the precedent of strengthening the military institution, also through foreign military assistance, was established in Pakistan, with far reaching consequences that were both domestic and international. On the latter, we note that in response to perceived or real threat from Pakistan accruing from its participation in the Western security alliances, the Indian view hardened over its disputes with the former state.[45] We therefore argue that the problems associated with national security can also acquire institutional persistence.[46]

An outline of the path-dependent approach is subtly revealed in Gerald A. Heeger's study of Pakistan's political experiences in the wake of the 1977 military coup. Heeger contends that 'the institutions and political processes of a military regime, and the means by which such institutions and processes are altered, are likely to shape its civilian successor.'[47] Importantly, Heeger expresses his reservations for a strict categorisation of regime type in terms of it being either civilian

or military, noting that even if the military rule gives way to a formal transfer of power, there is the likelihood of the 'emergence of the military in a somewhat less prominent, but no less political, role.'[48] Commenting on the aftermath of the war of 1971 between India and Pakistan, Heeger notes that, for the latter, given the military defeat, it was a 'national organizational crisis' as a 'whole new system of civilian political institutions and roles remained to be organized and somehow integrated with the surviving governmental institutions.'[49] The position that post-military regimes 'must face a general collapse of previously organized roles and institutions'[50] is, however, difficult to generalize in Pakistan's context. One can see the argument that the country had to rebuild the political order, as it were, after the 1971 war. This occasion presented a systemic crisis combined with the loss of territory and military defeat. The military coup of July 1977 (Heeger's article appeared in January 1977) and those of 1958 and 1999, in contrast were, however, preceded by events far less traumatic and the post-military order also reflected that situation. Much more relevant to this review is the contention that 'Under most circumstances, a voluntary transition is not likely to reduce a ruling elite's dependence on the military.'[51]

The imperatives of creating a strong Pakistani state, as opposed to the need for establishing 'participatory political institutions and processes',[52] is how Hasan Askari Rizvi explains the salience of Pakistan's military, and notes that the only time a military rule ended in Pakistan was in December 1971 after the military's defeat. This is a useful insight, and needs to be recorded as such. Of all military interventions in Pakistan, the single occasion when the military was forced to relinquish power was after the debacle of the 1971 war with India. It could there-fore be argued that, in certain contexts, it would be unlikely that the military could be forced to withdraw from the political stage in the absence of systemic crises, e.g. military defeats. For our present purposes it is noteworthy that Rizvi engages with the institutional constructs designed by the military for retaining influence in the political domain. One is reminded that the military commanders:

> redefined the parameters of political competition through executive orders and decrees, constitutional and legal changes, and manipulation of political forces to entrench themselves and promote a leadership that was prepared to engage in politics in accordance with their game plan.[53]

There is also evidence that the first military coup in Pakistan in 1958 was endorsed by the American president, Eisenhower, to the Pakistani leadership in a letter of 11 October of the same year. The official and unofficial circles in the USA hoped that the military, deemed pro-Western, would take the lead in ensuring political stability, economic development and, ironically perhaps, creating condi-tions for a constitutional and a democratic rule in Pakistan.[54] There is then a need for clearly delineating between the forces of modernisation and Westernisation, and to recognise such 'transitional dilemmas can be dealt with by a leadership that enjoys popular appeal and legitimacy.'[55] This concurs with what has been identi-fied in literature: the military is limited by its lack of capacity to mediate political

problems and is unlikely to be a force for either modernisation or social change. It cannot be so, Finer had reminded us, for it lacks the moral title to govern.

Explaining military *coups d'état*

One can examine and employ variables, identified by Rosemary O'Kane,[56] likely to explain[57] the occurrence of military intervention in a given setting. This makes it possible to extrapolate the key assumptions of this study for a greater understanding[58] of the embedded influence of the military. An assessment of 'the relative values of different explanations for coups'[59] draws attention to four possible functions of this phenomenon, namely, coups as agents of modernisation, as the outcomes of social cleavages, as a consequence of economic development, and as the outcomes of a 'correctly calculated strategy.'[60] Contrary to received wisdom, the coups do not occur in disorganised societies, though the phenomenon of military intervention seems located in the 'developing nations', measured by the 'lower ranges of GNP per capita' as reported in some Asian and African countries.[61] It is also noted that the likelihood of a coup increases 'where a coup has occurred previously, and where the country is not very recently independent.'[62] Now, an assessment of the last two variables is particularly useful: the fact of a coup setting a precedent has practical implications for the study of military intervention in the present context. Similarly, the fact that the military coup is unlikely to be executed immediately after independence can also be seen in the case of Pakistan. It so happens because the 'government not having had the time to lose its support'[63] soon after the independence manages to sustain the political system in some form. How do these insights apply in political developments in Pakistan? Following from this argument, by the time of the first military intervention in 1958, there arguably emerges a likelihood of sufficient time-lag (from the memory of the events of independence in 1947 to 1958), making it possible for the military to intervene and overthrow the political order. O'Kane, however, reminds us that several African countries did not have military interventions even after a passage of considerable time from independence and 'an explanation for this must be sought in the differences between the conditions found in these countries.'[64] It is then a reasonable assumption that the historical context of the political system needs to be evaluated before drawing conclusions about the causes of military intervention.[65] O'Kane proceeds to examine and dismiss as of little consequence the variable relating to the 'defence expenditure as percentage of budget'[66] (for countries that spend large annual sums on defence acquisitions) impacting on the civil–military relations of a country, contending that higher defence spending, as a percentage of the national budget, is not in itself an adequate explanation of the phenomenon of a military *coup d'état*. Drawing on this, we argue it is more likely that higher military expenditure strengthens and extends the *existing*, institutional influence of the military within the state. In turn this influence has existed prior to high military spending, as demonstrated for instance, by the original absence of civilian control or the involvement of the military in civilian affairs or a combination of the two.

As a multitude of variables are at play, an inquiry into the question of identifying polities most prone to military intervention is complex and conceptually problematic. This conceptual difficulty is dealt with in O'Kane's later work, calling for further refining of theory so that 'the dichotomised view of military and civilian regimes . . . [is] replaced' by a focus on 'power and force in all political systems.'[67] It also emphasises the definitional value of coup as 'a crucial criterion for distinguishing military from civilian regimes' by reflecting on the incorporation of the political actors or the civilians in the government.[68] This is an important point, as we see shortly.

As per the evidence furnished by O'Kane, of the 121 successful coups between 1950 and 1986, a huge majority of these interventions established civilian–military governments rather than the expected purely military regimes.[69] We expect a purely military regime by assuming that a *coup d'état* probably originates from the military's perception of either civilian mismanagement or a perceived threat to the formers' institutional interests from the latter. The military has the capacity to intervene 'because of their peculiarly advantageous qualifications for staging them';[70] it has the capacity to threaten violence, the organisational skills and expertise to carry out such an operation, and is not dependent on other (coercive) state apparatuses for completing a successful intervention. That the military possesses the aforementioned attributes for staging a coup and overthrowing the civilian government, but after the event seeks civilian cooperation, is a striking feature of the process. It can be argued, therefore, that an explanation of military intervention per se would remain a theoretically sterile field without accounting for the reasons propelling the military to seek civil cooperation in running the affairs of the state.

We note that the military interventions in Pakistan have displayed most of the attributes identified above, including the incorporation of the political elites and civilian bureaucracies in running the affairs of the government. The military interventions of 1958, 1977 and 1999 in Pakistan are, arguably, remarkable for the swift civilianisation of the military regimes. It remains to be investigated if this peculiar characteristic of military governance, that is, co-opting the civilians in sharing of office, is evidence of the military's confidence in its ability to control political mechanism and political space, or a reflection of the desire to attain internal and international legitimacy.[71] The problem of legitimacy is central to this argument, as coups remain 'an illegal means for overthrowing governments.'[72] We understand '*Internal* legitimacy [original italics] . . . in our day is closely related to democracy in the broad sense of people having the conviction that they control their destinies and that governments operate for their welfare.'[73]

The case of Pakistan comes across as complex, where the institutionalisation of military control, formally through introducing constitutional provisions, penetrating the public sector by appointing serving and retired military officers, and by occupying the economic space through its business activity, has made it increasingly difficult for the political elite to roll back its influence. This has created what may be referred to as 'informal blocks' that have stalled transition to a democratic form of government in the country. Illustrations of informal blocks as exemplars

of the process include the absence of debate over the defence expenditure or any accountability mechanisms in this sphere in the parliament of Pakistan. The lack of parliamentary accountability manifests an historical precedent, institutionalised over a period of time. Though parliamentary accountability is not the only relevant indicator to measure civilian control of the military, it is arguably a very important variable within the civil–military paradigm, supplying crucial insights to our understanding of the problem: for example, in the case of Pakistan 'all Finance Ministers have almost routinely announced increased allocations to the defence sector in line with perceived security threats and annual levels of inflation, [and] the parliament has ritually approved such increases without tangible debate.'[74]

The argument that the institutionalisation of military involvement in civilian affairs can lead to a greater likelihood of a full-blown military coup in some countries is borne out by the examples of Chile and Uruguay where the 'military personnel had held key posts in the government before their respective first coups in 1973 and 1976.'[75] Lest the lines between the military and the civil merge or disappear, we are reminded of what constitutes a military government: that 'irrespective of the military–civilian composition of . . . government', if the military manages key issues and policy areas, 'and/or prevents important issues ever being debated, then indeed the classification as a military government seems truly deserved.'[76] This makes for a strong case for an investigation of the military's historic control over the defence budget, strategic weapons and involvement in shaping aspects of foreign policy. The investigation also draws attention to a more central question: given an influential military, how far can the civilian governments in Pakistan be held accountable for the perceived policy failures and mismanagement that trigger a military *coup d'état* in the first instance? It is this perceived mismanagement that precipitates (from the military's point of view at least) political and economic crises, culminating in military interventions in the name of securing order and national interests.

The military of course is not the only institution concerned with the problem of power. Arguably, the force of O'Kane's analysis is in the extension of the instrumentality of power and force beyond military regime type. This position enables a better understanding of countries such as the Philippines under President Marcos and India under prime minister Indira Gandhi, and their experiences during the mid-1970s of the use of force when martial law was declared in the Philippines and a state of emergency in India,[77] demonstrating the relevance of power and force in non-military regimes. Thus India, along with Sri Lanka and Spain, democratic countries by most definitions, nevertheless 'rank high on official violence',[78] as demonstrated by the use of force in the disputed (between India and Pakistan) territory of Kashmir, the Punjab, and the North-east in India, and the prolonged civil strife in Sri Lanka.

Understanding civil–military relations

Another approach examining civil–military relations advocates shared responsibility of control between civilian and military leaders, though Douglas L. Bland warns us of practical difficulties inherent within the scheme.[79] For instance, on a daily basis, 'How are ministers to control the armed forces when they [the ministers] (usually) lack the necessary knowledge and experience to do this effectively?'[80] This, then, can have potential consequences for the civilian elites not having the technical skills to hold the military to account. We recall 'civil–military relations are built on particular ideas that have evolved into principles, norms, and rules embedded in institutions and reinforced by history, experience, and prejudice',[81] an observation that holds 'considerable promise for the explanation of institutional persistence.'[82] The idea of shared responsibility within the civil–military dynamic, is therefore more likely to contribute to civilian control of the military where, for example, the ministries of defence succeed in building 'workable structures and processes', drawing on the skills and competencies of 'informed and responsible civilians', and co-opting military officers in support of policy making.[83] And what explains this insistence on building institutions? This is so because 'institutions…are the foundations and building blocks for civilian control [of the military].'[84]

Norms and principles have been defined and interpreted by Stephen D. Krasner as 'sets of implicit or explicit principles . . . and decision-making procedures'[85] that are 'more than temporary arrangements that change with every shift in power and interests.'[86] Though Krasner's analysis relates to variables determining regime formation, there is considerable purchase, from the point of this investigation, in his explication of Oran Young's work on 'imposed regimes' where 'Dominant actors . . . explicitly use a combination of sanctions and incentives to compel other actors to act in conformity with a particular set of principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures.'[87] It follows that as a conceptual tool, imposed regime explains regime development at one level. This view of imposing patterns and principles sheds light on the centrality of military control in a political setting. The argument then unfolds in this manner: the dominant actor, that is, the military, applies sanctions (as an illustration, consider the removal of an elected government) and incentives (translating into opportunities for other political actors for co-option in the subsequent governance regime by the military), thus imposing a set of norms (a recognition and acceptance of both formal and informal military control) and decision-making procedures on most defence-related matters, aspects of foreign policy and control over strategic (nuclear) assets, among others.

Another way of exercising control refers to 'manipulating opportunity sets so that weaker actors are compelled to behave in a desired way.'[88] As an exemplar, the military's decision to impose sanctions on political parties or the political leadership can be categorised as a manipulation of opportunity sets. For the present theoretical position, this opportunity set can be identified as holding of elections (in itself a contested issue, as a likely outcome is the opposition claiming manipulation of results) where the military allows restricted political participation

for controlling political outcome. The aforementioned restriction can include exiling the political leadership (Pakistan's former prime minister Nawaz Sharif to Saudi Arabia), initiating corruption charges against leadership with the threat of reprisals (resulting in former prime minister Benazir Bhutto's self-exile in Dubai and London) and constructing and co-opting political alliances sufficiently acquiescent to the continuation of military control, both formal and informal, under the conditions referred to above (for example, the creation and sustenance of breakaway factions of the Pakistan Muslim League of Sharif, and Bhutto's Pakistan Peoples Party).[89] Revealingly, all the preceding examples, following the military *coup d'état* of 1999 in Pakistan, illustrate the manipulation of the weaker political actors to compel them to behave according to the military's preferences. This is not a static position for it is stated 'that imposed orders are likely to disintegrate when there are major shifts in underlying power capabilities.'[90] Krasner's article, focusing on regime development in an international context, has the theoretical elegance to account for certain aspects of regime development within the national contexts, as the linkages with the *problématique* of military control show. For theoretical formulation, it is of considerable import to investigate under what conditions such military control nationally is likely to give way to a different configuration of power structure.[91]

What then is the next step in understanding civil–military dynamics and, more importantly, what accounts for the civilian control of the military? One view suggests we evaluate the end product as 'Outcomes, not policies, are the key indicator of civil control of armed forces' and there should be clear evidence of this control flowing 'directly and solely from the actions and decisions of civilians, not merely from the nonactions of the military.'[92] One can draw on this insight to understand the period of the military's non-intervention in Pakistan. For example, during 1988–99, the military did not directly intervene in the affairs of the state. Given the 11-year hiatus, when the civilian governments were functional, one way of looking at the military's non-intervention could be to proclaim some form of civilian consolidation (the term 'democratic consolidation' is not being applied advisedly). It is nevertheless highly likely that in the case of Pakistan, the non-intervention fits the description of it being the military's non-action, rather than civilian consolidation. The fact takes on an added significance given that there was little evidence of civilian control of the military to begin with. This set of reasoning then allows identification of military intervention as formal reassertion of military control in Pakistan. It is therefore not a theoretically informed or empirically supported claim when Larry Diamond categorises the 1999 military intervention in Pakistan as signalling a 'reverse wave' of democracy.[93] The significance of this observation arises from the assumptions of the absence of military control made by Diamond prior to 1999. This study, on the contrary, posits that the military coup is indicative of the military's embedded influence.

Conceptual inadequacies: problems of a professional military

For Huntington, professionalism in the military should establish the ascendancy of civilian control of the military.[94] But what constitutes 'professionalism' within the military? A likely answer will reveal certain qualities, 'which make armed forces efficient, and able to carry its primary task, that is fighting and possibly winning a war. These qualities include discipline, trust, motivation and superior skills acquired by repeated manoeuvres and exercises.'[95] There is, however, a challenge to the notion of professionalism of the armed forces as an adequate explanation of the military's non-intervention in politics. For instance, a study conducted by Mehran Kamrava argues that the professionalisation of the militaries in the Middle East has made the military forces more likely to intervene in the political sphere.[96] We examine these findings in a later part of this chapter.

An investigation into the civil–military relations in India by Apurba Kundu also ranks professionalism of India's armed forces as the most important factor, in addition to 16 other factors identified and rated in the order of importance, contributing to 'India never having experienced a military coup.'[97] The study allows comparison and contrasts with the case of civil–military relations in Pakistan. We should therefore address this question: if professionalism of the Indian armed forces (ranked as the first important factor by Kundu based on the responses of the interviewees) played a central role in India not having a military intervention, then what accounts for the military intervention in Pakistan? The first military intervention of 1958 was carried out by the same generation of the British Indian Army officers who, in 1958, opted for the newly independent state of Pakistan. The level of professionalism for these military personnel would probably have been similar for the officers serving in either the Pakistani or Indian militaries. There is thus an immediate problem with Kundu's findings. To put it another way, the militaries of both India and Pakistan inherit traditions, legacy and training of the British Indian Army. Subsequently, one is deemed adequately professional to not intervene in the political processes in India, while the other (and just across the border) subsequently carves out a history of intervention and control of the political developments within the state. Professionalism, then, does not fully explain this phenomenon. It is also unlikely that the other 16 factors identified by Kundu can, cumulatively, help in building a coherent account of the military's non-intervention in politics.[98] On the question of the military's intervention in Pakistan, Kundu makes an interesting observation, claiming that the people of Pakistan demanded military intervention given the political instability of the formative years.[99] More remarkably, Kundu neither presents evidence for this claim nor reveals the sources of this 'demand' for military intervention by the people of Pakistan. Kundu then alludes to the idea of Islam and democracy being incompatible, with the underlying assumption being that the phenomenon of military *coup d'état* in Muslim Pakistan is religiously determined, while 'Hinduism has instilled tolerance even to governmental mismanagement.'[100] As for tolerance there is evidence of a perennial problem with religious violence in India, before and after the 1947 partition of the subcontinent.[101] Both professionalism of the

military and religious disposition of the society, then, fail to account for the problem of military control in Pakistan. The other serious flaw with Kundu's investigation would indicate an over-emphasis on differentials within the polity. We are warned that the pressure to over-differentiate can entail 'Ptolemaic parochialism' whereby in 'over-emphasizing the differences among the many national states the observer is prone to attribute many of what he conceives to be virtues to his own nation and the vices to others'[102] One would, however, concede Kundu's point of the Pakistani military establishment being strengthened as a direct consequence of alliances with the United States and its participation in regional pacts.[103]

Cohen offers a more nuanced articulation of the actual mechanism through which the Indian political leadership and the civil bureaucracy has exercised control over the Indian military. For instance, it is observed the 'Defense matters fall under the purview of the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) cadre assigned to the Ministry of Defense and various defense facilities, and fiscal policy is largely shaped by IAS officials on assignment to the Finance and Commerce ministries.'[104] Here the contrast with defence policy formulation in Pakistan becomes immediately clear where the military exercises control in vital matters; in Cohen's estimation, 'the security establishment, led by the army, has a veto over all important treaties, especially those involving security issues.'[105] In the case of India, Cohen notes the 'most remarkable fact about the decision making process is that the military plays almost no role in it.'[106] It is also likely that Nehru and other leading Indian politicians concluded the military takeover in Pakistan was connected with the country's alliance with the United States and might serve as a model for India's generals; the Indian political leadership has thus been 'wary of military to military ties between the Indian armed forces and those of other states, notably the United States. [Therefore such] . . . routine contacts are strictly controlled.'[107] The observation is illuminating given that, as an instrument of political control, it is likely that the level and incidence of direct military contacts between developed and developing nations can be factored in as an important variable within the theoretical framework of civil–military relations theory.

Cohen also mentions that 'the real Indian experts on defense and military matters were politically marginalized after independence [in 1947] or went to Pakistan.'[108] This point is introduced, but without an adequate explanation. For instance, Cohen does not reveal who these real experts were, or if they belonged to the military or the civilian bureaucracy and, more importantly, if they went over to Pakistan what, if any, were the implications of their cumulative expertise or relevance in building up the military. Similarly, there is little evidence that accounts for how and why these defence experts were politically marginalised in India, and what effect this had on the subsequent development of civil–military relations in that country.

While discussing Pakistan, Cohen refers to what he describes as the 'influence of the Islamic tradition to politics – where soldiers are an equal party to political decisions' as a likely cause for 'stalling the progress of any liberal democratic tradition.'[109] This assumption actually contradicts the empirical evidence. For instance, the military interventions in Pakistan as demonstrated in 1958, 1977 and

1999 have taken place for maintaining the institutional dominance of the military, even though the military regimes have drawn on the discourse of restoring stability to the state or ridding the government of corruption or mismanagement.[110] The military chiefs, on taking over the affairs of the state, claim the safeguarding of national interests without resorting to any calls for saving Islam in Pakistan, a predominantly Muslim country. Additionally, equating Islam and Muslim is in itself a flawed approach.[111]

Cohen's underlying assumption of an Islamic tradition constraining liberal democratic tradition, moreover, alerts us to the possibility of the circularity of the argument. The movement from point A to point B, for instance, cannot be representative because the backdrop of this movement is Islamic/Muslim, and as it is Islamic/Muslim, it will not be representative or participatory. It goes without saying that countries like Malaysia, Turkey and Indonesia (the last being the largest Muslim country of the world in terms of population) have demonstrated attributes of participation and representation within their polities.[112]

To conclude this section, a syncretic account of the civil–military relations should not focus on disparate causal factors such as professionalism of the military or the religious disposition of the society. An analysis of civil–military relations over time, paying particular attention to the exercise of power by the actors, and incorporating the issue of threat perceptions, is therefore likely to yield more reliable insights to the study of the subject in the case of Pakistan.

Problem of civilian control

Whilst it is tempting to single out Pakistan as a possible exception to the general trend of global representational politics, projecting the problem of military control in some other countries shows how militaries are likely to exercise or retain influence under different scenarios. Kamrava has accounted for the existence of an 'intimate nexus between the state and the armed forces' as 'one of the most salient features of Middle Eastern politics.'[113] Suggesting that the 'more general patterns of state formation and the specific typologies of civil–military relations are all products of larger historical developments', hardly 'any of the contemporary states of the Middle East have been able to fully overcome their military past.'[114] Similar linkages between the state and the militaries exist elsewhere. For example, in what have been termed as 'military democracies' of Turkey[115] and Israel, Kamrava posits that 'military elites are bound together by a consensus over what they consider to be their historic mission: either protecting the state or acting as an arbitrator among its frequently unruly civilian leaders.'[116] However, for Kamrava, it is of more substance that the Turkish military perceives its role as that of a political arbitrator as opposed to that of a protector for the Israeli military clearly illustrating 'how the Israeli and Turkish militaries perceive professionalism.'[117] Military control and influence, as is seen, can then be exercised in polities with varying degrees of political representation, ranging from the one extreme (authoritarian) to the varying shades of the representative and the participatory. Kamrava's sample of military democracies therefore makes it

difficult to generalise about the problem of military control. It is suggestive of the composite interpretations that can be ascribed to, for instance, the concept of professionalism within the military.

Accounting for the military's control in some polities will necessarily remain inadequate without an understanding of the economic dimension of the matrix. In the Middle East, the 'armed forces . . . have considerable stakes within both the economic as well as the political systems', turning the military 'into a formidable, at times insurmountable financial and industrial force'[118] and making a formal intervention superfluous. In the case of Pakistan, however, Ayesha Siddiqa Agha suggests 'Administrative control of the armed forces and general military planning are areas where the [Pakistani] armed forces do not allow any interference.'[119] The 1999 military intervention in Pakistan occurred, it is claimed, because the military 'feared that by instituting personal control of the Army, [prime minister] Sharif [after his dismissal of General Musharraf as the army chief and his attempt to subsequently appoint his nominee as Musharraf's replacement] would eventually downsize the military and reduce its influence.'[120] There is, however, little evidence to support the argument that Sharif had planned any such downsizing of the military. Furthermore, it is unlikely, given the institutional interests and cohesiveness of the Pakistani military, that any army chief would have acted against the military's perceived institutional interests. Handpicking army chiefs in Pakistan has not proved to be a useful prescription for either diluting the military leadership's cohesion or forestalling military intervention. For example, prime minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's handpicked army chief General Zia-ul-Haq dismissed the former's government in 1979, while prime minister Nawaz Sharif's government met a similar fate at the hands of his [Sharif's] own nominee, General Pervaiz Musharraf, in 1999.

The role of a professional military can then make professionalism appear as Janus-faced, where a professional military is likely to be underpinned by institutional norms, making it all the more difficult to roll back its influence within a polity. Not all scholars, however, subscribe to this view and in turn locate relative prospects for civilian control of the military. Muthiah Alagappa, for one, observes the:

> end of the cold war, the dominant position of the United States, and the ascendance of democracy, capitalism, and human rights to nearly hegemonic status have significantly undermined the power and influence of militaries while strengthening that of civilian leaders and institutions with consequences for civil–military relations.[121]

It is possible to claim here that the application of international norms such as human rights and democracy (to illustrate the point) has been selectively applied. It is also likely that these norms appear far less 'hegemonic' after the crisis of 11 September 2001.[122] More importantly, it is difficult to measure how far the problem of military control has receded in some regions of the world; for example 'on the eve of the twenty-first century, when democracy was being viewed as a

fundamental human right, the military in Pakistan was able to pull off a *coup d'état* and assume direct control of the state.'[123]

Constraining military control

This section of the chapter sketches some prescriptive measures suggested for constraining the military's influence in the political affairs of the state and why, sometimes, it is difficult to do so. Examining authoritarian regimes, Casper and Taylor consider the complex interaction of political elites and masses involved in forcing such regimes to exit from the political stage, arguing that public protest against the authoritarian regimes should be combined with a 'vote for change as they [the public] did in Argentina, Chile, the Philippines, Poland and Sudan.'[124] It is noted that where the authoritarian actors are allowed to retain influence after their exit, it is likely that the 'new democracy will collapse, or at least not be able to move towards consolidation.'[125] To forestall this event, it is useful to 'curb military's autonomy'[126] in polities where the military was the pre-eminent actor, for instance in Latin America.

In Pakistan, there is no precedent of civilian control over the military. Having said that, this fact must be differentiated from an indifference to the question of public representation and participation as 'all political leaders and all political parties and organizations, including the Islamic parties, proclaimed their dedication to some form of democracy.'[127] This point is illustrated to counter the argument for taking positions driven by ethnocentric or religious assumptions explaining the military's control of societies. It is indeed possible to argue that the very event of military intervention in Pakistan is probably reflective of the desire by the political elite to widen the scope of political control, not necessarily or exclusively within the domain of defence affairs (interpreted as limiting the military's institutional control), that in turn precipitates the crises of intervention.

We next turn to a consideration of the problem of constraining the military's influence within polities.[128] In a timely reminder, Richard H. Kohn opines 'among the oldest problem of human governance has been that of securing the subordination of military forces to political authority.'[129] Therefore, especially critical are times 'When the military . . . possesses advanced bureaucratic skills . . . or comes to doubt the civilian leadership, [then the] civilians can face great obstacles in exercising their authority', with military intervention as one likely outcome.[130] For Kohn, '*civilian control is not a fact but a process* [original italics]',[131] and 'if civilian control is a process, and its measure is the relative influence of the military over policy, then civilian and military personnel have to work together day after day, week after week, year after year.'[132] One would argue that the processes need not be ascribed a mechanical quality in this instance, as these refer to a deliberate construction of civilian–military interaction. Finally, for introducing a normative value to the argument, Kohn's comment is relevant wherein he reminds us that the 'point of civilian control is to make security subordinate to the larger purposes of a nation, rather than the other way around. The purpose of the military is to defend society, not to define it.'[133]

Cawthra and Luckhman also reflect on the problem of military control and ask for developing innovative approaches to the study of civil–military relations, for a 'different *kind* [original italics] of analysis is [now] required' that 'focuses on a range of new issues, including the diverse and often subterranean forms of military political influence under civilian or democratic regimes.'[134] How the Latin American militaries have evolved under civilian governments provides evidence for the capacity of the military to adapt to a dynamic world order: thus 'Threat perceptions have been adapted [by the Latin American militaries] to the post-Cold War context', where 'narco-terrorism, Maoist guerrilla warfare, ethnic tensions and poverty-induced unrest have been cited as potential threats meriting continued attention by the military.'[135] What is on display is a process of ideological repositioning geared at securing the military's pre-eminence within the polity. It also shows the military's institutional capacity to reframe the terms of reference in order to retain and extend its salience within the polity.

4 Examining military *coups d'état* in Pakistan

An evaluation of the 1958 military coup in Pakistan sheds light on how the military gradually established its control over the affairs of the state, demonstrating that the military coups in Pakistan are a predictable response of the military to safeguarding of its institutional interests, rather than manifestations of ethnic, religious or regional dynamics. In this account, we take institutionalisation as 'the process through which rules or norms are implemented in the sense that they meet with acceptance and that violations towards them are met with sanctions, in one form or another, that are considered legitimate by the group concerned.'[1] An understanding of the event is therefore important for excavating salient features of the institutional processes that enabled the military to penetrate the civilian sphere in Pakistan.

While a useful point of reference for signposting a political crisis, an account of the first military coup in Pakistan necessitates a retracing of steps. As illustrated in Chapter 1 of this book, the problem of centralisation and consolidation of executive power in Pakistan was exemplified by outcomes such as the induction of the military personnel into the public sphere for administering the state. The cascading executive power led a former senior commander of the Pakistan Army to highlight the problems intrinsic to this outcome: what was 'not . . . realised at that time that the Army's direct approach to problems [of governance] was effective only in the short-term. In the long-term such encroachments in the civil sphere retarded the healthy growth of [political] institutions.'[2] This approach soon developed a pattern where the 'Army mind – especially of those in appointments that mattered – had come to accept and expect that Army as a whole could take on any and every problem of the State.'[3] This was, however, not the whole story.

Given the legacies and the violence of the partition of India, the mistrust between India and Pakistan was profound and the bitterness 'copiously fuelled . . . by the great animosity felt on both sides throughout the build-up to the emergence of the state of Pakistan during the whole of the decade between 1937 and 1947.'[4] The frequent deployments of the Indian Army on the borders with Pakistan during 1950–51 probably resulted in positioning national security as a primary goal by the policy-makers: thus, 'If India was intent on war, as it seemed [given the army

deployments], the [Pakistani] army would have to be more efficient and better equipped to ensure the defence of Pakistan.'[5] The Indian political leadership was also seen by Pakistan as part of the problem; for example, the Indian Deputy prime minister Sardar Patel was urging the Bengali Hindus in East Pakistan 'to seek more room for expansion', fanning 'even more passions . . . since the region was divided into East Pakistan and West Bengal (in India).'[6] As a response to real or perceived threat to state survival, the centralisation of executive control in turn probably constrained and restricted democratic norms, for as noted by Adeney *et al.* 'democratisation is less likely to occur when a country is under threat, because the armed forces are more powerful and ruling elites are less likely to risk uncertainty of a transition during a period of conflict.'[7] As an aside, the contention that China posed a more serious threat to India[8] is not supported by evidence. It is important to clear any confusion that India perceived a comparable level of threat from a supposedly hostile China. India, after all, was neither carved out of the Chinese territory, nor had the Chinese leadership questioned the existence or legitimacy of an independent India. Pakistan, it will be recalled, was created 'in the face of stiff opposition from Indian nationalists who had rejected the idea of a separate Muslim state.'[9] Moreover, the country's refusal to accept India's dominance over the years 'irritated New Delhi' and 'has cast Pakistan in the capacity of "spoiler" '[10] where India's international aspirations were concerned.

India was the primary, but not the only, foreign policy concern engaging the Pakistani leadership; the relations with Afghanistan had remained contentious due to the latter's territorial claims over the North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan.[11] Given this dispute, the Soviet Union's provision of $300 million assistance to the government of Afghanistan during 1956–60 would not have gone unnoticed in Pakistan; this included help with the construction of military airfields in Afghanistan in addition to ancillary military aid.[12] Afghanistan was also the only country that had voted against Pakistan's application for the membership of the United Nations on the grounds of it having a territorial dispute with its neighbour. It is noteworthy that in '1969 the Afghan government issued a postage stamp that showed the borders of Afghanistan as incorporating [Pakistan's largest province] Baluchistan and parts of the Pakistan tribal belt.'[13] Arguably, Afghanistan's persistence with this territorial claim is explained by the diplomatic support it received on the issue from both India and the Soviet Union.[14] Cumulatively then, the problems faced by the newly established state bordered on a 'national security dilemma of nightmarish proportions.'[15]

The military's ascendancy

The next stage of this investigation briefly refers to the modernisation phase of the Pakistani Army, linked to a large extent with the foreign military assistance the armed forces received in return for the country's association with the security alliances constructed as part of the Cold War politics. Pakistan, it seemed, had especially captured the imagination of the US military 'as a base for air operations against [the] central U.S.S.R. and as a staging area for forces engaged in

the defense or recapture of Middle East oil areas.'[16] The 'United States Military Assistance Programme (MAP) in 1954, accession to the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) later that year, and joining the Baghdad Pact (later the Central Treaty Organization, CENTO) in 1955', were some of the key events that critically impacted on the 'direction of the Pakistan army – and of Pakistan'[17]; the 'army grew more confident and proficient as new equipment arrived and training doctrine evolved.'[18] A similar theme emerges from an account of an early historian (and a former Major-General) of the Pakistani Army, Fazal Muqeem Khan, who provides an important insight into the institution of the military, informing 'Despite the army's preoccupation with events following Partition, it had succeeded in building itself a fairly firm foundation by the beginning of 1951.'[19] It is clarified that even though 'Pakistan inherited an army that was little more than a skeleton, but the backbone – its officers and men – were safely in Pakistan.'[20] Additionally, it is generally acknowledged that with the appointment of General Ayub Khan (who later became the country's first military ruler after the 1958 military coup) as Army Chief in 1951, the professional capacity building of the army began in earnest.[21] Most significantly, however, we note that the agreements pertaining to the military assistance were 'worked out by the army, not the foreign ministry',[22] highlighting a pattern of an absence of civilian oversight over military affairs that probably continues to this day.[23] Foreign military assistance consolidated the influence of the military as a political actor to the extent where the government 'began to depend upon their [military's] organised manpower to deal with situations of internal security. Thus, a tacit understanding emerged between the civilian and military bureaucracy to strengthen the existing order.'[24]

The Pakistani army's involvement in civil affairs is well documented; it was being called on by the civilian administration for assistance in tasks ranging from help in coping with floods; conducting anti-smuggling operations; distribution of food; rescuing, transporting and feeding millions of refugees; and maintaining roads and bridges.[25] Strikingly, the army was alert to the problem of its increasing commitments towards aiding the civilian administration, echoed in an address of the Chief of Staff at the Joint Services Commanders Conference on 31 July 1950:

> In a homogeneous country such as Pakistan the use of troops . . . to enforce law and order on the people is always resented and leads to antagonism between them. The army . . . expects that the civil administration will take every measure in its power, by wise government and maintenance of adequate and efficient police forces, to prevent this contingency from arising.[26]

In his important study of the Pakistani army, Stephen Cohen expands on the dilemma of the military aiding the civil administration. Cohen seeks answers to the difficult questions underpinning the civil–military equation and argues as follows:

> The very fact of calling in the military implies civilian incompetence or a

failure to apply corrective measures before things get out of hand. Is the military obligated continually to rescue civilian politicians and administrators from their own mistakes? Does the military dare to pick and choose the times when it will provide support, and if it does, will it make the government dependent on them?[27]

Based on his assessment of the political developments, Cohen posits that in fact, the Pakistani army's 'aid to the civil power' role 'is a key to understanding how the military originally acquired the confidence to intervene in Pakistani politics.'[28] Taking this argument further, it is suggested that the socialisation of the Pakistani army in the political sphere was a probable causal factor in laying the foundation of emerging patterns of rules of behaviour, drawing on precedence and experience, and finally, constructing norms of institutionalism that have remained embedded within the polity, namely those of an influential military. The interplay of internal pressures and external circumstances, that is the threat perception from a real or perceived hostile environment, constitute important variables in our understanding of the military's ascendance in Pakistan.[29] Examining the problem of threat perception and noting some of its consequences, we see that:

> A perception of serious threat to the country's military security, from either external invasion or external support for subversion or insurgency, tends to strengthen the hand of military–bureaucratic forces. In particular, it legitimises the augmentation and centralization of state power, the militarization of society, and the restriction of civil and political liberties as matters of necessity for national security.[30]

The point here is not to reduce the attendant problems of political and socioeconomic disorder generic to the partition of India to secondary import, but merely to draw out the growing involvement and ascendancy of the executive within the Pakistani polity. This leads to the problem of centralisation of power within the state, evolving into a set of institutions, embedding within the polity as 'rules of the game' or 'standard operating procedure',[31] in contradistinction to the rules of political competition. This is not to say that the political destiny of Pakistan was somehow predetermined. After all, Pakistan's founder Muhammad Ali Jinnah had a clear vision regarding the state's political system and the role of the bureaucracy within it. In an interview with a newspaper in London on 14 October 1944, he declared:

> It [Pakistan] is the Muslims' demand for freedom because Muslims in Pakistan want to be able to establish their own real democratic popular government. This government will have the sanction of the mass of the population of Pakistan and will function with the will and the sanction of the entire body of people in Pakistan irrespective of caste, creed or colour.[32]

Jinnah was equally forthcoming on the role of the bureaucracy. In an address to the Gazetted Officers at Chittagong (in present day Bangladesh, formerly East Pakistan) on 25 March 1948 he stated:

> You have to do your duty as servants; you are not concerned with this or that political party, that is not your business. It is the business of politicians to fight out their case under the present constitutions or the future constitution that may be ultimately framed . . . You are civil servants. Whichever gets the majority will form the government and your duty is to serve that government . . . as servants, not politicians.[33]

In the following section we briefly examine the competing arguments proposed as an explanation of the genesis of the 1958 military coup in Pakistan.

Political disorder, military intervention

Now, the problem of the military seeking to institutionalise and consolidate its influence in Pakistan needs to be flagged up as an alternative explanation, accounting for problems of political developments. Put another way, there is a problem where the scholarship tends to identify political disorder as a *cause* of the military's intervention, but does not offer an adequate explanation of the latter's ascendancy in the first instance. The perception of the military's status within the polity probably flows from successive civilian governments' reliance on the former for either performing tasks within the civil sphere or bailing out the civilian leadership from transient governmental crises. As earlier noted, both Rahman and Cohen have referred to this point. The former observes that, given the prevalence of governmental crises and the military's involvement for a likely resolution of such crises, policy decisions made by the Army Chief came to be 'invariably accepted by the government'.[34] What we can infer from the logic of the observation, is a spectre of unfolding of processes of the military's institutionalisation of its influence and control within the state.

If it is accepted that, given this evidence, the military was well on its way to institutionalising its role as a political actor, then it was also likely that it would act to protect its institutional interests. For example, while analysing the 1954 dismissal of the Constituent Assembly in Pakistan by the Governor-General Ghulam Muhammad, Allan McGrath has argued that this dismissal was a likely response to the budgetary proposals (initiated by the civilian government and passed by the Assembly) calling for a one-third reduction in defence expenditure: 'This was an unprecedented move, and was bound to alarm [General] Ayub and the army.'[35] It shows that military interventions in Pakistan cannot be seen in isolation as a set of responses to political disorder, but also a manifestation of the military (and at least early civilian bureaucracy) leadership's determination to challenge political forces seeking to dilute their influence within the political arena. For example, Hashmi is among the scholars contending that 'the main reason for the military coup [of October 1958] seems to be the civil and military elites' overriding desire

to prevent Pakistan's first-ever general elections from taking place in February 1959.'[36] More importantly, Jalal makes the acute observation that 'The very fact of a military takeover in October 1958 suggests that, in spite of the dominance of the bureaucracy and the army, the internal structures of the State were still fluid enough to be threatened by political forces.'[37] Here, a key theme can be inferred: that the military in Pakistan was not only establishing its influence within the state, but was also prepared to encroach upon the political space independently of the emergent political scenario. For example, explaining the construction of perception among the Pakistani military leadership, Rahman informs of a lack of trust (on the part of the armed forces) of 'civilians in their ability to keep military secrets', thus encouraging the latter to deal directly with certain civil departments; resultantly the military, as an institution, gained the knowledge, skills and the confidence to the extent that the 'tail started to wag the dog.'[38] Arguably, one cause of this mistrust among the military leadership can be ascribed to the attempts of the political leadership seeking to curtail defence expenditure. It is also likely that such attempts would have been interpreted by the military as challenging its institutional interests. Therefore, the attempts by the government during the years 1947–48 to curtail expenditure on the army or planning to 'disband the only Armoured Brigade the Pakistan Army possessed, on the pretext that the army could neither afford such expensive equipment nor maintain it satisfactorily'[39] probably resulted in increased suspicion and mistrust.[40]

Consolidating military control

In an earlier part of the chapter, a reference was made to the dismissal of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan in 1954. Herbert Feldman, in his detailed analysis suggests it is unlikely that the Assembly could have been dismissed without the army chief General Ayub Khan's prior knowledge, or that the Governor-General Ghulam Muhammad had not been assured of the support of the army on this step. The subsequent induction of the serving army chief General Ayub Khan in the reconstituted cabinet as the Defence Minister supports the proposition.[41] The following example also supports the contention of an emerging civil–military dynamic within the polity: when the Constituent Assembly's President Tamizuddin Khan challenged the dissolution of the Assembly, the Federal Court of Pakistan ruled in favour of government's appeal for upholding the dissolution on 21 March 1955.[42] Significantly, once the challenge was filed with the court, both Iskander Mirza and Ayub Khan approached Tamizuddin's attorney with a view to attempting a 'political settlement' resulting in the possible 'withdrawal of the Court petition'.[43] What is significant in this account is the involvement of a serving army chief, who acted as a *political mediator*, even arbitrator, in a governmental crisis. Of the actual decision of the Federal Court upholding the dismissal of the Assembly, it has been suggested that the 'judgement paved the way for future justifications by the judiciary of patently arbitrary . . . acts of the executive on hyper-technical grounds.'[44] To complete the present account, we note that the second Constituent Assembly (after the dismissal of the first) was indirectly

elected through the 'electoral college of the provincial assemblies of Pakistan', subsequently passing the 1956 Constitution, vesting 'extra-ordinary powers in the president' despite the constitution's claim of adherence to a parliamentary form of governance.[45] The military was thus exercising control over the political trajectory of the state, both formally and informally, where informal control[46] in this context is exemplified by the tacit approval of the army to the dismissal of the Assembly, while the appointment of the serving army chief as a cabinet minister demonstrates a formal control or influence of the military.

Examining the political history of Pakistan from a constitutional and legal perspective, an argument suggests that Ayub's induction into the Cabinet was 'the beginning of the end of the supremacy of civilian over military power.'[47] We contend, however, that there was no civilian supremacy over the military in the first instance. For example, the formulation of defence policy in Pakistan was neither established nor considered within the domain of parliamentary accountability. Whilst there was an acceptance amongst the Constituent Assembly members of the need to strengthen the defence of the country, 'What the Parliament did not do in the first session, and which tended to set the pattern of future debates, was to discuss the defence allocations to various arms of the forces in detail and emphasise the need to avoid secrecy.'[48] It is, however, problematic to educe the reason for the parliament's non-engagement with the debate on defence affairs. One view holds that, given the absence of parliamentary and cabinet committees on defence affairs for overview and scrutiny purposes, the bureaucracy probably exerted considerable influence in this sphere and that, in the absence of any special expertise in defence affairs, the bureaucracy in turn remained dependent on the military leadership for military policy formulation.[49] Though parliamentary governance as a function of the capacity of the representatives remains an important issue, one should also take into account Saeed Shafqat's assertion (though more specific to the 1977 military coup in Pakistan) that 'it was the relative strength of the military that prompted its intervention in politics, and not merely the weakness of the political institutions.'[50] However, the fact remains that the absence of parliamentary accountability of military affairs in Pakistan continues to this day. Thus, where the civilian political leadership struggles to exercise control, the military resists such an outcome.

This tussle is illustrated by the following example in contemporary Pakistan, and helps us answer this question: 'Who in fact is in charge of [the] country?'[51] Here, we evaluate the working of the Defence Committee of the Senate (Upper House of the Parliament) of Pakistan, and draw on the views and experiences of Mr Farhatullah Babar, a former Senator and member of the Committee to ascertain the Committees' effectiveness in scrutinising defence-related matters.[52] The account provides significant insights into the dynamics of civil–military relations in Pakistan and illuminates the extent and the consequences of institutionalised military control within the state.

On the question of the remit of the Defence Committee of the Senate (henceforth DCS), Mr Babar notes that 'in theory' it includes 'the powers to call for record, summon witnesses, question officials and investigate any matter relating

to any department of the Defence Ministry.'[53] The DCS is also empowered to 'take up suo moto notice of any defence related matter through the device of requisitioning a meeting by three members of the Committee.'[54] The mechanism of scrutinising defence affairs is therefore in place, but what actually transpires beneath the veneer is our concern. We discover that in practice, when summoned to answer questions on issues such as those relating to the army's business concerns among others, the military officers both retired and in uniform have refused to appear before the DCS, either by questioning the mandate of the Committee or by simply ignoring such notice.[55] Similarly, where the DCS members belonging to the opposition demanded that the Committee, 'for the sake of symbolism at least'[56], should be briefed by the armed forces' General Headquarters (GHQ) at the Committee Room of the Parliament instead of the military headquarters, the Defence Ministry refused; the opposition members of the DCS in turn declined to attend the GHQ for this purpose. The outcome of the disagreement was two-fold: the briefing was postponed and not held, 'a rare thing indeed', and second, it 'showed a mindset and an attitude that has adversely affected the working of the Committee.'[57] It does not take much to infer that real or symbolic gestures, which may even suggest parliamentary, or for that matter civilian, oversight, are likely to be resisted by the military. Equally revealing is another occasion when the DCS sought to discuss the shifting of the military headquarters from Rawalpindi to Islamabad, the meeting was postponed on different pretexts 'till the term of the members who had requisitioned the meeting expired and he was out of the Senate.'[58] The evidence demonstrates, in all its complexity, the real challenges faced by a polity seeking to exercise control over an influential military, and the latter's determination to resist such measures, even symbolic ones. To reiterate, the military is even unwilling to engage in a process that could probably lead to a perception of civilian control.

Answering a question on the problems faced by the DCS in auditing and monitoring of defence-related matters, Mr Babar thought a very serious issue related to 'the inability of uniformed [military] officers to come to terms with a sovereign parliament and [the concept of] parliamentary supremacy. The military officers seem to believe that they are not accountable to the Parliament.'[59] The former Senator acutely notes 'the long standing desire of the military to re-write the civil–military equation on their terms alone', and cites former army chief General Jahangir Karamat's public comment on the subject.[60] Though the question of parliamentary oversight of military affairs is a 'long drawn battle the outcome of which will not be coming anytime soon', the members of parliament should not give up on asking questions, and 'must equip themselves with [the] knowledge and demonstrate willingness and courage to demand answers [from the armed services].'[61] That the members of the parliament are still seeking answers, without success, is illustrated in another report. The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) of the National Assembly (the Lower House) of Pakistan asked the Secretary Defence (the administrative head of the Defence Ministry, then a retired Lieutenant General of the Pakistani army) to provide details about the agreement reached between Pakistan and the USA on using Pakistani airbases in its campaigns in

Afghanistan, the names of those who had signed the agreement, and the money received by the Pakistani government.[62] The Secretary Defence, the report noted, refused to answer the questions as it was 'not in the purview of the PAC to ask him such questions when he was there to reply to objections of the audit department about the defence ministry.'[63] The fact that Pakistan has an in-uniform president, who is also the army chief, can be stated as limiting civilian authority in the first instance. However, even where the military is not directly or overtly running the affairs of the state, it is equally disinclined to accept direction from the elected officials.[64]

Saving democracy

Returning to our assessment of the 1958 military coup, on 7 October 1958, President Iskander Mirza abrogated the Constitution of 1956, dismissed the central and provincial governments, dissolved the National and Provincial Assemblies, banned all political parties and declared martial law in Pakistan. The army chief General Ayub Khan was appointed the Chief Martial Law Administrator. In a broadcast to the nation on 8 October 1958, Ayub spoke of wanting to restore democracy 'of a type that people could understand and work.'[65] That the military had decided to intervene becomes apparent in the light of Ayub Khan's subsequent statement: 'while it was the president's [Mirza's] constitutional responsibility to halt the disintegration of the country, it would have been the Army's responsibility to do so if the president had not acted.'[66] As for the potential disintegration of the country, a counterargument challenges the received wisdom with the claim that, 'before the military coup, Pakistan was in a state of *contrived* [emphasis added] political instability . . . It is a matter of record that both Mirza and Ayub had pleaded corruption among the politicians for overthrowing the political system in 1958.'[67] The same analysis, however, notes:

> None of the seven prime ministers during this period [1951–58] was accused of graft. The government was unstable with reference to prime minister's identity but not in relation to the substance of public policy, which was shaped largely by higher civil servants, who remained secure and stable both in their posts and in orientations.[68]

Essentially, the military coup of 1958 was motivated by the quest for preservation of institutional control by the military of political developments in Pakistan and not for 'political' or governance failures; as has been duly argued 'No civilian regime has ever produced a *general* [original italics] breakdown of civil authority in Pakistan' and the 'only rulers who have ever reduced Pakistan to anarchy have been [the] generals.'[69] Add on to this the contention that in Pakistan the civilian governments have mostly been at the receiving end of the mantra of good governance and democratisation, whereas the military regimes have benefited from extensive military and economic assistance, especially from the USA. This is evident from the support given to Generals Ayub Khan (security alliances),

Zia-ul-Haq (the Afghan campaign), and Pervaiz Musharraf (the war on terror). Thus we see the progression from an 'illegal regime [formed after overthrowing elected governments] into a loyal friend of the West, a front-line state.'[70] Where the justification for the overthrow of the civilian government comes in, that is, in order to arrest corruption or mismanagement, one is warned of an outcome where the 'guardians may indeed try to carry on ruling the country after the end of the emergency, or more often, by prolonging the emergency – if they can get away with it.'[71] Following from this reasoning, in the absence of political competition and public accountability,[72] it is highly likely that the authoritarian regime would seek to preserve the status quo that it has so recently created.[73]

As to the present concern with the military coup of 1958, there is evidence of the military's quest for the preservation of its institutional interests. For example, Jalal cites an American intelligence report of 1958 as suggesting 'the Pakistan army ha[d] developed as a pressure group [and would] continue to have priority over economic development for appropriations irrespective of the Indian factor.'[74] The declassified documents of British and the US governments shed more light on the 1958 military and provide important information about the military's capacity to influence political developments. We find the country's military leadership was determined, as far back as 1952, to influence and control the trajectory of political affairs of the state. In this context, note the striking comments made by the then army chief General Ayub Khan to the American Consul General in Pakistan. This conversation takes place in the backdrop of General Ayub being told that some of his junior officers were looking up to the military governments in Egypt, Syria and Lebanon as possible exemplars for establishing a military government in Pakistan. Ayub informs the American Consul that:

> he had told his Divisional Commanders that the talk of the Pakistan Army taking over the Government was to be stopped . . . the position of the Army was to protect the country . . . that the Pakistan Army did not have trained men in Governmental affairs and that such talk was a danger to the country. General Ayub stated that he had been talking to the leading politicians of Pakistan, and had told them that they must make up their minds to go whole-heartedly with the West . . . He [Ayub] stated that the Pakistan Army will not allow the political leaders to get out of hand, and the same is true regarding the people of Pakistan. He stated that he realized that the Army was taking on a large responsibility, but that the Army's duty was to protect the country.[75]

An analysis of the above report allows for the articulation of the following inferences: first is General Ayub Khan's implicit concern with the *problematique* of the military's overt involvement in politics. Importantly, the army chief's concern is on account of not having trained personnel to run the affairs of the government, as opposed to acceptance of the principle of civilian supremacy over all governmental affairs, including those of the military. This point is of considerable significance. We will note that the above conversation takes place in 1952, that is within 5 years of Pakistan's independence, and serves to indicate the emerging

contours of a pattern of behaviour in the exercise of influence and control by the Pakistani military. Of equal import is the other timescale. Within 6 years of Ayub's conversation with the American Consul General, Pakistan experienced the first military *coup d'état* of 1958. Now, Rosemary O'Kane has acutely observed that the 'the great definitional virtue of *coup d'état* is that it is a particular strategy for illegal government overthrow.'[76] O'Kane's is an essential point, in striking contrast to the position taken by some scholars on the phenomenon of military *coup d'état* in Pakistan. For example, Herbert Feldman agrees with the view that Ayub's removal of the civilian government was to 'help the civil power to clear up the existing mess'[77] without assigning due consideration to the original illegality of the event. This suggests that normatively based explanations and justifications also always reside within a context that may not support these positions.

Going back to the importance of the timescale of the 1958 *coup d'état*, one can argue that paying 'attention to the significance of history, timing and sequence in explaining political dynamics'[78] leads to the formation of outcomes relevant to the path-dependent and historical institutionalist approaches. A path-dependent approach then illustrates 'how broad structural changes shape particular regime transitions in ways' that may either facilitate or constrain democracy; the strategy also reveals 'how the range of options available to decision makers . . . is a function of structures put in place in an earlier period.'[79]

Second, and more importantly, in the aforementioned report of the conversation, General Ayub Khan explicitly informs the American Consul General of the military's determination in exerting control over political developments by constraining the political elite and the wider electorate. In case of a political crisis, say, there being any possibility of the overthrow of the government (in 1953), 'the Army would declare a Military Government in order to secure stability for Pakistan . . . the Pakistan Army would not allow either politicians or the public to ruin the country.'[80]

Third, the evidence points to the military leadership's influence within the political space where not only internal political crises are to be resolved following the armed forces' estimations, but also the construction of the foreign policy is expected to follow a similar path and the politicians expected to align with the West 'wholeheartedly'. Ayub's conversation, as observed, refers to the context of the armed forces lacking competency in governmental affairs. However, the political disturbances of March 1953 in Lahore gave the military experience of managing civilian affairs after the declaration of martial law in the city. Hamid Hussain explains the process of the military's expanding role:

> The disturbances quickly fizzled but the role of the military expanded so quickly to so many areas that an abnormal situation was created. Army officers started to preside public functions, addressing public gatherings, touring city areas and opening new markets and public buildings . . . From a simple 'aid to civil power' duty, army quickly penetrated the civil society thus setting the stage for military take over in the next few years.[81]

We then note that 'a string of secret and confidential despatches to the State Department from the US embassy in Karachi, in 1958'[82] made it abundantly clear that the civil bureaucracy and the military would have brooked no opposition [from the political government]. By 19 May 1958 (that is nearly 5 months before the government was actually dismissed with the proclamation of martial law), President Iskander Mirza and General Ayub Khan had, in separate conversations with the US ambassador conveyed, that 'only a dictatorship would work in Pakistan.'[83] We are also informed of Iskander Mirza's concerns relating to the outcome of elections scheduled for February 1959 in Pakistan; Aftab Ahmed refers to the British High Commissioner's despatch of 23 August 1958 where the latter records from his meetings with Mirza:

> he [Mirza] told me [the High Commissioner] frankly that if the elections returns showed that a post-elected government was likely to be dominated by undesirable elements (he [Mirza] did not define 'undesirability' for this purpose . . .) he would himself intervene[84]

Significantly, Ahmed informs of a 'long and very disturbing' discussion that the High Commissioner had with President Mirza, reporting in the despatch of September 27 1958: 'The President if he can help it will not allow elections to be held, and he has in mind a personal coup with army support.'[85] In the despatches of the High Commissioner, Mirza is also seen reverting to his familiar theme of rejecting political representation, proclaiming 'Democracy will not work in Pakistan at this stage – elections would do no good . . . the constitution was really quite unworkable' and that the demand for election was quite irrelevant.[86] The High Commissioner's analysis of the post-coup scenario is prescient, noting (on 9 October 1958) that, though Mirza and Ayub were working together:

> Ayub as supreme commander is in effective control of armed forces, which are the regime's only sanction . . . at present he [Ayub] is finding his feet but when he does so and understands more clearly the power of his command and the opportunity before him, the strain on his loyalty to the president might be put to the test.[87]

As Aftab Ahmed shows, the strain was tested within 20 days after the coup; Ayub subsequently exiled Mirza and became the President himself.[88] The evidence provided by the American and British correspondence on the subject helps build a lucid account of the military's role in the coup, given that the embassies, even though working from within, represented an outside view.

There are two issues of note here: one broadly relates to the military's perception of its role in politics. Now consequent to this perception, reinforced by the military's continued socialisation within the civil realm, the possibility of perception evolving as institutional behaviour emerges. Second, the thematic engagement and concern with the design of political institutions alerts us to the possibility of the military acting as a political actor, where during such times of

transition, that is, subsequent to a military coup in this instance, it seeks to 'change the rules of the game', to be 'able to shape the political institutions of the future, and sometimes . . . even able to establish rules favouring themselves.'[89] That in the military's perception parliamentary democracy was unworkable in Pakistan, illustrates a prescriptive approach by the military, which sought to redesign political institutions, most notably by strengthening the office of the president through constitutional change. Equally relevant is another pattern of behaviour, whereby the military obtains justification, legitimacy or perhaps legality, for the removal of the civilian government after the *coup d'état*.

As the scope of this inquiry is limited to an investigation of the role of the military as an analytical construct, an in-depth description of the court rulings according legality to the military coups is not undertaken, except as an exemplar projecting judicial endorsement of the military's removal of the civilian governments in Pakistan. Suffice to note for now that the court's decision to legitimise the military coup of 1958 was resonant of the earlier ruling endorsing Governor-General Ghulam Muhammad's dismissal of the first Constituent Assembly in 1954.[90] This is an essential point as, arguably, the judiciary's endorsement of the Assembly's dissolution gave credence to the logic 'that those in command of the coercive powers of the state had the right to suspend constitutional government when and for however long they thought necessary.'[91] The Supreme Court of Pakistan, following precedence, provided the justification for the promulgation of the 1958 martial law by drawing on Hans Kelsen's General Theory of Law and State, setting out that 'a successful *coup d'état* is an internationally recognised legal method of changing the Constitution.'[92]

After obtaining judicial endorsement, the military government of General Ayub Khan introduced the system of 'Basic Democracies' where these bodies, composed of men deemed to be in contact with and thus representing people, were to assist the government in rural development and national reconstruction.[93] The military government's attempt to redesign political institutions unfolded during 26 December 1959 and 9 January 1960 when elections were held to the 80,000 seat Basic Democracy Units (constitutive of union councils in the rural areas and town and union committees in the urban areas).[94] The Basic Democracy system, as it were, later functioned as an electoral college for the office of the president of Pakistan, duly electing Ayub Khan to the position with 95.6 per cent of the vote, and giving him the mandate to set up the procedures for designing a new constitution for the country.[95] The constitution that came into existence in 1962 created a presidential form of government where the president enjoyed extensive powers at law-making, and was not accountable to the National Assembly: additionally this Assembly 'had no control whatsoever' over the national expenditure.[96] Crucially, if the military had intervened to arrest political chaos or corruption, the assessment that 'Ayub Khan allowed commercial malpractice and corruption of the crudest sort to expand and flourish'[97] and that such methods 'at no time in the history of Pakistan had been used so widely, effectively or ruthlessly',[98] provides evidence to the contrary. Ayub Khan's system of Basic Democracies resulted in a disconnect between the people and politics for the reason that the military finds

it difficult to establish political institutions; this is so because the armed services' competencies and skills 'do not transfer well to the sphere of politics. Society is more complex than an army.'[99]

The purpose of this description is not to narrate the history of Ayub Khan's government, but to identify processes of authoritarian control in Pakistan as the 'critical agenda for institutional analysis should be to show how choices made at one point in time create institutions that generate recognizable patterns of constraints and opportunities at a later point.'[100] It is therefore in this context that the 1958 military coup and its aftermath is of relevance to an investigation of the problem of military control in Pakistan. The military's discontent with democracy and political institutions casts it in the light of a status quo-oriented institution, protective of its institutional interests, as is shown next.

5 Ordering the state

Consolidating military control

An analysis of the military interventions of 1977 and 1999 excavates further evidence on the saliency of the armed services as the core executive in Pakistan. The 1977 coup sheds light, for example, on the constitutional measures adopted by the military for extending its control of the public sphere. These measures included strengthening the office of the president (at a time when the presidency was occupied by the serving army chief) and introducing a 10 per cent job quota for the military officers in the public sector and government departments, among others. The aftermath of the military intervention of 1999 shows similar characteristics. We argue these measures enable the military to penetrate civil society. A brief reference is made of the post-communist European states to understand why in these cases the militaries did not intervene or influence political developments at times of profound political change. It is likely that the non-intervention in the post-communist states is best explained by the history and experience of civilian control over the military, exercised by the communist party in these cases.

As we are presently concerned with recurring patterns, it is important to state 'that early stages in a sequence [of events] can place particular aspects of political systems onto distinct tracks, which are then reinforced through time.'[1] An application of this assumption[2] to the study of the trajectory of political developments in Pakistan reveals important insights into the dynamics of military control and influence. As an example, consider the military *coup d'état* of July 1977. The background to the military takeover should be noted: in 1971 following a civil war and the military defeat in war with India, the eastern part of Pakistan had emerged as the independent state of Bangladesh. What is striking is that in the wake of political crises, such as a civil war, an external war leading to military defeat, and the consequent dismemberment of the state in 1971 (these events arguably constituting a critical juncture thereby offering a window of opportunity for the development of alternative paths in terms of subsequent policy choices and political developments),[3] the military in Pakistan successfully intervened and overthrew the civilian government in July 1977. The concept of critical juncture in this context needs clarification. We understand critical junctures as phases where the existing 'institutions grow more fragile as immediate solutions, perhaps

blocked up by existing institutions, are demanded.'[4] Subsequently, given the presence of a critical juncture (such as military defeat and regime change), the course of ensuing political developments is estimated to constrain the military's influence, providing greater opportunity to political forces in developing alternative policy outcomes.

Now, the argument is that the military's ability to reclaim its institutional pre-eminence within the state structure is attributable to the extent of its embedded influence since the establishment of Pakistan. A full historical analysis of the political developments immediately preceding the military coup in 1977 is beyond the remit of this inquiry, but the military had intervened in Pakistan with the declared objective of restoring law and order and facilitating the holding of elections.[5] The restoration of public order and systemic stability as a justifiable cause for a military coup, however, does not adequately account for such an intervention; it has been documented that the 1977 martial law in Pakistan came 'not when governmental authority was at its lowest in April and May [1977], but after more than a month of peaceful negotiations [with the opposition] which appeared to be nearing a successful completion.'[6] A likely conclusion would be that the military in Pakistan resorted to *coup d'état* for protecting its institutional interests,[7] as defined and perceived by them. This assumption is explained through the application of two strategies. First, evidence is analysed to establish if the problems of governance,[8] improving law and order within the country, and bringing stability to the political system, adequately explain the military coup. This strand of argument draws on statistics on reported crime figures as a measure of the problem of law and order and stability. Second, while inquiring into the issue of role of the military and its perception of that role, an important publication of the Pakistani army *The Green Book 2000* (discussed more fully in the next chapter), is examined. The significance of this publication is that it addresses the concept of nation-building as perceived by the military, highlights areas where the institution is already involved, and signposts other avenues where it can make further contributions.[9] This approach of studying the perceptions of the Pakistani military through internal publications is generally not applied in the investigations conducted on civil–military relations in Pakistan. Similar methodology has, however, been adopted elsewhere, e.g. where evidence from the official Army journals has been drawn 'on the assumption that they best reflect what the regimes want to inculcate amongst an important, if not the most important, sector in society.'[10]

Coming back to an analysis of the military *coup d'état* in the context of Pakistan, it has been contended that problems of governance combined with the absence of public discontent or open opposition to the removal of elected governments is a measure of the loss of democratic or legitimacy credentials of the civilian regimes.[11] This study has, on the contrary, posited that the *coup d'état* is more likely indicative of the military's embedded control and influence within the polity rather than being an exclusive function of legitimacy of the civilian regimes in Pakistan. It is this embedded influence and control, institutionalised over a period of time that explains the military's successful coup of 1977 (within 6 years of the multiple crises of 1971). Put another way, in 1971, the magnitude of political

problems faced by the country was such that 'Pakistan was not only confronted with having to replace a regime, but also having to reconstitute an entire political system.'[12] These problems, encountered in what has been described as a post-military state, are linked to 'managerial problems' or 'institutional chaos',[13] not to mention political ambiguity. Therefore, where the military has gone through its own set of crises, the political uncertainties also supply an opening, or the possibility of an opening, to the military to reassert its pattern of influence and control within the state. This point refers to the difficulties of developing and managing a new political system in the aftermath of a significant crisis such as civil war and a military defeat.

Ordering the state

As observed by Philippe C. Schmitter, scholarly investigations of military coups, at least within the genre of Latin American studies, tend to focus on the 'causes' of military interventions and not the 'consequences' of the phenomenon.[14] This is a central point for it is likely that a focus on the consequences of the military intervention can, in fact, produce empirical evidence for illuminating the path of subsequent political developments within the state. In Pakistan for example, after supplanting political forces following the *coup d'état* of 1958, the military regime produced a new constitution in 1962 and adopted a number of measures to consolidate its position within the state.[15] The military's consolidation of its influence supports the contention 'institutions tend to seek to expand their domain'[16] that in turn sets precedent for such behaviour and, if successful, is likely to be reinforced.

The 1977 coup in Pakistan is also illustrative of the military's continuing influence within the polity, equipped as it were with the knowledge and experience of governing Pakistan. This is an important claim given the military's defeat and the attendant fallout after the 1971 war with India. With the ushering in of martial law in 1977, the military regime adopted several measures to continue the processes of consolidation of the military's control within the state. For example, by 1980 a job quota of 10 per cent had been introduced for the military personnel (essentially officers) in public sector/civil service jobs.[17] In March 1981, the Chief Martial Law Administrator and President General Zia-ul-Haq promulgated the Provisional Constitutional Order to force the judiciary to take a fresh oath of office, thereby validating the imposition of martial law. Furthermore, the 1973 Constitution[18] (adopted by the civilian government after the separation of East Pakistan) was amended by the military regime. With the introduction of the 1985 Eighth Constitutional Amendment, the office of the president of Pakistan was strengthened, investing it with the power to dismiss the prime minister, and the National and Provincial Assemblies [granted under Article 58 (2) (b) of the Constitution]. Significantly, this Amendment legitimised all the legal and constitutional changes introduced by the martial law government.[19] The claim that the Eighth Amendment to the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan resulted in 'the presidentialization of the fundamental law of the land'[20] is therefore accurate. Maya Chadda refers to

this constitutional provision as undermining parliamentary democracy in Pakistan by giving the president 'extraordinary legal power over the parliament.'[21] However, Chadda's claim of these amendments being symbolic of the 'travails of a country unsure of its identity and international persona, obsessed by a sense of vulnerability to regional rivals'[22] is a case of over-analysis of the scenario to the extent where it leads to incorrect inferences being drawn from the empirical evidence.

In a previous section, Schmitter's concern with the consequences, as opposed to the causes, of the military *coup d'état* was considered. Here we note the continuation of the precedent (a possible outcome or consequence of path-dependent behaviour) of involving the military in political affairs. Prior to the 5 July 1977 military intervention in Pakistan, the then prime minister, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, had included the military leadership in discussions of his government's strategy and response to the political agitation by the opposition parties (who were protesting against election results and claiming widespread rigging), even inviting the army generals to Cabinet meetings.[23] It is likely to remain a matter of conjecture as to the actual impact of such involvement of the military in the political crisis.[24] However, it can reasonably be inferred that one important outcome of such involvement was that the military leadership gained direct insight into the relative weakness of the civilian government, perceived (on the part of the military) as a loss of governmental legitimacy.[25]

A salient feature of the military coup of 1977 in Pakistan is that it shows resilience of the institution in exercising influence. The historical situation is again relevant: Prime Minister Bhutto purged the military after his coming to power following the 1971 crisis and reorganised the institution's command structure.[26] In effect, Bhutto recognised the powers of the institution but could not ultimately forestall the coup. Therefore, even measures such as the change of military leadership and command structures are insufficient to roll back the military's influence in the political developments in Pakistan. One possible explanation of this observation can be located in the processes that construct the perceptions and an understanding of the military leadership of its role within the state; a change in command structures or the military leadership in isolation does not affect these processes. A reasonable conclusion would therefore have the military leadership accustomed to this particular policy outcome. Thus, if the military leadership perceives the civilian leadership challenging the pre-eminence of the former, then such a challenge is likely to lead to the dismissal of the civilian government. This argument draws on historical precedent and the military's expectation of such an outcome: the October 1999 military *coup d'état* in Pakistan has been categorised as such.[27]

However, notwithstanding the history of military *coup d'état* and the issue of path dependency, what of the political side of the equation of governance? To put it another way, is the military the sole or main agent in the civil–military equation? Prescient and insightful are Kenneth Waltz's observations on the nature of the civilian control of the military, for these add to our understanding of the problem of military influence in polities such as Pakistan; we are informed that

'civilian control is not something that simply exists by constitutional and other laws. It has to be maintained through persistence and hard work, lest civilian control of the military give way to military control of the military.'[28]

The relevance of Waltz's caveat is borne out when considering the following exemplar drawn from the records of the activities of the Indian military where they attempted to provoke a military confrontation with Pakistan without the prior knowledge of the Indian political leadership. A senior Indian army commander referring to the incident in his memoirs reports that the 1986–87 military exercise named 'Brasstacks' (conducted by the Indian military) was in fact 'no military exercise. It was a plan to build up a situation for a fourth war with Pakistan. And what is even more shocking is that the [then Indian] prime minister, Mr Rajiv Gandhi, was not aware of these plans for war.'[29] The same narrative ascribes the motive for an attempt to provoke war with Pakistan to the then Indian army chief General K. Sundarji's views on a preventative war, whereby the conflict could be used to 'take out' Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme 'in a preventive strike.'[30]

What is spectacularly evident in this account is the apparent ease with which civilian control of the military, even under conditions of historical continuity and institutionalisation as in the case of India, has the potential of being undermined by any number of variables, in this case an army chief's predisposition to a particular doctrine of war.

A similar theme echoes in the analysis of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and the state of civil–military relations in Israel: by drawing on the evidence from studies published by the 'members of the inner circle of the [Israeli] political and military systems', it comes across that even though the elected governments in Israel have retained overall control of the armed forces, 'behind the scenes the [Israeli] Army was fully in charge of its own affairs' and that the IDF 'had in fact been transformed into an independent, self-directing institution whose autonomy and influence exceeded the state's original designs.'[31] These original objectives are articulated by the Israeli leader Ben-Gurion, reminding the then Israeli army's Chief of Staff in 1949 that the army being only 'an executive arm for the defence and security' of the state of Israel, is 'unconditionally subordinate to the government.'[32] The requirement for establishing control systems for civilian dominance of the military is clear as the 'continuous external threat to Israel's survival'[33] had enhanced the military's capacity to influence political developments within the state. Note the similarity of the threat perception encountered by the leadership in Pakistan, and the differential outcome, given the involvement of the military in administering the state. The military in Pakistan, far from being subordinated to the political executive, had joined in governing the affairs of the state as a central partner. Thus where the Pakistani military is involved in the civilian administration or having an Army chief assuming the role of a cabinet member, the Israeli forces are reminded of their subordinate status to the political government. Therefore, it is important that democratic norms are 'accepted as a value [and], not merely a political tactic. A military with its own definition of democracy . . . is a threat.'[34]

Controlling the state

The military *coups d'état* of 1958 and 1977 were followed by an appreciable shift from a parliamentary form of government to an increasingly presidential system.[35] One reason for this shift is fairly obvious. As the serving army chiefs had taken over as the presidents, the next logical move, from the military's perspective, was securing the offices of the president by concentrating executive and some legislative power. The military is therefore likely to resort to constitutional and legal measures in search of legitimacy. Now, clearly, there are several options available to the military for controlling the political space. The more rudimentary of the methods relates to the actual or the threat of use of force. The example of the Turkish military, it is suggested, demonstrably falls into such categorisation, given that it was by 'continually threatening to intervene and by greatly expanding its internal security networks through the infamous *Milli Istihbarat Teskilatt* (National Intelligence Service) the military elite maintained a veto over governmental policy decisions.'[36] It is seen that in the two exemplars of Pakistan and Turkey, there is a comparable outcome given the presence of an embedded military.

Further research can investigate if the measures employed by the military to embed its control and influence account for the subsequent trajectory of political developments. It is likely that variables including those of initial coercion (Turkey) and legal redesign (Pakistan), the latter albeit a function of the former, account for the successor regime's longevity and the degree of the military's capacity to influence subsequent political developments. The exercise can be particularly useful in measuring the extent of civilian consolidation, where the primary aim of research is such. It is also worth considering the insights provided by a study investigating the problem of military control in post-communist Europe. A comparison of civil–military relations in this context makes it possible to conclude that the military in the post-communist European states did not intervene at critical junctures (for instance during regime change when the old order was being displaced by a new one), for the reason that 'the military was . . . subject to quite strong and direct civilian control and was not directly engaged in domestic politics as an institution in its own right', in this case being clearly under the influence and control of the communist parties.[37] Two preliminary inferences can be drawn from this significant piece of evidence. First, it becomes possible to accord a lesser value to regime type[38] as a controlling factor in the study of civil–military relations. This position needs elaboration. As post-communist regimes in the European theatre were deemed prone to military intervention given the authoritarian traits of the past regimes, the possibility of military intervention, in the presence of problems associated with the transition from one political system to another, could not be ruled out. However, the study concluded that the threat of military intervention in the post-communist European regimes proved exaggerated[39] for the reasons of the precedence of civilian (communist party) control. It therefore seems likely that the fact of a regime being of a democratic or authoritarian dispensation is of lesser consequence in determining the extent of the military's influence and its

predisposition to intervene. Another study similarly notes that in many Central and East European countries 'where the military was under civilian control during communist rule, civil–military relations tended not to be a high priority during the transition to democracy.'[40] What seems of greater significance is that the absence of any type of civilian control, either democratic or authoritarian, of the military is likely to propel the latter in occupying political space. Second, and equally note-worthy, is the assumption that the military does not engage in domestic politics as an institution. This again turns out to be a valuable perspective, for the militaries in Latin American countries, as in Pakistan and Turkey, exhibit the inclination to protect and institutionally extend their influence. An argument can be made that precedence approximates institutionalisation. How this process unfolds further illuminates the debate.

A military *coup d'état* in Pakistan is followed by a pattern of constitutional re-engineering that constrains parliamentary forms of government, for example, by limiting the powers of the prime minister including those of appointing the military chiefs (the 1985 Eighth Constitutional Amendment). Redesigning con-stitutional provisions, however, is not unique to Pakistan. For example, a study focusing on civil–military relations in Chile is termed as being descriptive 'of the process of legalization of dictatorship.'[41] Note where the Chilean constitutions of 1833 and 1925 had subordinated the armed forces to elected governmental authority, the 1980 Chilean constitution, in contrast, restricted the 'president's authority to name and retire commanders in chief of the different forces as well as to appoint and remove lower ranking officials', thus weakening the 'principle of obedience to an elected official.'[42]

In Chile's case, a key feature of the military *coup d'état* of 1973 must point to the longevity of the civilian rule prior to the event. For instance institutions such as the Chilean Supreme Court had been functional since 1823, being the 'the second oldest in the Americas after the U.S. Supreme Court', while the Chil-ean Congress since its establishment in 1831 'had functioned normally . . . for ninety-three years without interruption'; more importantly, unlike the militaries of countries such as Argentina and Brazil, the 'Chilean armed forces did not have extensive past experience of coup making or military rule to draw upon.'[43]

The longevity of civilian administration, and the absence of precedence for mounting a military coup, was not sufficient for deterring the occurrence of the 1973 Chilean coup. Kenneth Waltz's earlier assertion of maintaining civilian con-trol over the military through persistence and hard work, instead of relying on law and constitution, therefore assumes added significance. It also raises the question of what the 'hard work' must consist of, though it can be argued that 'law and con-stitution' refers to the realm of formal politics whereby the Parliament/National Assemblies hold the military accountable by establishing parliamentary com-mittees for over-viewing and scrutinising defence affairs. Similarly, 'persistence and hard work', probably refers to informal politics including measures where the political elites maintain interaction with the military leadership for acquiring familiarity with the military's institutional concerns through briefings, presenta-tions, and holding of workshops, among others. The Chilean example is useful to

flag up the complexities associated with studies investigating the cause and consequence of the military coup. As noted, even in countries with the tradition and history of civilian control of the military, as in India and Israel, there have been occurrences, that on their own while not signalling a breakdown of such control, alert us to the imperative for continuous vigilance to guard against such an event. The project of consolidation of democracy, then, 'is a never ending task, with the democratic process continually facing new challenges as a result of social, political, and economic change.'[44] More fundamentally, 'even the older, more established democracies face their own civil–military dilemmas' where specialisation and technical innovation in defence matters can probably make it difficult for the civilians in terms of 'really understanding what they need to control.'[45]

Are there any lessons to be learnt from these examples? One is fairly straightforward: that declaring victory where the military has retreated from the political arena will be complacent.[46] The declaration of the head of the Turkish armed forces warning the government in 2003 that the possibility of military intervention still existed should then be seen and analysed in the context of a political army's embedded influence.[47]

The politics of military *coups d'état*: theoretical implications

The global wave of democracy, global economic liberalism, the end of the Cold War, and indeed the difficult economic and financial outlook of the country itself proved inadequate as constraining factors in preventing the 1999 military *coup d'état* in Pakistan. While the 1999 interruption of civilian rule in Pakistan makes for a striking example in the study of civil–military relations (given, as has been suggested, a new post-Cold War order)[48], there remains an inadequate engagement with the problem of military's embedded control and influence within the state. This inadequacy is revealed, as a representative example, in an analysis of the military coup of 1999 in Pakistan even as the state is acknowledged as being 'by far the most strategically influential country to have suffered a democratic breakdown'[49] given its acquisition of nuclear weapons among other things. This assessment proceeds to mirror the argument advanced by the military in justifying the policy of *coup d'état*. It does so by pigeonholing the civilian interlude in Pakistan as 'years of venal misrule', characterised by a corrupt police force and, for good measure, abuse of civil liberties.[50] Arguably, democratic reversal occurs at the moment of the coup, but for the military, 'democratic reversal' brings about the coup.

That there are problems of governance in Pakistan is stating the obvious.[51] Governance, suggests Subrata Mitra, is 'measured by empirical indicators like violent deaths, criminal damage to property, riots, lawlessness, man-days lost in illegal strikes and other variables specific to particular political systems.'[52] The problems of governance or law and order, however, need not be identified or compartmentalised within a particular regime-type categorisation, for the approach 'smacks faintly of a neo-Orientalist identification of non-Western cultures with the problem of governability.'[53] We therefore turn to the problems and issues relat-

ing to the breakdown of law and order as a causal factor (cited by the military, in addition to corruption and mismanagement of economy) in triggering a military *coup d'état*, as seen in the case of Pakistan.

An important study conducted by Azhar Hasan Nadeem, a senior serving Pakistani police officer, sheds light on the issue of lawlessness. It is reasonable to assume that this study is based on privileged access enjoyed by the author by virtue of his position (as a senior member of the Police Service). Nadeem's study notes crime figures registered by the police in Pakistan in 1947 as 73,105; these doubled to 129,679 by 1971.[54] The statistics further reveal that the decade of 1980–90 (when both a military regime and a civilian government had been in office) saw reported crime figures double from 152,782 to 403,078; in percentage terms, 'Since 1951, the annual growth rate of crimes has generally been higher than that of population. This is despite the fact that almost 40 per cent of crimes remain unreported.'[55]

It will be acknowledged that a single study focusing on crime figures is open to possible criticism on account of providing inadequate data for drawing definitive conclusions about the state of law and order in a society. It is nevertheless signifi-cant a serving senior police officer having access to privileged data has drawn up these findings, and identified an important source for further investigation. This enables us to argue the case for ascribing due consideration to these findings in the present context. We also note the reservations of organisations such as Trans-parency International (TI), claiming an increase in the perception of corruption in Pakistan since the 1999 military coup; drawing on public opinion polls and surveys, TI claims 'a majority of people had a poor opinion of the government's anti corruption efforts.'[55]

Two preliminary assumptions from the preceding data are readily inferred. First, lawlessness is not intrinsic to civilian governments and military regimes cannot claim to be successful, on their own terms, in relation to law and order. Second, and following from the first assumption, it will be equally trivial, theoreti-cally, to categorise civilian regimes as unstable and by implication, not having the legitimacy to govern. The latter position is particularly significant, necessitating a deeper analysis of the stated motives of military interventions as being aimed at restoration of law and order or bringing stability to the system, among others. As has been argued in this chapter, the most probable cause of military coups in Pakistan is located in the protection of the military's institutional interests, regard-less of the claims of political legitimacy that are advanced by the military. These interests, or prerogatives, relate to:

> areas where, challenged or not, the military as an institution assumes they have an acquired right or privilege, formal or informal, to exercise effective control over its internal governance, to play a role within extra-military areas within the state apparatus, or even to structure relationships between the state and political or civil society.[57]

An analysis of the problem of governance reveals interesting insights. Consider

the following illustration. The military in Pakistan has been directly involved in the processes of governance during 1958 to 1971 (Generals Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan), from 1977 to 1988 (General Zia-ul-Haq), and the latest instance from October 1999 (General Pervaiz Musharraf) to date. Given that elections were held, for example in 1985 and 2002, does not alter the original regime type that remains military for all practical purposes. This is explained by drawing on literature. Nordlinger for instance has argued, and one agrees with this position, that military regimes will continue to be categorised as such, that is, military regimes, even 10–20 years after a military coup, with the proviso being that:

> the military took power by means of a coup, the highest governmental offi-
> cials have served (or continue to serve) in the armed forces, and the governors
> [it will be assumed both civilian and military] are primarily dependent upon
> the support of the officer corps for the retention of power.[58]

In the present, the holder of the office of the president of Pakistan (General Pervaiz Musharraf) is the serving army chief, as was General Zia-ul-Haq before him during 1977–88. The contention of the present form of government being a military regime, notwithstanding the electoral exercise carried out in 2002 in Pakistan, will then have considerable merit. This arrangement follows an earlier precedent where General Ayub Khan attempted introduction of some form of political choice and representation after his military coup of 1958. Nordlinger termed this exercise as 'the most ambitious attempt of any praetorian government to clothe itself in a constitutional façade' though 'only marginally successful.'[59]

Problems of governance thus do not account for the dismissal of civilian regimes by the military. Recent scholarship reformulates the parameters of the civil–military relations debate, especially with reference to Pakistan. With much prescience, then, Vali Nasr illuminates the causes of the 1999 military *coup d'état*, and deserves to be quoted at length. Commenting on the government of the then prime minister Nawaz Sharif, and his Pakistan Muslim League (PML) party, Nasr argues, 'Between 1993 and 1999, the PML continued to push a mixture of busi-ness-friendly economic policies and nationalist-cum-Islamic appeals.'[60] However, and this is the crux of his argument:

> It was the PML's very success . . . that set the stage for its fall. The Generals
> began to worry that the party's strategy . . . would actually succeed. There fol-
> lowed Musharraf's 1999 coup against Sharif and the systematic dismantling,
> under the military tutelage, of the PML. When Musharraf allowed controlled
> elections to be held in 2002, Islamists did spectacularly well, rebounding all
> the way up to a best-ever 20 per cent vote share.[61]

To reiterate therefore, the 1999 military coup in Pakistan took place to safeguard the institutional interests of the military. These interests were in danger of being undermined by an assertive civilian government; had this not been the case, the 'dismantling' of the PML as a political party would not have occurred. We note

that the 1985 Eighth Constitutional Amendment empowering the president to dismiss the prime minister, dissolve the National Assembly, and appoint the military chiefs, had been done away with by the Sharif government through the constitutional amendment promulgated in 1997.[62] The repeal of the presidential powers is of significance as a case has been put forward that the Eighth Amendment was brought in to create a medium through the office of the president of Pakistan, allowing the military leaders to 'force their will and control governments.'[63]

We recall civilian governments in Pakistan were indeed dismissed by the exercise of presidential powers under the Eighth Amendment in 1988 (prime minister Muhammad Khan Junejo's government on charges of corruption, deteriorating law and order),[64] 1990 (prime minister Benazir Bhutto for corruption, corrupt practices),[65] 1993 (prime minister Nawaz Sharif, accused of misdeeds, mismanagement),[66] and in 1996 (Benazir Bhutto) where, in keeping with past practice, the dismissal order referred to lawlessness, undermining of the judiciary and general problems associated with a lack of governance as the reasons for the presidential exercise of dismissing the prime minister and National and Provincial Assemblies.[67] All the governments, as can be seen, were dismissed before the completion of the full 5-year term. Note also the 1999 dismissal of the government (of prime minister Nawaz Sharif), through a direct military *coup d'état*, similarly proclaimed mismanagement and the undermining of the institution of the armed forces by the civilian government as among the reasons for the intervention.[68]

The evidence, however, proclaims otherwise, and locates the phenomenon of military coup in Pakistan not as a function of problems of governance but in terms of defending the military's institutional interests. For instance, the 1988 dismissal of the civilian government in Pakistan, by invoking the Eighth Amendment, is illustrated as suggestive of the differences of the civilian government with the military establishment in the conduct of policies over Afghanistan and India. Interestingly, the then president and in-uniform General Zia-ul-Haq had initiated negotiations with India for improving relations, but the civilian prime minister and the president's nominee Muhammad Khan Junejo had passed a 'strongly worded resolution on Kashmir' in the National Assembly presumably to stamp his authority on the policy making processes.[69] Similarly, the 1990 dismissal of the Benazir Bhutto government has been ascribed to the differences with the military over 'Kashmir, Afghanistan, army promotions, [and the] control of intelligence agencies.'[70] Prime minister Nawaz Sharif's first government of 1993, it is argued, was dismissed notwithstanding superior economic management and healthy indicators. The differences with the president over the appointment of the army chief, among other issues, probably accounted for this particular outcome.[71] Extraordinarily in the latter case, even though the ousted prime minister successfully appealed against his dismissal in the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the ensuing power struggle between the president and the prime minister saw the then army chief step in, demand, and obtain, the resignations of both the president and the prime minister.

A clarification is in order here: a reference to the civilian governments need not signal a shift of attention from the original scope of the military's influence, for

the civilian interlude merely denotes the military's position of disengagement and not neutrality from the political space; the term neutrality indicates a withdrawal from politics, while disengagement signifies a withdrawal from the government.[72] A further elaboration of the argument will suggest that the military's policy of disengagement, as opposed to neutrality (in the above usage), is reflective of 'institutional persistence'[73] of its influence. The military, then, influences the trajectory of political developments; it is socialised in the exercise of influence and control, both while intervening directly in the affairs of the state as in a *coup d'état*, or through constitutional redesign.

Analyse this: civil–military relations in an age of anxiety

Capturing the essence of the military's influence in a civilian government is a difficult and complex proposition. Drawing on published reports appearing in the quality print media is an important way of circumventing this problem and a practical way of locating evidence accounting for the interaction of military and political leadership in crises. The schema yields valuable insights in that it documents the actual unfolding of events, permitting the researcher as close as he/she will get, to acquiring contemporary historical records.[74]

The 1996 removal of the civilian government, therefore, presents one opportunity to approach this crisis for a multi-level analysis. The event has been identified as primary information has recently come to light through the print media that includes interviews of some of the principal participants, including the former army chief General Jehangir Karamat, former Pakistani president Farooq Leghari [heading his own political party the Millat Party at the time of publication of this report, and an ally of the present Musharraf government. Leghari was formerly a senior leader of Benazir Bhutto's Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), elected as the president of Pakistan in the wake of PPP's victory after the 1993 elections] and the former speaker of Pakistan's National Assembly Yousaf Raza Gilani (at the time of publication of this report, in prison on charges of nepotism). We acknowledge contextual determinants such as political climate of the time, the scale of political antagonism or opposition may possibly have an impact on the reporting of data.

Recording his views on the 1996 dismissal of the Benazir Bhutto government, and his own resignation during Nawaz Sharif's subsequent tenure, former president Farooq Leghari blames both the former prime ministers, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, for acting unconstitutionally, leading to the dismissal of their respective regimes.[75] Interestingly, when questioned in the same interview about his own motives during the political crises and the speculation that he (the president) himself resigned to avert a possible impeachment by the National Assembly during the 1997 Sharif government, Leghari categorically responds that the army 'was not allowing them [the government] to impeach me.'[76] Leghari further informs us that the army chief and the head of the security agency the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) (a serving Lieutenant General of the Pakistani army), asked to mediate to resolve the political crisis.[77]

It is important to remember that description of the political crises leading to a

particular outcome, for instance the dismissal of a government or the resignation of the president, is not the focal point here. The purpose of the account is thus to locate evidence for the primacy of the military as an influential actor in political developments in Pakistan, as illustrated by the army chief's or the security agencies' initiative to mediate in a political crisis.

The next significant piece of evidence comes from the former speaker of Pakistan's National Assembly, Yusaf Raza Gilani. In his interview, Gilani states that the then army chief General Karamat 'leaked the news [to Gilani] of the impending dismissal' of the Benazir government by President Leghari in 1996; the information came through after the security agencies had 'bugged . . . conversation of the then opposition leader Nawaz Sharif', confirming such action by the president.[78] It is reasonable to assume the transcripts of the conversation would have been passed on to the army chief. Additionally, General Karamat further narrates to Gilani that President Leghari gave a 'hostile briefing to the IMF [International Monetary Fund] against the fiscal policies of Benazir', a fact, in the General's opinion, indicative of Leghari's antagonism towards the government.[79] The army chief was ready to act as a guarantor, he told Gilani, 'so that the government was not dismissed and some kind of arrangement could be arrived at.'[80] Benazir, on the other hand, could not accept the offer of an army chief to mediate 'between a civilian prime minister and a civilian president', asserts Gilani.[81]

The narrative illuminates the scope of the military's penetration of national institutions whether relating to the briefings on fiscal policy, or the imminent dismissal of a civilian regime. It is not being argued that the military actually instigated the civilian government's dismissal in this particular instance. It is, however, likely that the president would have taken the military leadership into confidence before initiating this action; his earlier assertion of the army opposing any impeachment processes against him would lead to a reasonable inference of the military's linkage with the presidency over political decision-making.

General Karamat's interview is probably a good representation of the military leadership's perception of political developments in Pakistan.[82] Interestingly, Karamat adopts the familiar argument of 'good governance and sound policy formulation' as central in maintaining credibility of the elected governments.[83] Additionally, on the question of the army chiefs resisting 'pressure' to intervene due to the 'misconduct of politicians', Karamat notes:

> In my opinion, if we have a repeat of past events then we must understand that army chiefs can resist pressure only up to a point. Beyond that their own position starts getting undermined because the army is after all a mirror image of the society from which it is drawn.[84]

While the reader is not informed of the exact source of the pressure on the army chief to intervene or how it is linked with being the mirror image of society, it is still possible to tease out the conceptualisation of good governance as a function of systemic stability. However, it is questionable if the military has the mandate to determine what is good governance for an elected government. Equally

significant is the question if, in the military's estimation, the elected government is acting contrarily to the principles of good governance, the removal of such government, especially through a *coup d'état*, is warranted. As has been demonstrated and documented in this chapter, the available evidence suggests the possibility of an *institutionalisation* of electoral politics as an important explanation in the occurrence of military *coup d'état* in Pakistan. The modus operandi allows the military to safeguard its institutional interests and respond to an assertive civilian leadership.

This chapter has explored the institutionalisation of military control in Pakistan. In particular, we illustrated the military's capacity to exercise influence and control by mounting a successful coup in 1977, that is, within 6 years of it undergoing a significant crisis (in the shape of military defeat). We accomplished this by employing the theoretical possibilities offered by historical institutionalist and path dependency in explaining this outcome in the civil–military interaction in Pakistan. The chapter referred to exemplars of influential militaries in countries such as Chile and Turkey, and recognised patterns of military control through constitutional design that makes it difficult for civilian governments to completely roll back the military's influence. We found no conclusive evidence linking problems of law and order and political instability with the military coups in Pakistan. By drawing on an important study documenting the problems of lawlessness and crime statistics in Pakistan, it was noted that regardless of the political system (military regime or civilian government), the crime rate has generally registered an upward trend. The assumption therefore that the military in Pakistan intervenes as a response to, and addresses, systemic crises is flawed.

6 'L'Etat, c'est militaire'

What are the lessons to be learnt from an analysis of the military leadership's perception[1] of its role in the politics of the state? Research into military affairs is difficult under most conditions and therefore requires the researcher to attend to 'perception of "politics" and their relationship to intramilitary values and beliefs.'[2] This is so because most 'clearly lacking have been analyses from within the military's perspective' and similarly absent are the voices of 'active-duty generals and admirals.'[3] In this chapter, then, the military also 'speaks' for itself. An examination of the armed force's premier training institution, the National Defence College, and internal publications such as *The Green Book*, allows us to capture the essence of the leadership's aspirations. By drawing on this data for analysing the perceptions of the Pakistani military, we argue that the armed forces are unlikely to encourage the establishment of viable civilian political institutions in the country. Through various constitutional and administrative measures, the military has continued the penetration of the civilian sphere and has further consolidated its control over the state institutions. This chapter demonstrates that, in addition to its influence over political developments in Pakistan, the military has significant economic interests in sectors such as power generation, engineering and construction among others. Arguably, the military has come to identify itself with the state, rather than see itself as just one of the key components of a constitutional state.

The military's premier training institution in Pakistan, the National Defence College (NDC), is a significant resource in accounting for the military leadership's perception and understanding of its role. The curriculum and selective publications of the NDC were obtained for an analysis of the mission statement and the remit of the College. The head of this training institution was interviewed, along with a senior faculty member (both serving senior military officers of the Pakistani army in 2003) for generating complementary evidence accounting for the construction of the institution's world view.

As extensive individual interviews with the serving military leadership were not considered practicable given the constraints and problems of access to military institutions,[4] a specific publication brought out by the Pakistani army was examined, which contained contributions from a number of senior commanders on

the subject of nation-building and the military's role therein. The strategy allows for circumventing the problem of resistance[5] and access to the senior military commanders and analyses, in some detail at least, the military's approach on a number of issues, including those of its contribution towards nation-building and economic development in Pakistan.

As earlier noted, the military's perception of its role within the state is inferred from an examination of the primary data sourced from the NDC. The college instructs, among others, the senior military leadership in competencies ranging from the development of policy-making to policy-implementing skills. A comparable institution, the Pakistan Administrative Staff College (PASC), similarly prepares the senior leadership of the civilian bureaucracy of the country, and is also discussed. This is done with the objective of considering the perceptions of both the military and civil bureaucracy leadership on a range of issues within the public sphere. The comparison strikingly reveals key differentials in how the attendant themes of governance and policy-making are articulated and dealt with institutionally by a part of the establishment (the military and the civil bureaucracy) that has historically exercised influence (in the case of the civil bureaucracy, at least during the earlier years of the country's independence) over the trajectory of political developments in Pakistan. The evidence obtained from the documentary sources is then triangulated with the information collated from the interviews of the respective heads of these training institutions (NDC and PASC) for understanding the problem of the military's control and influence in this context. An analysis of the institutions, primarily the NDC, enables us to account for the military's world view; how we go about doing this is explained below:

1 The function of the NDC is gathered from the college's published mission statement and its vision for the senior military leadership. The claim is not that such scrutiny of any one institution or its representatives draws a complete picture in terms of accounting for the military's perception. What is being argued is that the National Defence College remains an exemplar in that it sheds light on the military leadership's favoured perception and approach to political developments in the country. Moreover, this is the only College of its kind in Pakistan that trains the entire senior military leadership. The data from sources such as the NDC adds to the body of knowledge within the discipline that investigates civil–military relations and the accrued evidence enriches the debate about the role and the extent of the military's influence in Pakistan.

2 An evaluation of *The Green Book 2000*, published by the Pakistani army sheds light on the military leadership's perception of its role in the developments within the state.[6] This publication incorporates contributions by the senior military officers (all in-service in 2000 and having completed the NDC course) on the subject of nation-building and the role – past, present and potential – of the military in these processes. An account of the military officers' world view on issues such as nation-building has considerable advantages. First, it provides evidence that the military considers this discourse as of central

concern.[7] Second, it allows us to analyse and interpret the military's approach to what it considers is constitutive of nation-building, thus establishing it as an important variable. Third, with the military's articulation of preceding concerns, it sheds light on how the military perceives its role within the polity. Fourth, the publication demonstrates the military's official view on policy. Finally, the analysis makes it possible to support the argument of why the military is not likely to encourage strong civilian governments in Pakistan.

To recap therefore, by deferring to 'common sense',[8] institutions such as the NDC and the PASC were accessed to retrieve cumulative data not readily available in the public domain. One is also mindful of Stephen Cohen's observation in this context: 'the Pakistan Army (like all professional armies) engages in lively debate over such issues as the social responsibility of the officer, the identity and intentions of potential enemies, and the military's political role.'[9] What constitutes this debate, especially the political side of it, is therefore of primary interest to us for the purposes of this inquiry.

The National Defence College: 'Taught man that which he knew not'[10]

Established in 1971, the College is organised into the National Defence Wing and the War Wing.[11] Our present focus is on the instruction provided by the National Defence Wing as the War Wing is primarily concerned with the military and operational strategy. Headed by a Lieutenant General of the Pakistan Army, the College's Crest represents:

> "National Defence" with an Islamic shield [with a crescent and star] in tri-service colours [those of the army, the navy and the air force] . . . A crossed sword and pen placed upon the lower portion of the shield represent honour, strength and achievement through learning.[12]

The following key objectives encapsulate the remit of this institution:

1 Training the senior leadership of the military, the civil bureaucracy, and business leaders from the private sector of Pakistan. Additionally, the College imparts training to military officers from overseas[13] and prepares them for the assumption of higher policy formulation and implementation roles.
2 Providing a platform for the formulation of national security strategy and military strategy, and acting 'as a think tank on national security strategy and military strategy.'[14]

An examination of the outline of the National Defence Course reveals an emphasis on the subject of national security and the underlying permutations. Variables such as the socio-political environment and the state of economy are deemed to be of central concern in the construction of the concept of national

security.[15] The implication of this accent on national security as a function of political stability[16] is demonstrated in the contributions of military officers contained in *The Green Book*, discussed in a later section of this chapter.

As frequent references have been made to the instruction of the senior military leadership, it is only appropriate that we briefly outline the composition of the participants of the NDC programme. The college generally accepts military officers of the rank of Brigadier and equivalent (an Air Commodore in case of the air force, and a Commodore for the navy), normally attained in excess of 20 or so years of service for the Pakistani armed forces. From the civilian bureaucracy, those of the rank of a Joint Secretary and equivalent are expected to participate in the programme. An additional requirement for the participants from the civilian bureaucracy category is that of the participants/nominees having a good service record, with the potential for further career progression.[17]

At one level, institutions such as the NDC identify (by admitting such officers) the potential military leaders who are expected to participate in policy formulation and implementation at some point in their careers. That these senior military leaders have been socialised through training and instruction throughout their military careers is not disputed. The primacy of the NDC is in it being the highest forum where the Pakistani military leadership comes together for common instruction, and where the current thinking on a range of issues can be assessed for furthering the research agenda of understanding the dynamics of civil–military relations in Pakistan. The NDC at another level, it is suggested, serves notice of the end of formal 'training' of a military officer in so far as it relates to their career progression. This proposition is demonstrated by the following example: officers from the armed forces who are not selected for the NDC programme are highly unlikely to progress any further in their careers. Conversely, in the present context, selection to the NDC programme is equally likely to mark the beginning of the process where an officer's perception of what undermines or promotes national security can, in theory, impact on political outcomes, especially in the case of political crises. The phenomena of the military *coups d'état* in Pakistan, however, are not only a function of the military leadership's perception of political crises undermining national security; this study also contends that the safeguarding of the institutional interests of the armed forces is a central factor in triggering military interventions in Pakistan.[18] In support of this assumption, we refer to Cohen's account where it meticulously documents the course of evolution of the Pakistani army's officer corps. Cohen identifies three generations of Pakistani officers – namely British or American (depending on their training in the British or the American military academies) during 1950–65 and Pakistani from 1972 onwards[19] on account of their estimation (of the impact on the armed forces) of historical events of the time.

We note, however, that a differential in the generation or social class of the military leadership does not appear to be a sufficient deterrent or a catalyst in the occurrence of a *coup d'état* in Pakistan, and therefore is of limited value where applied as an explanatory variable. Consider for instance that the armed forces in Pakistan successfully intervened and removed the civilian governments in 1958

(General Ayub Khan),[20] 1977 (General Zia-ul-Haq) and 1999 (General Pervaiz Musharraf), without any regard to the class or generational issues of the military leadership, as outlined by Cohen for instance. The problem, we propose therefore, is embedded in the institutional interests of the military. After the 1999 military *coup d'état* in Pakistan to quote a relevant example, General Pervaiz Musharraf, in his 17 October 1999 address, said that 'the few at the helm of affairs in the last government [of prime minister Nawaz Sharif] were intriguing to destroy the *last institution of stability* left in Pakistan by creating dissension in the ranks of the armed forces of Pakistan [emphasis added].'[21] In an incisive comment, however, Hamid Hussain suggests that the 'Military officers generally blame politicians for politicisation of the armed forces' but the issue is not as simplistic as is presented; it is 'the military rule, which politicizes the army officers. Repeated military intervention [in Pakistan] has lowered the threshold for the involvement of army officers in civil affairs.'[22]

Reverting to our concern with the NDC, it will be appropriate to draw on the interview with the Commandant of the College. During the interview, the Commandant commented on his understanding of the reason for the creation of Pakistan. As 'national endeavours in organised states emerge from a national purpose', the Commandant argued, the need then is to take stock of history. 'We need to remind ourselves of the purpose of the creation of Pakistan' he said, and also the 'vision of the founding fathers [of Pakistan].' Had it not been for 14 August 1947 (when Pakistan came into existence), the Commandant said, 'I would have been an Indian national. This date made me who I am, and I am constrained by my identity. Without August 14, I am an Indian national.'[23]

The underlying assumption in this observation probably remains the problem of association with an Indian identity. In Chapter 1, we traced the historical antecedents of the issue of threat perception as articulated by the Muslim minorities in the united India. Cohen argues that this perception had similarly affected the Muslim armed forces officers in the British Indian army at the time of partition of India; that the Muslim army officers in the British Indian army chose Pakistan because of 'a sense of injustice and fear in relationship to the Hindu majority' and so a 'vast majority of Muslim officers came to the conclusion that they could lead a better life in an Islamic state.'[24] Cohen opines that the 'suspicion (but not fear) of communal enemies was engraved on the psyches of almost all officers in the new Pakistan Army.'[25] A likely inference from Cohen's account points to the constancy of threat perception from an external enemy. By extension, then, this is one legacy that resonates with the Commandant of the NDC.

An external enemy though is not the only variable within the matrix of national security. For instance, when asked about the challenges facing the newly established state of Pakistan, the Commandant sounded the familiar refrain of identifying the political elite as responsible for recurrent crises in their failure to meet the expectations or challenges facing the newly established state.[26] He pointed to the inability of the then government to frame a constitution for the country; that when the constitution did come into existence in 1956, it failed to address the important issues of the time.[27] This observation of the failure of the politicians to mediate

political and economic crises is consistent with the military leadership's views on the subject.

Before proceeding to examine the Pakistani army's publications for an analysis of the military leadership's perceptions, a brief reference is made to an interview conducted by this writer with another senior military officer (a Major General in rank) of the Pakistani army who had also served on the faculty of the NDC.[28] This officer pointed out (in response to a question on how the curriculum of the College meets the objective of the training programme) that the NDC provides a platform to help develop consensus in policy-making and in determining and defining the national interest. With this consensus the College ensures, as far as is possible, that the different elites (the military officers and the civilian executives) are not working at cross-purposes. On being asked what constituted national security from his point of view, the officer acknowledged the concept itself defies simple classification but proposed that 'as a matter of understanding, any issue which ultimately results in the use of force as a consequence of any development at some stage should fall into national security categorisation.'[29] The officer counted economic breakdown and law and order issues as a function of national security. Broadly speaking, the officer argued, if we consider among others, diplomacy, economy, the military and the media as elements of power, then a weakening of any of these elements should also be categorised as a national security concern. In other words, all the elements associated with routine democratic government could be of concern to the military, if they so decided.

In an answer to a question on what comprised the military's institutional strength, the officer identified discipline, training and the internal cohesiveness of the army as of foremost importance. It was further articulated that in Pakistan, the army was 'one institution with roots in the masses at the leadership level' and that it takes its intake from 'all walks of life' where 'all ethnic groups, religious groups, even minorities are represented.'[30] The army makes this integration happen, the officer stated, through a fair system of selection of personnel and thus the institution 'draws its strength from the rule of law and merit within the army.'[31] Now, two broad themes immediately become apparent from the above responses. The first refers to the inclusive nature of national security as perceived by the military leadership. The second theme is concerned with the attributes of military in terms of its internal cohesiveness. It can therefore be inferred that the military leadership's justification for the removal of civilian governments in Pakistan is probably attributable to this broad interpretation of what constitutes national security and, by similar reasoning, the factors that undermine it. With this all-inclusive definition of national security, it is expected that the perceived crises in political or economic domains are likely to be advanced as sufficient and legitimate raison d'être for military intervention. Indeed, military rulers from General Ayub Khan in 1958 to General Pervaiz Musharraf in 1999 have resorted to this argument. Equally relevantly, the evidence presented here has not supported the argument of economic and or political crises as an adequate explanation of military *coups d'état* in Pakistan.

The 1999 military coup

An examination of the 1999 military *coup d'état* in Pakistan reveals that it can stand as an exemplar of path dependency, in relation to the army's underlying and historical concerns. In addition to the charge of the civilian government attempting to create dissension in the ranks of military leadership[32] and triggering a coup by implication, General Musharraf, in an interview with the Qatar-based television station Al-Jazeera on 12 November 1999, stated that 'stabilisation of economy is my number one priority. We have very poor economic conditions. We would like to stabilise the economy. Secondly, we need to strengthen national integration, because there was a degree of provincial disharmony in Pakistan.'[33]

Measuring provincial harmony or national integration being beyond the scope of this investigation, our primary consideration is to assess the claim of the military government's first priority: reviving the national economy. As a notional reference to the revival of national economy assumes initial economic underachievement or mismanagement, 'it is [therefore] more *useful* [original italics] to identify factors that are prior to the event to be explained.'[34] This is what the following section sets to achieve by drawing on a report presented by the World Bank on Pakistan's economic performance. The report on the state of Pakistan's economy (published by the World Bank on 7 April 1999, that is, some 6 months before the 12 October 1999 military *coup d'état*) is relevant as it makes a contrasting read to the military government's claim of economic difficulties. Commenting on the variables that had impacted on the country's national economy, the report notes:

> The nuclear tests of May 1998 [conducted by Pakistan in response to India's nuclear tests of the same year], the economic sanctions that followed, and the related drying up of most capital inflows led to severe financial difficulties. A combination of adroit domestic economic and financial management and international financial assistance have allowed Pakistan to come through the immediate crisis without drastic disruption of economic activity . . . Most important, Pakistan had an on-going economic reform program since 1997 that helped mitigate the effects of the crisis. Pakistan had reduced its fiscal deficit from 7.1 per cent of GDP in 1995/96 to 5.4 per cent in 1997/98.[35]

The essential point is therefore clear. The data presented here does not support the claim of economic crises, let alone serve as a sufficient cause for the military *coup d'état* of 1999. There is, by contrast, strong preliminary evidence that the military takeover of 1999 was precipitated after the limited India–Pakistan armed hostility in the disputed territory of Kashmir over the Kargil area.

Two caveats,[36] however, are in order. First, it is not being claimed that this conflict was the immediate cause of the 1999 military *coup d'état* in Pakistan. The military intervened when General Pervaiz Musharraf was removed as the army chief by the then prime minister Nawaz Sharif. Second, it is equally important to note that our focus is not on the territorial dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. The reference to the Kargil conflict usefully illuminates the military's

influence and allows for a greater understanding of the processes of civil–military interaction in Pakistan.

Bruce Riedel, a Special Assistant to the American president, Bill Clinton, from 1997 to 2001, has (as a participant in the subsequent discussions held between President Clinton and the Pakistani prime minister Nawaz Sharif) documented President Clinton's intervention in the India–Pakistan crisis over the Kargil area of Kashmir. The episode had sufficiently alarmed the American Administration, given the nuclear weapons status of the two protagonists.[37] The American Administration, in order to press upon Pakistan the need to disengage from the conflict, enlisted the help of the Saudi Ambassador in the USA who in turn secured the support of the Saudi Crown Prince (and the present King) Abdullah for the American initiative. The British prime minister, Tony Blair, 'also contacted [Nawaz] Sharif to weigh in as well on the need for withdrawal [of the Pakistani armed forces from the Kargil sector].'[38] Prime minister Nawaz Sharif arrived in Washington from Pakistan for the summit meeting with President Clinton on 4 July 1999.

Riedel informs us that Sharif appeared deeply troubled by the possibility of an escalation (in the wake of the armed conflict in the Kargil) leading to an all-out war with India and was 'equally worried about his own hold on power and the threat from his military chiefs who were pressing for a tough stand.'[39] For example, Riedel observes that the Pakistani army chief General Pervaiz Mushrraf 'was said to be a hardliner on Kashmir, a man some feared was determined to humble India once and for all.'[40] The prime minister, after the intervention by American president Bill Clinton, agreed to withdraw the Pakistani troops from the Kargil area.[41] After Sharif's subsequent return to Pakistan, the Americans attempted to continue a level of mediation over the Kashmir problem but concluded that the situation within Pakistan was not conducive for Nawaz Sharif to move forward on that front.[42] Riedel further notes that around the September of that year, the American Administration was given the impression that the Nawaz Sharif government:

> knew a military coup was coming. On October 12 1999 it came. Ironically, it was Nawaz who provoked the coup's timing by trying to exile [the army chief General Pervaiz] Musharraf when he was on an official visit to Sri Lanka. His plane was denied permission to return to Karachi or anywhere in Pakistan. The military rebelled and forced open the airport. Within hours, Nawaz was in jail and the army was in control.[43]

While the above illustration presents an interpretation of the Kargil conflict from the American point of view, it nevertheless informs us about the complexity of the civilian government's limited control over an influential military. On the one hand, the military accepted the civilian government's decision to disengage from the Kargil sector subsequent to Sharif's summit with Clinton. On the other, we have evidence that the civilian government had considerable reservations, conveyed to the American Administration and as noted by Riedel, regarding the projected backlash from the military after the withdrawal of Pakistani troops from

conflict with India. Vali Nasr suggests that the conflict even supports the view that the Pakistani military:

> used extremist forces in Kashmir to undermine [prime minister] Sharif, most notably in Kargil in 1999, when an incursion by militants into Indian-held Kashmir brought the two countries to the brink of war, and eventually greatly weakened Nawaz Sharif.[44]

The Kargil episode shows that the military had probably adopted a rigid stance against withdrawing troops in this conflict with India, and Prime Minister Sharif was aware of the potential political costs of the decision to withdraw troops.[45] This assumption is also linked with the first, in the sense of the military's reaction to a civilian government encroaching upon the formers' domain in an attempt to project civilian control. Lastly, the Kargil episode demonstrates the dynamics of civil–military relations in Pakistan by revealing the limited political space afforded to the former by the latter.

As an aside, we note contrasting interpretations of the aftermath of the 1999 military *coup d'état* in Pakistan. For example, Riedel notes that the 'US relations with Pakistan have substantially improved . . . thanks to the Musharraf's government's role in the war against the Taliban and Osama bin Laden.'[46] Nasr, on the other hand, is mindful of the rise of religious extremism 'where the military did full-bore Islamism a huge favor by yanking the PML from power' and ending Pakistan's progress towards democracy.[47] Where Riedel's view probably reflects the historical American take on military interventions in Pakistan, Nasr's is an important insight in that it is in fact military intervention that promotes extremism, be it religious or otherwise, rather than the political elite creating such cleavages. This point essentially negates the military's contention for removing the civilian governments on account of political disorder. Rather, going by the evidence, it will be argued that the aftermath of a military intervention is a legacy of political cleavages and deficits that the successor civilian regimes attempt to mediate or contain. These regimes, in turn, are constrained by the limited political space allowed by the departing military regime, for instance in terms of constitutional amendments strengthening the presidency where a parliamentary form of government exists. The problem with a strong presidency, as we are reminded in the case of the Weimar Republic, was that it got 'eventually exploited to subvert and then destroy altogether the place of Parliament.'[48] Through the adoption of constitutional measures, the present military government has followed the path of the earlier military coups in Pakistan. The military coup of 1958 had produced the 1962 constitution, while the Eighth Constitutional Amendment was an outcome of the 1977 military coup in the country. Following the military *coup d'état* of 1999, constitutional cover has been obtained for the continuation of the serving army chief General Pervaiz Musharraf as the president of the country, in addition to strengthening the office of the president relative to that of the prime minister, among others.[49]

Pakistan Administrative Staff College

This section offers a brief outline of the Pakistan Administrative Staff College (PASC), an institution that instructs the senior members of the civilian bureaucracy in policy formulating skills. In an earlier section of this chapter we refer to the PASC to draw out the contrast of its thrust on capacity building of the civilian bureaucracy, as compared with the nation-building discourse of the NDC that trains the senior military leadership. As a retired General of the Pakistan Army now heads the PASC, it will also be fruitful, as a further research agenda, to document any change of focus that this institution undergoes where the training of the senior civilian bureaucracy is concerned.

While examining the National Defence College, it was highlighted that the College, in addition to training the senior military officers, also intakes selected members of the senior civilian bureaucracy. The PASC, on the other hand, is an institution primarily concerned with preparing the senior members of the civilian bureaucracy for policy formulation roles.[50] Both the NDC and the PASC, thus share objectives of improving key skills and competencies of the potential leaders of the military and the civilian bureaucracy respectively.

The National Management Course of the PASC for the civilian bureaucracy is thus described as a 'watershed in the career of civil servants' for it aims to increase the capacity of the senior civil servants in taking on leadership roles.[51] The 'capacity building' theme (enabling the civil servants to cope with change) resonates in the interview with the then Principal of the PASC.[52] More relevant to this study, however, are the Principal's comments on the influence of the military being instructive. While referring to the present system of governance and the role of the military in Pakistan, the Principal remarked that in his opinion, it was about:

> the chemistry of power. Army has emerged as the single most powerful, organised entity in [our] political system. From the barracks they have started expanding. They [the Army] lay down rules, define them, [and identify] spheres of influence for other actors [in the system].[53]

While the comment can be interpreted as the personal opinion of a member of the civilian bureaucracy, it is important to emphasise that the Principal's observation on his understanding of the influence of the military in Pakistan is consistent with the findings of this investigation. Furthermore, as an in-service (in 2003), senior member of the Pakistani civil services (equivalent to the rank of a permanent secretary to the government), the Principal is propitiously located to comment on the influence of the military.

During the course of the interview, the Principal made another pertinent observation on the nuances of the military's influence, suggesting that the present military regime in Pakistan probably had the Indonesian model of government (under General Suharto) in mind to be applied in this country. However, with the collapse of the Suharto regime, the Principal argued, the military in Pakistan

has now turned its attention to adopting the Turkish model of government. This observation can be further analysed and developed fruitfully. The objective here is not an explication of either the Indonesian or the Turkish models of governance. How far these models have been or are likely to be replicated in Pakistan is also beyond the scope of this investigation. What concerns us here are the potential problems encountered in altering the path of political developments subsequent to the event of a military *coup d'état*. For example, while Suharto's dictatorship has ended, 'the [Indonesian] army enjoys unhealthy influence over the government [and] exploits this to pursue shady businesses.'[54] Another comment similarly informs that in Indonesia:

> Military foundations run logging concessions, palm oil plantations, hotels, banks, an airline and all manner of other businesses. The army's presence in every district and village of the country . . . gives it leverage over local politicians and officials. The army exploits this influence to win lucrative contracts, muscle in on land deals . . . and so on.[55]

In the Turkish model of governance, it has been demonstrated that the Turkish military has retained considerable influence over the government's policy-making processes through institutions such as the National Security Council. There are processes in these exemplars common to governance of the military regime in Pakistan. For instance, the 1999 military coup in Pakistan saw the army chief and the president (General Pervaiz Musharraf) amending the Constitution and setting up a National Security Council, empowering the Presidency to dissolve the National Assembly, and appointing the armed forces chiefs.[56] It is therefore reasonable to argue that the Pakistani armed forces exhibit characteristics of both the Indonesian model in terms of the former's considerable economic interests, and the Turkish model, whereby the creation of the National Security Council in Pakistan and the strengthening of the office of the president through constitutional amendments are illustrative of the military's control and influence within the state.

In an earlier part of the chapter, it was argued that the publications of the Pakistani army provide evidence for the world view of the military leadership on a range of political and professional issues such as those of nation-building, among others. The following section therefore analyses one of the more significant publications, known as *The Green Book 2000*, for this purpose.

The Green Book 2000

The Green Book 2000 contains articles by 39 senior (major-generals and brigadiers) and middle-ranking (colonels, lieutenant colonels) officers of the Pakistani army, all in-service in 2000. They have articulated their views on aspects of nation-building, and the military's contribution in political, social and economic spheres. Considering the roles, status and experience of these officers, the views expressed by these representatives of the military leadership are clearly reflective

of the military's *institutional* perception and understanding of the nation-building processes, and the military's present and likely contribution to these processes. So, the editorial of this publication confirms: 'Gone are the days when the sole role of an army was limited, either to invade or beat back the attackers . . . Geopolitical and geo-strategic regional compulsions of South Asia have made the revision and redefinition of Pakistan Army's role a necessity.'[57]

Out of these 39 military officers, contributions by 13 senior officers have been selected for an analysis of the motivation and understanding of the military leadership's views on political developments in Pakistan. Political and economic mismanagement, inefficiency and corruption of the civil governments in Pakistan (real or perceived), and the law and order situation emerge as key themes in the military leadership's perception of the state of the affairs. A Major-General of the Pakistani army thus claims that where the politicians have fomented sectarianism and regionalism, the army, on the other hand, has provided stability and has helped develop cohesiveness within the society.[58] For a resolution of the aforementioned shortcomings of the civilian governments in Pakistan, the officer argues for the induction of army personnel in the police service and sectors such as health services and engineering.[59] The fact that by 2003 1,027 civilian positions in the public sector in Pakistan had been occupied by military personnel confirms the preceding view (on the induction of the military) is far from a personal opinion of an individual officer. Similarly, a newspaper report[60] informs us that a number of inducted military officers (both serving and retired) are working in ministries of defence, communications, foreign affairs, education, information, establishment division (responsible for the promotions and postings of the civilian bureaucracy), interior (responsible for police and law enforcement agencies), food and agriculture, information technology, defence production, petroleum and natural resources, science and technology, and the revenue division among others.[61] To quote specific examples from recent reports, we note that the education ministry's monitoring and evaluation cell is 'entirely manned' by the former military officers,[62] whereas retired armed forces officers are being inducted in the Central Board of Revenue of the Finance Ministry among others.[63] The formidable control of the military is further demonstrated by the fact that the education ministry (presently headed by a retired Lieutenant General of the Pakistani army) 'has acquired the services of Pakistan army' to rebuild or renovate 'all government-run schools in the country', where the project is expected to cost a staggering PRs 100 billion.[64]

That the military has embarked on perhaps the most comprehensive attempt to occupy the public sphere is illustrated by the changes that have been introduced in the syllabus of secondary schools in Pakistan. The Pakistan Studies curriculum now includes the 12 October 1999 military *coup d'état* of General Musharraf, 'his philosophy of "enlightened moderation"' and other reforms initiated by the regime.[65]

It is also striking that for the first time in the history of the PASC, an institution for the training of senior civil servants, is headed by (the now retired) Lieutenant General Javed Hassan, the former Commandant of the military's National Defence College.[66] Not unexpectedly, this appointment has come under criticism

from the civilian bureaucracy.[67] This appointment can be seen as one of the first steps indicative of the military's desire to influence the direction of the training of the civil bureaucracy, develop precedence and institutionalise this particular policy choice with considerable implications for public policy formulation in Pakistan. It now transpires that right from the time of appointment of civil servants in the country, retired military officers generally direct the formers' career progression and training. For instance, the Civil Services Academy in Lahore that trains the newly inducted civil officers, is headed by a retired army officer, as are the institutions such as the National Institution of Public Administration (responsible for training mid-career civil servants) at Lahore, Karachi and Peshawar.[68]

As earlier mentioned, criticism of civilian governments in Pakistan on account of political and economic mismanagement is a recurring theme in *The Green Book*.[69] Elsewhere in this publication, another officer advocates that the Defence Ministry should be solely manned by the personnel drawn from the army, the navy, and the air force, as the civilian bureaucracy at the level of the 'joint secretary and deputy secretary level do not show an understanding of the military matters.'[70] The step would help in facilitating decision-making and maintaining secrecy towards 'all service matters.'[71] The preceding statement illustrates a fundamental issue of trust and confidence, or more specifically, the lack of trust in the civil bureaucracy. Thus, where a lack of specialised knowledge of military affairs within the civilian bureaucracy can be explained as an issue of capacity building and training, the reference to issues of secrecy in this context directly question the integrity of the civilian stakeholders in the Defence Ministry.

Pakistan's history of conflict and dispute with India is an important theme, emphasised by the senior military commanders in *The Green Book*. At one level, the military leadership views Pakistan's nuclear capability as offering potential for pursuing low intensity conflict with India (following the logic, or hope, that nuclear weapons are likely to contain the possibility of an all-out war between India and Pakistan).[72] We are also offered a more measured comment on the India–Pakistan conflict with the observation that both 'India and Pakistan have found it increasingly difficult to overcome their mutual antipathy of formative years' resulting in spending of vast resources on the defence budgets.[73] The latest assertion by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (JCSC), that Pakistan's conventional and non-conventional weapons will be used to defend the country[74] is representative of the military's institutional assessment of India continuing to be a source of primary concern to the leadership. This assessment will have secondary ramifications in terms of sustained and high defence expenditure in Pakistan, making it potentially problematic for a civilian government to curtail the same. Not surprisingly then, the defence allocations have been increased by 3.3 per cent, with the state minister for Finance in General Pervaiz Musharraf's government helpfully observing that the 'People of Pakistan are always ready to sacrifice their lives and resources for the defence of geographical and ideological frontiers of this sacred homeland.'[75]

In contrast to the minister's assertion, a member (at the time of publication of this report) of the Defence Committee of the Senate of Pakistan (belonging to

the opposition Pakistan Peoples Party) has noted that the 'actual military spending will be masked as civil expenditure and the Parliament will not know which [armed forces] Service is spending how much and on what',[76] reflecting the historical absence of parliamentary debate and oversight of the defence expenditure in Pakistan.

Reverting to *The Green Book*, many of the senior army officers writing in this publication have drawn on the experiences of foreign military services with a view to presenting a more coherent account of the Pakistan armed forces' involvement in the political and economic affairs of the state. For instance, case studies have been cited where the militaries in Thailand, Turkey and Indonesia, among others, have held positions of influence and control within the state. The Peoples Liberation Army of China is mentioned where it is involved in 'fighting, farming and production' and in 'commercial activity.'[77] In a similar fashion, we are informed of the Egyptian army's engagement in heavy economic activity, and later of the role of the Brazilian, Chilean, Peruvian and the Guatemalan armies in their respective countries.[78]

While analysing the military's perception over the state of the nation, one acknowledges that some military officers have articulated reservations on the growing involvement of Pakistani armed forces in the civilian sphere, in recognition of the potential difficulties and 'ill effects' resulting from the army's increased engagement in the civil life.[79] There may well be political mismanagement, but the army cannot be expected to 'replace all state institutions.'[80] An officer sounds a further note of caution, warning 'On no account should the army be doing nation building at the cost of professional requirements.'[81] In the considered opinion of a senior army officer, the military's involvement outside its specific domain has a twin effect on both the civil and the military. For the military, it will 'affect training and operational edifice of the [armed] services . . . and [this] must constitute a serious consideration in determining the level of Army's involvement in national affairs.'[82] In the view of this officer, the army's intervention in civil affairs is likely to induce 'inertia of dependence and mar the very growth of these [civil] institutions from within, an essential prerequisite for a long-term perspective of nation building.'[83]

Before concluding this section, a reference to the military's perception of it having the requisite skills, knowledge and experience for laying claim to be the primary vehicle in the nation-building and governance projects is necessary. The military argues that it has the internal organisation to take up such a task, and that it is 'older than the political structure of the country as it was raised by the British on professional and apolitical lines.'[84] The importance of this assertion is in the implied and embedded claim to legitimacy, drawn on by an institution (the armed forces) that predates the existence of a political structure (Pakistan). This claim, however, is of limited, if any, utility in an explanation of the military's influence in Pakistan. More significant are the policy choices made starting from the incorporation of serving military officers in the civil administration in Pakistan in 1948, and the induction of the sitting army chief General Ayub Khan in 1954 as the Defence Minister, as events signposting the military's salience.

Business of the military

This section examines the considerable economic interests of the Pakistani military to explain why this institution has been euphemistically referred to as the 'parallel state'. The account begins with the rationale advanced by the military for extending its role in the economic sector of Pakistan. We are informed that due to the organisational requirements of the military forces, a large number of personnel from the services (approximately 30,000) retire annually between the ages of 40 and 50 years and the army regards the welfare of such personnel and their families as its 'major obligation.'[85] The establishment of the Army Welfare Trust (AWT) in 1971 was therefore designed to generate funds for the 'welfare and rehabilitation' of the services personnel.[86] Beginning with a start-up capital of PRs 0.7 million in 1971, the Trust's assets were estimated in excess of PRs 50 billion in 2000.[87] The AWT has diversified into the financial sector (with the creation of Askari[88] Commercial Bank in 1991, Askari Leasing Company in 1993, and Askari General Insurance Limited in 1995), and businesses in areas such as construction, security, pharmaceuticals and agriculture.[89]

The AWT, however, is preceded by another organisation, the Fauji[90] Foundation (FF), categorised as a 'charitable trust, exclusively devoted to the welfare of ex-servicemen of the armed forces of Pakistan and their dependents.'[91] The Foundation, created in the mid-1950s with an outlay of PRs 18 million, had assets worth over PRs 9 billion in 2000, in the process becoming the 'largest welfare-cum-industrial complex in Pakistan.'[92] Interestingly, in 2005, the net worth of the Foundation is estimated in excess of PRs 43 billion[93], an increase of PRs 34 billion over 5 years.

The Foundation's managing director (a retired Lieutenant General of the Pakistani army) sheds further light on the economic wherewithal of this entity noting that, by 2005, the organisation had contributed a total of PRs 167 billion in taxes and duties to the national exchequer.[94] The Foundation has plans for building power plants at various locations in Pakistan, and consolidating its presence in the health sector by constructing additional hospitals.[95] The FF owns 224 welfare institutions such as hospitals, schools, colleges and technical training centres,[96] and operates projects such as sugar mills, cereal plants and a polypropylene plant; the Foundation is also a shareholder in other companies owned by the Pakistani army including the Fauji Fertilizer Company, and the Fauji Oil terminal and Distribution Company, to name but a few.[97]

Among these companies, the Fauji Fertilizer Company (FFC) deserves a special mention. Incorporated as a public limited company in 1978, the FFC has a market capitalisation (in 2003) of PRs 19 billion.[98] The FFC holds around a 60 per cent share of the urea market in Pakistan; since its formation the Company claims a contribution of PRs 42 billion to the national exchequer in government taxes attaining the position of 'the highest taxpayer' in Pakistan.[99] The aforementioned organisations are, however, solely associated with the Pakistani army; the Pakistani navy and the Pakistani air force have their own designated welfare trusts and foundations.

The nature and the extent of the Pakistani military's influence in the national economy, in Ayesha Siddiqa Agha's view, reflect the 'military's top management's desire to institution building.'[100] This is a valuable observation, for it identifies the path adopted by the military for institutionalising its role not only in the political but also the economic realm in Pakistan.[101] The setting up of the Shaheen Foundation by the Pakistani air force in 1977 and the Bahria Foundation by the Pakistani navy in 1981, both taking a lead on a number of projects including those of commercial aviation, real estate development, ship breaking and education, similarly reflect the desire to maximise economic influence.[102]

However, returning to the overall context of the military's business activities, Agha cites the embedded political influence of the military to challenge the claim of welfare (of the military personnel) as an explanation of the business ventures of the armed forces and argues: 'The top management of the armed forces jealously guard their interests. Over the years the interests have narrowed down from the greater benefit of the institution to personal welfare of the generals.'[103] In support of her argument, Agha contends that the military's business ventures are more a product of personal whims than proper feasibility studies in the sense that the start-up projects are seen as potential employment-creating opportunities for the senior armed forces officers.[104]

Nevertheless, the military's economic interests are but a manifestation of the extent of its influence and control over the developments in Pakistan. That the business ventures in this instance are not likely to be driven by commercial feasibility studies does not detract from the main argument: the Pakistani military has adequate political and economic capacity to be categorised as the parallel state. It is therefore with good reason that where the military's economic capacity is concerned, the military (that is, the army, the navy and the air force) is now acknowledged to be operating the country's largest business entity in the form of its charitable foundations and trusts and these organisations amongst them 'produce almost everything which a Pakistani producer or a service provider can produce.'[105] So, what is the problem with the military's business activity? For one, with military's economic autarky, it becomes exceedingly difficult for the political government to 'engage in meaningful oversight of the military.'[106] It is also likely that the military's economic engagements 'introduce market distortions . . . provide a platform for corruption and rent-seeking behaviour (defined as the extraction of excess profits . . .)', among others.[107]

By way of concluding, we now summarise the key themes of this investigation below.

Summary

This inquiry set out to argue why the process of scrutinising the military, arguably the most powerful institution of the Pakistani state, helps in understanding political developments in the country. We demonstrated that the theoretical frameworks of path dependency and historical institutionalism are best situated to provide us with a powerful theoretical lens through which to investigate the civil–military

dynamics. An emphasis on the salience of institutions as a fruitful line of inquiry yielded important insights into the processes of constructing precedents that are difficult to reverse. During the course of the study, we found that the constitutional provisions adopted by the military for imposing formal controls constrained succeeding civilian governments in Pakistan by enabling the office of the president and validating all measures adopted by the military, among others.

Though not a central concern of this inquiry, the study highlighted the poverty of the concept of the military as a modernising agent and strikingly demonstrated that a professional military in the case of Pakistan has not reduced the likelihood of the occurrence of the military *coup d'état*. In fact, the military has intervened when it has perceived its institutional interest threatened by the civilian government.

The analysis presented the background to the problem of Hindu–Muslim conflict in a united India and demonstrated how the threat perception of the Muslim religious minority in India translated into political aspirations of separatism based on religious identity, and culminated in the demand for Pakistan. While discussing the establishment of the Indian National Congress and the All-India Muslim League, we observed that the former sought to represent all of India while the latter aspired to exclusively articulate the Indian Muslim community's political interests. This differential in the objectives of the two parties laid the foundation for political contestation on the basis of religious identity. The underlying theme of the discourse was to alert us to the application of threat perception as an analytical tool that permeated the construction of official policy in Pakistan. It can thus be reasonably inferred that political variations and historical experiences are likely to leave an imprint on policy outcome. Most relevant is the way that the experience of Hindu–Muslim conflict in India, and Pakistan's perception of threat from a larger hostile neighbour, has impacted on the public policy construction.

By examining the generic causes of a military *coup d'état* in some societies, the investigation scoped a number of variables likely to either constrain or precipitate military intervention. During the course of the analysis, a reference was made to some of the weaknesses within the civil–military relations theory, primarily but not exclusively relating to the problem of under-theorising within the discipline. It was argued that the theoretical framework requires innovative approaches to explain the persistence of the military's influence in different settings.

We noted some of the difficulties in rolling back the influence of the military in societies that have experienced a *coup d'état* are probably attributable to the persistence of institutional constraints introduced by the military following its intervention. Therefore to account for periods of direct military rule and the coups that bring these about in Pakistan, one should not focus on discrete causal factors such as 'professionalism' or 'Islam' as a *problematique*, but employ a path-dependent, historical institutionalist approach for unravelling the military's web of embedded control, and extricate the theory from contrived convenience of argument based on tautological assumptions.

An examination of the political developments after independence in 1947 demonstrates that the establishment of civil service positions in 1948 to mediate

between the cabinet and the parliament was one manifestation of the incremental centralisation of the authority within the state. Equally significant was the induction in 1954 of the serving army chief as Defence Minister into the Cabinet. Evidence was then presented to argue that, for example, the 1958 military *coup d'état* in Pakistan is best understood as a response of the civilian bureaucracy–military nexus intended to constrain the development of political institutions in Pakistan. With the emergence of the military as the core executive, the interventions of 1977 and 1999 are seen similarly.

We also reported that there is no conclusive evidence linking problems of law and order and political instability with the military coups in Pakistan and arrived at this conclusion by considering an important study documenting the problems of lawlessness and crime statistics in Pakistan; it was revealed that regardless of the political system (military regime or civilian government), the crime rate has generally registered an upward trend. The assumption that the military in Pakistan intervenes as a response to systemic political and or economic crises, and deals with these problems, is thus flawed.

The present study has identified new resources that shed light on the perception and the role, both present and potential, of the military leadership in the politics of Pakistan. Accessing significant resources such as the National Defence College that trains the entire military leadership of the Pakistani armed forces, locates a window of opportunity for conducting further research on this very important institution. We used the internal publication of the Pakistani army that articulates the senior military leadership's understanding, and the military's institutional contribution, to the project of nation-building in Pakistan. We also found that there is approximate consensus within the military leadership on two issues central to the civil–military relations debate. The first related to a sense of mistrust in the capacity of the political leadership to deliver 'good governance'. The second was the confidence that the military had the capacity, indeed duty, to contribute and engage in all the spheres of civilian life. In the articles contributed by the senior military officers seen here, most drew on the examples of the militaries of China, Indonesia, Egypt, Israel and Turkey among others, to support the case for the involvement of the Pakistani military in sectors such as health, education and agriculture to name but a few. Therefore, it is reasonable to infer that the military in Pakistan is unlikely to withdraw from the public sphere and act as a 'professional' military alone. On the contrary, it is likely that the civilian governments in Pakistan will continue to function under constraints imposed by the military's penetration of the civilian sector, thus undermining the capacity of political institutions to mediate politically.

One consequence of constraining political institutions needs to be highlighted, namely that the marginalisation of the political exacerbates religious and ethnic cleavages. At this point we note a key differential. We assume these cleavages to be a consequence of constraints imposed on political institutions. This assumption is contrary to the received wisdom of branding civilian governments in Pakistan a cause of religious and ethnic divisions. This is an essential point, for the event of a military *coup d'état*, in the literature is generally attributed to a 'failure' of politi-

cal governments in Pakistan. On the basis of evidence reviewed in this inquiry, the argument is fundamentally problematic.

This study has demonstrated the saliency of the military as the most formidable institution in Pakistan. We have set out the explanation of how this phenomenon came about, by differentiating the causes and the consequences of military coups from mere coincidence. Any project of sustainable democratisation in Pakistan will, therefore, have to contend with the institution of the military, socialised as it is in the exercise of power and governance.

Notes

Introduction

1 In this book the terms 'armed forces' and 'military' refer to the Army in the context of Pakistan. This is because all military coups in Pakistan have been initiated and executed by the Pakistani Army.

1 Conceptualising political developments in Pakistan

1 Modernisation and economic development are among the key terms in this debate. For a representative example see Seymour Martin Lipset, 'Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy', *The American Political cal Science Review*, vol. 53, no. 1, March 1959, pp. 69–105.

2 Problems associated with the idea of strengthening capacity of the state are not unique to Pakistan, though state-building may not always lead to robust political institutions. See for example, Francis Fukuyama, 'The Imperative Of State-Building', *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 15, no. 2, April 2004, pp. 17-31. On problems with India see G. W. Choudhry, *Pakistan's Relations with India, 1947-1966*, London: Pall Mall, 1968; Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, *Pakistan's Defence Policy, 1947-58*, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990; Latif Ahmed Sherwani, *Pakistan, China and America*, Karachi: Council for Pakistan Studies, 1980.

3 Few studies have directly attempted an analysis of civil–military relations in Pakistan. The exceptions include Hasan Askari Rizvi*, Military, State and Society in Pakistan*, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000; Saeed Shafqat, *Civil–military Relations in Pakistan: From Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to Benazir Bhutto*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1997; Stephen P. Cohen, *The Pakistan Army*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998 edition (stronger on the history of the development of the Pakistani Army's officer corps).

4 See for instance Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan*, Lahore: University of Punjab, 1983, chapters 16, 17.

5 Contrast this with the death of Pakistan's founder Muhammad Ali Jinnah within a year of Pakistan's independence in 1948, and the assassination of the country's first prime minister Liaquat Ali Khan in 1951.

6 Keith Callard, *Pakistan: A Political Study*, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1957.

7 Ibid., p. 5.

8 Ibid., p. 16.

9 Douglass C. North, *Institutions, Institutional Change, And Economic Performance*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 100.

10 Ibid., p. 99.

11 Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan*, Lahore: University of Punjab, 1983.

12 Ibid., pp. 242–43.

13 Ibid., p. 57.

14 Quoted in Callard, *Pakistan*, p. 142.

15 Samuel P Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968.

16 Why this should be the case is not persuasively demonstrated. See Adam Przeworski and Fernando Lomingi, 'Political Regimes and Economic Growth', *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, vol. 7, no. 3, summer 1993, p. 55; also Raymond Hinnebusch, 'Authoritarian Persistence, Democratization Theory and the Middle East: An Overview and Critique', *Democratization*, vol. 13, no. 3, June 2006, p. 375.

17 Huntington, *Political Order*, p. 398.

18 Ibid., p. 251.

19 *Keesings Contemporary Archives*, London, March 1-8, 1969, p. 23217.

20 Huntington, *Political Order*, p. 251.

21 Herbert Feldman, *From Crisis to Crisis: Pakistan 1962-1969*, London: Oxford University Press, 1972.

22 Feldman, *From Crisis to Crisis*, pp. 3–4

23 Khalid B. Sayeed, *Pakistan: The Formative Phase 1857–1947*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1968, p. 8.

24 Khalid B. Sayeed, *Politics In Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change*, New York: Praeger, 1980, p. 45.

25 Lawerence Ziring, *Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development*, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980. The poverty of political institutions and composition of power elites in Pakistan are some of the explanatory factors in B.M. Bhatia's, *Pakistan's Economic Development: 1948–1978*, New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1979, with a focus on economic aspects of crisis of governance in Pakistan.

26 Ziring, *Pakistan*, p. 86.

27 Ibid., p. 83.

28 Ibid., p. 86.

29 Ibid., p. 196.

30 We use the term 'peripheral political elites' in the meaning of regional or local political leaders lacking a national base.

31 Tariq Ali, *Can Pakistan Survive? The Death of a State*, Middlesex: Penguin, 1983, p. 67.

32 Nationalism as a concept is not our focus here though we note Eric Hobsbawm's interesting comment it is 'by no means evident that Pakistan was the product of a national movement among the Muslims of the then Indian Empire, though it may well be regarded as a reaction against an all-Indian national movement which failed to give adequate recognition to the special feelings or requirements of Muslims . . .' in *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, myth, reality*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 70. One definition of nationalism suggests that it is a 'theory of political legitimacy', in Ernest Gellenr, *Nations and Nationalism*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1983, p. 1. Also see Benedict Anderson, *Imagined communities: reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, revised edn, London: Verso, 1991.

33 Ayesha Jalal, *The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, p. 1.

34 Ibid., p.277.

35 Iftikhar H. Malik, *State and Civil Society in Pakistan: Politics of Authority, Ideology and Ethnicity*, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997.

36 Ibid., p. 4.

37 For some of the attendant issues see Uttam Sen and Ayesha Siddiqa Agha, 'Governance

in Plural Societies and Security: An Overview', *Policy Studies 19*, Colombo: Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, 2001.

38 Malik, *State and Civil Society*, pp. 25, 35.
39 Ian Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History*, London: Hurst, 1998, p. 125.
40 Ibid., p. 17.
41 While there has been significant unrest in Baluchistan, the crisis is not likely to lead to the dismemberment of the country. Also see Leo E. Rose and D. Hugh Evans, 'Pakistan's Enduring Experiment', *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 8, no. 1, 1997, pp. 83–96.
42 Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History,* p. 3.
43 As stated by Paul Pierson, historical institutionalism is historical 'because it recognizes that political developments must be understood as a process that unfolds over time' and it is institutionalist 'because it stresses that many of the contemporary political implications of these temporal processes are embedded in institutions . . .' in 'Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics', *American Political Science Review*, vol. 94, no. 2, June 2000, p. 265.
44 Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History*, p. 291.
45 Ian Talbot, *India and Pakistan*, London: Arnold, 2000, p. 1.
46 Rounaq Jahan, *Pakistan: failure in national integration*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1972, fn 3, p.1.
47 Ibid., p. 23.
48 Ibid., p. 52.
49 Ibid., pp. 54–5.
50 Bilal Hashmi, *United States Foreign Policy and the Development of an Elite: The Case of Pakistan*, PhD thesis, Washington State University, 1972, p. 3.
51 Ibid., p. 26.
52 Ibid., p. 53.
53 Ibid., pp. 34–5.
54 Robert J. McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1994, p. 16.
55 Hashmi, *United States Foreign Policy*, p. 68.
56 Dennis Kux, *The United States and Pakistan, 1947–2000: Disenchanted Allies*, Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, 2001, p. 18.
57 Ibid., p. 118.
58 Ibid., p. 360.
59 Sumit Ganguly, *Conflict Unending: India–Pakistan Tensions since 1947*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2001, p. 1.
60 Ibid.
61 Ayesha Jalal, *Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia: A Comparative and Historical Perspective*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 15.
62 Ibid., p. 23.
63 Ibid., p. 53.
64 Farzana Shaikh, *Community and Consensus in Islam: Muslim Representation in Colonial India, 1860–1947*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 14.
65 For a comment on differing interpretations of political Islam see Leonard Binder, 'Problems of Islamic Political Thought in the Light of Recent Developments in Pakistan', *The Journal of Politi*cs, vol. 20, no. 4, November 1958, pp. 655–75.
66 Shaikh, *Community And Consensus*, p. 21.
67 The College was the forerunner of the Aligarh Muslim University; the significance of this institution will become clearer later in the chapter.
68 H.C. Philips, H.L. Singh and B.N. Panday (eds) *The Evolution of India and Pakistan 1858 to 1947: Select Documents*, London: Oxford University Press, 1962, p. 174.
69 Shaikh, *Community and Consensus*, p. 102.
70 Shaikh, *Community and Consensus*, p. 104.

71 Ibid., p. 107.
72 Ibid., p. 109.
73 Phillips *et al. The Evolution of India and Pakistan*, pp. 190–1.
74 Shaikh, *Community and Consensus*, p. 164.
75 Ibid., p. 236.
76 Hamza Alavi, *Pakistan And Islam: Ethnicity and Ideology*. Available online. http://www.ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/sangat/pakisltt.htm accessed 1 March 2004.
77 Jalal, *Democracy and Authoritarianism*, p. 3.
78 Quoted in Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi, *The Struggle For Pakistan*, Karachi: University of Karachi, 1974, p. 23.
79 Ibid., p. 12.
80 Ibid., p. 31.
81 Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan*, p. 13.
82 Soofia Mumtaz, 'Interpreting Ethnic Movements in Pakistan', *The Pakistan Development Review*, vol. 38, no. 2, Summer 1999, p. 212.
83 Subrata K. Mitra, *State-Society Linkage and Political Parties in Changing societies: the case of India*, paper presented at American Political Science Association Conference, San Francisco, 2001, p. 4.
84 Giovanni Sartori, *Parties and party systems: A framework for analysis*, vol. I, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976, p. ix.
85 Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori, *Muslim Politics*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996, p. 7.
86 Subrata K. Mitra, *Culture and Rationality: the Politics of Social Change in Post-Colonial India*, New Delhi: Sage, 1999, p. 72.
87 Waheed-Uz-Zaman, *Towards Pakistan*, Lahore: Publishers United, 4th edn, pp. 77–9.
88 Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan*, p. 27.
89 Zaman, *Towards Pakistan*, p. 80.
90 Ibid., p. 81.
91 Ibid., p. 82.
92 Sayeed, *Pakistan: The Formative Phase*, p. 83.
93 Ibid., pp. 84–5.
94 Zaman, *Towards Pakistan*, p. 88.
95 Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan*, p. 30.
96 Sayeed, *Pakistan: The Formative Phase* p. 90.
97 An interesting article on minority politics is by Theodore P. Wright, 'The Muslim League in South India since Independence: A Study in Minority Group Political Strategies', *The American Political Science Review*, vol. 60, issue 3, September 1966, pp. 579–99.
98 Sayeed, *Pakistan: The Formative Phase*, p. 88.
99 Philips *et al. The Evolution of India and Pakistan*, p. 239.
100 Qureshi, *The Struggle For Pakistan*, p. 322.
101 Zaman, *Towards Pakistan*, p. 99.
102 Ibid., pp. 194-95.
103 Qureshi, *The Struggle For Pakistan*, p. 324.
104 Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan*, p. 40.
105 Sayeed, *Pakistan: The Formative Phase*, p. 134.
106 Ibid., p. 135.
107 Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan*, p. 52.
108 Sayeed, *Pakistan: The Formative Phase*, p. 136.
109 Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan*, p. 55.
110 Ibid., p. 57.
111 Ibid., p. 55.

112 Stanley Wolpert, *Jinnah of Pakistan*, Karachi, Oxford University Press, 1984, p. 267.

113 Sayeed, *Pakistan: The Formative Phase*, p. 145.

114 Ibid., p. 147.

115 Ibid., pp. 147–8.

116 Wolpert, *Jinnah*, p. 282.

117 Paul Brass, *The Production of Hindu–Muslim Violence in Contemporary India*, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003, p. 383.

118 Ibid., p. 9.

119 Ibid., pp. 9–10.

120 Ibid., p. 36.

121 Brass, *The Production of Hindu–Muslim Violence*, p. 374.

122 Subrata K. Mitra, 'The Morality of Communal Politics: Paul Brass, Hindu–Muslim Conflict, and the Indian State', (Review Essay), *India Review,* vol. 2, no. 4., October 2003, p. 16.

123 Ibid., p. 21.

124 Ibid., pp. 27-8.

125 Prasun Sonwalkar, 'Mediating otherness: India's English-language press and the Northeast', *Contemporary South Asia*, vol. 13, no. 4, December 2004, p. 396.

126 Pankaj Mishra, *Temptations of the West: How to be Modern in India, Pakistan and Beyond*, London: Picador, 2006, pp. 123–4.

127 Brass, *The Production of Hindu–Muslim Violence*, p. 10.

128 Ibid.

129 Mitra, 'The Morality of Communal Politics', pp. 27-8.

130 Brass, *The Production of Hindu–Muslim Violence*, p. 374.

131 Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations*, Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1983, pp. 78–9.

2 Explaining politics: of institutions and institutional theory

1 See Hamza Alavi for a Marxist view in Subrata K. Mitra (ed.) *The Post-Colonial State in South Asia: Dialectics of Politics and Culture*, Lahore: Sange-e-Meel, 1998. A reference is made to the inability of any social class to 'capture leadership', in Anita M. Weiss and S. Zulfiqar Gilani (eds) *Power and Civil Society in Pakistan*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 40.

2 Husain Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military*, Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005, p.1.

3 Frederic Grare, '*Pakistan: The Myth of an Islamic Peril*, Policy Brief 45, Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006. Available online. http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/45.grare.final.pdf accessed 1 February 2007. For Grare, the religious parties in Pakistan are a 'dependent variable whose power is largely determined by the army', in *Islam, Militarism, and the 2007–2008 Elections in Pakistan*, Carnegie Papers, no. 70: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006. Available online. http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/CEIP_CP_70_fnl2.pdf accessed 1 February 2007.

4 Grare, *Pakistan: The Myth*.

5 Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military*, p. 131.

6 D. A. Low (ed.) *The Political Inheritance of Pakistan*, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991, p. 268.

7 Kenneth N. Waltz, 'Evaluating Theories', *American Political Science Review*, vol. 91, no. 4, December 1997, pp. 913-14.

8 Waltz, 'Evaluating Theories', p. 913.

9 Manzoorudin Ahmed, (ed.) *Contemporary Pakistan*, Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1980, p. 45.

10 Waltz, 'Evaluating Theories', p. 914.
11 See for instance S.M. Burke, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1973, and Latif Ahmed Sherwani, *Pakistan, China and America*, Karachi: Council For Pakistan Studies, 1980.
12 Waltz, 'Evaluating Theories', p. 915.
13 Ibid. Also, Randall L. Schweller, 'Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In', *International Security*, vol. 19, no. 1, 1994, pp. 72–107.
14 Latif Ahmed Sherwani, *Pakistan, China and America*, Karachi: Council For Pakistan Studies, 1980, pp. 225–6.
15 Ayesha Jalal, *The State of Martial Rule: The origins of Pakistan's political economy of defence*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1990, p. 23.
16 Ibid., pp. 38–9.
17 B. Guy Peters, *Institutional Theory In Political Science: The 'New Institutionalism'*, London: Pinter, 1999, p. 150.
18 Ibid., p. 18.
19 Peters, *Institutional Theory*, p. 19. For agency-structure debate see David Dessler, 'What's at Stake in the Agency-Structure Debate?', *International Organization,* vol. 43, issue 3, Summer 1989, pp. 441–73; Andreas Bieler and Adam David Morton, 'The Gordian Knot of Agency-Structure in International Relations: A Neo-Gramscian Perspective', *European Journal of International Relations*, 2001, vol.7, no. 1, pp. 5–35; Colin Wight, *Agents, Structures and International Relations: Politics as Ontology*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
20 Peters, *Institutional Theory*, ibid.
21 Ibid., p. 68.
22 James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, 'The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life', *The American Political Science Review,* vol. 78, issue 3, September 1984, p. 734.
23 March and Olsen, 'The New Institutionalism', pp. 735–38.
24 Ibid., p. 738.
25 James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, *Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics*, New York: The Free Press, 1989, p. 17.
26 March and Olsen, 'The New Institutionalism', p. 739.
27 March and Olsen, *Rediscovering Institutions*, p. 106.
28 March and Olsen, 'The New Institutionalism', p. 739.
29 See the newspaper report, 'Defence expenditure exceeds allocation', *Dawn* (Karachi), 3 September 2004.
30 'Musharraf says…No power-sharing with PM', *Dawn* (Karachi), 17 April 2002.
31 The military regime thus assures the International Monetary Fund that political government in Pakistan will continue economic reforms, see 'Political govt to continue reforms, IMF assured', *Dawn* (Karachi), 19 November 2002.
32 See for instance 'Musharraf's four years in power', *Dawn* (Karachi), 12 October 2003.
33 'A profounder crisis persists', *The News* (Karachi), 13 August 2003.
34 'Military govt promulgated 297 ordinances in three years', *Dawn* (Karachi), 16 December 2002.
35 March and Olsen*,* 'The New Institutionalism', p. 741.
36 National Defence College publication, Islamabad, no date.
37 Ferrel Heady, *Public Administration: A Comparative Perspective*, New York: Marcel Dekker, 3rd edn, 1984, p. 279.
38 Mark J. Gasiorowski, 'Economic Crisis and Political Regime Change: An Event History Analysis', *American Political Science Review,* vol. 89, no. 4, December 1995, pp. 882–97.
39 Ibid., p. 883.
40 Ibid.

41 Douglass C. North, *Institutions, Institutional Change, And Economic Performance*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 98–9.
42 Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen and Frank Longstreth, *Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 1–2.
43 Gasiorowski, 'Economic Crisis', p. 893.
44 Ibid., p. 883.
45 Husain Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military*, Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005, p. 324.
46 Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *Islamic Leviathan: Islam and the Making of State Power*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 133.
47 'Pakistan got $1.1 bn for fighting terrorism', *Dawn* (Karachi), 15 November 2006.
48 Ibid.
49 Gasiorowski, 'Economic Crisis', p. 885.
50 Ibid., p. 894.
51 Robert Barros, *Constitutionalism and Dictatorship: Pinochet, the Junta, and the 1980 Constitution*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 4.
52 Ibid., p. 41.
53 Aylin Guney, 'The Military, Politics and Post-Cold War Dilemmas in Turkey', in Kees Koonings and Dirk Kruijt (eds.), *Political Armies: The Military and Nation Building in the Age of Democracy*, London: Zed Books, 2002, p. 163.
54 Kees Koonings and Dirk Kruijt (eds) *Political Armies: The Military and Nation Building in the Age of Democracy*, London: Zed Books, 2002, p. 101.
55 Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990–1992*, Cambridge, Mass: Blackwell, 1992, p. 195.
56 Tilly, *Coercion*, p. 218.
57 North, *Institutions, Institutional Change*, p. vii.
58 Robert E. Goodin (ed.) *The Theory of Institutional Design,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 10.
59 North, *Institutions, Institutional Change*, p. 3.
60 Clause Offe, 'Designing Institutions in East European Transitions', in Goodin (ed.) p. 208.
61 Robert Grafstein, 'The Problem of Institutional Constraint', *The Journal of Politics*, vol. 50, issue 3, August 1988 p. 577.
62 North, *Institutions, Institutional Change*, p. 78.
63 Ibid.
64 Quoted in Javed Hassan, *India: A Study In Profile*, Rawalpindi: Army Press, 1990, p. xiii.
65 Goodin, *The Theory of Institutional Design*, p. 22.
66 Ibid., p.23.
67 Koonings *et al. Political Armies*, p. 1.
68 Ibid., p. 1.
69 Ibid., p. 2. For an economic interests argument, see Ayesha Siddiqa Agha, 'Power, Perks, Prestige and Privileges: Military's Economic Activities in Pakistan', paper presented at *The International Conference on Soldiers in Business, Military as an Economic Actor*, Jakarata, October 17–19, 2000.
70 Koonings *et al. Political Armies*, p. 12.
71 Koonings *et al. Political Armies*, p. 13.
72 Ibid., p. 1.
73 Ibid., p. 26.
74 Ibid., p. 93; the case of Brazil is cited.
75 Ibid., p. 29.
76 Ibid.
77 North, *Institutions, Institutional Change*, p. 74.

78 Ibid., pp. 113–17.
79 Ibid., p. 117.
80 Ibid.
81 Paul Pierson, 'Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics', *American Political Science Review*, vol. 94, no. 2, June 2000, p. 251.
82 Philippe C. Schmitter and Javier Santiso, 'Three Temporal Dimensions to the Consolidation of Democracy', *International Political Science Review*, vol. 19, no. 1, 1998, p. 69.
83 Schmitter *et al.* 'Three Temporal Dimensions', p. 70.
84 Ibid., p. 81.
85 Pierson, 'Increasing Returns', p. 252.
86 Ibid., p. 265.
87 Ibid., p. 262.
88 Ibid., p. 251.
89 Veena Kukreja, *Contemporary Pakistan: Political Processes, Conflicts and Crise*s, New Delhi: Sage, 2003, p. 3.
90 Allen McGrath, *The Destruction of Pakistan's Democracy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 83.
91 Ibid., p. 137.
92 Pierson, 'Increasing Returns', p. 264.
93 Steinmo *et al. Structuring Politics*, p. 2.
94 Steinmo et al. *Structuring Politics*, p. 7.
95 Ibid., pp. 12–13.
96 B. Guy Peters and Jon Pierre, 'Institutions and Time: Problems of Conceptualization and Explanation', *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory,* vol. 8, October 1998, p. 565.
97 Ibid., p. 567.
98 Ibid., p. 568.
99 Ibid., p. 570.
100 Ibid., p. 574.
101 Ibid., p. 581.

3 The military in politics

1 Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier And The State: The Theory and Politics of Civil–military Relations*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957.
2 Ibid., p. 7.
3 Ibid., p. 15.
4 William B. Skelton, 'Samuel P. Huntington and the Roots of the American Military Tradition', *The Journal of Military History*, vol. 60, issue 2, April 1996, p. 333.
5 Edward M. Coffman, 'The long Shadow of The Soldier and the State', *The Journal of Military History*, vol. 55, issue 1, January 1991, pp. 69-82.
6 See David Silverman, *Interpreting Qualitative Data: Methods for Analysing Talk, Text and Interaction*, London: Sage Publications, Second Edition, 2001, p. 10.
7 S.E. Finer, *The Man On Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*, London: Pall Mall, 1962. The caveat would be to contextualise and identify this text as reflective of the political instability of the 1960s, where military coups had recently taken place in countries such as Argentina, Syria and Burma (Myanmar), among others.
8 Ibid., p. 47.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid., p. 6. This argument directly supports our earlier point, made while discussing Huntington, of the militaries being strictly hierarchical and useful contrasts likely to be more visible in comparison to other militaries.
11 Ibid., p. 14.

12 The quest for legitimacy holds true for both a political and a military regime. In the case of Pakistan for instance, the military has sought legitimacy after the *coup d'état* both from the courts and by holding of elections (historically restrictive, in terms of favouring or constraining one political faction or another), or referenda, under a limited choice scenario. Here the political actors might operate within constraints for example, with elections being held on a non-party basis, disallowing of participation in elections of certain political leaders, and so forth. An argument could be had if the political process initiated under the military supervision, at least theoretically, is legitimised by the participation of political actors. The other alternative or form of protest would be to not participate in this contest at all. On issues surrounding legitimacy, see Thomas M. Franck, *The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1990. Legitimacy may have different connotations in a strictly legal or purely political frame of reference, with the underlying assumption that in the latter case, it will tend to have a normative value.

13 Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle For Power And Peace* 5th edn revised, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978, p. 9. On mind control, see J.A.C. Brown's seminal account, *Techniques of Persuasion: From Propaganda to Brainwashing*, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1963.

14 Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, p. 31.

15 C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1956, pp. 3–4.

16 Ibid., p. 4.

17 Ibid., p. 195.

18 Peter Paret, 'Military Power', *Journal of Military History*, vol. 53, issue 3, July 1989, p. 239.

19 Ibid., p. 242.

20 Paret, 'Military Power', p. 254.

21 David E. Albright, 'Comparative Conceptualization of Civil–military Relations', *World Politics*, vol. 32, issue 4, July 1980, p. 553.

22 Ibid., p. 560.

23 Ibid., p. 573.

24 Robert W. Jackman, 'Politicians in Uniform: Military Governments and Social Change in The Third World', *The American Political Science Review*, vol. 70, issue 4, December 1976, p. 1078.

25 Ibid., p. 1079.

26 Ibid., p. 1081.

27 Ibid., pp. 1080–1. The literature concerning civil–military relations uses Latin America as an exemplar and from this focal point, seeks to build and apply theories across different settings.

28 Jackman, 'Politicians in Uniform', p. 1096.

29 David C. Rapoport, 'The Political Dimensions of Military Usurpation'*, Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 83, issue 4, December 1968, pp. 551–72.

30 Ibid., p. 560.

31 Ibid., p. 567.

32 Martin Edmonds, *Armed Services and Society*, Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1988, p. 29.

33 Ibid., p. 38.

34 Ibid., p. 208.

35 See, for instance, Samuel J. Valenzuela, *Democratic Consolidation in Post-Transitional Settings: Notion, Process and facilitating Conditions*, The Helen Kellog Institute of International Studies Working Paper Number 150, University of Notre Dame, December 1990, pp. 8–9.

36 Michael C. Desch, *Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment*, , Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999, p. 5.

37 Ibid., p. 12.
38 An important essay reflecting concerns about transition issues is Thomas Carothers, 'The End Of The Transition Paradigm', *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 13, no. 1, January 2002, pp. 5–21.
39 Peter Lock, *Exploring the changing role of the military in the economy*, paper presented at The International Conference on Soldiers In Business: Military as an Economic Actor, Jakarta, October 17–19, 2000, p. 1. This is an important point, for it addresses two issues. First, it persuasively flags up gaps in scholarship, and second, that one likely explanation of these gaps is the difficulty of accessing sources to investigate the military, given the perceived national security concerns related to such an investigation. Conversely, herein also lies the case for breaking potentially new ground and contributing to the body of existing knowledge by undertaking such an investigation.
40 Ibid., p. 3.
41 Ibid., p. 5.
42 Ibid., p. 8.
43 James W. Spain, 'Military Assistance for Pakistan', *The American Political Science Review*, vol. 48, issue 3, September 1954, pp. 738–51.
44 Ibid., p. 738.
45 Ibid. See especially pp. 740–2.
46 For example, an important position proposed for the study of the problem of military control in Pakistan is connected to the subject of threat perceptions within the state (for instance the perception of political instability or poor governance) and real or perceived facts of a hostile international environment. While Barry Buzan accepts the 'near impossibility of defining and measuring threats' in *People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations*, Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1983, p. 61, he posits that in the case of India and Pakistan the 'tension between them is neatly institutionalised in their dispute over Kashmir' and the 'political threats posed to each other [by India and Pakistan] clearly define a central element in the national security problem of each of them' p.79; this also demonstrates grounds for 'confusion between internal politics and national security', ibid.
47 Gerald A. Heeger, 'Politics in the Post-Military State: Some reflections on the Pakistani Experience', *World Politics*, vol. 29, issue 2, January 1977, p. 243.
48 Ibid., p. 244.
49 Ibid., p. 253.
50 Ibid., p. 262.
51 Ibid., p. 248.
52 Hasan Askari Rizvi, *Military, State and Society in Pakistan*, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000, p.1.
53 Ibid., p. 9.
54 Ibid., p. 83.
55 Ibid., p. 19.
56 Rosemary H. T. O'Kane, 'Towards an Examination of the General Causes of Coup d'etat', *European Journal of Political Research*, vol. 11, 1983, pp. 27–44.
57 'To explain an event or state of affairs is to find another which caused it', in Martin Hollis and Steve Smith *Explaining and Understanding International Relations*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991, p. 3.
58 'To understand is to reproduce the order in the minds of actors', ibid., p. 87.
59 O'Kane, 'Towards an Examination', p. 28; a coup is defined as 'the employment of a particular strategy for the overthrow of a government, by a small group, from within the State apparatus.' p. 42, n. 8, ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid., pp. 32–3.
62 O'Kane, 'Towards an Examination', p. 34.
63 Ibid.

64 Ibid., p.39.

65 Sartori argues the significance of examining the past: 'the past is the original map, the design of the foundations. In the course of time the building grows, and the foundations are covered up. This is why from time to time it is well to look back at the original design' in Giovanni Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems: A framework for analysis*, vol. I, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976, p. 24.

66 O'Kane, 'Towards an Examination', p. 38.

67 Rosemary H. T. O'Kane, 'Military regimes: power and force', *European Journal of Political Research*, vol. 17, 1989, p. 333.

68 Ibid., p. 335.

69 Ibid.

70 O'Kane, 'Military regimes', p. 335.

71 Or it could be a matter of survival for the regime, for 'Even tyrannical regimes cannot survive without the support of some portion, if small, of the citizenry', in Barry R. Weingast, 'The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law', *The American Political Science Review*, vol. 91, issue 2, June 1997, fn 1, p. 247.

72 O' Kane, 'Military regimes', p. 335.

73 James N. Rosenau (ed.), *International Politics and Foreign Policy: a reader in research and theory*, New York: The Free Press, Macmillan, 1969, p. 83; in 'its broadest sense, a society can be said to experience a high level of legitimacy when its rules are not explicitly rejected by any major social group', Subrata K. Mitra, *International Colloquium on Legitimacy and Conflict in South Asia*, New Delhi: Manohar, 1997, p. 20.

74 Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, *The Armed Forces of Pakistan*, Crows Nest Australia: Allen and Unwin, 2002, p. 45.

75 O'Kane, 'Military regimes', p. 338.

76 Ibid., p. 341.

77 Ibid., p. 342. Also see John Kenneth Galbraith, *The Anatomy of Power*, London: Corgi Books, 1985.

78 O'Kane, 'Military regimes', p. 345. See Melvin Small and J. David Singer, 'The War-Proneness of Democratic Regimes, 1816–1965', *The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations*, vol. 1, no. 4, Summer 1976, pp. 50–69. On violence see W. J. M. Mackenzie, *Power, Violence, Decision*, London: Penguin Books, 1975, especially chapter 13 ('The Manipulation of Violence', pp. 160–171).

79 Douglas L. Bland, 'A Unified Theory of Civil–military Relations', *Armed Forces & Society*, vol. 26, no. 1, Fall 1999, p. 7.

80 Ibid., p. 13.

81 Ibid., p. 16.

82 Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio (eds), *The New Institutional in Organizational Analysis*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991, p. 194.

83 Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson (eds), *Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil–military Relations*, Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006, p. 92.

84 Ibid., p. ix.

85 Stephen D. Krasner, 'Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening variables', *International Organization*, vol. 36, no. 2, Spring 1982, p. 186.

86 Ibid. This assumption can be illuminated by differentiating between coincidence (as a transient feature) and causality (with enduring attributes and thus likely to have an effect on the phenomenon).

87 Krasner, 'Structural causes', pp. 199–200. For Krasner's definition of rules, see p. 186.

88 Ibid., p. 200.

89 See various newspaper reports, Mohammad Waseem, 'The more it changes . . .' , *Dawn* (Karachi), 23 December 2002; Shahwar Junaid, 'Regime failure and regime

change', *Nation* (Lahore), 20 November 2003; 'Referendum, polls 'seriously flawed': EU Parliament', *Nation* (Lahore), 26 November 2002.

90 Krasner, 'Structural causes', p. 200.
91 Bland for one argues, 'The application of concepts and definitions taken from regime theory to civil–military relations is not difficult and can be rewarding' in 'A Unified Theory', p. 16.
92 Ibid., p. 18.
93 Larry Diamond, 'Is Pakistan the (Reverse) Wave of the Future?' *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 11, no. 3, July 2000, pp. 91–106.
94 Huntington, *The Soldier And The State*, p. 80.
95 Hamid Hussain, 'Case of Pakistani Armed Forces', *Defence Journal*, vol. 6, no. 6, January 2003, p. 20.
96 Mehran Kamrava, 'Military Professionalization and Civil–military Relations in the Middle East', *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 115, no. 1, 2000, pp. 67–8.
97 Apurba Kundu, *Militarism in India: The Army and Civil Society in Consensus*, London: Taurus Academic Studies, 1998, Table 1, p. 6. Other factors include diversity of people, initial political stability, military's national character, India's size, Hindu culture, belief in democracy and administrative efficiency, among others.
98 Interestingly, the respondents rate political awareness of the masses the least important factor, ibid., p. 6.
99 Ibid., p. 91.
100 Ibid., p. 93.
101 See for example, Gurharpal Singh, *Ethnic Conflict in India: A Case-Study of Punjab*, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000.
102 Rosenau (ed.) *International Politics*, p. 24.
103 Kundu, *Militarism in India*, p. 92.
104 Stephen P. Cohen, *India: Emerging Power*, Washington DC: Brookings Institutions Press, 2001, p. 72.
105 Ibid., p. 87.
106 Ibid., p. 77.
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid., p. 19.
109 Ibid., p. 16.
110 See for instance, *Three Years of Reform*, a fact sheet issued by the Pakistan government, available online. www.pak.gov.pk/Factsheets/3-year-reforms.pdf accessed 8 October 2002.
111 It is not a place to expand on the differentials inherent in the conceptualisation of an Islamic and a Muslim country, but it will be noted that the latter only refers to the presence of a majority of people who are Muslims by faith and living within the state boundaries, while the former describes a country that *practices* Islamic law as applicable in all its manifestations. More significantly, the religious parties have rarely captured the public's imagination or votes during elections in Pakistan. (The recent phenomenon of a religious alliance governing two provinces in Pakistan is more of an exception than the norm.) For an informed interpretation of Islam see Syed Ameer Ali, *The Spirit of Islam* first Pakistan edn, Karachi: Pakistan Publishing House, 1969; Khalifa Abdul Hakim, *Islamic Ideology: The Fundamental Beliefs and Principles of Islam* 3rd edn, Lahore: The Institute of Islamic Studies, 1961.
112 Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset (eds), *Democracy in Asia*, New Delhi: Sage, 1989, p. 17.
113 Kamrava, 'Military Professionalization', p. 67.
114 Ibid., p. 68. The four typologies in this instance refer to 'ostensibly democratic states', such as Israel and Turkey; the 'inclusionary states' of Iran, Iraq and Libya where a large militia acts as a counter force to the regular military; the 'exclusionary states' such as Algeria and Egypt, among others, where the former military officers act as

'civilian autocrats', and finally the 'monarchies' of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the Gulf states relying on tribal loyalty or on 'foreign mercenaries' for holding the military in check.

115 The '[Turkish] military's informal authority is such that, when it expresses an opinion, civilian governments rarely try to implement a policy which contradicts it', in Gareth Jenkins, *Context and Circumstance: The Turkish Military and Politics*, Adelphi Paper 37, London: The International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2001, p. 7.

116 Kamrava, 'Military Professionalization', p. 72.

117 Ibid., p. 73.

118 Ibid., pp. 80–1.

119 Ayesha Siddiqa Agha, *Pakistan's Arms Procurement and Military Buildup, 1979–99: in Search of a Policy*, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001, p. 74.

120 Ibid., p. 192.

121 Muthiah Alagappa, *Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001, p. 49.

122 The Cold War is over, but the discourse lingers on; we thus note the actual 'persistence of Cold War discourses' within the context of a discussion of failed/rogue states, and reflect on how the pattern of authoritarianism within the polities was sustained: 'When "friends" (or client states during the Cold War) posed a threat to international stability because of their "weakness", the recommended policy was usually one of building "strong" states, as was the case with Pakistan, Indonesia, Colombia and Sierra Leone', in Pinar Bilgin and Adam David Morton, 'From "Rogue" to "Failed" states? The Fallacy of Short-termism', *Politics,* vol. 24, no. 3, September 2004, pp. 174, 170.

123 Alagappa, *Coercion and Governance*, p. 387.

124 Gretchen Casper and Michelle M. Taylor, *Negotiating Democracy: Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996, p. 1.

125 Ibid., p. 10.

126 Ibid.

127 Leo E. Rose, 'Pakistan: Experiments with Democracy', in Linz *et al.*, *Democracy in Asia*, p. 111.

128 See Stephen Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, *The political economy of democratic transitions*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995.

129 Richard H. Kohn, 'How Democracies Control the Military', *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 8, no. 4, October 1997, p. 140.

130 Ibid., p.141. It is reasonable to suggest as military interventions in Pakistan have not attracted general public discontent, the removal of the civilian governments seems indicative of loss of mass public support for the latter, but not necessarily a vote of legitimacy for the *coup d'état*. This is a crucial differentiation, validated by the fact of early induction of civilians into the military regime, or resort to constitutional measures for seeking some legitimacy.

131 Ibid., p. 143.

132 Ibid., p. 152. Other scholars hold similar views, for 'It does not take great analytical skills to assert that even where democracy enjoys a long tradition and favourable conditions, optimal civilian control is not guaranteed and must be vigilantly attended to', in Daniel Maman, Eyal Ben-Ari, Zeev Rosenhek, *Military, State, and Society in Israel*, New Jersey: Transaction, 2001, p. 51.

133 Kohn, 'How Democracies Control the Military', p. 142.

134 Gavin Cawthra and Robin Luckham (eds) *Governing Insecurity: Democratic Control of Military and Security Establishments in Transitional Societies,* London: Zed Books, 2003, p. 10.

135 Ibid., p. 132.

4 Examining military *coup d'état* in Pakistan

1 Jan-Erik Lane and Svante Ersson, *The New Institutional Politics: Performance and Outcomes*, London: Routledge, 2000, p. 3.
2 M. Attiqur Rahman, Lieutenant General, *Leadership: Senior Commanders*, Lahore: Ferozsons, 1973, p. 5.
3 Ibid., p. 15.
4 D. A. Low (ed.) *The Political Inheritance of Pakistan*, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991, p. 11. Vali Nasr notes that 'Pakistan was the culmination of Muslim separatism that emerged as a corollary of decolonization of India', in *Islamic Leviathan: Islam and the Making of State Power*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 46.
5 Brian Cloughley, *A History of the Pakistan Army: Wars and Insurrections* 2nd edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 30.
6 Ibid., p. 28.
7 Katharine Adeney and Andrew Wyatt, 'Democracy in South Asia: Getting beyond the Structure-Agency Dichotomy', *Political Studies*, vol. 52, no. 1, March 2004, p. 3.
8 Adeney *et al.* 'Democracy in South Asia, p. 3.
9 Farzana Shaikh, 'Pakistan's nuclear bomb: beyond the non-proliferation regime', *International Affairs*, vol. 78, no.1, 2002, p. 35.
10 Vernon Hewitt, *The new international politics of South Asia*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997, p. 257.
11 S.M. Burke, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1973, pp. 68–90.
12 Cloughley, *A History*, p. 45.
13 Hewitt, *The new international politics of South Asia*, fn 28, p. 79.
14 Hasan Askari Rizvi, *Military, State and Society in Pakistan*, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000, p. 59. Between 1955 and 1965, India itself received Soviet aid worth 1.5 billion US dollars, in Hewitt, *The new international politics of South Asia*, p. 100.
15 Robert J. McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1994, p. 127.
16 Quoted in McMahon, *The Cold War*, p. 17.
17 Cloughley, *A History*, p. 35.
18 Ibid., p. 39.
19 Fazal Muqeem Khan, *The Story of The Pakistan Army*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1963, p. 137.
20 Ibid., p. 40.
21 Ibid., pp. 138–50; also Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, *The Armed Forces of Pakistan*, Crows Nest, Australia: Allen & Unwin, 2002, pp. 55–60.
22 Low (ed.) *Political Inheritance*, p. 260.
23 See for example Javid Husain, *The Process of Foreign Policy Formulation in Pakistan*, Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development And Transparency, Briefing Paper No. 12, April 2004.
24 Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, *Pakistan's Defense Policy: 1947–58*, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990, p. 154.
25 Khan, *The Story*, pp. 59–60, 170, 173.
26 Ibid., p. 179.
27 Stephen P. Cohen, *The Pakistan Army*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998 edn, pp. 48–9.
28 Ibid., p. 35.
29 The latter part, that of the threat perception based on external circumstances is explained by the 'the actors' desires, beliefs, and resulting reasons for action . . . generated in turn by external factors. In the jargon of social science, they may be intervening and not independent variables', in Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, *Explaining and Understanding International Relatio*ns, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991, p. 3.

30 Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, Seymour Martin Lipset (eds), *Democracy in Asia*, New Delhi: Sage, 1989, p. 40.

31 Robert E. Goodin and Hans-Dieter Klingemann (eds), *A New Handbook of Political Science*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 145–6.

32 Directorate General of Films and Publication, *Quotes from the Quaid*, Islamabad, 1992, p. 34.

33 Ibid., p. 70.

34 Rahman, *Leadership*, p. 6.

35 Allan McGrath, *The Destruction of Pakistan's Democracy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 97. On the creation of Constituent Assembly, see p. 32; see n. 53, 54, pp. 241–2.

36 Hashmi, *United States*, p. 125.

37 Ayesha Jalal, *The State of Martial Rule: The origins of Pakistan's political economy of defence*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 296.

38 Rahman, *Leadership*, p. 13.

39 Khan, *The Story*, p. 59.

40 It is also important that the civilians should have the skills to oversee military affairs and thus earn the respect of the armed forces. See for example David Pion-Berlin (ed.) *Civil–military Relations in Latin America: New Analytical Perspectives*, Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 2001, pp. 32–3.

41 Herbert Feldman, *Revolution in Pakistan: A Study of The Martial Law Administration*, London: Oxford University Press, 1967, pp. 40–1.

42 Of note is Hamid Khan's observation that this petition was earlier decided unanimously in favour of the petitioner by the Sindh High Court. The Federal Court on an appeal by the government of Pakistan, however, overturned the High Court's ruling, in *Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 137. Also see Ivor Jennings, *Constitutional Problems in Pakistan*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1955.

43 McGrath, *The Destruction*, p. 158.

44 Hamid Khan, *Constitutional and Political History*, p. 140.

45 Syed Jaffar Ahmed, *Overview of the Constitution of Pakistan*, Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency, Briefing Paper No. 17, August 2004, pp. 10–11.

46 The 'informal rules of political life – while hard to research – can be every bit as important in shaping actors' behaviour as formally agreed procedures', in David Marsh and Gerry Stoker, *Theory and Methods in Political Science*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p. 98.

47 Hamid Khan, *Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 131.

48 Cheema, *Pakistan's Defense Policy*, pp. 95, n. 186, p. 210.

49 Ibid., p. 97.

50 Saeed Shafqat, *Civil–Military Relations in Pakistan: From Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to Benazir Bhutto*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1997, p. 12. Shafqat also identifies monopolisation of power centres by bureaucracy–military, and the latter's conscious choice of incremental intervention in politics as an explanation of authoritarian ascendancy in Pakistan, ibid, p. 21.

51 Taken from Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson (eds) *Who Guards the Guardian and How: Democratic Civil–military Relations*, Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006, p. 5.

52 Former Senator Mr Farhatullah Babar was elected to the Senate on a Pakistan People's Party (PPP) ticket from the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan on the seats reserved for technocrats. He served a 3-year term from 2003–06. In addition to being a member of the Defence Committee of the Senate, Mr Babar was also a member of the Human Rights Committee of the Senate and the Senate Committee

on Special Education and Social Welfare. Mr Babar was responding to a written questionnaire e-mailed by author, 29 January 2007.

53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
62 'Defence secretary grilled by PAC: Use of airbases by USA', *Dawn* (Karachi), 27 January 2007.
63 Ibid.
64 Syed Ghaus Ali Shah, interview with author, London, 6 February 2007. Mr Shah was the Defence Minister of Pakistan during 1991–93 in prime minister Nawaz Sharif's government.
65 *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, London, 25 October to 1 November, 1958, p. 16457.
66 Ibid., p. 16458.
67 Anwar Syed, 'Presidential system is not suitable', *Dawn* (Karachi), 28 April 2001.
68 Ibid.
69 Low (ed.), *The Political Inheritance*, p. 266.
70 Hewitt, *The new international politics of South Asia*, p. 96. Strikingly, in the case of Latin America one view holds that 'where the decline in U.S. hegemony was greatest, democracy seemed to appear' in Terry Lynn Karl, 'Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America', *Comparative Politics*, vol. 23, no.1, October 1990, p. 5. Democratisation is also considered problematic for American interests in the Middle East as it 'risks empowering mass forces deeply hostile to the United States' in Raymond Hinnebusch, 'Authoritarian Persistence, Democratization Theory and the Middle East: An Overview and Critique', *Democratization*, vol. 13, no. 3, June 2006, p. 391.
71 Bernard Crick, *In Defence of Politics*, London: Penguin, 4th edn, 1993, p. 27.
72 As Crick asks rhetorically: 'Quis custodiat custodies? Who, indeed, shall guard the guardians?', ibid.
73 It is for good reason therefore the observation: 'Where the military has itself controlled the pace and character of the transition from authoritarian rule, establishing civilian supremacy is a much more formidable task', in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, *Civil–Military Relations and Democracy*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, p. xxix.
74 Jalal, *The State of Martial Rule*, p. 238.
75 Memo of Conversation: General Mohammed Ayub Khan, Commander-in-Chief, Pakistan Army and Raleigh A. Gibson, American Consul General, Embassy of the United States of America, Karachi, Foreign Service Despatch No. 105, 23 December 1952. Available online. www.icdc.com/~paulwolf/pakistan/ayubkhan23dec1952.jpg accessed 18 August 2005.
76 Rosemary H. T. O'Kane, 'The Ladder of Abstraction: The Purpose of Comparison and the Practice of Comparing African Coups d'état', *Journal of Politics*, vol. 5, no. 2, 1993, p. 175.
77 Herbert Feldman, *Revolution in Pakistan: A Study of the Martial Law Administration*, London: Oxford University Press, 1967, p. 10.
78 Colin Hay, *Political Analysis: A Critical Introduction*, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002, p. 11.
79 Terry Lynn Karl, 'Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America', *Comparative Politics*, vol. 23, no.1, October 1990, p. 7.

80 Conversation between Mohammed Ayub Khan, Commander-in-Chief Pakistan Army and Raleigh A. Gibson, American Consul General, Embassy of the United States of America, Karachi, Foreign Service Despatch No. 135, 13 February, 1953. Available online. www.icdc.com/~paulwolf/pakistan/ayub13feb1953.jpg site accessed 18 August 2005.

81 Hamid Hussain, 'Professionalism and Discipline of Armed Forces in a Society with Repeated Military Interventions – Case of Pakistani Armed Forces', *Defence Journal*, vol. 6, no. 6, January 2003, p. 28.

82 Aftab Ahmed, 'The genesis of the October 1958 coup'*, Dawn* (Karachi), 1 October 2002.

83 Ibid.

84 Aftab Ahmed, '1958 coup in the light of British papers', *Dawn* (Karachi), 30 January 2004.

85 Ibid.

86 Ibid.

87 Ahmed, '1958 coup', *Dawn* (Karachi), 30 January 2004.

88 Ibid.

89 Goodin *et al. A New Handbook*, p. 159.

90 See McGrath, *The Destruction*, p. 96, for the reasons assigned for the dismissal of government.

91 Ibid., p. 221.

92 Wolfgang Peter Zingel and Stephanie Zingel Ave Lallemant (eds), *Pakistan in the 80s: Law and Constitution*, Lahore: Vanguard, 1985, p. 127. Also former Pakistan Supreme Court Chief Justice Sajjad Ali Shah's brief account of judicial decisions, 'Is Army's rule Pakistan's fate?', *The Nation*, (Lahore), 11 January 2003.

93 *Keesings Contemporary Archives*, London, 10 October to 17 October, 1959, p. 17043.

94 Ibid. 5 March to 12 March, 1960, p. 17298.

95 Ibid.

96 Herbert Feldman, *From Crisis to Crisis: Pakistan 1962–1969*, London: Oxford University Press, 1972, pp. 4–5.

97 Ibid., p. 284.

98 Ibid., p. 282.

99 Talukder Maniruzzaman, *Military Withdrawal from Politics: A Comparative Study*, Dhaka: The University Press, 1987, pp. 4–5.

100 Walter W. Powell and Paul J DiMaggio (eds), *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991, p. 188.

5 Ordering the state: consolidating military control

1 Paul Pierson, *Politics in Time: History, Institutions and Social Analysis*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004, p. 45.

2 The detractors of this approach insist substantial change in this interpretation only occurs during 'critical junctures' or 'policy windows' before institutions and policies evolve into new paths. See for instance a reference to this criticism in Ian Greener, 'The Potential of Path Dependence in Political Studies', *Politics*, vol. 25, no. 1, February 2005, p. 64.

3 With the emergence of Bangladesh, Pakistan had not only lost its eastern wing but also '54 percent of its population' with more than 90,000 officers and men taken prisoner, in Stephen Philip Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan*, Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004. p. 56.

4 Craig L. Arceneaux, *Bounded Missions: Military regimes And Democratization in the Southern Cone And Brazil*, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001, p. 11.

5   William L. Richter, 'From Electoral Politics to Martial Law: Alternative Perspectives on Pakistan's Political Crisis of 1977', in Manzooruddin Ahmed (ed.) *Contemporary Pakistan: Politics, Economy, and* Society, Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1980, p. 93.

6   Ayesha Jalal, *The State of Martial Rule: The origins of Pakistan's political economy of defence*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 97.

7   An important point is that the 'coup by professional armies is generally a coup by senior commanders. The professional armies thus intervene as an institution', in Talukder Maniruzzaman, *Military Withdrawal from Politics: A Comparative Study*, Dhaka: The University Press, 1987, p. 79.

8   Arguably, 'Historical institutionalists . . . would view governing as path dependent, so that programmes that have worked in the past would be likely to continue to be successful in the future', in Jon Pierre and B. Guy Peters, *Governance, Politics and the State*, London: Macmillan, 2000, pp. 43–4, but also note it may be 'virtually impossible to make any clear generalizations about governance' Ibid., p. 69.

9   *Pakistan Army Green Book 2000*, editorial, General Headquarters, Rawalpindi, 2000.

10 Hillel Frisch, 'Perceptions of Israel in the Armies of Syria, Egypt, and Jordan', *Political Studies*, vol. 52, no. 3, October 2004, p. 398.

11 See Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, Seymour Martin Lipset (eds) *Democracy in Asia*, New Delhi: Sage, 1989, p. 6; Eric A. Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1977, pp. 14, 54, 64.

12 Gerald A. Heeger, 'Politics in the Post-Military State: Some Reflections on the Pakistani Experience', *World Politics*, vol. 29, issue 2, January 1977, p. 253.

13 Ibid., p. 260.

14 Eric A. Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1977, cited, fn. 3, p. 110.

15 See these studies by Herbert Feldman, *Revolution in Pakistan: A Study of the Martial Law Administration*, London: Oxford University Press, 1967; *From Crisis to Crisis: Pakistan 1962–1969*, London: Oxford University Press, 1972; *The End And The Beginning: Pakistan 1969–1971*, London: Oxford University Press, 1975.

16 Jon Pierre and B. Guy Peters, *Governance, Politics and the State*, London: Macmillan, 2000, p. 78.

17 Christophe Jaffrelot, (ed.) *A History of Pakistan And Its Origins*, translated by Gillian Beaumont, London: Anthem Press, 2004, p. 79.

18 For a brief comment on the constitutional history of Pakistan, including the 1973 Constitution, see '*The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan'*, with commentary by Justice Qadeeruddin Ahmad and S.M. Zafar, Karachi: East and West Publishing Company, 1974, pp. XV–XLVIII.

19 Maya Chadda, *Building Democracy in South Asia: India, Nepal, Pakistan*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000, p. 70.

20 Jaffrelot (ed.) *A History of Pakistan*, p. 82.

21 Chadda, *Building Democracy*, p. 69.

22 Ibid.

23 Hamid Khan, *Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 567. See pp. 668–73 for a comment on the Eighth Constitutional Amendment.

24 A former Pakistan army chief Lt. Gen. Gul Hasan Khan (1971–72) states that Bhutto 'made it a habit of inviting the top brass of the Army to his meetings . . . unconsciously furnishing the generals with an opportunity to witness the insecurity that had gripped him', in *Memoirs*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 417.

25 As has been argued, 'Legitimacy deflations are crucial in facilitating the transformation of interventionist motivations into coup attempts', in, Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics*, p. 64. Legitimacy, suggests Rouquie, is also central to the military regime

because 'military regimes are only really legitimised by their future . . . de facto governments have legitimacy only by the way they exercise power, and almost, one might say, by the performance they ultimately accomplish . . . The military regime, therefore, always lives for the future. It is, in essence, transitory', quoted in Arceneaux, *Bounded Missions*, p. 5.

26 Saeed Shafqat, *Civil–military Relations in Pakistan: From Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto to Benazir Bhutto*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1997, pp. 167–9, 174–7.

27 Chadda, *Building Democracy*, p. 225. The pattern of behaviour, where the military is expected to defend its institutional interests is explained by Kenneth N. Waltz's comment on the socialisation processes of complex organisations. In such organisations, Waltz posits, the 'Members of an establishment develop strong commitments to their organizations, making them less willing to place their group in position of unnecessary danger', in Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed*, New York: Norton, 2003, p. 141. The reference to 'danger' for our present purposes can be adequately employed as the military's perception of action by the civilian government, potentially undermining the formers' pre-eminence within the polity.

28 Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed*, New York: Norton, 2003, p. 134.

29 Ibid. cited, p. 94.

30 Ibid.

31 Gerhard Kummel and Wilfried von Bredow, *Civil–Military Relations in an Age of Turbulence: Armed Forces and the Problem of Democratic Control*, Strausberg: Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr, Oct. 2000, p.76.

32 Ibid., pp. 76–7.

33 Ibid., p. 77.

34 David R. Mares (ed.) *Civil–Military Relations: Building Democracy and Regional Security in Latin America, Southern Asia, and Central Europe*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998, p. 18.

35 Why a presidential system is likely to create difficulties in democratic consolidation is argued by Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach, 'Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation', *World Politics*, vol. 46, October 1993, pp. 1–22.

36 Tim Jacoby, 'For the People, Of the People and By the Military: The Regime Structure of Modern Turkey', *Political Studies*, vol. 51, no. 4, December 2003, p. 677.

37 Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds and Anthony Forster (eds), *Democratic Control of the Military in Postcommunist Europe: Guarding the Guards*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p. 3.

38 Many scholarly interventions are available on regime/transition classification. See for example the following series of articles appearing in *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 13, no. 2, April 2002, by Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, 'The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism', pp. 51–65; Andreas Schedler, 'The Menu of Manipulation', pp. 36–50; Larry Diamond, 'Thinking About Hybrid Regimes', pp. 21–35. Also see Gerardo L. Munck, 'Democratic Transitions in Comparative Perspective', Review Article, *Comparative Politics*, April 1994, pp. 355–75.

39 Cottey *et al. Democratic Control of the Military*, p. 252.

40 Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson (eds), *Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil–Military Relations*, University of Texas Press, Austin, 2006, p. 51.

41 Quoted in Robert Barros, *Constitutionalism and Dictatorship: Pinochet, the Junta, and the 1980 Constitution*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. xi.

42 Ibid., p. 240.

43 Ibid., pp. 41–2.

44 Mares (ed.) *Civil–Military Relations*, p. 17.

45 Bruneau *et al. Who Guards the Guardians*, p. ix.

46 The 19 September 2006 military coup in Thailand readily comes to mind.

47 'Turkey's military warns govt of coup', *Dawn* (Karachi)/*The Guardian News Service*, (London), 28 May 2003.

48 Interestingly, we are also informed that the 'post-Cold War era never came to Asia. It was a Western conceit. The very term "post-Cold war era" presumes that the US-Soviet struggle was the central event of our time and that its end marked a completely new beginning for the world', in Paul Bracken, 'The Second Nuclear Age', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 79, no. 1, January/February 2000, p. 148.

49 Larry Diamond, 'Is Pakistan The (Reverse) Wave of Democracy', *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 11, no. 3, July 2000, p. 92.

50 Ibid., pp. 92–3.

51 Also see two articles by Aqil Shah, 'Pakistan's "Armored" Democracy', *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 14, no. 4, October 2003, pp. 26–40, and 'Democracy On Hold in Pakistan', *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 13, no. 1, January 2002, pp. 66–75.

52 Subrata K. Mitra and Dietmar Rothermund, *Legitimacy and Conflict in South Asia*, New Delhi: Manohar, 1997, p. 1.

53 Ibid., p. 2.

54 Azhar Hasan Nadeem, *Pakistan: The Political Economy of Lawlessness*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 90.

55 Ibid.

56 'Corruption has risen since '99 coup: TI', *Dawn* (Karachi), 10 December 2006.

57 Quoted in Terry Lynn Karl, 'Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America', *Comparative Politics*, vol. 23, no.1, October 1990, n. 6, p. 18.

58 Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics*, p. 3.

59 Ibid., pp. 134, 139.

60 Vali Nasr, 'The Rise of Muslim Democracy', *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 16, no. 2, April 2005, p. 21.

61 Ibid., pp. 21–2.

62 Aftab Ahmed, 'Constitution and its amendment', *Dawn* (Karachi), 23 September 2002; Syed Jaffar Ahmed, *Overview of the Constitution of Pakistan*, Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development And Transparency, Briefing Paper No. 17, August 2004.

63 Hamid Khan, *Constitutional and Political History*, p. 878.

64 Ibid., p. 693.

65 Ibid., pp. 722–4.

66 Ibid., pp. 753–5.

67 Ibid., pp. 793–6.

68 See part address of Pakistan Army Chief General Pervaivz Musharraf in Koonings *et al.*, *Political Armies*, p. 10.

69 Chadda, *Building Democracy*, p. 72.

70 Ibid., p.76.

71 Ibid., pp. 77–9.

72 Arceneaux, *Bounded Missions*, p. 233.

73 Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio (eds) *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991, p. 191.

74 In response to this author's question as to why there was inadequate research published on the Pakistani military, one scholar working on South Asia cited reasons such as the reluctance of the politicians and officers to divulge information via interview, that the idea of scholarly research is sometimes mistaken for spying, that there was the tendency of the people to be optimistic and devote more attention to civilian rather than military rulers and, lastly, the lack of systematic archives or access to private papers. Where they did exist, 'scholars would rarely get access until at least 40 years after the events.' Personal communication.

75 'Nawaz couldn't have impeached me: Leghari', *Dawn* (Karachi), 6 August 2003.

76 Ibid.

77 Ibid.
78 'How Leghari dismissed Benazir government', *The News* (Karachi), 15 April 2003.
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
82 Available online. www.heraldelections.com/fixed/jehangirint.htm accessed 13 October 2002.
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid.

6 'L Etat, c'est militaire'

 1 One definition suggests perception is 'the interpretive process through which we pass all the stimuli that we accept from our environment, and meaning is what comes out of this process', in Wilbur Schramm (ed.), *The Process and Effects of Mass Communication*, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1961, p. 109. For Barry Buzan the issue of perception is important for it impacts on the processes of decision-making and he states that there are two components to perception relating to, first, 'where the observer is located in relation to the thing viewed', and second, 'according to the internal constitution of the viewer', in *People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations*, Wheatsheaf, Sussex, 1983, pp. 226–31 for extended discussion. Thomas Kuhn notes 'What a man sees depends both upon what he looks at and also upon what his previous visual–conceptual experience has taught him to see' and that in the 'absence of such training' the only outcome can be great confusion, in *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 3rd edn, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1996, p. 113. How we understand the experience that Kuhn refers to, and how it approximates perception becomes clear upon reflecting on Karl W. Deutsch's assessment that, 'An experience may be built up into a perception and recorded in memory' in *The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control*, The Free Press, New York, 1963, p. 100. The application of the concept for illuminating the military's perception of its role in the politics in Pakistan will then require an examination of the *evidence*, which is considered in this chapter.
 2 Claude E. Welch, 'Military disengagement from Politics: Paradigms, Processes or Random Events', *Armed Forces & Society,* vol. 18, no. 3, Spring 1992, p. 338.
 3 Ibid., p. 334.
 4 For instance, a senior army officer pointed out to the present writer that such interviews, if agreed to at all by the military's General Headquarters, would entail security clearances and vetting by concerned agencies. Accessing the National Defence College requires similar clearance.
 5 As an example of this resistance at another level see a news report 'MPs can't speak against Army', *The Nation* (Lahore), 19 May 2005, recording a ruling by the Speaker of Pakistan's National Assembly that the parliamentarians cannot speak against the armed forces in the Assembly. The ruling came after the opposition members of the Assembly criticised the military leadership over a number of issues.
 6 The word 'development' instead of *political* developments is being used advisedly here. Arguably, the military's involvement in the economic sphere and business enterprises makes it one of the largest stakeholders in the state economy in Pakistan. The point is discussed in some detail in a later part of the chapter.
 7 Militaries elsewhere are also likely to consider issues of nation-building as a primary activity. However, for our purposes, what is of salience is the fact that where the militaries *exercise* influence and control in politics, such discourse is likely to reveal the trajectory of subsequent political developments.
 8 David Silverman, *Interpreting Qualitative Data: Methods for Analysing Talk, Text and Interaction*, 2nd edn, London: Sage Publications, 2001, p. 130.

9 Stephen P. Cohen, *The Pakistan Army*, 1998 edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 2.
10 The motto of the College has been taken from one of the verses of the Quran that are 'the first direct revelation to the Holy Prophet (Peace be upon him)', in the National Defence College booklet, Islamabad, no date.
11 National Defence College, booklet, Islamabad, no date.
12 Ibid.
13 It is estimated that 247 officers from 29 countries have graduated from the NDC, including the USA, China, Malaysia, UK, Australia, Indonesia and Bangladesh among others. Online. http://www.ndc.edu.pk/about_history.htm site accessed 20 July 2005.
14 Online. http://www.ndc.edu.pk/about_ndc.htm site accessed 20 July 2005.
15 Online. http://www.ndc.edu.pk/SOPs/nd_wing/Section2.htm site accessed 20 July 2005.
16 This is an important point for the military in Pakistan has primarily referred to the issues of lack of political stability and economic mismanagement as a trigger for military *coup d'état*.
17 Online. http://www.ndc.edu.pk/courses_ndcourse.htm site accessed 20 July 2005.
18 Hasan Askari Rizvi notes that the Pakistani army has never intervened prematurely or in the absence of significant crises, interview author, Lahore, 20 April 2003.
19 Cohen, *The Pakistan Army*, pp. 55–74.
20 We do not include 1969 where General Yahya Khan took over from General Ayub Khan, as it was a continuation of the military government.
21 Online. http://www1.infopak.gov.pk/CE_Addresses/Speech-COAS.htm accessed 22 July 2003.
22 Hamid Hussain, 'Forbidden Fruit – Military and Politics', *Defence Journal*, vol. 6, no. 7, February 2003, p. 18.
23 Javed Hassan, Lieutenant General, Commandant National Defence College, interview, Islamabad, 3 March 2003.
24 Cohen, *The Pakistan Army*, pp. 58–9.
25 Ibid., p. 62.
26 On the expectations from the political leadership in times of transition, see Philippe C. Schmitter and Javier Santiso, 'Three Temporal Dimensions to the Consolidation of Democracy', *International Political Science Review*, vol. 19, no. 1, 1998, pp. 69–92.
27 General Hassan, interview.
28 Interview, Karachi, 22 March 2003.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid. A retired Lieutenant General of the Pakistani army opines that the civilian bureaucracy can learn from the army's promotion procedures; see S. M. H. Bokhari, 'A system civil services can learn from', *The News* (Karachi), 10 May 2005.
32 Online. http://www1.infopak.gov.pk/CE_Addresses/Speech-COAS.htm site accessed 22 July 2003.
33 Online. http://server1.pak.gov.pk/public/govt/reports/CE_interviews.htm site accessed 22 July 2003.
34 John Gerring, *Social Science Methodology: A Criterial Framework*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 140.
35 The World Bank *Pakistan Economic Report April 7, 1999*, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management South Asia Region, Executive Summary, p. i, n. 2, 5.
36 Rosemary H. T. O'Kane has noted that 'not only must the phenomenon being employed in general analysis be defined in terms of what it is, but also in terms of what it is not', in 'The Ladder of Abstraction: The Purpose of Comparison and the Practice of Comparing African Coups d'état', *Journal of Politics*, vol. 5, no. 2, 1993, p. 170.
37 Bruce Riedel, 'American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House',

Policy Paper Series, Centre for the Advanced Study of India, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, 2002, pp. 1–18.

38 Ibid., p. 8.

39 Riedel, 'American Diplomacy', p. 9.

40 Ibid., p. 3.

41 Ibid., p. 14. Sharif was warned by President Clinton that in case of Pakistan's refusal to withdraw troops from the Kargil area, 'he [Clinton] had a draft statement ready to issue that would pin all the blame for the Kargil crisis on Pakistan tonight', ibid, p. 12.

42 Ibid., p. 15.

43 Ibid.

44 Vali Nasr, 'Military Rule, Islamism and Democracy in Pakistan', *Middle East Journal*, vol. 58, no. 2, Spring 2004, p. 201.

45 Riedel for instance claims that as the prime minister was bringing his family with him to Washington, it was 'a possible indication' he feared either to return home if the summit failed, 'or that the military was telling him to leave', 'American Diplomacy', p. 8.

46 Riedel, 'American Diplomacy', p. 16.

47 Vali Nasr, ' The Rise of Muslim Democracy', *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 16, no. 2, April 2005, p. 22.

48 David Dyzenhaus, *Legality and Legitimacy: Carl Schmitt, Hans Kelsen and Hermann Heller in Weimar*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997, p. 14.

49 For further details see 'Musharraf says no power-sharing with PM', *Dawn* (Karachi), 17 April 2002; 'Musharraf says no timeframe to quit army', *Dawn* (Karachi), 30 June 2003; 'Amendments irreversible', *Dawn* (Karachi), 22 August 2002; 'Text of the 17th amendment bill', *Dawn* (Karachi), 30 December 2003.

50 Pakistan Administrative Staff College, 78th National Management Course, (17 February to 21June 2003), Lahore, p. 1.

51 Ibid., p. 1.

52 Tariq Sultan, Principal PASC, interview, Lahore, 24 April 2003.

53 Ibid.

54 'Khaki Power: Indonesia's armed forces', *The Economist*, 7 September 2002.

55 Ibid.

56 '58(2) b back, NSC formed', *Nation* (Lahore), 22 August 2002.

57 Pakistan Army General Headquarters, *The Green Book 2000*: *Role of Pakistan Army in Nation Building*, Rawalpindi, 2000, editorial. An interesting assumption, for the Pakistani military's considerable involvement in the affairs of the state since independence in 1947 has been documented in this study.

58 *The Green Book 2000*, p. 1.

59 Ibid., p. 2. Other senior officers, pp. 7–8, take similar positions, ibid.

60 We use the media, as does 'politics . . . to present a persuasive picture of reality' in Frederick D. Weil (ed.), *Political Culture and Political Structure: Theoretical and Empirical Studies*, Connecticut: JAI Press, vol. 2, 1994, p.16.

61 '1,027 civilian posts occupied by servicemen', *Dawn* (Karachi), 3 October 2003. Also see 'Armed Forces exceed 10pc quota in Cabinet Div.', *Dawn* (Karachi), 22 March 2005.

62 'Army men run education ministry's monitoring cell', *Dawn* (Karachi), 20 January 2007.

63 'Army men being inducted into Customs Intelligence', *The News* (Karachi), 4 October 2006.

64 'Army to rebuild govt schools . . . ' *Dawn* (Karachi), 9 December 2006.

65 'Oct 12 takeover made part of SSC curriculum', *Dawn* (Karachi), 30 December 2006.

66 'Master trainer's appointment disappoints bureaucracy', *The News* (Karachi), 12 November 2004.
67 Ibid.
68 'Militarisation of civil bureaucracy', *The News* (Karachi), 13 February 2007.
69 *The Green Book*, pp. 4, 11. This, along with a collapse of state institutions, is cited as the implied reason for the 1999 military *coup d'état* in Pakistan, p. 4.
70 Ibid., p. 15.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid., p. 1. It is, however, not clear if the civilian leadership or the government is expected to be involved in such a decision of waging a low intensity war with India.
73 *The Green Book*, p. 17. We are reminded that the Indian army is largely focused on operations against Pakistan, in turn compelling the latter 'to maintain a combat ready standing army', p. 18.
74 'Indian hegemony unacceptable: Ehsan', *The News* (Karachi), 11 April 2005. On the rising defence expenditures in Pakistan, see 'Defence expenditure exceeds allocation', *Dawn* (Karachi), 3 September 2004; on defence expenditure increases in South Asia see the report 'Poverty does not stop S. Asia arms race', *Dawn* (Karachi), 12 February 2003; the growth in the global defence expenditure is addressed by Mehmood-ul-Hasan Khan, 'Rising military spending and its causes', *Dawn* (Karachi), 8 November 2004.
75 'Defence spending up by 3.3 pc', *The News*, (Karachi), 7 June 2005. Interestingly, the minister is the son of a former speaker of the National Assembly of Pakistan in the Nawaz Sharif government, and the grandson of the former president General Ayub Khan.
76 Farhatullah Babar, 'Making the military budget: a plea for change', *The News* (Karachi), 2 May 2005.
77 *The Green Book*, p. 5.
78 Ibid., pp. 5–6.
79 Ibid., pp. 20–1.
80 Ibid., p. 26.
81 Ibid., p. 39.
82 Ibid., p. 241.
83 Ibid., p. 241.
84 Ibid., p. 38.
85 *The Green Book*, p. 313.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid.
88 'Askari' roughly translates as armed forces, identifying the brand as associated with the military.
89 *The Green Book*, pp. 314–15.
90 Literal meaning, a soldier.
91 *The Green Book*, p. 317. This publication notes that the Foundation contributed PRs 101.58 million to the national exchequer as government taxes during the financial year 1998–99.
92 Ibid.
93 Online. http://www.fauji.org.pk/financials.htm site accessed 23 September 2006.
94 'Fauji Foundation plans to invest Rs 2.18 b', *The News* (Karachi), 8 October 2005.
95 Ibid. The Foundation's present assets are calculated at over PRs 27 billion by the managing director.
96 Ibid.
97 *The Green Book*, pp. 318–19.
98 'Fauji Fertilizer Company', Advertisement Supplement, *Dawn* (Karachi), 8 May 2003.
99 Ibid.

100 Ayesha Siddiqa Agha, *Power, Perks, Prestige and Privileges: Military's Economic Activities In Pakistan*, paper presented at International Conference on Soldiers in Business: Military as an Economic Actor, organised by the Bonn International Centre for Conversion, Jakarta, 17–19 October, 2000, p. 2.
101 Interestingly, Agha correlates the establishment of the Fauji Foundation in the 1950s to the then serving army chief General Ayub Khan's induction into the Cabinet, the latter event being symbolic of 'the growing influence of the armed forces', Ibid., p. 4.
102 Agha, 'Power, Perks, Prestige', pp. 8_11.
103 Ibid., p. 22.
104 Ibid. The economic activity of the military, articulated as business ventures, is not unique to Pakistan. Peter Lock refers to the 'autonomisation' of the military within the economic sphere while tracing the historical antecedents of the phenomenon. See Peter Lock, *Exploring the changing role of the military in the economy*, paper presented at the International Conference on Soldiers in Business: Military as an Economic Actor, organised by the Bonn International Centre for Conversion, Jakarta, 17–19 October, 2000, pp. 1-18.
105 'Army the second largest employer', *Dawn* (Karachi), 25 January 2004.
106 'Too High a Price: The Human Rights Cost of the Indonesian Military's Economic Activities'. Online. http://hrw.org/reports/2006/indonesia0606 accessed 1 February 2007.
107 Ibid.

Bibliography

Adeney, Katharine and Wyatt, Andrew, 'Democracy in South Asia: Getting beyond the Structure-Agency Dichotomy', *Political Studies*, vol. 52, no. 1, 2004, 1–18.

Agha, Ayesha Siddiqa, *Pakistan's Arms Procurement and Military Buildup, 1979–99: In Search of a Policy*, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001.

Agha, Ayesha Siddiqa, *Power, Perks, Prestige And Privileges: Military's Economic Activities In Pakistan*, paper presented at The International Conference on Soldiers In Business: Military as an Economic Actor, Bonn International Centre for Conversion Jakarta, 17–19 October 2000.

Ahmad, Qadeeruddin and Zafar, S.M., commentary on *The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan*, Karachi: East and West Publishing Company, 1974.

Ahmed, Syed Jaffar, *Overview of the Constitution of Pakistan*, Briefing Paper No. 17, Lahore: Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency, August 2004.

Ahmed, Manzoorudin (ed.) *Contemporary Pakistan*, Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1980.

Alagappa, Muthiah, *Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001.

Alam, Aftab (ed.) *Pakistan's Fourth Military Coup*, Delhi: Raj Publications, 2001.

Alavi, Hamza, *Pakistan and Islam: Ethnicity and Ideology*. Available at http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/sangat/pakisltt.htm accessed 1 March 2004.

Albright, David E., 'Comparative Conceptualization of Civil–Military Relations', *World Politics*, vol. 32, issue 4, July 1980, 553–76.

Alexander, Gerard, 'Institutions, Path Dependence, and Democratic Consolidation', *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, vol. 13, no. 3, 2001, 249–70.

Ali, Chaudhri Muhammad, *The Emergence of Pakistan*, Lahore: University of the Punjab, 1983.

Ali, Syed Ameer, *The Spirit of Islam*, Karachi: Pakistan Publishing House, 1969.

Ali, Tariq, *Can Pakistan Survive? The Death of a State*, Middlesex: Penguin, 1983.

Anderson, Benedict, *Imagined communities: reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, revised edn, London: Verso, 1991.

Arceneaux, Craig L., *Bounded Missions: Military Regimes and Democratization in the Southern Cone And Brazil*, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001.

Babar, Farhatullah, e-mail, 29 January 2007.

Barros, Robert, *Constitutionalism and Dictatorship: Pinochet, the Junta, and the 1980 Constitution*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

Bhatia, B.M., *Pakistan's Economic Development: 1948–1978*, New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1979.

Bieler, Andreas, and Morton, Adam David, 'The Gordian Knot of Agency-Structure in International Relations: a Neo-Gramscian Perspective', *European Journal of International Relations*, 2001, vol.7, no. 1, 5–35.

Bilgin, Pinar, and Morton, Adam David, 'From "Rogue" to "Failed" states? The Fallacy of Short-termism', *Politics,* vol. 24, no. 3, September 2004, 169–80.

Binder, Leonard, 'Problems of Islamic Political Thought in the Light of Recent Developments in Pakistan', *The Journal of Politi*cs, vol. 20, issue 4, November 1958, 655–75.

Bland, Douglas L., 'A Unified Theory of Civil–Military Relations', *Armed Forces & Society*, vol. 26, no. 1, Fall 1999, 7–26.

Bracken, Paul, 'The Second Nuclear Age', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 79, no. 1, January/February 2000, 146–56.

Brass, Paul, *The Production of Hindu- Muslim Violence in Contemporary India*, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003.

Brecher, Michael, 'International Relations and Asian Studies: the Subordinate State System of Southern Asia', *World Politics*, vol. 15, issue 2, January 1963, 213–35.

Brown, J. A. C., *Techniques of Persuasion: From Propaganda to Brainwashing*, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1963.

Bruneau, Thomas C., and Tollefson, Scott D. (eds) *Who Guards the Guardian and How: Democratic Civil–Military Relations*, Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006.

Burke, S. M., *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1973.

Buzan, Barry, *People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations*, Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books, 1983.

Callard, Keith, *Pakistan: A Political Study*, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1957.

Carothers, Thomas, 'The End Of The Transition Paradigm', *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 13, no. 1, January 2002, 5–21.

Casper, Gretchen, and Taylor, Michelle M., *Negotiating Democracy: Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996.

Cawthra, Gavin, and Luckhman, Robin (eds), *Governing Insecurity. Democratic Control of Military and Security Establishments in Transitional Societies,* London: Zed Books, 2003.

Chadda, Maya, *Building Democracy in South Asia: India, Nepal, Pakistan*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000.

Cheema, Pervaiz Iqbal, *Pakistan's Defence Policy, 1947–58*, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990.

—— *The Armed Forces of Pakistan*, Crows Nest Australia: Allen and Unwin, 2002.

Choudhry, G. W., *Pakistan's Relations with India, 1947–1966*, London: Pall Mall Press, 1968.

Cloughley, Brian, *A History of the Pakistan Army: Wars and Insurrections*, 2nd edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.

Coffman, Edward M., 'The long Shadow of The Soldier and the State', *The Journal of Military History*, vol. 55, issue 1, January 1991, 69–82.

Cohen, Stephen P., *The Pakistan Army*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998 edn.

—— *India: Emerging Power*, Washington D.C.: Brookings Institutions Press, 2001.

—— *The Idea of Pakistan*, Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004.

—— 'The Nation and the State of Pakistan', *The Washington Quarterly*, summer 2002, 109–22.

Collier, David, and Levitsky, Steven, *Democracy With Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research*, The Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, Working Paper No. 230, University of Notre Dame, August 1996.

Constable, Pamela, 'Pakistan's predicament', *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 12, no. 1, January 2001, 15–29.

Conversation between Mohammed Ayub Khan, Commander-in-Chief Pakistan Army and Raleigh A. Gibson, American Consul General, Embassy of the United States of America, Karachi, Foreign Service Despatch No. 135, 13 February 1953. Online www.icdc.com/~paulwolf/pakistan/ayub13feb1953.jpg accessed 18 August 2005.

Cottey, Andrew, Edmunds, Timothy, and Forster, Anthony (eds), *Democratic Control of the Military in Postcommunist Europe: Guarding the Guards*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.

Crick, Bernard, *In Defence of Politics* 4th edn, London: Penguin, 1993.

Desch, Michael C., *Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999.

Dessler, David, 'What's at Stake in the Agency-Structure Debate?' *International Organization,* vol. 43, issue 3, Summer 1989, 441–73.

Deutsch, Karl W., *The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control*, New York: The Free Press, 1963.

Diamond, Larry, and Plattner, Marc F., *Civil–Military Relations and Democracy*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996.

Diamond, Larry, 'Is Pakistan The (Reverse) Wave of Democracy', *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 11, no. 3, July 2000, 91–106.

—— 'Thinking About Hybrid Regimes', *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 13, no. 2, April 2002, 21–35.

Diamond, Larry, Linz, Juan J., Lipset, Seymour Martin (eds), *Democracy in Asia*, New Delhi: Sage, 1989.

Directorate General of Films and Publications, *Quotes from the Quaid*, Islamabad, 1992.

Dyzenhaus, David, *Legality and Legitimacy: Carl Schmitt, Hans Kelsen and Hermann Heller in Weimar*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997.

Edmonds, Martin, *Armed Services and Society*, Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1988.

Eickelman, Dale F., and Piscatori, James, *Muslim Politics*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996.

Farcau, Bruce W., *The Transition to Democracy in Latin America: the Role of the Military*, Westport, CN.: Praeger, 1996.

Faruqui, Ahmad, *Rethinking the National Security of Pakistan: the Price of Strategic Myopia*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003.

Feldman, Herbert, *From Crisis to Crisis: Pakistan 1962–1969*, London: Oxford University Press, 1972.

—— *Revolution in Pakistan: a Study of the Martial Law Administration*, London: Oxford University Press, 1967.

—— *The End and the Beginning: Pakistan 1969–1971*, London: Oxford University Press, 1975.

Finer, S.E., *The Man on Horseback: the Role of the Military in Politics*, London: Pall Mall Press, 1962.

Franck, Thomas M., *The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.

Frisch, Hillel, 'Perceptions of Israel in the Armies of Syria, Egypt, and Jordan', *Political Studies*, vol. 52, no. 3, 2004, 395–412.

Fukuyama, Francis, 'The Imperative Of State-Building', *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 15, no. 2, April 2004, 17–31.

Galbraith, John Kenneth, *The Anatomy of Power*, London: Corgi Books, 1985.

Ganguly, Sumit, *Conflict Unending: India–Pakistan Tensions since 1947*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2001.

—— 'The Crisis of Indian Secularism', *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 14, no. 4, October 2003, 11–25.

—— 'Pakistan's Never-Ending Story', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 79, no. 2, March/April 2000, 2–7.

Gasiorowski, Mark J., 'Economic Crisis and Political Regime Change: An Event History Analysis', *American Political Science Review,* vol. 89, no. 4, December 1995, 882–97.

Gellenr, Ernest, *Nations and Nationalism*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1983.

Gerring, John, *Social Science Methodology: A Criterial Framework*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

Goodin, Robert E., and Klingemann, Hans-Dieter (eds), *A New Handbook of Political Science*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.

Goodin, Robert E. (ed.), *The Theory of Institutional Design,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Grafstein, Robert, 'The Problem of Institutional Constraint', *The Journal of Politics*, vol. 50, issue 3, August 1988, 577–99.

Grare, Frederic, *Pakistan: the Myth of an Islamic Peril*, Policy Brief 45, Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006. Online. http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/45.grare.final.pdf accessed 1 February 2007.

Grare, Frederic, *Islam, Militarism, and the 2007–2008 Elections in Pakistan*, Carnegie Papers, no. 70: Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006. Online. http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/CEIP_CP_70_fnl2.pdf accessed 1 February 2007.

Greener, Ian, 'The Potential of Path Dependence in Political Studies', *Politics*, vol. 25, no. 1, February 2005, 62–72.

Hakim, Khalifa Abdul, *Islamic Ideology: The Fundamental Beliefs and Principles of Islam*, 3rd edn, Lahore: The Institute of Islamic Studies, 1961.

Haggard, Stephen, and Kaufman, Robert R., *The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995.

Haqqani, Husain, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military*, Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005.

Hashmi, Bilal, *United States Foreign Policy And The Development of an Elite: The Case of Pakistan*, PhD thesis, Washington State University, 1972.

Hassan, Javed, *India: a Study in Profile*, Rawalpindi: Army Press, 1990.

Hassan, Javed, interview, Commandant National Defence College, Islamabad, 3 March 2003.

Hay, Colin, *Political Analysis: a Critical Introduction*, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002.

Heady, Ferrel, *Public Administration: a Comparative Perspective*, 3rd edn, New York: Marcel Dekker, 1984.

Heeger, Gerald A., 'Politics in the Post-Military State: Some reflections on the Pakistani Experience', *World Politics*, vol. 29, issue 2, 1977, 242–62.

Hewitt, Vernon, *The New International Politics of South Asia*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997.

Hinnebusch, Raymond, 'Authoritarian Persistence, Democratization Theory and the Middle East: An Overview and Critique', *Democratization*, vol. 13, no. 3, June 2006, 373–395.

Hobsbawm, Eric, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

Hollis, Martin, and Smith, Steve, *Explaining and Understanding International Relations*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991.

Huntington, Samuel P., *The Soldier and the State: the Theory and Politics of Civil–Military Relations*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957.

—— *Political Order in Changing Societies*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968.

—— *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century,* Norman and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991.

—— 'Reforming civil–military relations', *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 6, no. 4, 1995, 9–17.

Husain, Javid, *The Process of Foreign Policy Formulation in Pakistan*, Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development And Transparency, Briefing Paper No. 12, April 2004.

Hussain, Hamid, 'Professionalism and Discipline of Armed Forces in a Society with Repeated Military Interventions – Case of Pakistani Armed Forces', *Defence Journal*, vol. 6, no. 6, January 2003, 20–31.

—— 'Forbidden Fruit-Military and Politics', *Defence Journal*, vol. 6, no. 7, February 2003, 13–26.

Jackman, Robert W., 'Politicians in Uniform: Military Governments and Social Change in The Third World', *The American Political Science Review*, vol. 70, issue 4, December 1976, pp. 1078–97.

Jacoby, Tim, 'For the People, Of the People and By the Military: The Regime Structure of Modern Turkey', *Political Studies*, vol. 51, no. 4, December 2003, 669–85.

Jaffrelot, Christophe (ed.), *A History of Pakistan and its Origins*, translated by Gillian Beaumont, London: Anthem Press, 2004.

—— *Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation?* London: Zed Books, 2002.

Jahan, Rounaq, *Pakistan: Failure in National Integration*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1972.

Jalal, Ayesha, *Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia: a Comparative and Historical Perspective*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.

—— *The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

—— *The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan's Political Economy of Defence*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

Jenkins, Gareth, *Context and Circumstance: The Turkish Military and Politics*, Adelphi Paper 37, London: The International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2001.

Jennings, Ivor, *Constitutional Problems in Pakistan*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1955.

Kamrava, Mehran, 'Military Professionalization and Civil–Military Relations in the Middle East', *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 115, no. 1, 2000, 67–92.

Karl, Terry Lynn, 'Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America', *Comparative Politics*, vol. 23, no.1, October 1990, 1–21.

Katzenstein, Peter J. (ed.), *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1996.

Keesings Contemporary Archives, London, 25 October – 1 November, 1958.

Keesings Contemporary Archives, London, 1 March – 8 March, 1969.

Keesings Contemporary Archives, London, 10 October – 17 October, 1959.

Keesings Contemporary Archives, London, 19 October – 26 October, 1963.

Khan, Fazal Muqeem, *The Story of the Pakistan Army*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1963.

Khan, Gul Hasan, *Memoirs*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1993.

Khan, Hamid, *Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.

Kohn, Richard H., 'How Democracies Control the Military', *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 8, no. 4, October 1997, 140–53.

Koonings, Kees, and Kruijt, Dirk (eds), *Political Armies: the Military and Nation Building in the Age of Democracy*, London: Zed Books, 2002.

Krasner, Stephen D., 'Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening variables', *International Organization*, vol. 36, no. 2, Spring 1982, 185–205.

Kuhn, Thomas S., *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 3rd edn, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996.

Kukreja, Veena, *Contemporary Pakistan: Political Processes, Conflicts and Crise*s, New Delhi: Sage, 2003.

—— *Civil–Military Relations in South Asia: Pakistan, Bangladesh and India*, New Delhi: Sage, 1991.

Kummel, Gerhard, and Bredow, Wilfried von, *Civil–Military Relations in an Age of Turbulence: Armed Forces and the Problem of Democratic Control*, Strausberg: Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr, 2000.

Kundu, Apurba, *Militarism in India: the Army and Civil Society in Consensus*, London: Taurus Academic Studies, 1998.

Kux, Dennis, *The United States and Pakistan, 1947–2000: Disenchanted Allies*, Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, 2001.

Lane, Jan-Erik, and Ersson, Svante, *The New Institutional Politics: Performance and Outcomes*, London: Routledge, 2000.

Levitsky, Steven, and Way, Lucan A., 'The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism', *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 13, no. 2, April 2002, 51–65

Lewis Beck, Michael S., 'Comparative Economic Voting: Britain, France, Germany, Italy', *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 30, no. 2, May 1986, 315–46.

Lijphart, Arendt, *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999.

Lipset, Seymour Martin, 'Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy', *The American Political Science Review*, vol. 53, no. 1, March 1959, 69–105.

Lock, Peter, *Exploring the changing role of the military in the economy*, paper presented at The International Conference on Soldiers In Business: Military as an Economic Actor, Bonn International Centre for Conversion Jakarta, 17–19 October 2000.

McGrath, Allen, *The Destruction of Pakistan's Democracy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.

McMahon, Robert J., *The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1994.

Mackenzie, W. J. M., *Power, Violence, Decision*, London: Penguin Books, 1975.

Malik, Iftikhar H., *State and Civil Society in Pakistan: Politics of Authority, Ideology and Ethnicity*, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997.

Maman, Daniel, Ben-Ari, Eyal, Rosenhek, Zeev, *Military, State, and Society in Israel*, New Jersey: Transaction, 2001.

Maniruzzaman, Talukder, *Military Withdrawal from Politics: a Comparative Study*, Dhaka: The University Press, 1987.

March, James G., and Olsen, Johan P., *Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics*, The Free Press, New York, 1989.

—— 'The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life', *The American Political Science Review,* vol. 78, issue 3, September 1984, 734–49.

Mares, David R, (ed.), *Civil–Military Relations: Building Democracy and Regional Security in Latin America, Southern Asia, and Central Europe*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998.

Marsh, David, and Stoker, Gerry, *Theory and Methods in Political Science*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.

May, R. J., and Selochan, Viberto (eds), *The Military and Democracy in Asia and the Pacific*, London: Hurst, 1998.

Memo of Conversation: General Mohammed Ayub Khan, Commander-in-Chief, Pakistan Army and Raleigh A. Gibson, American Consul General, Embassy of the United States of America, Karachi, Foreign Service Despatch No. 105, 23 December 1952. Online. www.icdc.com/~paulwolf/pakistan/ayubkhan23dec1952.jpg accessed 18 August 2005.

Memo of Conversation: General Mohammad Ayub Khan, C-in-C, Pakistan Army and Charles D. Withers, First Secretary, Embassy of the United States of America, Karachi, Foreign Service Despatch No. 851, 28 February 1953. Online. www.icdc.com/~paulwolf/pakistan/ayub28feb1953.htm accessed 18 August 2005.

Mills, C. Wright, *The Power Elite*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1956.

Mitra, Subrata K., and Rothermund, Dietmar, *Legitimacy and Conflict in South Asia*, New Delhi: Manohar, 1997.

Mitra, Subrata K. (ed.), *The Post-Colonial State in South Asia: Dialectics of Politics and Culture*, Lahore: Sange-e-Meel Publications, 1998.

—— *Legitimacy and Conflict in South Asia*, International Colloquium, New Delhi: Manohar, 1997.

—— 'The Morality of Communal Politics: Paul Brass, Hindu–Muslim Conflict, and the Indian State', Review Essay, *India Review,* vol. 2, no. 4., October 2003, 15–30.

—— *State-Society Linkage and Political Parties in Changing societies: the case of India*, paper presented at American Political Science Association annual conference, San Francisco, 29 August – 2 September 2001.

—— *Culture and Rationality: the Politics of Social Change in Post-Colonial India*, New Delhi: Sage, 1999.

Morgenthau, Hans J., *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 5th edn revised, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973.

Mumtaz, Soofia, 'Interpreting Ethnic Movements in Pakistan', *The Pakistan Development Review*, vol. 38, no. 2, Summer 1999, 207–17.

Munck, Gerardo L., 'Democratic Transitions in Comparative Perspective', Review Article, *Comparative Politics*, April 1994, 355–75.

Nadeem, Azhar Hasan, *Pakistan: The Political Economy of Lawlessness*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2002.

Nasr, Vali, 'Military Rule, Islamism and Democracy in Pakistan', *Middle East Journal*, vol. 58, no. 2, Spring 2004, 195–209.

—— *Islamic Leviathan: Islam and the Making of State Power*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.

—— 'The Rise of Muslim Democracy', *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 16, no. 2, April 2005, 13–27.

—— 'Democracy and Islamic Revivalism', *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 110, issue 2, Summer 1995, 261–85.

National Defence College publication, Islamabad, no date.

Newman, Karl J., 'The Constitutional problems of Pakistan', in Ahmed, Manzooruddin (ed.) *Contemporary Pakistan: Politics, Economy, and Society*, Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1980, 54–62.

—— 'The Dyarchic Pattern of Government and Pakistan's Problems', *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 75, no. 1, March 1960, 94–108.

Nordlinger, Eric A., *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1977.

North, Douglass C., *Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

O'Kane, Rosemary H. T., 'Military regimes: power and force', *European Journal of Political Research*, vol. 17, 1989, 333–50.

—— 'The Ladder of Abstraction: The Purpose of Comparison and the Practice of Comparing African Coups d'état', *Journal of Politics*, vol. 5, no. 2, 1993, 169–93.

—— 'Towards an Examination of the General Causes of Coup d'etat', *European Journal of Political Research*, vol. 11, 1983, 27–44.

Pakistan Administrative Staff College, 78th National Management Course, 17 February – 21 June 2003, Lahore.

General Headquarters, *Pakistan Army Green Book 2000*, Rawalpindi, 2000.

Paret, Peter, 'Military Power', *Journal of Military History*, vol. 53, no. 3, July 1989, 239–56.

Peters, Guy B., and Pierre, Jon, 'Institutions and Time: Problems of Conceptualization and Explanation', *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory,* vol. 8, October 1998, 565–83.

Peters, Guy B., *Institutional Theory in Political Science: the 'New Institutionalism*, London: Pinter, 1999.

Philips, H.C., Singh, H.L., and Panday, B.N. (eds), *The Evolution of India and Pakistan 1858 to 1947: Select Documents*, London: Oxford University Press, 1962.

Pierson, Paul, 'Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics', *American Political Science Review*, vol. 94, no.2, June 2000, 251–67.

—— *Politics in Time: History, Institutions and Social Analysis*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004.

Pierre, Jon, and Peters, B. Guy, *Governance, Politics and the State*, Macmillan, London, 2000.

Pion-Berlin, David (ed.), *Civil–Military Relations in Latin America: New Analytical Perspectives*, Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 2001.

Powell, Walter W., and DiMaggio, Paul J. (eds), *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991.

Przeworski, Adam, and Lomingi, Fernando, 'Political regimes and Economic Growth', *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, vol. 7, no. 3, Summer 1993, 51–69.

Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, *Quaid-I-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Speeches and Statements 1947–48*, Islamabad, 1989.

Qureshi, I.H., *The Struggle For Pakistan*, Karachi: University of Karachi, 1974.

Rahman, Attiqur M., *Leadership: Senior Commanders*, Lahore: Ferozsons, 1973.

Rapoport, David C., 'The Political Dimensions of Military Usurpation'*, Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 83, issue 4, December 1968, 551–72.

Raza, Maroof (ed.), *Generals And Governments in India and Pakistan*, New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 2001.

Richter, William L., 'From Electoral politics to Martial Law: Alternative Perspectives on Pakistan's Political Crisis of 1977', in Ahmed, Manzooruddin (ed.) *Contemporary Pakistan: Politics, Economy, and Society.* Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1980, 92–113.

Riedel, Bruce, *American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House*, Policy Paper Series, Centre for the Advanced Study of India, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2002.

Rizvi, Hasan Askari, *Military, State and Society in Pakistan*, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000.

Rizvi, Hasan Askari, interview, Lahore, 20 April 2003.

Rose, Leo E., and Evans, D. Hugh, 'Pakistan's Enduring Experiment', *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 8, no. 1, 1997, 83–96.

Rosen, Stephen Peter, *Societies and Military Power: India and its Armies*, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1996.

Rosenau, James N. (ed.) *International Politics and Foreign Policy: a reader in research and theory*, New York: The Free Press, 1969.

Sagan, Scott D., and Waltz, Kenneth N., *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: a Debate Renewed*, New York: Norton, 2003.

Said, Edward W., *Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient*, London: Penguin, 1995.

Sartori, Giovanni, *Parties and Party Systems: A framework for analysis*, vol. I, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976.

Sayeed, Khalid B., *Pakistan: The Formative Phase 1857–1947*, Karachi: Oxford Printing Press, 1968.

—— *Politics In Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change*, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980.

Schedler, Andreas, 'The Menu of Manipulation', *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 13, no. 2, April 2002, 36–50.

Schmitter, Philippe C., and Santiso, Javier, 'Three Temporal Dimensions to the Consolidation of Democracy', *International Political Science Review*, vol. 19, no.1, 1998, 69–92.

Schramm, Wilbur (ed.), *The Process and Effects of Mass Communication*, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1961.

Schweller, Randall L., 'Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In, *International Security*, vol. 19, no. 1, Summer 1994, 72–107.

Sen, Uttam, and Agha, Ayesha Siddiqa, *Governance in Plural Societies and Security: An Overview*, Colombo: Regional Centre For Strategic Studies Policy Studies 19, 2001.

Shafqat, Saeed, *Civil–Military Relations in Pakistan: From Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to Benazir Bhutto*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1997.

Shah, Aqil, 'Democracy On Hold in Pakistan', *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 13, no. 1, January 2002, 66–75.

—— 'Pakistan's "Armored" Democracy', *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 14, no. 4. October 2003, 26–40.

Shah, Syed Ghaus Ali, interview, London, 6 February 2007.

Shaikh, Farzana, 'Pakistan's nuclear bomb: beyond the non-proliferation regime', *International Affairs*, vol. 78, no.1, 2002, 29–48.

—— *Community And Consensus in Islam: Muslim Representation in Colonial India*, 1860-1947, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.

Sherwani, Latif Ahmed, *Pakistan, China and America*, Karachi: Council For Pakistan Studies, 1980.

Silverman, David, *Interpreting Qualitative Data: Methods for Analysing Talk, Text and Interaction*, 2nd edn, London: Sage Publications, 2001.

Singh, Gurharpal, 'The Partition of India as State Contraction: Some Unspoken Assumptions', *Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics,* vol. 35, no. 1, March 1997, 51–66.

—— *Ethnic Conflict in India: a Case-Study of Punjab*, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000.

Sisson, Richard and Rose, Leo E., *War and Secession: Pakistan, India and the creation of Bangladesh*, Berkley: University of California Press, 1990.

Skelton, William B., 'Samuel P. Huntington and the Roots of the American Military Tradition', *The Journal of Military History*, vol. 60, issue 2, April 1996, 325–38.

Small, Melvin, and Singer, David J., 'The War-Proneness of Democratic Regimes, 1816–1965', *The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations*, vol.1, no.4, Summer 1976, 50–69.

Smith, Steve, 'Singing Our World into Existence: International Relations Theory and September 11,' *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 48, 2004, 499–515.

Sonwalkar, Prasun, 'Mediating otherness: India's English-language press and the Northeast', *Contemporary South Asia*, vol. 13, no. 4, December 2004, 389–402.

Spain, James W., 'Military Assistance for Pakistan', *The American Political Science Review*, vol. 48, issue 3, September 1954, 738–51.

Steinmo, Sven, Thelen, Kathleen, and Longstreth, Frank, *Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

Stepan, Alfred, and Skach, Cindy 'Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation', *World Politics*, vol. 46, October 1993, 1–22.

Sultan, Tariq, interview, Principal PASC, Lahore, 24 April 2003.

Tahir, Naveed Ahmad (ed.), *Problems of Good Governance in South Asian Countries: Learning from European Political Models*, Area Study Centre for Europe, University of Karachi, and The Hanns Seidel Foundation Islamabad, 1999.

Talbot, Ian, *Pakistan: A Modern History*, London: Hurst, 1998.

—— *India and Pakistan*, London: Arnold, 2000.

The World Bank, *Pakistan Economic Report April 7, 1999*, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management South Asia Region.

Three Years of Reform, fact sheet issued by the Pakistan government. Online. www.pak.gov.pk/Factsheets/3-year-reforms.pdf accessed 8 October 2002.

Tilly, Charles, *Coercion, Capital And European States, AD 990–1992*, Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1992.

Too High a Price: The Human Rights Cost of the Indonesian Military's Economic Activities. Online. http://hrw.org/reports/2006/indonesia0606 accessed 1 February 2007.

United States Embassy Pakistan, *Telegram to the US Secretary of State on dismissal of Nazimuddin Government*, No. 1582, 20 April 1953. Online. www.icdc.com/~paulwolf/pakistan/emerson20april1953.htm accessed 18 August 2005.

Valenzuela, Samuel J., *Democratic Consolidation in Post-Transitional Settings: Notion, Process and Facilitating Conditions*, University of Notre Dame: The Helen Kellogg Institute of International Studies Working Paper No. 150, December 1990.

Wallis, Malcolm, *Bureaucracy: Its Role in Third World Development*, London: Macmillan, 1989.

Waseem, Mohammad, *Military in the Power Structure of Pakistan*, paper presented at The

International Conference on Soldiers In Business: Military as an Economic Actor, Bonn International Centre for Conversion, Jakarta, 17–19 October 2000.

Waltz, Kenneth N. 'Evaluating Theories', *American Political Science Review*, vol. 91, no. 4, December 1997, 913–17.

Weil, Frederick D. (ed.), *Political Culture and Political Structure: Theoretical and Empirical Studies*, Connecticut: JAI Press, vol. 2, 1994.

Weingast, Barry R., 'The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law', *The American Political Science Review*, vol. 91, issue 2, June 1997, 245–63.

Weiss, Anita M., and Gilani, Zulfiqar S. (eds), *Power and Civil Society in Pakistan*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001.

Welch, Claude E., 'Military disengagement from Politics: Paradigms, Processes or Random Events', *Armed Forces & Society,* vol. 18, no. 3, Spring 1992, 323–342.

Wight, Colin, *Agents, Structures and International Relations: Politics as Ontology*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

Wolpert, Stanley, *Jinnah of Pakistan*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1984.

Wright, Theodore P., 'The Muslim League in South India since Independence: A Study in Minority Group Political Strategies', *The American Political Science Review*, vol. 60, no. 3, September 1966, 579–99.

Zakaria, Fareed, 'The Rise of Illiberal Democracy', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 76, no. 6, November/December 1997, 22–43.

Zaman, Waheed-Uz, *Towards Pakistan*, 4th edn, Lahore: Publishers United Ltd., 1985.

Zingel, Wolfgang Peter, and Lallemant, Stephanie Zingel Ave (eds), *Pakistan in the 80s: Law and Constitution*, Lahore: Vanguard, 1985.

Ziring, Lawerence, *Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development*, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980.

Newspaper reports

'1,027 civilian posts occupied by servicemen', *Dawn* (Karachi), 3 October 2003.

'58(2) b back, NSC formed', *Nation* (Lahore), 22 August 2002.

'Amendments irreversible', *Dawn* (Karachi), 22 August 2002.

'A profounder crisis persists', *The News* (Karachi), 13 August 2003.

'Armed Forces exceed 10pc quota in Cabinet Div.', *Dawn* (Karachi), 22 March 2005.

'Army men being inducted into Customs Intelligence', *The News* (Karachi), 4 October 2006.

'Army men run education ministry's monitoring cell', *Dawn* (Karachi), 20 January 2007.

'Army the second largest employer', *Dawn* (Karachi), 25 January 2004.

'Army to rebuild govt schools…' *Dawn* (Karachi), 9 December 2006.

'Corruption has risen since '99 coup: TI', *Dawn* (Karachi), 10 December 2006.

'Defence expenditure exceeds allocation', *Dawn* (Karachi), 3 September 2004.

'Defence secretary grilled by PAC: Use of airbases by USA', *Dawn* (Karachi), 27 January 2007.

'Defence spending up by 3.3 pc', *The News*, (Karachi), 7 June 2005.

'Fauji Fertilizer Company', Advertisement Supplement, *Dawn* (Karachi), 8 May 2003.

'Fauji Foundation plans to invest Rs 2.18b', *The News* (Karachi), 8 October 2005.

'Hindu Power', *Newsweek*, 26 April 1993.

'How Leghari dismissed Benazir government', *The News* (Karachi), 15 April 2003.

'Indian hegemony unacceptable: Ehsan', *The News* (Karachi), 11 April 2005. 'Poverty does not stop S. Asia arms race', *Dawn* (Karachi), 12 February 2003.

'Khaki Power: Indonesia's armed forces', *The Economist*, 7 September 2002.

'Master trainer's appointment disappoints bureaucracy', *The News* (Karachi), 12 November 2004.

'Militarisation of civil bureaucracy', *The News* (Karachi), 13 February 2007.

'Military govt promulgated 297 ordinances in three years', *Dawn* (Karachi), 16 December 2002.

'MPs can't speak against Army', *The Nation*, (Lahore), 19 May 2005.

'Musharraf says no power-sharing with PM', *Dawn* (Karachi), 17 April 2002.

'Musharraf says no timeframe to quit army', *Dawn* (Karachi), 30 June 2003.

'Nawaz couldn't have impeached me: Leghari', *Dawn* (Karachi), 6 August 2003.

'Oct 12 takeover made part of SSC curriculum', *Dawn* (Karachi), 30 December 2006.

'Pakistan got $1.1 bn for fighting terrorism', *Dawn* (Karachi), 15 November 2006.

'Political govt to continue reforms, IMF assured', *Dawn* (Karachi), 19 November 2002.

'Referendum, polls 'seriously flawed': EU Parliament', *Nation* (Lahore), 26 November 2002.

'Text of the 17th amendment bill', *Dawn* (Karachi), 30 December 2003.

'Turkey's military warns govt of coup', *Dawn* (Karachi) / *The Guardian News Service* (London), 28 May 2003.

Ahmed, Aftab, '1958 coup in the light of British papers', *Dawn* (Karachi), 30 January 2004.

Ahmed, Aftab, 'Constitution and its amendment', *Dawn* (Karachi), 23 September 2002.

Ahmed, Aftab, 'The genesis of the October 1958 coup'*, Dawn* (Karachi), 1 October 2002.

Bokhari, S. M. H. 'A system civil services can learn from', *The News* (Karachi), 10 May 2005.

Babar, Farhatullah, 'Making the military budget: a plea for change', *The News* (Karachi), 2 May 2005.

Khan, Mehmood-ul-Hasan, 'Rising military spending and its causes', *Dawn* (Karachi), 8 November 2004.

Shah, Sajjad Ali, 'Is Army's rule Pakistan's fate?', *The Nation*, (Lahore), 11 January 2003.

Syed, Anwar, 'Presidential system is not suitable', *Dawn* (Karachi), 28 April 2001.

Junaid, Shahwar, 'Regime failure and regime change', *Nation* (Lahore), 20 November 2003.

Waseem, Mohammad. 'The more it changes…' *Dawn* (Karachi), 23 December 2002.

Index

Notes: Listing is alphabetical with the exception of some subheadings which are listed in page order to reflect an argument's logic. Notes are indexed only where an element is not referable through the main text.